Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku: 1945. - 1948.
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Croatian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Zagreb
Golden Marketing [u.a.]
2006
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 367 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9532122605 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Sadržaj
UVOD
................................................... 7
I. BRITANSKA VOJNA I POLITIČKA PRISUTNOST
U JUGOSLAVIJI TIJEKOM
DRUGOGA SVJETSKOG BATA
......................... 21
1.1.
Britanske vojne misije
.............................. 24
1.1.1.
Misije kod D. Mihailovića
...................... 25
1.1.2.
Misije kod partizana
........................... 26
1.2.
Vojna suradnja
s
partizanima
........................ 46
1.3.
Politička pitanja krajem rata
......................... 52
II.
POLITIKA, PRIVREDA I KULTURA U ODNOSIMA
BRITANIJE I JUGOSLAVIJE,
1945. - 1948................ 57
2.1.
Završne vojne operacije
1945......................... 61
2.2.
Jugoslavija u diplomatskim izvještajima
1945. - 1948. ... 68
2.3.
Sporna pitanja u odnosima
.......................... 104
2.3.1.
Pitanje Trsta, Istre i Slovenskog primorja
......... 104
2.3.2.
Uloga dr. Ivana Šubašića
...................... 109
2.3.3.
Jugoslavenski izbori za Ustavotvornu skupštinu
1945........................................ 125
2.3.4.
Položaj Katoličke crkve
......................... 128
2.3.5.
Izručenje osoba osumnjičenih za ratne zločine
u Jugoslaviji
................................ 140
2.3.6.
UNRRA
.................................... 166
2.4.
Odnos Britanije prema jugoslavenskoj opoziciji
u zemlji i inozemstvu
............................... 177
2.5.
Britansko-jugoslavenski incidenti
.................... 186
2.6.
Privredni odnosi
................................... 192
2.6.1.
Trgovački sporazum
........................... 193
2.6.2.
Naknada za nacionaliziranu britansku imovinu
.... 196
2.7.
Kulturna suradnja
................................. 200
2.7.1.
Načela britanske propagande prema Jugoslaviji
.... 201
2.7.2.
Oblici britanskoga propagandnog djelovanja
....... 206
2.7.3.
Britanci
о
propagandi i kulturi u Jugoslaviji
....... 216
BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU
1945. - 1948.
III. BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU:
POLITIKAI
DRUŠTVO,
1945. - 1948..................... 227
3.1.
Hrvatska u diplomatskim izvještajima
1945. - 1948...... 231
3.1.1.
Važniji izvještaji
о
Hrvatskoj
.................... 232
3.1.2.
Rad Generalnoga konzulata Velike Britanije
u Zagrebu
................................... 262
3.1.3.
Izvještaji Generalnog konzulata u Zagrebu
1945. - 1948................................. 275
3.1.4.
Izvještaji Konzulata Velike Britanije u Splitu
...... 293
3.2.
Istaknute osobe u diplomatskim izvještajima
........... 302
3.3.
Posjet britanskih parlamentaraca Zagrebu
1945......... 315
Zaključak
................................................. 333
Summary
................................................. 338
Zahvale
.................................................. 344
Popis kratica
.............................................. 345
Izvori
.................................................... 347
Literatura
................................................ 350
Kazalo imena
.............................................. 357
Bilješka
о
autorici
.......................................... 367
Summary
Immediately after World War II relations between Yugoslavia and
Great Britain were burdened with several political problems. These prob¬
lems arose from the consequences of the war, for example the extradition of
Yugoslav citizens accused of war crimes, the problem of western borders of
the Yugoslav state, United Nations Relief andJRehabilitation Administra¬
tion s help to Yugoslavia, the position of Ivan
Šubašić.
For the British side
there was also a general question of acceptance of legitimacy of the new
communist order in Yugoslavia and the way it conducted political elections
and nationalized private property. The British side also had to take posi¬
tion toward the enemies of the communist system in Yugoslavia.
In some elements this research was not able to give a final answer when
dealing with the problem of British extradition of groups and individuals
who were accused of war crimes in Yugoslavia. Some documents, not in¬
cluded in this research, could probably explain British reluctance to ex¬
tradite some of these persons, despite British general agreement that all
accused of war crimes should be brought to justice. The documents of For¬
eign Office do not give a clear answer to this problem. These documents
show that the British insisted on formal legal procedure
(prima
facie) but
they also did not trust Yugoslav legal and political procedures, even when
British side had no doubt about the culpability of some groups and indi¬
viduals accused of war crimes. Therefore it can be concluded that Great
Britain refused to comply with Allied arrangements made during the war
for the simple reason that its political view of the newly established regime
in Yugoslavia differed greatly from the almost romantic relations with the
Yugoslav partisans during World War II. Among the Yugoslav citizens ac¬
cused of war crimes the British side made visible distinctions, combining
international criteria on war crimes, its moral obligations toward some
groups accused by Yugoslavia of such crimes and humanitarian approach
developed mostly through negative British view of what was perceived as
Yugoslav totalitarian regime.
It is clear that the British side attempted to use United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration help for Yugoslavia as a form of pres¬
sure in order to force Yugoslav authorities to allow the activity of non-com-
338
Summary
munist opposition. The British side believed that this opposition, derived
from the political parties from the period before World War II, can and
must take an important position at the Yugoslav political scene.
The problem of Trieste belonged to the wider context of developments
in the post-World War II Europe. Britain supported Italy as a strategic al¬
ly of the west and obviously it could not support Yugoslavia that was part
of the eastern block. Britain was also repulsed by what it saw as Yugoslav
nationalism that claimed the dispute area because it was populated by
ethnic south Slavs.
British relation toward Ivan
Šubašić,
the first minister of foreign affairs
of the new unified government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, clear¬
ly demonstrates all elements of British policy toward Yugoslav communist
authorities and non-communist politicians. Britain supported
Šubašić
un¬
til he resigned. Although he was considered to be a politician under British
influence he resigned without consulting with them. This may be the rea¬
son why
Šubašić
was soon forgotten and quickly disappeared from British
diplomatic reports. British pragmatism and realistic approach may have
also caused the rapid abandonment of
Šubašić.
British diplomacy quick¬
ly accepted a new situation caused by the stabilization of Yugoslav com¬
munist regime and within the framework of regular diplomatic relations
British side tried to assert practical influence over certain measures of the
Yugoslav authorities. British diplomats considered the practical approach
as the best way to alleviate the rigid methods of the Yugoslav communist
authorities and such approach became regular British policy toward Yu¬
goslavia, despite tensions that were often the case.
The researched documents show that Britain was surprised by the
weakness and fragmentation of the non-communist political forces in Yu¬
goslavia. British side was even enraged with the immaturity of the politi¬
cal opposition and its inability to unite and act together. This would have
been the only way to act against Popular front led by the communists. Very
soon British diplomats stopped paying attention to analyses and appeals
by some non-communist politicians who were previously very respected
both in Yugoslavia and abroad.
In the direct contacts with the representatives of the Yugoslav authori¬
ties immediately after the war British diplomats received support from
persons who did not have an official diplomatic position. William Deakin
and Fitzroy Maclean were always available to visit marshal Tito when
official diplomatic contacts concerning some issues run into troubles or
seemed insurmountable. In such cases the British diplomats thought that
only unofficial intervention could solve problems. That is why a large pro¬
portion of British diplomatic staff consisted of persons who served in Brit¬
ish military delegations attached to Tito s partisan units during the war.
It cannot be said that all these persons had left wing political affiliations,
although some of them did. What was more important was the fact that
they had experience in dealing with certain representatives of the Yugo-
339
BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU
1945. - 1948.
slav
authorities, who led partisan units during the war. British diplomatic
reports painted a very negative picture of Tito s regime and Foreign Office
reports were no less negative in descriptions of Tito s dictatorial methods.
Nevertheless all these reports were also quick to note every successful
British contact with Tito. Therefore that British side sought support of the
Yugoslav leader, although they severely criticized him. It might have been
that some British officials were seduced by Tito, as for example general
H. Wilson. It might have also been that British multi-layered perception
of democracy played a role in relations with Yugoslav authorities. A fur¬
ther answer to this question could be a subject of some new research that
would give insight into historical and political stereotypes and prejudices
that are present even were they are not usually expected.
Ambassador Ralph S. Stevenson was an experienced diplomat who
dealt well with the problems of Yugoslav post-war political life. He was
well acquainted with the most of the persons he contacted, both those who
were representatives of the regime as well as members of the political op¬
position. He was neither ideological nor personally inclined toward the
Yugoslav communists, but was able to detect their characteristics. Before
coming to power they acted as an illegal political force, they mostly had
modest social background and after gaining the power, that even for some
of them seemed almost impossible, they attempted to change the world
around them overnight. Stevenson saw them as stubborn, proud, poorly
educated but personally honest persons. But there were many other more
important issues that Stevenson could not understand nor accept person¬
ally
-
their communist fanaticism that led them to brutality and violence
which were used to achieve what they saw as necessary for their country.
Charles Peake arrived in Belgrade in
1946
and sometimes his report con¬
tained irony and cynicism when describing some moves of the Yugoslav au¬
thorities and its distinguished representatives. Certainly there were few
reasons to be optimistic during the period when all illusions concerning
the new regime vanished and communists were ready to repress any kind
of political opposition and also initiated severe economic measures that
hit peasantry. During this period propaganda against Great Britain was
widespread and Yugoslavs often mentioned one foreign power during the
trials of those accused of espionage held in
1947.
It was clearly visible that
this foreign power was in fact Great Britain.
Peake s meetings with marshal Tito were less often then those of Ste¬
venson, who knew Tito much better. In comparison with Stevenson, Peake
also had fewer contacts with Yugoslavs who could give him important in¬
formation. Peake was not able to grasp the importance of Yugoslav split
with Stalin in
1948.
After the Yugoslav-Soviet split Peake s position im¬
proved because western countries in general adopted a more positive policy
toward Yugoslavia.
From the formal perspective the conditions for the activity of British
diplomatic and cultural representatives in Yugoslavia were positive. Great
340
Summary
Britain was a country with the biggest number of diplomatic institutions
in post-war Yugoslavia. From the political perspective the British influ¬
ence was small because until
1948
Yugoslavia was orientated toward So¬
viet Union and the countries under Soviet influence. During that period
the important diplomatic assignment was to preserve the stability of the
British-Yugoslav relations, or at least to keep these relations at a bearable
level. For this reason mutual interest for economic cooperation was a wel¬
come instrument and Foreign Office wisely estimated that trade relations
with eastern block countries should be continued. The aim of this Brit¬
ish decision was to curb the Soviet influence. Yugoslavia purchased from
Britain items that could not be obtained from the Soviet Union, machines
and equipment needed for the Yugoslav five year plan of industrialization.
Both sides were satisfied with this arrangement but because of the politi¬
cal reasons before the split with Stalin Yugoslavia was not able to obtain
all it sought from Britain.
When dealing with the British perception of Croatia it must be con¬
cluded that British side counted on some Croatian politicians who were
perceived as pro-British in their ideological and political views. After com¬
munist gaining of power such persons lost any real influence. They most¬
ly belonged to democratically orientated groups and individuals who were
members of the Croatian Peasant Party and Independent Democratic Par¬
ty before the World War II and there were also some intellectuals and pub¬
lic persons as well. Some of them took part in the new regime and other
continued with their professional occupations. They lost value they once
had among British diplomats and Foreign Office. Some of them ended up
in prisons or withdrew from public life. Those who remained abroad had no
political influence whatsoever, but they contacted the Foreign Office hop¬
ing that Britain would intervene politically and even militarily against the
communist regime in Yugoslavia. Foreign Office saw such views as unreal¬
istic and possibly embarrassing because they could harm normal relations
with Yugoslavia. Elements who during and after the war sought British
intervention in Yugoslavia proved their inability to conduct a political ac¬
tion on their own.
In the post-war period British side perceived the Catholic Church in
Croatia and Yugoslavia as the only real opposition to the communist re¬
gime. British side viewed the Catholic Church as well organized and wide¬
ly supported by people. British diplomats paid a great deal of attention to
the Catholic Church and disapproved of the severe measures that commu¬
nist authorities conducted against it. Nevertheless Foreign Office did not
forget the role of the Catholic Church during World War II and thought
that it was too close to the regime of the Independent State of Croatia. This
was a general conclusion that will remain permanent view of the Foreign
Office.
Historical and cultural remarks in the diplomatic reports and Foreign
Office s analyses always perceived Croatia as a part of the western world.
341
BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU
1945. - 1948.
This was especially visible in the reports of Cyril
0.
Wakefield-Harrey, the
first British consul general in Zagreb. He was a professional diplomat who
served in several European and Asian countries before World War II. Be¬
fore Zagreb he never served in a communist country and he was strongly
anticommunist. His inclination to raise Croatian question as a particu¬
lar issue is clearly visible. He treated this problem in a manner similar to
Croatian political public before World War II and such views were retained
by remaining oppositional circles in Croatia after the war, especially in the
circles around the Catholic Church as well as among political exiles. Con¬
trary to such approach British ambassadors in Belgrade treated this issue
in a slightly different manner. They claimed that officially proclaimed fed¬
eral structure of the new Yugoslav state was a dead letter because practi¬
cal organization of the state was highly centralized. Nevertheless this did
not mean the resurgence of Serb domination because all nations were in
equal position. Wakefield-Harrey estimated that communist government
in Zagreb could not count on general support of the Croatian population,
but such views were met with doubt at the higher levels of British diplo¬
macy. In some situations Wakefield-Harrey was inclined to adopt the views
of the Croatian political opposition as his own and Foreign Office thought
this could only harm normal relations with authorities in Zagreb. Ralph
Cornwallis Stevenson, who replaced Wakefield-Harrey, was equally criti¬
cal of the political scene that surrounded him, although he was more dis¬
tanced, at least during the first year of his duty, toward all issues.
The experience of the British Council personnel that served in Croatia
was slightly different. They encountered obstacles made by the regime
that kept a watchful eye over their propaganda-cultural activities but they
were also in contact with the population. Although small in number their
public was curious about Council s exhibitions, reading rooms and librar¬
ies. Such activities offered values and achievements of general civilization
but also included propaganda about the British way of life . According to
the principles of the post-war British propaganda toward Yugoslavia such
activities had intention to develop independent and critical thought, es¬
pecially among the young population. Such activities had intention to es¬
tablish better relation between Great Britain and Yugoslavia, but also to
enable liberalization of the Yugoslav regime. Taking into account the pe¬
riod immediately after World War II there were few people in Croatia and
Yugoslavia who spoke English and therefore the activities of the British
Council were concentrated on a marginal social group. From the perspec¬
tive of realistic British approach this was not discouraging because the
mere fact that the British Council was allowed to be present in a commu¬
nist country during the most difficult period of the Cold war was seen as
a positive development. This distinguished Yugoslavia from other commu¬
nist countries.
We must be very careful when discussing pro-British or anti-British
sentiments among Croatian population during the researched period. This
342
Summary
type of analysis as well as the content of researched documents can give
us only superficial perspective. British diplomatic reports cannot give com¬
plete explanation of how British diplomats and the British Council person¬
nel were perceived by the population of the country where they were de¬
ployed. It seems probable, regarding the perception of Britain, that rough
division into Yugoslav political representatives and Yugoslav public is in¬
accurate. According to such inaccurate view the state and the political
bodies of the Yugoslav regime were strongly antagonistic towards British
representatives, while the public saw Britain in favorable way. It is obvi¬
ous that real relations were much more complex.
Translated by Nikica Baric
343
|
| adam_txt |
Sadržaj
UVOD
. 7
I. BRITANSKA VOJNA I POLITIČKA PRISUTNOST
U JUGOSLAVIJI TIJEKOM
DRUGOGA SVJETSKOG BATA
. 21
1.1.
Britanske vojne misije
. 24
1.1.1.
Misije kod D. Mihailovića
. 25
1.1.2.
Misije kod partizana
. 26
1.2.
Vojna suradnja
s
partizanima
. 46
1.3.
Politička pitanja krajem rata
. 52
II.
POLITIKA, PRIVREDA I KULTURA U ODNOSIMA
BRITANIJE I JUGOSLAVIJE,
1945. - 1948. 57
2.1.
Završne vojne operacije
1945. 61
2.2.
Jugoslavija u diplomatskim izvještajima
1945. - 1948. . 68
2.3.
Sporna pitanja u odnosima
. 104
2.3.1.
Pitanje Trsta, Istre i Slovenskog primorja
. 104
2.3.2.
Uloga dr. Ivana Šubašića
. 109
2.3.3.
Jugoslavenski izbori za Ustavotvornu skupštinu
1945. 125
2.3.4.
Položaj Katoličke crkve
. 128
2.3.5.
Izručenje osoba osumnjičenih za ratne zločine
u Jugoslaviji
. 140
2.3.6.
UNRRA
. 166
2.4.
Odnos Britanije prema jugoslavenskoj opoziciji
u zemlji i inozemstvu
. 177
2.5.
Britansko-jugoslavenski incidenti
. 186
2.6.
Privredni odnosi
. 192
2.6.1.
Trgovački sporazum
. 193
2.6.2.
Naknada za nacionaliziranu britansku imovinu
. 196
2.7.
Kulturna suradnja
. 200
2.7.1.
Načela britanske propagande prema Jugoslaviji
. 201
2.7.2.
Oblici britanskoga propagandnog djelovanja
. 206
2.7.3.
Britanci
о
propagandi i kulturi u Jugoslaviji
. 216
BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU
1945. - 1948.
III. BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU:
POLITIKAI
DRUŠTVO,
1945. - 1948. 227
3.1.
Hrvatska u diplomatskim izvještajima
1945. - 1948. 231
3.1.1.
Važniji izvještaji
о
Hrvatskoj
. 232
3.1.2.
Rad Generalnoga konzulata Velike Britanije
u Zagrebu
. 262
3.1.3.
Izvještaji Generalnog konzulata u Zagrebu
1945. - 1948. 275
3.1.4.
Izvještaji Konzulata Velike Britanije u Splitu
. 293
3.2.
Istaknute osobe u diplomatskim izvještajima
. 302
3.3.
Posjet britanskih parlamentaraca Zagrebu
1945. 315
Zaključak
. 333
Summary
. 338
Zahvale
. 344
Popis kratica
. 345
Izvori
. 347
Literatura
. 350
Kazalo imena
. 357
Bilješka
о
autorici
. 367
Summary
Immediately after World War II relations between Yugoslavia and
Great Britain were burdened with several political problems. These prob¬
lems arose from the consequences of the war, for example the extradition of
Yugoslav citizens accused of war crimes, the problem of western borders of
the Yugoslav state, United Nations Relief andJRehabilitation Administra¬
tion's help to Yugoslavia, the position of Ivan
Šubašić.
For the British side
there was also a general question of acceptance of legitimacy of the new
communist order in Yugoslavia and the way it conducted political elections
and nationalized private property. The British side also had to take posi¬
tion toward the enemies of the communist system in Yugoslavia.
In some elements this research was not able to give a final answer when
dealing with the problem of British extradition of groups and individuals
who were accused of war crimes in Yugoslavia. Some documents, not in¬
cluded in this research, could probably explain British reluctance to ex¬
tradite some of these persons, despite British general agreement that all
accused of war crimes should be brought to justice. The documents of For¬
eign Office do not give a clear answer to this problem. These documents
show that the British insisted on formal legal procedure
(prima
facie) but
they also did not trust Yugoslav legal and political procedures, even when
British side had no doubt about the culpability of some groups and indi¬
viduals accused of war crimes. Therefore it can be concluded that Great
Britain refused to comply with Allied arrangements made during the war
for the simple reason that its political view of the newly established regime
in Yugoslavia differed greatly from the almost romantic relations with the
Yugoslav partisans during World War II. Among the Yugoslav citizens ac¬
cused of war crimes the British side made visible distinctions, combining
international criteria on war crimes, its moral obligations toward some
groups accused by Yugoslavia of such crimes and humanitarian approach
developed mostly through negative British view of what was perceived as
Yugoslav totalitarian regime.
It is clear that the British side attempted to use United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration help for Yugoslavia as a form of pres¬
sure in order to force Yugoslav authorities to allow the activity of non-com-
338
Summary
munist opposition. The British side believed that this opposition, derived
from the political parties from the period before World War II, can and
must take an important position at the Yugoslav political scene.
The problem of Trieste belonged to the wider context of developments
in the post-World War II Europe. Britain supported Italy as a strategic al¬
ly of the west and obviously it could not support Yugoslavia that was part
of the eastern block. Britain was also repulsed by what it saw as Yugoslav
nationalism that claimed the dispute area because it was populated by
ethnic south Slavs.
British relation toward Ivan
Šubašić,
the first minister of foreign affairs
of the new unified government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, clear¬
ly demonstrates all elements of British policy toward Yugoslav communist
authorities and non-communist politicians. Britain supported
Šubašić
un¬
til he resigned. Although he was considered to be a politician under British
influence he resigned without consulting with them. This may be the rea¬
son why
Šubašić
was soon forgotten and quickly disappeared from British
diplomatic reports. British pragmatism and realistic approach may have
also caused the rapid abandonment of
Šubašić.
British diplomacy quick¬
ly accepted a new situation caused by the stabilization of Yugoslav com¬
munist regime and within the framework of regular diplomatic relations
British side tried to assert practical influence over certain measures of the
Yugoslav authorities. British diplomats considered the practical approach
as the best way to alleviate the rigid methods of the Yugoslav communist
authorities and such approach became regular British policy toward Yu¬
goslavia, despite tensions that were often the case.
The researched documents show that Britain was surprised by the
weakness and fragmentation of the non-communist political forces in Yu¬
goslavia. British side was even enraged with the immaturity of the politi¬
cal opposition and its inability to unite and act together. This would have
been the only way to act against Popular front led by the communists. Very
soon British diplomats stopped paying attention to analyses and appeals
by some non-communist politicians who were previously very respected
both in Yugoslavia and abroad.
In the direct contacts with the representatives of the Yugoslav authori¬
ties immediately after the war British diplomats received support from
persons who did not have an official diplomatic position. William Deakin
and Fitzroy Maclean were always available to visit marshal Tito when
official diplomatic contacts concerning some issues run into troubles or
seemed insurmountable. In such cases the British diplomats thought that
only unofficial intervention could solve problems. That is why a large pro¬
portion of British diplomatic staff consisted of persons who served in Brit¬
ish military delegations attached to Tito's partisan units during the war.
It cannot be said that all these persons had left wing political affiliations,
although some of them did. What was more important was the fact that
they had experience in dealing with certain representatives of the Yugo-
339
BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU
1945. - 1948.
slav
authorities, who led partisan units during the war. British diplomatic
reports painted a very negative picture of Tito's regime and Foreign Office
reports were no less negative in descriptions of Tito's dictatorial methods.
Nevertheless all these reports were also quick to note every successful
British contact with Tito. Therefore that British side sought support of the
Yugoslav leader, although they severely criticized him. It might have been
that some British officials were "seduced" by Tito, as for example general
H. Wilson. It might have also been that British multi-layered perception
of democracy played a role in relations with Yugoslav authorities. A fur¬
ther answer to this question could be a subject of some new research that
would give insight into historical and political stereotypes and prejudices
that are present even were they are not usually expected.
Ambassador Ralph S. Stevenson was an experienced diplomat who
dealt well with the problems of Yugoslav post-war political life. He was
well acquainted with the most of the persons he contacted, both those who
were representatives of the regime as well as members of the political op¬
position. He was neither ideological nor personally inclined toward the
Yugoslav communists, but was able to detect their characteristics. Before
coming to power they acted as an illegal political force, they mostly had
modest social background and after gaining the power, that even for some
of them seemed almost impossible, they attempted to change the world
around them overnight. Stevenson saw them as stubborn, proud, poorly
educated but personally honest persons. But there were many other more
important issues that Stevenson could not understand nor accept person¬
ally
-
their communist fanaticism that led them to brutality and violence
which were used to achieve what they saw as necessary for their country.
Charles Peake arrived in Belgrade in
1946
and sometimes his report con¬
tained irony and cynicism when describing some moves of the Yugoslav au¬
thorities and its distinguished representatives. Certainly there were few
reasons to be optimistic during the period when all illusions concerning
the new regime vanished and communists were ready to repress any kind
of political opposition and also initiated severe economic measures that
hit peasantry. During this period propaganda against Great Britain was
widespread and Yugoslavs often mentioned "one foreign power" during the
trials of those accused of espionage held in
1947.
It was clearly visible that
this "foreign power" was in fact Great Britain.
Peake's meetings with marshal Tito were less often then those of Ste¬
venson, who knew Tito much better. In comparison with Stevenson, Peake
also had fewer contacts with Yugoslavs who could give him important in¬
formation. Peake was not able to grasp the importance of Yugoslav split
with Stalin in
1948.
After the Yugoslav-Soviet split Peake's position im¬
proved because western countries in general adopted a more positive policy
toward Yugoslavia.
From the formal perspective the conditions for the activity of British
diplomatic and cultural representatives in Yugoslavia were positive. Great
340
Summary
Britain was a country with the biggest number of diplomatic institutions
in post-war Yugoslavia. From the political perspective the British influ¬
ence was small because until
1948
Yugoslavia was orientated toward So¬
viet Union and the countries under Soviet influence. During that period
the important diplomatic assignment was to preserve the stability of the
British-Yugoslav relations, or at least to keep these relations at a bearable
level. For this reason mutual interest for economic cooperation was a wel¬
come instrument and Foreign Office wisely estimated that trade relations
with eastern block countries should be continued. The aim of this Brit¬
ish decision was to curb the Soviet influence. Yugoslavia purchased from
Britain items that could not be obtained from the Soviet Union, machines
and equipment needed for the Yugoslav five year plan of industrialization.
Both sides were satisfied with this arrangement but because of the politi¬
cal reasons before the split with Stalin Yugoslavia was not able to obtain
all it sought from Britain.
When dealing with the British perception of Croatia it must be con¬
cluded that British side counted on some Croatian politicians who were
perceived as pro-British in their ideological and political views. After com¬
munist gaining of power such persons lost any real influence. They most¬
ly belonged to democratically orientated groups and individuals who were
members of the Croatian Peasant Party and Independent Democratic Par¬
ty before the World War II and there were also some intellectuals and pub¬
lic persons as well. Some of them took part in the new regime and other
continued with their professional occupations. They lost value they once
had among British diplomats and Foreign Office. Some of them ended up
in prisons or withdrew from public life. Those who remained abroad had no
political influence whatsoever, but they contacted the Foreign Office hop¬
ing that Britain would intervene politically and even militarily against the
communist regime in Yugoslavia. Foreign Office saw such views as unreal¬
istic and possibly embarrassing because they could harm normal relations
with Yugoslavia. Elements who during and after the war sought British
intervention in Yugoslavia proved their inability to conduct a political ac¬
tion on their own.
In the post-war period British side perceived the Catholic Church in
Croatia and Yugoslavia as the only real opposition to the communist re¬
gime. British side viewed the Catholic Church as well organized and wide¬
ly supported by people. British diplomats paid a great deal of attention to
the Catholic Church and disapproved of the severe measures that commu¬
nist authorities conducted against it. Nevertheless Foreign Office did not
forget the role of the Catholic Church during World War II and thought
that it was too close to the regime of the Independent State of Croatia. This
was a general conclusion that will remain permanent view of the Foreign
Office.
Historical and cultural remarks in the diplomatic reports and Foreign
Office's analyses always perceived Croatia as a part of the western world.
341
BRITANSKI POGLED NA HRVATSKU
1945. - 1948.
This was especially visible in the reports of Cyril
0.
Wakefield-Harrey, the
first British consul general in Zagreb. He was a professional diplomat who
served in several European and Asian countries before World War II. Be¬
fore Zagreb he never served in a communist country and he was strongly
anticommunist. His inclination to raise Croatian question as a particu¬
lar issue is clearly visible. He treated this problem in a manner similar to
Croatian political public before World War II and such views were retained
by remaining oppositional circles in Croatia after the war, especially in the
circles around the Catholic Church as well as among political exiles. Con¬
trary to such approach British ambassadors in Belgrade treated this issue
in a slightly different manner. They claimed that officially proclaimed fed¬
eral structure of the new Yugoslav state was a dead letter because practi¬
cal organization of the state was highly centralized. Nevertheless this did
not mean the resurgence of Serb domination because all nations were in
equal position. Wakefield-Harrey estimated that communist government
in Zagreb could not count on general support of the Croatian population,
but such views were met with doubt at the higher levels of British diplo¬
macy. In some situations Wakefield-Harrey was inclined to adopt the views
of the Croatian political opposition as his own and Foreign Office thought
this could only harm normal relations with authorities in Zagreb. Ralph
Cornwallis Stevenson, who replaced Wakefield-Harrey, was equally criti¬
cal of the political scene that surrounded him, although he was more dis¬
tanced, at least during the first year of his duty, toward all issues.
The experience of the British Council personnel that served in Croatia
was slightly different. They encountered obstacles made by the regime
that kept a watchful eye over their propaganda-cultural activities but they
were also in contact with the population. Although small in number their
public was curious about Council's exhibitions, reading rooms and librar¬
ies. Such activities offered values and achievements of general civilization
but also included propaganda about the British "way of life". According to
the principles of the post-war British propaganda toward Yugoslavia such
activities had intention to develop independent and critical thought, es¬
pecially among the young population. Such activities had intention to es¬
tablish better relation between Great Britain and Yugoslavia, but also to
enable liberalization of the Yugoslav regime. Taking into account the pe¬
riod immediately after World War II there were few people in Croatia and
Yugoslavia who spoke English and therefore the activities of the British
Council were concentrated on a marginal social group. From the perspec¬
tive of realistic British approach this was not discouraging because the
mere fact that the British Council was allowed to be present in a commu¬
nist country during the most difficult period of the Cold war was seen as
a positive development. This distinguished Yugoslavia from other commu¬
nist countries.
We must be very careful when discussing pro-British or anti-British
sentiments among Croatian population during the researched period. This
342
Summary
type of analysis as well as the content of researched documents can give
us only superficial perspective. British diplomatic reports cannot give com¬
plete explanation of how British diplomats and the British Council person¬
nel were perceived by the population of the country where they were de¬
ployed. It seems probable, regarding the perception of Britain, that rough
division into Yugoslav political representatives and Yugoslav public is in¬
accurate. According to such inaccurate view the state and the political
bodies of the Yugoslav regime were strongly antagonistic towards British
representatives, while the public saw Britain in favorable way. It is obvi¬
ous that real relations were much more complex.
Translated by Nikica Baric
343 |
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| geographic | Großbritannien Croatia Foreign relations Great Britain Croatia Politics and government 1945-1990 Foreign public opinion, British Great Britain Foreign relations Croatia Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Großbritannien Croatia Foreign relations Great Britain Croatia Politics and government 1945-1990 Foreign public opinion, British Great Britain Foreign relations Croatia |
| id | DE-604.BV022397652 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T17:17:06Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:56:43Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9532122605 |
| language | Croatian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015606365 |
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| physical | 367 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Golden Marketing [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Spehnjak, Katarina Verfasser aut Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. Katarina Spehnjak Zagreb Golden Marketing [u.a.] 2006 367 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1945-1948 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik Politik Kroatienbild (DE-588)4450689-2 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien Croatia Foreign relations Great Britain Croatia Politics and government 1945-1990 Foreign public opinion, British Great Britain Foreign relations Croatia Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 g Kroatienbild (DE-588)4450689-2 s Geschichte 1945-1948 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015606365&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015606365&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Spehnjak, Katarina Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. Außenpolitik Politik Kroatienbild (DE-588)4450689-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4450689-2 (DE-588)4022153-2 |
| title | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. |
| title_auth | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. |
| title_exact_search | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. |
| title_full | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. Katarina Spehnjak |
| title_fullStr | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. Katarina Spehnjak |
| title_full_unstemmed | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku 1945. - 1948. Katarina Spehnjak |
| title_short | Britanski pogled na Hrvatsku |
| title_sort | britanski pogled na hrvatsku 1945 1948 |
| title_sub | 1945. - 1948. |
| topic | Außenpolitik Politik Kroatienbild (DE-588)4450689-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenpolitik Politik Kroatienbild Großbritannien Croatia Foreign relations Great Britain Croatia Politics and government 1945-1990 Foreign public opinion, British Great Britain Foreign relations Croatia |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015606365&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015606365&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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