A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions: England, the United States, Germany and China
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Deventer
Kluwer
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
56 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zugl.: Groningen, Univ., Diss., 2006 |
| Beschreibung: | XXVI, 370 S. |
| ISBN: | 9013043917 9789013043914 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV022386204 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20081212 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070413s2007 m||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9013043917 |9 90-130-4391-7 | ||
| 020 | |a 9789013043914 |9 978-90-13-04391-4 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)123126223 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV022386204 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-M382 |a DE-12 |a DE-19 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a K1338 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 346.922 |2 22 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Li, Xiaoning |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions |b England, the United States, Germany and China |c Xiaoning Li |
| 264 | 1 | |a Deventer |b Kluwer |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a XXVI, 370 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen |v 56 | |
| 500 | |a Zugl.: Groningen, Univ., Diss., 2006 | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Aandeelhouders |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Schadevergoeding |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Vorderingsrecht |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Stockholders' derivative actions |z China | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Stockholders' derivative actions |z England | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Stockholders' derivative actions |z Germany | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Stockholders' derivative actions |z United States | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Rechtsvergleich |0 (DE-588)4115712-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Aktionär |0 (DE-588)4000947-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Nebenklage |0 (DE-588)4171379-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a Deutschland | |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Aktionär |0 (DE-588)4000947-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Nebenklage |0 (DE-588)4171379-5 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Rechtsvergleich |0 (DE-588)4115712-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen |v 56 |w (DE-604)BV002309080 |9 56 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m HBZ Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015595124&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015595124 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136443107344384 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface V
Preface from the author IX
Contents XI
Selected abbreviations XXIII
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The nature of derivative action 1
1.1.1 The proper plaintiff principle 1
1.1.2 The nature of derivative action 2
1.1.2.1 The derivative action as an exception to the proper plaintiff
principle 2
1.1.2.2 The nature of derivative and representative 3
1.2 Justifications for derivative action 4
1.2.1 Derivative action justified by its function 4
1.2.2 Derivative action justified from an economic perspective 4
1.3 Disadvantages of derivative action 5
1.3.1 Risk of unjust interference in corporate management 5
1.3.2 The plaintiff s weak incentive 5
1.3.3 Problems of corporate recovery 7
1.4 The role of derivative action 7
1.4.1 Corporate governance as a comprehensive system 7
1.4.2 Different approaches towards the role of derivative action 8
1.4.3 Factors affecting the function of derivative action 9
1.5 Comparative study 12
1.5.1 Derivative action as a generally accepted mechanism 12
1.5.2 The countries chosen for the comparative study 13
1.5.2.1 England 13
1.5.2.2 The United States 13
1.5.2.3 Germany 14
1.5.2.4 China 15
1.6 The structure of the comparative study 15
1.6.1 The structure of the book 15
1.6.2 The scope of the comparative study 15
XI
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 2. ENGLAND
2.1 Introduction to English law on derivative actions 19
2.1.1 Overview 19
2.1.2 The traditional Foss rule: the principles and the exceptions 20
2.1.2.1 Two basic principles of the Foss rule 20
2.1.2.2 Exceptions to the Foss rule principles 23
2.1.2.2.1 The personal rights exception 23
2.1.2.2.2 The illegal or ultra vires acts exception and the special
majority exception 23
2.1.2.2.3 The fraud on the minority exception 24
2.1.2.2.4 The interest of justice exception 27
2.1.2.3 Comments on the traditional Foss rule 27
2.1.3 Development of the Foss rule 28
2.1.3.1 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd.
(No. 2) (the Court of Appeal): the Foss rule as the locus
standi requirement as well as the substantive requirement
for derivative actions 28
2.1.3.2 Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area):
generalization of the wrongdoer control requirement 29
2.1.3.3 Smith v. Croft (No. 2): the independent body s view 30
2.1.3.4 Comments on the development of the Foss rule 31
2.1.4 Rule 19.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules: the requirement of
judicial approval to continue a derivative action 31
2.1.5 Reforms of the common law derivative action 31
2.1.5.1 The necessity for reforms 31
2.1.5.2 Proposals for the reforms 32
2.2 The role of derivative action in England 33
2.2.1 An unimportant role and the reasons for it 33
2.2.2 The unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative action 35
2.2.2.1 An introduction to the unfair prejudice remedy 35
2.2.2.1.1 The predominant role of the unfair prejudice remedy 35
2.2.2.1.2 The unfair prejudice remedy: a wide-ranging remedy 36
2.2.2.1.3 Remedies awarded under the unfair prejudice petition 38
2.2.2.1.4 Problems with the unfair prejudice petition 39
2.2.2.2 The relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy and the
derivative action 40
2.2.2.2.1 The purpose of the unfair prejudice petition: also providing
protection for minority shareholders where the company has
suffered losses 40
2.2.2.2.2 A derivative action or an unfair prejudice petition: application
of the unfair prejudice petition where the company has
suffered losses 41
2.2.2.2.3 Remedies in the unfair prejudice petition regarding
corporate losses 43
XII
CONTENTS
2.2.2.3 Will the section 459 petition supersede the derivative action
under current English law? 50
2.2.2.4 Should there be one or two forms of action? 51
2.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between shareholders
derivative action and direct action 54
2.3.1 Introduction 54
2.3.2 Claims arising from the breach of a company s constitution 55
2.3.2.1 Nature of a company s constitution 55
2.3.2.2 The twin aspects of the liability arising from a breach of the
constitution 56
2.3.2.3 Vagueness of personal rights conferred by the constitution
(the principle of mere internal irregularities ) 56
2.3.3 Claims arising from the director s breach of fiduciary duties 59
2.3.3.1 The general principle 59
2.3.3.2 Exceptions to the general principle 60
2.3.4 Claims arising from the majority shareholders misconduct 63
2.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the
company and the minority shareholders 64
2.4.1 Rules in the common law derivative action 64
2.4.1.1 Substantive limitations on the scope of derivative actions 65
2.4.1.1.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 65
2.4.1.1.2 Nature of the defendant s misconduct that may lead to a
derivative action 66
2.4.1.2 Procedural requirements on plaintiffs for bringing derivative
actions 67
2.4.1.2.1 The requirement of being a current member of the company 67
2.4.1.2.2 The three standing requirements under modern case law 68
2.4.1.2.3 Rule 19.9 of the CPR: the court s approval etc. 68
2.4.1.2.4 Other situations which may bar a derivative action 70
2.4.1.3 The appropriate independent body s view: Smith v. Croft
(No. 2) 72
2.4.1.4 Incentives for individual shareholders to pursue derivative
actions 74
2.4.1.4.1 Costs and indemnity: providing negative incentive 74
2.4.1.4.2 The conditional fee agreement 74
2.4.1.4.3 Conclusion 76
2.4.1.5 Limiting directors financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 76
2.4.2 Changes in the Companies Bill 76
2.4.2.1 Introduction 76
2.4.2.2 The new law concerning substantive limitations on the scope
of derivative actions 77
2.4.2.2.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 78
2.4.2.2.2 The nature of the defendant s misconduct that may give rise to
a derivative action 80
XIII
CONTENTS
2.4.2.3 The new law of the procedural requirement on plaintiffs to
initiate derivative actions 81
2.4.2.3.1 The requirement of the court s permission to continue a
derivative action: a preliminary trial 81
2.4.2.3.2 A two-stage procedure for the preliminary trial 81
2.4.2.3.3 The matters which the court should consider in deciding
whether to grant permission 82
2.4.2.4 Comments on the Companies Bill s regulation 83
2.5 Conclusion 84
2.5.1 The function of derivative action in English corporate
governance 84
2.5.1.1 An unimportant role for derivative action 84
2.5.1.2 Neglecting the function of public purpose for derivative
action 85
2.5.2 The English model of striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and protection of the interests of the company and
of minority shareholders 85
2.5.2.1 The appropriate body for making a litigation decision in the
best interests of the company 85
2.5.2.2 The English model of striking a balance 87
CHAPTER 3. THE UNITED STATES
3.1 Introduction to American law on derivative actions 89
3.1.1 Development of American law on derivative actions 89
3.1.1.1 The first stage: the origin of American law on derivative
actions — an isolated development 89
3.1.1.2 The second stage: reception of the English Foss rule in a
different form and to a limited extent 91
3.1.1.2.1 Reception of the English Foss rule 91
3.1.1.2.2 Developments after Hawes v. Oakland 93
3.1.1.3 The third stage: the security-for-expenses statutes 93
3.1.1.4 The fourth stage: the special litigation committee 94
3.1.1.5 Recent developments 95
3.1.2 Methodology of research 96
3.2 The role of derivative action in the United States 96
3.2.1 A more important role in the United States than in England 96
3.2.2 A less important role nowadays than in the past 98
3.2.3 A more important role in public corporations than in close
corporations 99
3.2.3.1 Classification of close corporations and public corporations 99
3.2.3.1.1 The distinction between close and public corporations 99
3.2.3.1.2 Different treatment for close corporations 101
3.2.3.2 Empirical study of the role of derivative action 101
XIV
CONTENTS
3.2.3.3 Different corporate governance strategies in close
corporations 103
3.2.3.4 The new causes of shareholders direct action in close
corporations: remedies against the majority shareholder s
oppression 105
3.2.3.4.1 Introduction 105
3.2.3.4.2 The broadened involuntary dissolution remedy: the statutory
remedy of oppression 106
3.2.3.4.3 The enhanced fiduciary duties owed by the controlling
shareholder directly to other shareholders: the common law
remedy 110
3.2.4 Ongoing debates as to the role of derivative action in the
United States 114
3.2.4.1 Compensation versus deterrence 114
3.2.4.1.1 The possible conflict between the functions of compensation
and deterrence 114
3.2.4.1.2 Current judicial approaches 115
3.2.4.1.2.1 The judicial approach that compensation
prevails over deterrence 115
3.2.4.1.2.2 The judicial approach that deterrence
predominates when the compensation function
is absent 117
3.2.4.1.2.3 The third approach which considers neither
compensation nor deterrence to be the major
concern 118
3.2.4.1.2.4 Comments 118
3.2.4.1.2.4.1 Problems of the first approach 118
3.2.4.1.2.4.2 Problems of the second approach 119
3.2.4.1.2.4.3 Striking a balance between the two approaches 119
3.2.4.2 Debates as to the role of derivative action 121
3.2.4.2.1 Doubts about the prominent role of derivative action 121
3.2.4.2.2 The approach favoring a strengthened role for derivative
action 122
3.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between derivative
action and direct action 125
3.3.1 Criteria applied in American law generally 125
3.3.1.1 The injury and the right criteria 125
3.3.1.1.1 Introduction to the injury and the right criteria 125
3.3.1.1.2 Non-exhaustive categories of actions based on the right
and/or injury criteria 126
3.3.1.2 Other considerations 128
3.3.1.3 Application of the criteria 130
3.3.2 Distinction in several situations 130
3.3.2.1 Claims arising from ultra vires or unauthorized acts 131
3.3.2.2 Claims arising from breach of duties by corporate fiduciaries 132
XV
CONTENTS
3.3.3 Special treatment for close corporations 136
3.3.3.1 Different approaches to the question of whether the nature of
close corporations should be relevant to the distinctions in
lose corporations 136
3.3.3.2 Judicial grounds for allowing direct actions instead of
derivative actions in close corporations 138
3.3.3.2.1 New causes of direct action and the varied injury criterion 139
3.3.3.2.2 The concern that justifications for derivative actions may
not exist in close corporations 141
3.3.3.2.3 Prevention of unjust enrichment 142
3.3.3.2.4 The procedural ground 143
3.3.3.2.5 Other concerns 143
3.3.4 Direct pro rata recovery to the individual shareholder in
derivative actions 144
3.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the
corporation and the minority shareholders 145
3.4.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of derivative actions 145
3.4.1.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 145
3.4.1.2 Nature of the defendant s misconduct that may lead to a
derivative action: the business judgment rule 146
3.4.1.2.1 Introduction to the business judgment rule 146
3.4.1.2.2 Rationale for and necessity of the rule 147
3.4.1.2.3 Prerequisites for applying the business judgment rule
(formulations or elements of the rule) 149
3.4.1.2.4 Judicial applications of the business judgment rule 154
3.4.2 Procedural requirements on plaintiffs to bring derivative
actions 156
3.4.2.1 The standing requirements 156
3.4.2.2 The demand requirement 160
3.4.2.2.1 Overview 160
3.4.2.2.2 Demand on the board requirement 161
3.4.2.2.2.1 Overview 161
3.4.2.2.2.2 Recognition of the demand futility exception
or not 161
3.4.2.2.2.2.1 Recognition of the demand futility exception
(the distinction between the demand-required
and demand-excused cases) 161
3.4.2.2.2.2.2 A universal demand requirement 163
3.4.2.2.2.3 The effect of litigation decisions of the board
or a litigation committee (the standard of
judicial review) 164
3.4.2.2.2.3.1 Overview 164
3.4.2.2.2.3.2 The standard of judicial review in demand-
required cases 166
XVI
CONTENTS
3.4.2.2.2.3.3 The standards of judicial review in demand-
excused cases: the special litigation
committee 167
3.4.2.2.2.3.3.1 The increasing role of the special litigation
committee 167
3.4.2.2.2.3.3.2 The standards of judicial review of the special
litigation committee s decision 168
3.4.2.2.2.3.4 The standards of judicial review in universal
demand cases 172
3.4.2.2.2.3.5 Conclusion 174
3.4.2.2.3 Demand on the shareholders 174
3.4.2.2.4 Conclusion 175
3.4.2.3 Security-for-expenses provided by plaintiffs 176
3.4.3 The independent body s view 177
3.4.4 Incentives for the plaintiff to pursue derivative actions 177
3.4.4.1 Litigation costs and indemnity to the plaintiff shareholder 177
3.4.4.2 The contingency fee arrangement 178
3.4.4.3 The attorney-driven problem 178
3.4.5 Limiting directors financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 180
3.4.5.1 Eliminating or limiting (exculpation of) directors personal
liability 181
3.4.5.2 Indemnification of directors 184
3.4.5.3 D O insurance 186
3.4.6 The shareholder s right to information 188
3.5 Conclusion 188
3.5.1 The function of derivative action in American corporate
governance 188
3.5.2 The American model of striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and protection of the interests of the corporation
and its minority shareholders 189
3.5.2.1 Overview 189
3.5.2.2 The appropriate body to make corporate litigation decisions 189
3.5.2.3 Both facilitating and controlling derivative actions 190
3.5.2.4 Providing protection for directors 191
3.5.2.5 Distinguishing between duty of loyalty and duty of care 191
3.5.2.6 The court s role in derivative actions 192
CHAPTER 4. GERMANY
4.1 Introduction to the German rules 193
4.1.1 Background 193
4.1.2 Recent reforms concerning corporate governance 196
4.1.2.1 The reasons for these reforms 196
4.1.2.2 A brief history of the current reforms 198
XVII
CONTENTS
4.1.3 German rules on enforcing corporate claims 199
4.1.3.1 The law on the AG 199
4.1.3.2 The law on the GmbH 202
4.1.3.3 The law on groups of companies 203
4.2 The role of the minority shareholders right to enforce corporate claims
in Germany 204
4.2.1 The unimportant role of the minority shareholders right to
enforce corporate claims in German corporate governance 204
4.2.2 The reasons behind this unimportant role 205
4.2.3 The alternative mechanisms in German corporate
governance 207
4.2.3.1 IntheAG 207
4.2.3.1.1 Alternative mechanisms against the directors abuse of power
in the AG 207
4.2.3.1.2 Alternative mechanisms against the majority shareholders
abuse of power in the AG 209
4.2.3.2 In the GmbH 211
4.2.3.2.1 Against the controlling shareholders 211
4.2.3.2.2 Against the directors 214
4.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between
corporate action and shareholders direct action 215
4.3.1 Claims to set aside defective resolutions of corporate bodies 215
4.3.2 Claims arising from the director s breach of fiduciary duties 218
4.3.3 Claims arising from the shareholder s misconduct (breach
the duty of loyalty) 218
4.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and
protection for the corporation and the minority shareholders 219
4.4.1 The rules prior to the UMAG 219
4.4.1.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of misconduct which
might be enforced by minority shareholders 220
4.4.1.1.1 Whose misconduct might be the corporate cause of action
enforceable by minority shareholders 220
4.4.1.1.2 Nature of the defendant s misconduct that might lead to a
corporate action enforceable by minority shareholders 221
4.4.1.2 Major requirements placed on plaintiffs in order to enforce
corporate claims: the procedural aspect 224
4.4.1.2.1 Section 147(1) 224
4.4.1.2.2 Section 147(3) 224
4.4.1.3 The independent body s view 225
4.4.1.4 Incentives for plaintiffs to enforce corporate claims 225
4.4.1.4.1 The negative incentive: allocation of litigation costs 225
4.4.1.4.2 No positive incentive mechanisms: no contingency fee
device 226
4.4.2 Changes in the UMAG 227
4.4.2.1 Reasons for the reform 227
XVIII
CONTENTS
4.4.2.2 Changes in the UMAG in regard to section 147 of
the AktG (1998) 228
4.4.2.2.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of misconduct that may
be enforced by minority shareholders 229
4.4.2.2.2 Major requirements placed on plaintiffs to enforce corporate
claims: the procedural aspect 230
4.4.2.2.3 The plaintiff s incentives 231
4.4.2.3 Comments on the reform 233
4.4.3 Limiting directors financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 234
4.5 Conclusion 235
4.5.1 The function of the minority shareholders right to enforce
corporate claims in German corporate governance 235
4.5.2 The German model of striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and protection of the interests of the company
and the minority shareholders 236
4.5.2.1 The appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the best
interests of the company 236
4.5.2.2 The trend towards the Anglo-American model of striking a
balance between corporate efficiency and protection of the
interests of the company and the minority shareholders 238
CHAPTER 5. CHINA
5.1 Introduction to Chinese law on derivative actions 241
5.1.1 Background 241
5.1.1.1 The history of Chinese company law 241
5.1.1.2 Characteristics of the regulations on corporate governance in
Chinese company law 244
5.1.1.3 The major agency problems in Chinese companies 247
5.1.1.4 A general review of the protection for minority shareholders
provided by Chinese company law 250
5.1.1.4.1 Sources of Chinese law providing protection for companies
and minority shareholders 250
5.1.1.4.2 Legal protection for minority shareholders prior to Company
Law 2006 252
5.1.1.4.2.1 General characteristics 252
5.1.1.4.2.2 Company Law 1994 252
5.1.1.4.2.3 Other legislation 255
5.1.1.4.2.4 The SPC s judicial interpretations 255
5.1.1.4.2.5 The CSRC s regulations 257
5.1.1.4.3 The new regulations of Company Law 2006: a better position
for the company and minority shareholders 259
5.1.1.4.3.1 Methods of protection in Company Law 2006 259
5.1.1.4.3.2 Defects of Company Law 2006 265
XIX
CONTENTS
5.1.2 The development of derivative action in China 266
5.1.2.1 The development prior to Company Law 2006 266
5.1.2.1.1 Article 111 of Company Law 1994 266
5.1.2.1.2 The application of derivative action by the
courts 267
5.1.2.1.2.1 Practical problems faced by Chinese courts:
the necessity for introducing the mechanism of
derivative action 267
5.1.2.1.2.2 The judicial application of derivative action 268
5.1.2.2 The stipulation in Company Law 2006 272
5.2 The role of derivative action in China 272
5.2.1 Prior to Company Law 2006 272
5.2.2 After Company Law 2006 273
5.2.2.1 Lack of market controls on corporate management 273
5.2.2.2 The influence of legal rules and norms 274
5.2.2.3 The influence of Chinese special situations 275
5.2.2.3.1 The court s ability to hear derivative cases 275
5.2.2.3.2 Attitudes towards derivative actions 276
5.2.2.4 Conclusion 278
5.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between derivative action
and direct action 278
5.3.1 Claims to set aside defective resolutions of a shareholders
meeting or of the board of directors 279
5.3.2 Claims for damages arising from director (including any
supervisors) and senior officer misconduct 280
5.3.3 Claims for damages arising from shareholder misconduct 282
5.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the
company and the minority shareholders 282
5.4.1 Substantive limitations on the scope of derivative actions 284
5.4.1.1 Whose misconduct may be lead to a derivative action 284
5.4.1.2 Nature of the defendant s misconduct that may lead to a
derivative action 285
5.4.2 Procedural restrictions 289
5.4.2.1 The procedure of docketing (li an) 289
5.4.2.2 The standing requirements 290
5.4.2.3 The demand requirement 292
5.4.3 The independent body s view 294
5.4.4 Incentives for the plaintiff to pursue derivative actions 294
5.4.4.1 Litigation costs 294
5.4.4.2 The attorney s role 298
5.4.5 Limiting directors financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 298
5.4.6 The abuse of rights doctrine as a method of preventing the
abusive use of derivative actions 299
XX
CONTENTS
5.5 Conclusion 299
5.5.1 The function of derivative action in Chinese corporate
governance 299
5.5.2 The Chinese model for striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and the protection of the interests of the
corporation and its minority shareholders 300
5.5.2.1 The appropriate body for making corporate litigation
decisions 300
5.5.2.2 A fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection
for the company and minority shareholders 300
5.5.2.3 The court s role in derivative actions 301
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
6.1 The function of derivative action 303
6.1.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 303
6.1.2 The purpose of derivative actions in China (suggestions for
China) 307
6.2 The distinction between derivative actions and direct actions 309
6.2.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 309
6.2.2 Suggestions for China 311
6.3 Maintaining a fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection
for the company and minority shareholders 312
6.3.1 General comments 312
6.3.2 The appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the
best interests of the company 313
6.3.2.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 313
6.3.2.2 Suggestions for China 315
6.3.3 The principle of non-judicial interference with corporate
management 316
6.3.3.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 316
6.3.3.2 Suggestions for China 318
6.3.4 The procedural requirements for minority shareholders to
bring a derivative action 319
6.3.5 The plaintiff s incentives to initiate a derivative action 319
6.3.6 The court s role in derivative actions 319
XXI
CONTENTS
Summary 321
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 329
Bibliography 337
Table of Selected Cases 353
Table of Selected Statutes 359
Index 363
Acknowledgements 369
XXII
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface V
Preface from the author IX
Contents XI
Selected abbreviations XXIII
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The nature of derivative action 1
1.1.1 The proper plaintiff principle 1
1.1.2 The nature of derivative action 2
1.1.2.1 The derivative action as an exception to the proper plaintiff
principle 2
1.1.2.2 The nature of 'derivative' and 'representative' 3
1.2 Justifications for derivative action 4
1.2.1 Derivative action justified by its function 4
1.2.2 Derivative action justified from an economic perspective 4
1.3 Disadvantages of derivative action 5
1.3.1 Risk of unjust interference in corporate management 5
1.3.2 The plaintiff's weak incentive 5
1.3.3 Problems of corporate recovery 7
1.4 The role of derivative action 7
1.4.1 Corporate governance as a comprehensive system 7
1.4.2 Different approaches towards the role of derivative action 8
1.4.3 Factors affecting the function of derivative action 9
1.5 Comparative study 12
1.5.1 Derivative action as a generally accepted mechanism 12
1.5.2 The countries chosen for the comparative study 13
1.5.2.1 England 13
1.5.2.2 The United States 13
1.5.2.3 Germany 14
1.5.2.4 China 15
1.6 The structure of the comparative study 15
1.6.1 The structure of the book 15
1.6.2 The scope of the comparative study 15
XI
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 2. ENGLAND
2.1 Introduction to English law on derivative actions 19
2.1.1 Overview 19
2.1.2 The traditional Foss rule: the principles and the exceptions 20
2.1.2.1 Two basic principles of the Foss rule 20
2.1.2.2 Exceptions to the Foss rule principles 23
2.1.2.2.1 The'personal rights'exception 23
2.1.2.2.2 The 'illegal or ultra vires acts' exception and the 'special
majority' exception 23
2.1.2.2.3 The 'fraud on the minority' exception 24
2.1.2.2.4 The'interest of justice'exception 27
2.1.2.3 Comments on the traditional Foss rule 27
2.1.3 Development of the Foss rule 28
2.1.3.1 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd.
(No. 2) (the Court of Appeal): the Foss rule as the locus
standi requirement as well as the substantive requirement
for derivative actions 28
2.1.3.2 Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area):
generalization of the 'wrongdoer control' requirement 29
2.1.3.3 Smith v. Croft (No. 2): the independent body's view 30
2.1.3.4 Comments on the development of the Foss rule 31
2.1.4 Rule 19.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules: the requirement of
judicial approval to continue a derivative action 31
2.1.5 Reforms of the common law derivative action 31
2.1.5.1 The necessity for reforms 31
2.1.5.2 Proposals for the reforms 32
2.2 The role of derivative action in England 33
2.2.1 An unimportant role and the reasons for it 33
2.2.2 The unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative action 35
2.2.2.1 An introduction to the unfair prejudice remedy 35
2.2.2.1.1 The predominant role of the unfair prejudice remedy 35
2.2.2.1.2 The unfair prejudice remedy: a wide-ranging remedy 36
2.2.2.1.3 Remedies awarded under the unfair prejudice petition 38
2.2.2.1.4 Problems with the unfair prejudice petition 39
2.2.2.2 The relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy and the
derivative action 40
2.2.2.2.1 The purpose of the unfair prejudice petition: also providing
protection for minority shareholders where the company has
suffered losses 40
2.2.2.2.2 A derivative action or an unfair prejudice petition: application
of the unfair prejudice petition where the company has
suffered losses 41
2.2.2.2.3 Remedies in the unfair prejudice petition regarding
corporate losses 43
XII
CONTENTS
2.2.2.3 Will the section 459 petition supersede the derivative action
under current English law? 50
2.2.2.4 Should there be one or two forms of action? 51
2.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between shareholders'
derivative action and direct action 54
2.3.1 Introduction 54
2.3.2 Claims arising from the breach of a company's constitution 55
2.3.2.1 Nature of a company's constitution 55
2.3.2.2 The twin aspects of the liability arising from a breach of the
constitution 56
2.3.2.3 Vagueness of personal rights conferred by the constitution
(the principle of 'mere internal irregularities') 56
2.3.3 Claims arising from the director's breach of fiduciary duties 59
2.3.3.1 The general principle 59
2.3.3.2 Exceptions to the general principle 60
2.3.4 Claims arising from the majority shareholders' misconduct 63
2.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the
company and the minority shareholders 64
2.4.1 Rules in the common law derivative action 64
2.4.1.1 Substantive limitations on the scope of derivative actions 65
2.4.1.1.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 65
2.4.1.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that may lead to a
derivative action 66
2.4.1.2 Procedural requirements on plaintiffs for bringing derivative
actions 67
2.4.1.2.1 The requirement of being a current member of the company 67
2.4.1.2.2 The three standing requirements under modern case law 68
2.4.1.2.3 Rule 19.9 of the CPR: the court's approval etc. 68
2.4.1.2.4 Other situations which may bar a derivative action 70
2.4.1.3 The appropriate independent body's view: Smith v. Croft
(No. 2) 72
2.4.1.4 Incentives for individual shareholders to pursue derivative
actions 74
2.4.1.4.1 Costs and indemnity: providing negative incentive 74
2.4.1.4.2 The conditional fee agreement 74
2.4.1.4.3 Conclusion 76
2.4.1.5 Limiting directors' financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 76
2.4.2 Changes in the Companies Bill 76
2.4.2.1 Introduction 76
2.4.2.2 The new law concerning substantive limitations on the scope
of derivative actions 77
2.4.2.2.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 78
2.4.2.2.2 The nature of the defendant's misconduct that may give rise to
a derivative action 80
XIII
CONTENTS
2.4.2.3 The new law of the procedural requirement on plaintiffs to
initiate derivative actions 81
2.4.2.3.1 The requirement of the court's permission to continue a
derivative action: a preliminary trial 81
2.4.2.3.2 A two-stage procedure for the preliminary trial 81
2.4.2.3.3 The matters which the court should consider in deciding
whether to grant permission 82
2.4.2.4 Comments on the Companies Bill's regulation 83
2.5 Conclusion 84
2.5.1 The function of derivative action in English corporate
governance 84
2.5.1.1 An unimportant role for derivative action 84
2.5.1.2 Neglecting the function of public purpose for derivative
action 85
2.5.2 The English model of striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and protection of the interests of the company and
of minority shareholders 85
2.5.2.1 The appropriate body for making a litigation decision in the
best interests of the company 85
2.5.2.2 The English model of striking a balance 87
CHAPTER 3. THE UNITED STATES
3.1 Introduction to American law on derivative actions 89
3.1.1 Development of American law on derivative actions 89
3.1.1.1 The first stage: the origin of American law on derivative
actions — an isolated development 89
3.1.1.2 The second stage: reception of the English Foss rule in a
different form and to a limited extent 91
3.1.1.2.1 Reception of the English Foss rule 91
3.1.1.2.2 Developments after Hawes v. Oakland 93
3.1.1.3 The third stage: the security-for-expenses statutes 93
3.1.1.4 The fourth stage: the special litigation committee 94
3.1.1.5 Recent developments 95
3.1.2 Methodology of research 96
3.2 The role of derivative action in the United States 96
3.2.1 A more important role in the United States than in England 96
3.2.2 A less important role nowadays than in the past 98
3.2.3 A more important role in public corporations than in close
corporations 99
3.2.3.1 Classification of close corporations and public corporations 99
3.2.3.1.1 The distinction between close and public corporations 99
3.2.3.1.2 Different treatment for close corporations 101
3.2.3.2 Empirical study of the role of derivative action 101
XIV
CONTENTS
3.2.3.3 Different corporate governance strategies in close
corporations 103
3.2.3.4 The new causes of shareholders' direct action in close
corporations: remedies against the majority shareholder's
oppression 105
3.2.3.4.1 Introduction 105
3.2.3.4.2 The broadened involuntary dissolution remedy: the statutory
remedy of oppression 106
3.2.3.4.3 The enhanced fiduciary duties owed by the controlling
shareholder directly to other shareholders: the common law
remedy 110
3.2.4 Ongoing debates as to the role of derivative action in the
United States 114
3.2.4.1 Compensation versus deterrence 114
3.2.4.1.1 The possible conflict between the functions of compensation
and deterrence 114
3.2.4.1.2 Current judicial approaches 115
3.2.4.1.2.1 The judicial approach that compensation
prevails over deterrence 115
3.2.4.1.2.2 The judicial approach that deterrence
predominates when the compensation function
is absent 117
3.2.4.1.2.3 The third approach which considers neither
compensation nor deterrence to be the major
concern 118
3.2.4.1.2.4 Comments 118
3.2.4.1.2.4.1 Problems of the first approach 118
3.2.4.1.2.4.2 Problems of the second approach 119
3.2.4.1.2.4.3 Striking a balance between the two approaches 119
3.2.4.2 Debates as to the role of derivative action 121
3.2.4.2.1 Doubts about the prominent role of derivative action 121
3.2.4.2.2 The approach favoring a strengthened role for derivative
action 122
3.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between derivative
action and direct action 125
3.3.1 Criteria applied in American law generally 125
3.3.1.1 The injury and the right criteria 125
3.3.1.1.1 Introduction to the injury and the right criteria 125
3.3.1.1.2 Non-exhaustive categories of actions based on the right
and/or injury criteria 126
3.3.1.2 Other considerations 128
3.3.1.3 Application of the criteria 130
3.3.2 Distinction in several situations 130
3.3.2.1 Claims arising from ultra vires or unauthorized acts 131
3.3.2.2 Claims arising from breach of duties by corporate fiduciaries 132
XV
CONTENTS
3.3.3 Special treatment for close corporations 136
3.3.3.1 Different approaches to the question of whether the nature of
close corporations should be relevant to the distinctions in
lose corporations 136
3.3.3.2 Judicial grounds for allowing direct actions instead of
derivative actions in close corporations 138
3.3.3.2.1 New causes of direct action and the varied injury criterion 139
3.3.3.2.2 The concern that justifications for derivative actions may
not exist in close corporations 141
3.3.3.2.3 Prevention of unjust enrichment 142
3.3.3.2.4 The procedural ground 143
3.3.3.2.5 Other concerns 143
3.3.4 Direct pro rata recovery to the individual shareholder in
derivative actions 144
3.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the
corporation and the minority shareholders 145
3.4.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of derivative actions 145
3.4.1.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 145
3.4.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that may lead to a
derivative action: the business judgment rule 146
3.4.1.2.1 Introduction to the business judgment rule 146
3.4.1.2.2 Rationale for and necessity of the rule 147
3.4.1.2.3 Prerequisites for applying the business judgment rule
(formulations or elements of the rule) 149
3.4.1.2.4 Judicial applications of the business judgment rule 154
3.4.2 Procedural requirements on plaintiffs to bring derivative
actions 156
3.4.2.1 The standing requirements 156
3.4.2.2 The demand requirement 160
3.4.2.2.1 Overview 160
3.4.2.2.2 Demand on the board requirement 161
3.4.2.2.2.1 Overview 161
3.4.2.2.2.2 Recognition of the demand futility exception
or not 161
3.4.2.2.2.2.1 Recognition of the demand futility exception
(the distinction between the demand-required
and demand-excused cases) 161
3.4.2.2.2.2.2 A universal demand requirement 163
3.4.2.2.2.3 The effect of litigation decisions of the board
or a litigation committee (the standard of
judicial review) 164
3.4.2.2.2.3.1 Overview 164
3.4.2.2.2.3.2 The standard of judicial review in demand-
required cases 166
XVI
CONTENTS
3.4.2.2.2.3.3 The standards of judicial review in demand-
excused cases: the special litigation
committee 167
3.4.2.2.2.3.3.1 The increasing role of the special litigation
committee 167
3.4.2.2.2.3.3.2 The standards of judicial review of the special
litigation committee's decision 168
3.4.2.2.2.3.4 The standards of judicial review in universal
demand cases 172
3.4.2.2.2.3.5 Conclusion 174
3.4.2.2.3 Demand on the shareholders 174
3.4.2.2.4 Conclusion 175
3.4.2.3 Security-for-expenses provided by plaintiffs 176
3.4.3 The independent body's view 177
3.4.4 Incentives for the plaintiff to pursue derivative actions 177
3.4.4.1 Litigation costs and indemnity to the plaintiff shareholder 177
3.4.4.2 The contingency fee arrangement 178
3.4.4.3 The attorney-driven problem 178
3.4.5 Limiting directors' financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 180
3.4.5.1 Eliminating or limiting (exculpation of) directors' personal
liability 181
3.4.5.2 Indemnification of directors 184
3.4.5.3 D O insurance 186
3.4.6 The shareholder's right to information 188
3.5 Conclusion 188
3.5.1 The function of derivative action in American corporate
governance 188
3.5.2 The American model of striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and protection of the interests of the corporation
and its minority shareholders 189
3.5.2.1 Overview 189
3.5.2.2 The appropriate body to make corporate litigation decisions 189
3.5.2.3 Both facilitating and controlling derivative actions 190
3.5.2.4 Providing protection for directors 191
3.5.2.5 Distinguishing between duty of loyalty and duty of care 191
3.5.2.6 The court's role in derivative actions 192
CHAPTER 4. GERMANY
4.1 Introduction to the German rules 193
4.1.1 Background 193
4.1.2 Recent reforms concerning corporate governance 196
4.1.2.1 The reasons for these reforms 196
4.1.2.2 A brief history of the current reforms 198
XVII
CONTENTS
4.1.3 German rules on enforcing corporate claims 199
4.1.3.1 The law on the AG 199
4.1.3.2 The law on the GmbH 202
4.1.3.3 The law on groups of companies 203
4.2 The role of the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims
in Germany 204
4.2.1 The unimportant role of the minority shareholders' right to
enforce corporate claims in German corporate governance 204
4.2.2 The reasons behind this unimportant role 205
4.2.3 The alternative mechanisms in German corporate
governance 207
4.2.3.1 IntheAG 207
4.2.3.1.1 Alternative mechanisms against the directors' abuse of power
in the AG 207
4.2.3.1.2 Alternative mechanisms against the majority shareholders'
abuse of power in the AG 209
4.2.3.2 In the GmbH 211
4.2.3.2.1 Against the controlling shareholders 211
4.2.3.2.2 Against the directors 214
4.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between
corporate action and shareholders' direct action 215
4.3.1 Claims to set aside defective resolutions of corporate bodies 215
4.3.2 Claims arising from the director's breach of fiduciary duties 218
4.3.3 Claims arising from the shareholder's misconduct (breach
the duty of loyalty) 218
4.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and
protection for the corporation and the minority shareholders 219
4.4.1 The rules prior to the UMAG 219
4.4.1.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of misconduct which
might be enforced by minority shareholders 220
4.4.1.1.1 Whose misconduct might be the corporate cause of action
enforceable by minority shareholders 220
4.4.1.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that might lead to a
corporate action enforceable by minority shareholders 221
4.4.1.2 Major requirements placed on plaintiffs in order to enforce
corporate claims: the procedural aspect 224
4.4.1.2.1 Section 147(1) 224
4.4.1.2.2 Section 147(3) 224
4.4.1.3 The independent body's view 225
4.4.1.4 Incentives for plaintiffs to enforce corporate claims 225
4.4.1.4.1 The negative incentive: allocation of litigation costs 225
4.4.1.4.2 No positive incentive mechanisms: no contingency fee
device 226
4.4.2 Changes in the UMAG 227
4.4.2.1 Reasons for the reform 227
XVIII
CONTENTS
4.4.2.2 Changes in the UMAG in regard to section 147 of
the AktG (1998) 228
4.4.2.2.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of misconduct that may
be enforced by minority shareholders 229
4.4.2.2.2 Major requirements placed on plaintiffs to enforce corporate
claims: the procedural aspect 230
4.4.2.2.3 The plaintiff's incentives 231
4.4.2.3 Comments on the reform 233
4.4.3 Limiting directors' financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 234
4.5 Conclusion 235
4.5.1 The function of the minority shareholders' right to enforce
corporate claims in German corporate governance 235
4.5.2 The German model of striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and protection of the interests of the company
and the minority shareholders 236
4.5.2.1 The appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the best
interests of the company 236
4.5.2.2 The trend towards the Anglo-American model of striking a
balance between corporate efficiency and protection of the
interests of the company and the minority shareholders 238
CHAPTER 5. CHINA
5.1 Introduction to Chinese law on derivative actions 241
5.1.1 Background 241
5.1.1.1 The history of Chinese company law 241
5.1.1.2 Characteristics of the regulations on corporate governance in
Chinese company law 244
5.1.1.3 The major agency problems in Chinese companies 247
5.1.1.4 A general review of the protection for minority shareholders
provided by Chinese company law 250
5.1.1.4.1 Sources of Chinese law providing protection for companies
and minority shareholders 250
5.1.1.4.2 Legal protection for minority shareholders prior to Company
Law 2006 252
5.1.1.4.2.1 General characteristics 252
5.1.1.4.2.2 Company Law 1994 252
5.1.1.4.2.3 Other legislation 255
5.1.1.4.2.4 The SPC's judicial interpretations 255
5.1.1.4.2.5 The CSRC's regulations 257
5.1.1.4.3 The new regulations of Company Law 2006: a better position
for the company and minority shareholders 259
5.1.1.4.3.1 Methods of protection in Company Law 2006 259
5.1.1.4.3.2 Defects of Company Law 2006 265
XIX
CONTENTS
5.1.2 The development of derivative action in China 266
5.1.2.1 The development prior to Company Law 2006 266
5.1.2.1.1 Article 111 of Company Law 1994 266
5.1.2.1.2 The application of derivative action by the
courts 267
5.1.2.1.2.1 Practical problems faced by Chinese courts:
the necessity for introducing the mechanism of
derivative action 267
5.1.2.1.2.2 The judicial application of derivative action 268
5.1.2.2 The stipulation in Company Law 2006 272
5.2 The role of derivative action in China 272
5.2.1 Prior to Company Law 2006 272
5.2.2 After Company Law 2006 273
5.2.2.1 Lack of market controls on corporate management 273
5.2.2.2 The influence of legal rules and norms 274
5.2.2.3 The influence of Chinese special situations 275
5.2.2.3.1 The court's ability to hear derivative cases 275
5.2.2.3.2 Attitudes towards derivative actions 276
5.2.2.4 Conclusion 278
5.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between derivative action
and direct action 278
5.3.1 Claims to set aside defective resolutions of a shareholders'
meeting or of the board of directors 279
5.3.2 Claims for damages arising from director (including any
supervisors) and senior officer misconduct 280
5.3.3 Claims for damages arising from shareholder misconduct 282
5.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the
company and the minority shareholders 282
5.4.1 Substantive limitations on the scope of derivative actions 284
5.4.1.1 Whose misconduct may be lead to a derivative action 284
5.4.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that may lead to a
derivative action 285
5.4.2 Procedural restrictions 289
5.4.2.1 The procedure of docketing (li'an) 289
5.4.2.2 The standing requirements 290
5.4.2.3 The demand requirement 292
5.4.3 The independent body's view 294
5.4.4 Incentives for the plaintiff to pursue derivative actions 294
5.4.4.1 Litigation costs 294
5.4.4.2 The attorney's role 298
5.4.5 Limiting directors' financial exposure to the risks and costs
of litigation 298
5.4.6 The 'abuse of rights' doctrine as a method of preventing the
abusive use of derivative actions 299
XX
CONTENTS
5.5 Conclusion 299
5.5.1 The function of derivative action in Chinese corporate
governance 299
5.5.2 The Chinese model for striking a balance between corporate
efficiency and the protection of the interests of the
corporation and its minority shareholders 300
5.5.2.1 The appropriate body for making corporate litigation
decisions 300
5.5.2.2 A fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection
for the company and minority shareholders 300
5.5.2.3 The court's role in derivative actions 301
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
6.1 The function of derivative action 303
6.1.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 303
6.1.2 The purpose of derivative actions in China (suggestions for
China) 307
6.2 The distinction between derivative actions and direct actions 309
6.2.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 309
6.2.2 Suggestions for China 311
6.3 Maintaining a fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection
for the company and minority shareholders 312
6.3.1 General comments 312
6.3.2 The appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the
best interests of the company 313
6.3.2.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 313
6.3.2.2 Suggestions for China 315
6.3.3 The principle of non-judicial interference with corporate
management 316
6.3.3.1 Conclusions from the comparative study of England, the
United States and Germany 316
6.3.3.2 Suggestions for China 318
6.3.4 The procedural requirements for minority shareholders to
bring a derivative action 319
6.3.5 The plaintiff's incentives to initiate a derivative action 319
6.3.6 The court's role in derivative actions 319
XXI
CONTENTS
Summary 321
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 329
Bibliography 337
Table of Selected Cases 353
Table of Selected Statutes 359
Index 363
Acknowledgements 369
XXII |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Li, Xiaoning |
| author_facet | Li, Xiaoning |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Li, Xiaoning |
| author_variant | x l xl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022386204 |
| callnumber-first | K - Law |
| callnumber-label | K1338 |
| callnumber-raw | K1338 |
| callnumber-search | K1338 |
| callnumber-sort | K 41338 |
| callnumber-subject | K - General Law |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)123126223 (DE-599)BVBBV022386204 |
| dewey-full | 346.922 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 346 - Private law |
| dewey-raw | 346.922 |
| dewey-search | 346.922 |
| dewey-sort | 3346.922 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| discipline_str_mv | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02214nam a2200541 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022386204</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20081212 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070413s2007 m||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9013043917</subfield><subfield code="9">90-130-4391-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9789013043914</subfield><subfield code="9">978-90-13-04391-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)123126223</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV022386204</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">K1338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">346.922</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Li, Xiaoning</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions</subfield><subfield code="b">England, the United States, Germany and China</subfield><subfield code="c">Xiaoning Li</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Deventer</subfield><subfield code="b">Kluwer</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXVI, 370 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen</subfield><subfield code="v">56</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zugl.: Groningen, Univ., Diss., 2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Aandeelhouders</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Schadevergoeding</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Vorderingsrecht</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Stockholders' derivative actions</subfield><subfield code="z">China</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Stockholders' derivative actions</subfield><subfield code="z">England</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Stockholders' derivative actions</subfield><subfield code="z">Germany</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Stockholders' derivative actions</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtsvergleich</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4115712-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Aktionär</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4000947-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Nebenklage</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4171379-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Deutschland</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113937-9</subfield><subfield code="a">Hochschulschrift</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Aktionär</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4000947-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Nebenklage</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4171379-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Rechtsvergleich</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4115712-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen</subfield><subfield code="v">56</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002309080</subfield><subfield code="9">56</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015595124&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015595124</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| geographic | Deutschland USA |
| geographic_facet | Deutschland USA |
| id | DE-604.BV022386204 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T17:12:48Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:56:29Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9013043917 9789013043914 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015595124 |
| oclc_num | 123126223 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | XXVI, 370 S. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Kluwer |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen |
| series2 | Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen |
| spelling | Li, Xiaoning Verfasser aut A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China Xiaoning Li Deventer Kluwer 2007 XXVI, 370 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 56 Zugl.: Groningen, Univ., Diss., 2006 Aandeelhouders gtt Schadevergoeding gtt Vorderingsrecht gtt Stockholders' derivative actions China Stockholders' derivative actions England Stockholders' derivative actions Germany Stockholders' derivative actions United States Rechtsvergleich (DE-588)4115712-6 gnd rswk-swf Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 gnd rswk-swf Nebenklage (DE-588)4171379-5 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland USA (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 s Nebenklage (DE-588)4171379-5 s Rechtsvergleich (DE-588)4115712-6 s DE-604 Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 56 (DE-604)BV002309080 56 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015595124&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Li, Xiaoning A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China Uitgaven vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Aandeelhouders gtt Schadevergoeding gtt Vorderingsrecht gtt Stockholders' derivative actions China Stockholders' derivative actions England Stockholders' derivative actions Germany Stockholders' derivative actions United States Rechtsvergleich (DE-588)4115712-6 gnd Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 gnd Nebenklage (DE-588)4171379-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4115712-6 (DE-588)4000947-6 (DE-588)4171379-5 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China |
| title_auth | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China |
| title_exact_search | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China |
| title_exact_search_txtP | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China |
| title_full | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China Xiaoning Li |
| title_fullStr | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China Xiaoning Li |
| title_full_unstemmed | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions England, the United States, Germany and China Xiaoning Li |
| title_short | A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions |
| title_sort | a comparative study of shareholders derivative actions england the united states germany and china |
| title_sub | England, the United States, Germany and China |
| topic | Aandeelhouders gtt Schadevergoeding gtt Vorderingsrecht gtt Stockholders' derivative actions China Stockholders' derivative actions England Stockholders' derivative actions Germany Stockholders' derivative actions United States Rechtsvergleich (DE-588)4115712-6 gnd Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 gnd Nebenklage (DE-588)4171379-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Aandeelhouders Schadevergoeding Vorderingsrecht Stockholders' derivative actions China Stockholders' derivative actions England Stockholders' derivative actions Germany Stockholders' derivative actions United States Rechtsvergleich Aktionär Nebenklage Deutschland USA Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015595124&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002309080 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lixiaoning acomparativestudyofshareholdersderivativeactionsenglandtheunitedstatesgermanyandchina |