Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji: izzivi in priložnosti
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | Slovenian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ljubljana
Fak. za Družbene Vede
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Knjižna zbirka Varnostne študije
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 454 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9612351503 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV022242267 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20070508 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070125s2004 d||| |||| 00||| slv d | ||
| 020 | |a 9612351503 |9 961-235-150-3 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)238817728 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV022242267 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a slv | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 084 | |a 7,41 |2 ssgn | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji |b izzivi in priložnosti |c uredil Marjan Malešič |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ljubljana |b Fak. za Družbene Vede |c 2004 | |
| 300 | |a 454 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Knjižna zbirka Varnostne študije | |
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Krisenmanagement |0 (DE-588)4127374-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Führungslehre |0 (DE-588)4247908-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Zivilschutz |0 (DE-588)4067915-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Slowenien |0 (DE-588)4055302-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |a Aufsatzsammlung |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Slowenien |0 (DE-588)4055302-4 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Krisenmanagement |0 (DE-588)4127374-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Slowenien |0 (DE-588)4055302-4 |D g |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Zivilschutz |0 (DE-588)4067915-9 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 2 | |a Führungslehre |0 (DE-588)4247908-3 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Malešič, Marjan |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015453174 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136234541383680 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | 415
Marjan
SUMMARY
Security and politics in Europe have changed dramatically in the last
years. These changes require a reform of security policy and restructur¬
ing of contemporary states security systems. European states do not
neglect the military aspects of their security in new security and political
milieu. However, greater emphasis is given to non-military threats that
could lead to complex crises. These non-military threats are: natural and
technological disasters, severe social-economic problems, mass migra¬
tions, environmental problems, medical and epidemiological situations,
terrorism, organized crime, arms, dangerous substances, and drug traf¬
ficking. Many recent crises witnessed in the last years were related to
these threats. Comprehensive and consistent approaches to their man¬
agement are required, be it detection, prevention, preparedness, response
or recovery.
As we could see in the research for this volume, Slovenia is not an
exception in this regard. The effective response to the crises that we
experienced in the last decade or so, demanded adequate coordination
between different institutions involved in crisis management, quick and
smooth flow of information, logistic and information support to strategic
decision-making and the availability of proper information to the general
public regarding the consequences of the crisis and the measures taken
to overcome these consequences.
Contemporary complex crises tend to produce negative cross-national
effects, meaning that their prevention, management and consequences
should be addressed internationally. It is fair to say that we have wit¬
nessed substantial multilateral and bilateral international cooperation in
the field of crisis management in the last years. The globalisation process
and regional integration processes stimulate contemporary governments
to cooperate in the field of crisis management, be it on the multilateral
level (in the framework of UN,
eral one, through agreements between different countries. In addition to
the practitioners who cooperate at the operational level, there is an ever¬
growing tendency in the
processes, consequences and management of various natural or man-
made disasters that produce crises. One of the research projects promot¬
ing international cooperation in this field is Crisis Management Europe,
led by Swedish CRISMART (Crisis Management Research and Training).
The Defence Research Centre of the University of Ljubljana joined this
pan-European research programme in
416
The cooperation within the project Crisis Management Europe could
have many positive international and national impacts: The possibility of
forming a lobby of countries which could, in the context of the
tionalisation
EU
and the possibility of applying methodological procedures in the field of
civil defence and civil protection at the national level: The possibility of
comparing the empirical results obtained at the national level with
empirical results obtained in other countries involved in the programme
is explored. The possibility of identifying typical patterns of crisis
management in all involved countries and specific features of crisis man¬
agement at the national level: An opportunity to learn from mutual expe¬
riences in the field of crisis management; and fostering of inter-institu¬
tional research cooperation among countries involved in the research
programme.
The purpose of the research programme was to stimulate scientists
and researchers on one hand, and a wide circle of practitioners on the
other hand, in order to start more comprehensive and deliberate dealings
with the field of crisis management. The main guidance was that the
majority of experts accept new theoretical basis and research methods,
use them to explore different cases, obtain new knowledge and experi¬
ences, and create better conditions for civil crisis planning and crisis
management in Slovenia. The formation of research group was done in
this spirit and consists of professionals from the academic sphere and
the national security system, which overcomes the classical scheme of
commissioner-performer relationship and facilitates the transfer of
empirical results into everyday practice.
Apart from general positive effects on international research coopera¬
tion, as mentioned above, we anticipated some practical results in the ini¬
tial phase of the research: to obtain new theoretical and practical concep¬
tions, to adopt and apply crisis management research method in
Slovenia, to deepen the contacts with corresponding crisis management
institution abroad and to exchange experiences, to enhance crisis man¬
agement practises in the country to the level of most developed
NATO countries in this field, to create unified methodology for crisis
management research in different crisis cases, and to form concrete pro¬
posals and advices for practical activity in the field of crisis management.
Theoretical approach and methodology
By joining the Crisis Management Europe research programme, we
accepted basic theoretical assumptions and methodological approach
provided by CRISMART. Our empirical research is based on an under-
SUMMARY
standing of crisis as a subjective situation, in which basic values are
threatened, it is marked with uncertainty, and actors make decisions
under high time pressure. The decision-makers in the time of crisis
should recognise that decisions have cross-sector impacts and that mis¬
takes should therefore be avoided. The applicability of previous experi¬
ences and resources is limited in each new crisis, whereas the informa¬
tion available is likely to be scarce, redundant or inaccurate. As it
develops, a crisis produces new signs and characteristics, which require
strict internal and external control of decisions made. The decision-mak¬
ers are under constant stress, with little chances for rest and relaxation.
Taking into consideration the fact that we should explore the cognitive
capacity of people involved in crisis decision-making and the institution¬
al framework in which the decisions are made, we applied a cognitive-
institutional research approach to crisis decision-making. We used four-
level model of exploring various cases:
1.
cultural and institutional context,
2.
3.
and
4.
comprehensive entity and not only as a sum of its specific sequences.
We selected
dence war,
Posočje
apartment building in
1998,
Velenje enterprise,
and Y2K problem in Slovenia,
All these cases were explored using several analytical themes:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
It is evident that all selected cases do not provide the complexity needed
to be explored through all analytical themes. Nevertheless, all cases
allow us to thoroughly explore several analytical themes. The methods
418
we used most frequently were official document content analysis, mass
media content analysis, analysis of secondary sources and data, and
individual and group interviews. By selecting cases and themes, we actu¬
ally created a matrix that allows us not only to have a thorough insight
into the individual cases (through analytical themes), but also to explore
the analytical themes through various cases.
Specific findings
Various historical and cultural peculiarities, as well as natural, technolog¬
ical and geopolitical facts have required the authorities of Slovenia to
create and develop a rather sustainable and effective crisis management
system. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of room to improve the crisis
management strategies and to integrate various ostensibly separated
fields of crisis planning and preparedness. We believe that inserting the
lessons and experiences from previous crises into the cognitive frame¬
work of today s crisis management is an important task. Here are some
findings brought about by the analysis of selected cases:
The report on the war in Slovenia in
context, chronology of events, depiction of preventive activities, and pre¬
paredness. However, the report also included the analysis of two impor¬
tant decisions: The decision to block military objects and crucial commu¬
nications, and the decision to alert the population regarding the possible
air raid of Yugoslav People s Army
The war in Slovenia is one of the most complex crises in modern
Slovenian history. That was particularly true, since Slovenia did not enter
the armed conflict, which determined this crisis, as an internationally
recognized state with all attributes of statehood. The war violently began
the process of state, political, economic and security reforms. Despite
this fact, the preparations to cope with the possibility of violent collapse
of Yugoslavia started rather early in Slovenia. That was a consequence of
the timely perception of potential crisis on the part of political and
bureaucratic elite in Slovenia. However, despite the signals that were
coming from the Yugoslav surroundings
of JNA s legitimacy, Serbian economic warfare against Slovenia, seizure
of Territorial Defence weapons by
people in Slovenia.
The above mentioned war preparations were successful and made
possible for the authorities to create a modified system of total people s
defence , which did not give the primacy to military defence, but equally
took into account the military and non-military defence precautions.
This approach made possible the coordination of preparations in mili¬
tary, economic, psychological, civilian-based, intelligence, and other
SUMMARY
defence fields. In the war, such a structure of preparations enabled the
Slovenian authorities to apply asymmetric warfare, allowing the use of
its own advantages and opponent s disadvantages, and leaving a lot of
space to political negotiations.
Two cases of decisions that were thoroughly explored in the research
project, i.e. blocking of military objects and crucial communications, and
alerting the population regarding the possible air raid proved the success
of the preparations. The first experience has, nowadays, a limited value
due to changed security circumstances and security system of the coun¬
try, whereas the second one heavily influenced the reform of civil protec¬
tion system. The system was de-centralized, special state intervention
units were introduced, the notification system was reformed, and some
structure and leadership related changes occurred.
The case of NATO s air attacks against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in
nians in Kosovo, the so called Kosovo crisis, was not a typical crisis for
Slovenia, because it did not take place on the territory of Slovenia. How¬
ever, the crisis had indirect security and other implications that forced
the Slovenian authorities to adopt some measures. The analysis revealed
that the crisis gave enough time to crisis management actors to make the
needed preparations. They were successful at the individual actor level;
however, the coordination among them was rather poor. The way of mak¬
ing decisions did not change during the crisis
ment actors dealt with the crisis in the framework of their regular tasks
and competences.
The Kosovo crisis did not bring about different perceptions and presen¬
tations among various actors in Slovenia (population, bureaucracy, gov¬
ernment and parliament), which was the basis for relatively unified treat¬
ment of crisis and the absence of political-organisational conflicts. As far
as the crisis and its implications to Slovenia were concerned, the authori¬
ties were sending calming and balanced messages to the public. The
entire top state structure was involved in following the crisis. Further¬
more, all necessary precautions in the field of border control, protection
of important personalities and objects, and counter-terrorism were intro¬
duced. Due to its nature, the crisis did not make a high time pressure on
the decision makers.
Despite the fact that the Kosovo crisis was atypical for Slovenia, it
brought about some useful experiences, such as the necessity of timely
preparations, adequate documentation of events, processes and reac¬
tions to them, creating broader political consensus in crisis when dealing
with politically sensible crises, and the necessity of immediate coopera¬
tion and harmonic action of crisis management actors.
In Slovenia, the computer transition to year
Despite this fact, we analysed the events related to the publishing of pub-
420
lie warning regarding the possible difficulties of computer transition,
which we named the
media was a subject of an attack by the same mass media, blaming the
civil protection and disaster relief authorities that they unnecessarily
triggered panic reaction of the population. That was a typical problem of
crisis communication, which refers to the issue of alerting the population
in case of danger in general, and, in particular, the role of the mass
media in this process. Even more so due to the fact that similar warnings
regarding possible Y2K problems were released in other countries, but
without any consequent troubles. In Slovenia, the latter were related to
underestimation of computer transition to year
necessity of warning the public on possible consequences, and uncoordi¬
nated action of government agencies, which did not fully support the
state Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief. The case
also revealed the underestimation of importance of public relations in a
(potential) crisis and the absence of well-established communication
practice.
The analysis of Posocje earthquake offers a general judgement that,
despite some difficulties and deficiencies, the crisis management system
functioned relatively effectively. The system displayed the necessary flex¬
ibility, whereas some crisis management actors displayed a lot of self-
sacrifice and high level of solidarity with affected people. However, the
experience of an earthquake exposed some issues, such as consistent
earthquake-safe construction, thorough reconstruction of buildings and
infrastructure after the disaster, necessity of in-dept and intensive train¬
ing of crisis management actors, review of their functional coordination
and delineation of their competences.
The decision-making problem was a double responsibility of civil pro¬
tection commander at the municipal level: He was concurrently account¬
able to the mayor and to the subordinate civil protection commander. In
this category of difficulties, we could also place the fact that the incident
commander for the entire affected region was not appointed at all,
whereas at the level of affected municipalities that role was
assumed by the civil protection commanders, who also consulted mayors
and members of civil protection staff regarding crucial decisions.
Crisis communication was a weak point of crisis management. It start¬
ed with rather late notification of the public about the disaster. Regard¬
less of this fact, the local crisis management system was activated on the
basis of information collected by the local police, the fire brigade and the
affected individuals. The notification of affected people was rather poor
and caused dissatisfaction and frustration among them, and their pres¬
sure on the state commissions, who were checking the adequacy of
buildings for living and estimating the damage. The media relations were
also not productive enough and consequently, the crisis management
system did not gain full public support during the operation. The
SUMMARY
enee
the mass media is the basis for the success of the operation. Some com¬
munication problems were also identified within the crisis management
system; namely, some of the crisis managers in the field were not appro¬
priately trained to use the technical equipment.
Floods in
was not easy to deal with, especially due to the absence of proper pre¬
ventive measures in the hydro-economic field. The floods, which were
worst at the confluence of rivers and torrents, were accompanied by the
flooding of underground waters through the canalisation system, snow¬
ing in valleys, and even a low-scale earthquake. The analysis revealed
that even perfect disaster management could not compensate what was
missed in the preventive phase. Problematic interventions in the envi¬
ronment, such as the construction of buildings and communications in
flooding areas, uncontrolled exploration of forests, inadequate mainte¬
nance of forest roads, and unsatisfactory regulation of torrents, increase
the possibility of floods and the damage they cause.
We also witnessed many difficulties in crisis management itself.
Hydro-meteorological information system could not provide prompt
information and, as a consequence, provisional local information system
was established. The shortage of professionals and technical equipment
was acute, and the list of crisis management priorities was created,
which produced a lot of dissatisfaction in the mass media and in the
public. The problems could be overcome with more intensive inter-
municipal and inter-regional cooperation and with more intensive
involvement of state civil protection forces and the military. The latter
was included in crisis management rather late, although the Slovenian
Army wanted to help and the affected people expected them to help, but
the civilian authorities estimated that military help was not necessary.
One of the serious problems lies in the fact that some institutions
responsible for crisis management were also affected, which raises a con¬
ventional question: How can a victim help a victim?
Fire in
of a rather innovative crisis management, both at the operational level at
the time of fire brigade intervention and in the recovery phase. However,
the analysis of the crisis made by the fire brigade focused on the concor¬
dance of firemen activities with the rules of engagement and less on the
experiences that could be part of organisational learning. On the con¬
trary, the company managers used the analysis of crisis primarily for
organisational learning, which, as a consequence, brought a thorough
revision of fire safety, installation of fire notification system in all compa¬
ny premises, and the limitation of access to unauthorized persons with¬
out a proper escort provided by the company. Focusing on the structural
mistakes of the system, rather than searching for the individuals that
422
could be blamed for crisis management of related difficulties, enabled
the company to create the measures that assure long-term high-level fire
safety.
Fire in
fact that the fire brigade received the information on the fire relatively
late and that, when they arrived at the fire scene, they received false
information regarding the situation in the burning building, which made
their operation much more complicated. A correlation between the lack
of timely and accurate information on one hand, and wrong perceptions
and high level of stress among crisis managers on the other hand, was
more than evident. The fire warned about a necessity and usefulness of
common exercises of professional and volunteer firemen, and the trans¬
fer of experiences to the crisis management process. As far as incident
commander was concerned, some local peculiarities were practiced, this
time without any troubles in the inter-organisational cooperation of
actors involved.
The crisis showed that professionalism and trust were the basic crite¬
ria for unconditional fulfilment of orders and for the success of the inter¬
vention. The question of time, in case of fire, is mainly the question of
reaction time. Whereas the reaction time of coastal professional fire
brigade is satisfactory, the volunteer fire societies do not react in the
same fashion during the day due to the fact that many firemen are
employed in different enterprises and institutions in the morning and
early afternoon.
The relationship between the mass media and crisis management
structures was also rather tense in this case. The interests of the mass
media building in
agement at all levels and in and crisis managers in the time of a crisis are
evidently different; therefore, there is a need to find some common
points. The relationship of the fire brigade
is a formal one
to create a national and local public relations strategy is crucial for the
success of crisis management.
Gas explosion in an apartment all aspects. Some solutions were not institu¬
tionalised; they were based upon personal characteristics of decision-
makers, their experiences, knowledge, instant ideas, and common sense.
The same could be said for the coordination and information solutions,
meaning the creation of two ad hoc coordination committees and infor¬
mation centre. The analysis exposed the importance of harmonic percep¬
tion, unified opinion and picture of the situation. Crisis management
actors saw the accident as serious from the very beginning, and the
result of unified perception of the accident was adequate use of
resources, equal attention paid to the event by the political and adminis-
SUMMARY
trative layers of the municipality, and coordinated work. Proactive behav¬
iour of the crisis management actors also helped greatly, since they were
able to escalate and deescalate dealing with the crisis at the political-
administrative level. The actors had a constant control of the process;
therefore, the mass media and sporadic events did not push them into
making decisions, on the contrary, they had the initiative.
Symbolic acts also played an important role in crisis management. The
arrival of two important persons, the commander of city civil protection
and the mayor at the scene was a sign that the accident was regarded as
major and serious, and that had a positive symbolic and calming effect
on the affected people.
Crisis communication was a success. First official information was
provided by the mayor at the improvised press conference at the disaster
scene. It was followed by the regular press conferences that were the
major source of information and therefore, there was no need for the
media to search for information elsewhere. The affected people received
the information from the information system established at the scene,
whereas crisis managers communicated through the city coordinating
committee.
Collapse of Kolizej building in Ljubljana occurred in early
new system of local self-management was introduced. That caused a lot
of difficulties in the town region where some municipalities disappeared
and some new appeared. New local authorities were created, assuming
responsibilities and tasks. Many people exchanged their positions in the
local governments. The division of power and competences between the
state and the local communities took place and new approaches and
acquaintance with new tasks were required from many local officials.
Many changes occurred in the field of civil protection and disaster relief,
where local community in the town of Ljubljana could not provide
enough qualified personnel to deal with disasters. All these changes
influenced the crisis management activities when the Kolizej building
collapsed.
The intervention after the collapse of the building was first seen as
ordinary ; however, later on it transformed into a serious problem. The
accommodation of the affected people and the coordination of different
crisis management actors from different levels that have just assumed
their posts seemed to be the most demanding tasks. None of the civil
protection staff managed to meet in full number, while the majority of
their tasks were accomplished by the professional services of local and
state administrations. The latter could play a more prominent role in the
early stages of future disasters. The event warned that the role of civil
protection commander and staff should be reconsidered.
The communication with the mass media was the most critical and
poorly accomplished task. At that time, the mayor of the town did not
424
have his own public relations service, whereas a member of civil protec¬
tion staff responsible for media relations was not present at the scene of
disaster. The mass media was allowed to move almost freely at the scene,
which caused a relatively contradictory and one-sided reporting. The
absence of public relations strategy forced the media to search for infor¬
mation on their own, which produced incomplete and biased reporting.
Some mass media had quite a sensational approach to the disaster. Once
again, the accident proved that the importance of adequate crisis com¬
munication could not be overstressed.
Oil spill at Ortnek warehouse in
the disaster with such broad dimensions occurred at all. Municipal civil
protection staff in a nearby town Ribnica was cognisant of the potential
danger, but it did not have an insight into the quality of maintenance of
the warehouse. Many deficiencies were discovered after the disaster.
We can start with the perception of the crisis. The employees of the
company S-trade responsible for the oil warehouse noticed the oil spill,
but made a judgement that it was a small one, not too dangerous and
controllable. They decided not to report it. This decision influenced fur¬
ther organisation of intervention and recovery. It especially influenced
the reaction time of intervention services and it dramatically limited the
adoption of all subsequent decisions. The company S-trade did not main¬
tain the warehouse according to the standards for flammable substances
and it did not have the basic equipment required.
The intervention was characterised with improvisation, whereas the
lack of information on the quantity of oil in question hampered the pre¬
vention of further pollution. On the other hand, high motivation of crisis
management actors, fruitful improvisation, good coordination of all
human and material resources, effective leadership and command,
improved the quality of intervention, which was successful at the end.
Two general remarks could be made as well: First, Carst region with
limy stone and a lot of underground waters is not suitable at all to store
oil and other dangerous substances. Second, environmental issues are
not solved in a satisfactory fashion in the Slovenian legal documents,
although the situation is improving quickly due to the
2004.
General findings
In the previous chapter we introduced the selected findings offered by
the examined cases. We will continue by presenting some general con¬
clusions that, together with specific ones, provide the basis for the
improvement and upgrading of crisis management system in Slovenia:
1.
SUMMARY
do not take all precautions needed to cope with them. The fact is that some
measures to be taken are too costly: for example in the case of floods,
there is a huge hydro-economic project needed to prevent them; how¬
ever, at the same time, it is true that people approached rivers despite
the warnings and they built houses and even enterprises in threatened
areas. In the case of an earthquake, the only effective prevention is
safe construction, which is too late at least for buildings older than
years. Namely, the very first safe construction act was adopted in the
former Yugoslavia when the country experienced two devastating
earthquakes in the sixties. However, in the case of Kosovo crisis, the
course of events was predictable, but suitable preparedness of the
state bodies was not reached.
2.
diction with the rules and planned procedures. There was a lot of shifting
or simply assuming responsibility, improvisations, and ad hoc solu¬
tions. E.g. Civil Protection commander could appoint an incident com¬
mander to deal with the crisis on the ground; however, in two cases
the Civil Protection commander simply took over and led the interven¬
tion, while neglecting his coordination function. In one case, there
were two incident commanders operating concurrently. In another
case, there were two of them operating successively. And finally, in
one case there was nobody specifically appointed as an incident com¬
mander. However, it seems that the quality of people involved in crisis
management was more important for the success of the operation
than simply following the rules and formal procedures.
3.
ple who have already experienced a similar disaster, or more of them,
are prone to develop a so called crisis subculture and they are able to
perceive the threat in due time, take necessary measures, and assume
crisis roles . That was the case of floods and earthquake that repeat¬
ed in the same area
in the case of the oil spill, the employees in the warehouse, being with¬
out previous experience, did not perceive it as an accident and they
thought they would handle it on their own. Unfortunately, they were
wrong and it took
accident occurred. The underground waters in Carst area have already
been polluted. In the case of Kolizej building collapse in Ljubljana, the
accident was perceived in a smaller scope than it actually occurred.
4.
however, the relationship between different actors on the disaster site
was not always clear enough. The mix of local, regional, state, military
and non-governmental actors sometimes produces a certain degree of
tension and confusion regarding the responsibility and competencies.
In the case of a minor local disaster, which involves only local actors,
the cooperation is much better, because it is based upon the acquain-
426
tance
the so-called local practices , which do not necessarily correspond to
the legal solutions, but they are functional as long as the crisis is local.
In the case of a regional or state disaster, the cooperation or simply
composing of different local practices among themselves with regional
and state actors might be difficult.
5.
and defence resource activation for the purpose of protection, rescuing
and help, if the available civilian forces and resources do not suffice,
and the military is not performing other military tasks. However, it
seems that civilian authorities are reluctant to ask the military for help
in case of a disaster, while the expectations of affected people are
rather high in this respect. We witnessed such situation during the
floods, in which the military were in the barracks and they couldn t
help the people in the neighbouring apartment buildings, because the
civilian authorities did not ask them to do so. The military was finally
activated, but mainly participated in the recovery phase of the crisis.
In the case of the earthquake, the military help was promised on Sun¬
day when the disaster occurred, whereas the limited military help
came a few days later, on Wednesday.
6.
tant, especially in revealing the deficiencies of the system and creating
public pressure to improve the situation. It seems that the mass media
themselves play an ambivalent role in this process
an opportunity for the mass media to enlarge the audience or increase
the intensity of media attention, while on the other hand, the mass
media are, according to the law, part of crisis management
expected to help in mitigating severe consequences brought about by
the crisis (see
out a doubt, it is extremely desirable that the mass media find the ade¬
quate balance between their business (profit) interest and crisis com¬
munication role.
7.
affected people with the outside , normal surroundings, which helped
them in psychological terms: people knew they were not alone in their
unfortunate destiny, the affected people were able to communicate
their problems to the broader audience, there was a lot of readiness
among the citizens to provide help, and media reported about that.
Another important fact was that the flow of information, which
reached the affected people, reduced a sense of uncertainty among them,
and consequently reduced the level of fear, often induced by such uncer¬
tainty. Nevertheless, the media interviews with the affected people
revealed they lacked prompt, concrete and accurate information
released by a credible (local and state administration) source. Hence,
we face at least one ostensible contradiction or information paradox
SUMMARY
a lot of information provided by the media on one hand, and the lack
of information by the affected people on the other hand. It means that
in a crisis, the quality and source
8.
lems and difficulties on the scene of the disaster. Although state repre¬
sentatives claimed that some information was actually disinformation,
some mass media continued to use it in order to make their case of
incompetent authorities dealing with the crisis. The state also
entered a vicious circle in relation to the media
tives offered promises and deadlines to the affected people that were
not realistic and were not fulfilled. Media gladly used that fact to criti¬
cise the state , resulting in unrealistic promises by state representa¬
tives. Many mutual accusations were expressed in several explored
cases, most notably in the cases of Y2K crisis, earthquake, floods and
fire in
ed, the media created an impression that crisis management was
much better in the past than in the present. The syntagm ideal past vs.
chaotic present could be applied here, although the reality displayed
that there were a lot of difficulties (if not more) in past crisis manage¬
ment, as well.
9.
seen above, the relationship between the authorities and the media is
far from ideal. Y2K case and
were the cases to prove that. There were also difficulties in crisis com¬
munication between the crisis managers of different government sec¬
tors and various levels of political organisation (local, regional and
state). The analysis revealed that some crisis managers were also not
appropriately trained to use their personal communication devices,
especially designed for crisis management.
10.
in some of them (earthquake and floods) it seemed that other coun¬
tries respected international obligations and solidarity did work.
Sometimes, the neighbouring and other countries offered even more
help than needed in a certain case. It seems that the level of
tionalisation
some crises are not severe and are of local scope, others affect regions,
and some of them even an entire country. A political crisis, such as the
war in Slovenia in
international dimension. As far as war is concerned, we could say that
the international actors, individual states and organisations, con¬
tributed a lot to the relatively quick and smooth solution of the crisis.
However, not only the attitude of the international actors, who
canalised and limited the behaviour of belligerent parties, was impor¬
tant in crisis management, but also the favourable circumstances in
the international community in general
428
of Europe, the unification of East and West Germany, the collapse of
Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Not to mention
the general trend of political, law, value, and economic
tion
11.
tioned already that Slovenian crisis management system is in a rather
good condition. On the other hand, timely reactions are one of the
fields where the system could be improved. In the case of the earth¬
quake, the authorities needed one hour to notify the professional and
general public that a disaster occurred. Italian mass media reported
about the earthquake before our civil protection authorities even new
about it. In the case of Ortnek oil spill, the employees needed
to recognise that they were not able to deal with the accident on their
own and to notify the authorities. Fire in
minutes for the fire brigade to arrive to the accident site; however, the
building has been burning for at least
brigade was notified. In some cases, timely reaction is crucial for the
survival of people and protection of material commodities
pressure requires concurrent decision-making full of tensions and
stress for the decision-makers. Other cases bring low time pressure
and give a possibility for consecutive decision-making, which allows
contemplation and choice of adequate decisions. In all cases, time is
crucial in the recovery phase. The recovery phases of
and floods have not been finished yet. And many disasters occurred
afterwards.
12.
of crisis management, whereas, we often neglect the political-symbolic
dimension of the process. The cases we explored offered a lot of action
and inaction that had symbolic value: e.g. the immediate arrival of
high state or local officials and politicians to the disaster scene had a
high symbolic value with a positive psychological impact and vice
versa, if politicians did not arrive or arrived rather late to the disaster
scene, or if they did not even make a phone call, then, the symbolic
message to the affected area was rather poor. In the case of a gas
explosion in
civil protection commander ordered a bus as an instant solution to
accommodate the affected people, he also decided to organize an
information service in a nearby apartment building, and positive psy¬
chological effects were more than evident. In the case of
quake, it was important what kind of signs and colours should the cri¬
sis managers use in order to designate the damaged buildings,
because people still recalled those signs from previous experience
avoid confusion and worries, it was important to use the same signs
and colours as
ter management also had positive impact on the feelings of affected
summary
people. Therefore, it is important to combine the (prevalent) function¬
al and (supplementary) constructivist approaches in order to grasp the
crisis in its complex and comprehensive nature.
13.
reports from the affected area. Many reports warned that the context of
solidarity has changed due to the thorough political and economic
reform that occurred in Slovenia in the early nineties of the 20th centu¬
ry. Nevertheless, the content of media reports were frequently personal
experiences of affected people, their uncertain destinies and misery.
The aim of such editorial policy was most probably not only simply to
report, but also to trigger the compassion among the readers and to
stimulate them to help the victims. Such reports were often followed by
the bank account numbers, where financial help was collected. Interna¬
tional solidarity was reported by the media as well, namely, all neigh¬
bouring and some other countries offered immediate help to Slovenia.
The offered help was not always in conformity with the needs; there¬
fore, the government made a list of crucial items. The mass media was
critical due to the fact that state authorities sometimes complicated too
much with procedures and delayed the process of obtaining the help
from abroad. In the case of
huge scope of solidarity as far as donors, forms and types of help were
concerned. There was help coming from the international community,
the Slovenian state bodies, enterprises and banks, the citizens of Slove¬
nia helped. The affected people and their relatives showed solidarity to
each other, and finally, the state authorities introduced a special soli¬
darity tax paid by all employed and retired citizens of Slovenia. The
public accepted it as a coercive solidarity, especially due to the fact that
many people have helped already before the solidarity tax was dis¬
cussed and adopted by the Parliament. It is interesting to mention that
individuals, enterprises, and institutions offered mainly financial and
material help, while psychological help was neglected in the process,
although the victims of the disaster would sometimes need only a visit,
symbolic help or friendly conversation.
To conclude, it seems that every disaster brings about a clear picture of
society and its readiness to cope with the crisis in a broader sense. Do we
have adequate stand-by mechanisms to cope with the crisis, do we have
budget reserves to cover the immediate costs, are material reserves avail¬
able, is community well organised and prepared to cope with the crisis,
are crisis management solutions adequate and efficient, is research poli¬
cy adopted to the needs of the community in severe times, do people,
institutions and enterprises express enough material and also less tangi¬
ble solidarity with the affected area? It seems that fair answers to all
these questions could have a cathartic effect on the society, allowing it to
emerge better from the crisis.
430
Lessons learned in the explored cases could be of a great benefit for
the crisis management system of Slovenia; however, it is important to
emphasize that the lessons should not only be learned, but also applied
in crisis management practice. As a result of preliminary research find¬
ings, some crisis management dimensions have already been improved:
the authorities became more prone to deal with and invest into hydro-
economic measures to prevent floods, the earthquake recovery phase is
slow and financially demanding, but, as a consequence of the previous
experience, it is thorough and with long-term positive effects. New earth¬
quake monitoring stations have been installed since. Environmental dis¬
asters forced the authorities to create a national programme on environ¬
mental protection and to adopt the environment protection act. Local
attitude toward the oil warehouse in Ortnek is different today
tants are regularly informed about the situation through the local media,
the notification system has improved, and the local fire brigades are
equipped and trained to deal with potential environmental disasters in
the Carst area. Fires in the coastal area and the damage caused, forced
the regional authorities to develop a fire prevention system. Coastal fire
brigade grew in numbers and the training curriculum was enhanced,
including psychological treatment of firemen in post-crisis phase. Crisis
management plans are constantly updated, although our analysis
revealed that the plan, as a document, is of limited value in crisis; howev¬
er, planning as a process proved to be extremely important. The very fact
that crisis managers were a new and crucial element of the plan, that
they were trained and equipped according to it, helped a substantially to
increase the crisis management success.
KAZALO
PREDGOVOR
UVOD
I.
PREUČEVANJA KRIZE
П.
Ш.
NA ZRJ-IMPLIKACIJE ZA SLOVENIJO
IV.
RAČUNALNIŠKEGA PREHODA
V.
VI.
VII.
Vín.
SEPTEMBRA
IX.
V
X.
XI.
SKLEP
SUMMARY
DODATEK:
KRIZNEGA UPRAVLJANJA
STVARNO
OAVTORJIH
|
| adam_txt |
415
Marjan
SUMMARY
Security and politics in Europe have changed dramatically in the last
years. These changes require a reform of security policy and restructur¬
ing of contemporary states' security systems. European states do not
neglect the military aspects of their security in new security and political
milieu. However, greater emphasis is given to non-military threats that
could lead to complex crises. These non-military threats are: natural and
technological disasters, severe social-economic problems, mass migra¬
tions, environmental problems, medical and epidemiological situations,
terrorism, organized crime, arms, dangerous substances, and drug traf¬
ficking. Many recent crises witnessed in the last years were related to
these threats. Comprehensive and consistent approaches to their man¬
agement are required, be it detection, prevention, preparedness, response
or recovery.
As we could see in the research for this volume, Slovenia is not an
exception in this regard. The effective response to the crises that we
experienced in the last decade or so, demanded adequate coordination
between different institutions involved in crisis management, quick and
smooth flow of information, logistic and information support to strategic
decision-making and the availability of proper information to the general
public regarding the consequences of the crisis and the measures taken
to overcome these consequences.
Contemporary complex crises tend to produce negative cross-national
effects, meaning that their prevention, management and consequences
should be addressed internationally. It is fair to say that we have wit¬
nessed substantial multilateral and bilateral international cooperation in
the field of crisis management in the last years. The globalisation process
and regional integration processes stimulate contemporary governments
to cooperate in the field of crisis management, be it on the multilateral
level (in the framework of UN,
eral one, through agreements between different countries. In addition to
the practitioners who cooperate at the operational level, there is an ever¬
growing tendency in the
processes, consequences and management of various natural or man-
made disasters that produce crises. One of the research projects promot¬
ing international cooperation in this field is Crisis Management Europe,
led by Swedish CRISMART (Crisis Management Research and Training).
The Defence Research Centre of the University of Ljubljana joined this
pan-European research programme in
416
The cooperation within the project Crisis Management Europe could
have many positive international and national impacts: The possibility of
forming a lobby of countries which could, in the context of the
tionalisation
EU
and the possibility of applying methodological procedures in the field of
civil defence and civil protection at the national level: The possibility of
comparing the empirical results obtained at the national level with
empirical results obtained in other countries involved in the programme
is explored. The possibility of identifying typical patterns of crisis
management in all involved countries and specific features of crisis man¬
agement at the national level: An opportunity to learn from mutual expe¬
riences in the field of crisis management; and fostering of inter-institu¬
tional research cooperation among countries involved in the research
programme.
The purpose of the research programme was to stimulate scientists
and researchers on one hand, and a wide circle of practitioners on the
other hand, in order to start more comprehensive and deliberate dealings
with the field of crisis management. The main guidance was that the
majority of experts accept new theoretical basis and research methods,
use them to explore different cases, obtain new knowledge and experi¬
ences, and create better conditions for civil crisis planning and crisis
management in Slovenia. The formation of research group was done in
this spirit and consists of professionals from the academic sphere and
the national security system, which overcomes the classical scheme of
commissioner-performer relationship and facilitates the transfer of
empirical results into everyday practice.
Apart from general positive effects on international research coopera¬
tion, as mentioned above, we anticipated some practical results in the ini¬
tial phase of the research: to obtain new theoretical and practical concep¬
tions, to adopt and apply crisis management research method in
Slovenia, to deepen the contacts with corresponding crisis management
institution abroad and to exchange experiences, to enhance crisis man¬
agement practises in the country to the level of most developed
NATO countries in this field, to create unified methodology for crisis
management research in different crisis cases, and to form concrete pro¬
posals and advices for practical activity in the field of crisis management.
Theoretical approach and methodology
By joining the Crisis Management Europe research programme, we
accepted basic theoretical assumptions and methodological approach
provided by CRISMART. Our empirical research is based on an under-
SUMMARY
standing of crisis as a subjective situation, in which basic values are
threatened, it is marked with uncertainty, and actors make decisions
under high time pressure. The decision-makers in the time of crisis
should recognise that decisions have cross-sector impacts and that mis¬
takes should therefore be avoided. The applicability of previous experi¬
ences and resources is limited in each new crisis, whereas the informa¬
tion available is likely to be scarce, redundant or inaccurate. As it
develops, a crisis produces new signs and characteristics, which require
strict internal and external control of decisions made. The decision-mak¬
ers are under constant stress, with little chances for rest and relaxation.
Taking into consideration the fact that we should explore the cognitive
capacity of people involved in crisis decision-making and the institution¬
al framework in which the decisions are made, we applied a cognitive-
institutional research approach to crisis decision-making. We used four-
level model of exploring various cases:
1.
cultural and institutional context,
2.
3.
and
4.
comprehensive entity and not only as a sum of its specific sequences.
We selected
dence war,
Posočje
apartment building in
1998,
Velenje enterprise,
and Y2K problem in Slovenia,
All these cases were explored using several analytical themes:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
It is evident that all selected cases do not provide the complexity needed
to be explored through all analytical themes. Nevertheless, all cases
allow us to thoroughly explore several analytical themes. The methods
418
we used most frequently were official document content analysis, mass
media content analysis, analysis of secondary sources and data, and
individual and group interviews. By selecting cases and themes, we actu¬
ally created a matrix that allows us not only to have a thorough insight
into the individual cases (through analytical themes), but also to explore
the analytical themes through various cases.
Specific findings
Various historical and cultural peculiarities, as well as natural, technolog¬
ical and geopolitical facts have required the authorities of Slovenia to
create and develop a rather sustainable and effective crisis management
system. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of room to improve the crisis
management strategies and to integrate various ostensibly separated
fields of crisis planning and preparedness. We believe that inserting the
lessons and experiences from previous crises into the cognitive frame¬
work of today's crisis management is an important task. Here are some
findings brought about by the analysis of selected cases:
The report on the war in Slovenia in
context, chronology of events, depiction of preventive activities, and pre¬
paredness. However, the report also included the analysis of two impor¬
tant decisions: The decision to block military objects and crucial commu¬
nications, and the decision to alert the population regarding the possible
air raid of Yugoslav People's Army
The war in Slovenia is one of the most complex crises in modern
Slovenian history. That was particularly true, since Slovenia did not enter
the armed conflict, which determined this crisis, as an internationally
recognized state with all attributes of statehood. The war violently began
the process of state, political, economic and security reforms. Despite
this fact, the preparations to cope with the possibility of violent collapse
of Yugoslavia started rather early in Slovenia. That was a consequence of
the timely perception of potential crisis on the part of political and
bureaucratic elite in Slovenia. However, despite the signals that were
coming from the Yugoslav surroundings
of JNA's legitimacy, Serbian economic warfare against Slovenia, seizure
of Territorial Defence weapons by
people in Slovenia.
The above mentioned war preparations were successful and made
possible for the authorities to create a modified system of "total people's
defence", which did not give the primacy to military defence, but equally
took into account the military and non-military defence precautions.
This approach made possible the coordination of preparations in mili¬
tary, economic, psychological, civilian-based, intelligence, and other
SUMMARY
defence fields. In the war, such a structure of preparations enabled the
Slovenian authorities to apply asymmetric warfare, allowing the use of
its own advantages and opponent's disadvantages, and leaving a lot of
space to political negotiations.
Two cases of decisions that were thoroughly explored in the research
project, i.e. blocking of military objects and crucial communications, and
alerting the population regarding the possible air raid proved the success
of the preparations. The first experience has, nowadays, a limited value
due to changed security circumstances and security system of the coun¬
try, whereas the second one heavily influenced the reform of civil protec¬
tion system. The system was de-centralized, special state intervention
units were introduced, the notification system was reformed, and some
structure and leadership related changes occurred.
The case of NATO's air attacks against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in
nians in Kosovo, the so called Kosovo crisis, was not a typical crisis for
Slovenia, because it did not take place on the territory of Slovenia. How¬
ever, the crisis had indirect security and other implications that forced
the Slovenian authorities to adopt some measures. The analysis revealed
that the crisis gave enough time to crisis management actors to make the
needed preparations. They were successful at the individual actor level;
however, the coordination among them was rather poor. The way of mak¬
ing decisions did not change during the crisis
ment actors dealt with the crisis in the framework of their regular tasks
and competences.
The Kosovo crisis did not bring about different perceptions and presen¬
tations among various actors in Slovenia (population, bureaucracy, gov¬
ernment and parliament), which was the basis for relatively unified treat¬
ment of crisis and the absence of political-organisational conflicts. As far
as the crisis and its implications to Slovenia were concerned, the authori¬
ties were sending calming and balanced messages to the public. The
entire top state structure was involved in following the crisis. Further¬
more, all necessary precautions in the field of border control, protection
of important personalities and objects, and counter-terrorism were intro¬
duced. Due to its nature, the crisis did not make a high time pressure on
the decision makers.
Despite the fact that the Kosovo crisis was atypical for Slovenia, it
brought about some useful experiences, such as the necessity of timely
preparations, adequate documentation of events, processes and reac¬
tions to them, creating broader political consensus in crisis when dealing
with politically sensible crises, and the necessity of immediate coopera¬
tion and harmonic action of crisis management actors.
In Slovenia, the computer transition to year
Despite this fact, we analysed the events related to the publishing of pub-
420
lie warning regarding the possible difficulties of computer transition,
which we named the
media was a subject of an attack by the same mass media, blaming the
civil protection and disaster relief authorities that they unnecessarily
triggered panic reaction of the population. That was a typical problem of
crisis communication, which refers to the issue of alerting the population
in case of danger in general, and, in particular, the role of the mass
media in this process. Even more so due to the fact that similar warnings
regarding possible Y2K problems were released in other countries, but
without any consequent troubles. In Slovenia, the latter were related to
underestimation of computer transition to year
necessity of warning the public on possible consequences, and uncoordi¬
nated action of government agencies, which did not fully support the
state Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief. The case
also revealed the underestimation of importance of public relations in a
(potential) crisis and the absence of well-established communication
practice.
The analysis of Posocje earthquake offers a general judgement that,
despite some difficulties and deficiencies, the crisis management system
functioned relatively effectively. The system displayed the necessary flex¬
ibility, whereas some crisis management actors displayed a lot of self-
sacrifice and high level of solidarity with affected people. However, the
experience of an earthquake exposed some issues, such as consistent
earthquake-safe construction, thorough reconstruction of buildings and
infrastructure after the disaster, necessity of in-dept and intensive train¬
ing of crisis management actors, review of their functional coordination
and delineation of their competences.
The decision-making problem was a double responsibility of civil pro¬
tection commander at the municipal level: He was concurrently account¬
able to the mayor and to the subordinate civil protection commander. In
this category of difficulties, we could also place the fact that the incident
commander for the entire affected region was not appointed at all,
whereas at the level of affected municipalities that role was
assumed by the civil protection commanders, who also consulted mayors
and members of civil protection staff regarding crucial decisions.
Crisis communication was a weak point of crisis management. It start¬
ed with rather late notification of the public about the disaster. Regard¬
less of this fact, the local crisis management system was activated on the
basis of information collected by the local police, the fire brigade and the
affected individuals. The notification of affected people was rather poor
and caused dissatisfaction and frustration among them, and their pres¬
sure on the state commissions, who were checking the adequacy of
buildings for living and estimating the damage. The media relations were
also not productive enough and consequently, the crisis management
system did not gain full public support during the operation. The
SUMMARY
enee
the mass media is the basis for the success of the operation. Some com¬
munication problems were also identified within the crisis management
system; namely, some of the crisis managers in the field were not appro¬
priately trained to use the technical equipment.
Floods in
was not easy to deal with, especially due to the absence of proper pre¬
ventive measures in the hydro-economic field. The floods, which were
worst at the confluence of rivers and torrents, were accompanied by the
flooding of underground waters through the canalisation system, snow¬
ing in valleys, and even a low-scale earthquake. The analysis revealed
that even perfect disaster management could not compensate what was
missed in the preventive phase. Problematic interventions in the envi¬
ronment, such as the construction of buildings and communications in
flooding areas, uncontrolled exploration of forests, inadequate mainte¬
nance of forest roads, and unsatisfactory regulation of torrents, increase
the possibility of floods and the damage they cause.
We also witnessed many difficulties in crisis management itself.
Hydro-meteorological information system could not provide prompt
information and, as a consequence, provisional local information system
was established. The shortage of professionals and technical equipment
was acute, and the list of crisis management priorities was created,
which produced a lot of dissatisfaction in the mass media and in the
public. The problems could be overcome with more intensive inter-
municipal and inter-regional cooperation and with more intensive
involvement of state civil protection forces and the military. The latter
was included in crisis management rather late, although the Slovenian
Army wanted to help and the affected people expected them to help, but
the civilian authorities estimated that military help was not necessary.
One of the serious problems lies in the fact that some institutions
responsible for crisis management were also affected, which raises a con¬
ventional question: How can a victim help a victim?
Fire in
of a rather innovative crisis management, both at the operational level at
the time of fire brigade intervention and in the recovery phase. However,
the analysis of the crisis made by the fire brigade focused on the concor¬
dance of firemen activities with the rules of engagement and less on the
experiences that could be part of organisational learning. On the con¬
trary, the company managers used the analysis of crisis primarily for
organisational learning, which, as a consequence, brought a thorough
revision of fire safety, installation of fire notification system in all compa¬
ny premises, and the limitation of access to unauthorized persons with¬
out a proper escort provided by the company. Focusing on the structural
mistakes of the system, rather than searching for the individuals that
422
could be blamed for crisis management of related difficulties, enabled
the company to create the measures that assure long-term high-level fire
safety.
Fire in
fact that the fire brigade received the information on the fire relatively
late and that, when they arrived at the fire scene, they received false
information regarding the situation in the burning building, which made
their operation much more complicated. A correlation between the lack
of timely and accurate information on one hand, and wrong perceptions
and high level of stress among crisis managers on the other hand, was
more than evident. The fire warned about a necessity and usefulness of
common exercises of professional and volunteer firemen, and the trans¬
fer of experiences to the crisis management process. As far as incident
commander was concerned, some local peculiarities were practiced, this
time without any troubles in the inter-organisational cooperation of
actors involved.
The crisis showed that professionalism and trust were the basic crite¬
ria for unconditional fulfilment of orders and for the success of the inter¬
vention. The question of time, in case of fire, is mainly the question of
reaction time. Whereas the reaction time of coastal professional fire
brigade is satisfactory, the volunteer fire societies do not react in the
same fashion during the day due to the fact that many firemen are
employed in different enterprises and institutions in the morning and
early afternoon.
The relationship between the mass media and crisis management
structures was also rather tense in this case. The interests of the mass
media building in
agement at all levels and in and crisis managers in the time of a crisis are
evidently different; therefore, there is a need to find some common
points. The relationship of the fire brigade
is a formal one
to create a national and local public relations strategy is crucial for the
success of crisis management.
Gas explosion in an apartment all aspects. Some solutions were not institu¬
tionalised; they were based upon personal characteristics of decision-
makers, their experiences, knowledge, instant ideas, and common sense.
The same could be said for the coordination and information solutions,
meaning the creation of two "ad hoc" coordination committees and infor¬
mation centre. The analysis exposed the importance of harmonic percep¬
tion, unified opinion and picture of the situation. Crisis management
actors saw the accident as serious from the very beginning, and the
result of unified perception of the accident was adequate use of
resources, equal attention paid to the event by the political and adminis-
SUMMARY
trative layers of the municipality, and coordinated work. Proactive behav¬
iour of the crisis management actors also helped greatly, since they were
able to escalate and deescalate dealing with the crisis at the political-
administrative level. The actors had a constant control of the process;
therefore, the mass media and sporadic events did not push them into
making decisions, on the contrary, they had the initiative.
Symbolic acts also played an important role in crisis management. The
arrival of two important persons, the commander of city civil protection
and the mayor at the scene was a sign that the accident was regarded as
major and serious, and that had a positive symbolic and calming effect
on the affected people.
Crisis communication was a success. First official information was
provided by the mayor at the improvised press conference at the disaster
scene. It was followed by the regular press conferences that were the
major source of information and therefore, there was no need for the
media to search for information elsewhere. The affected people received
the information from the information system established at the scene,
whereas crisis managers communicated through the city coordinating
committee.
Collapse of Kolizej building in Ljubljana occurred in early
new system of local self-management was introduced. That caused a lot
of difficulties in the town region where some municipalities disappeared
and some new appeared. New local authorities were created, assuming
responsibilities and tasks. Many people exchanged their positions in the
local governments. The division of power and competences between the
state and the local communities took place and new approaches and
acquaintance with new tasks were required from many local officials.
Many changes occurred in the field of civil protection and disaster relief,
where local community in the town of Ljubljana could not provide
enough qualified personnel to deal with disasters. All these changes
influenced the crisis management activities when the Kolizej building
collapsed.
The intervention after the collapse of the building was first seen as
"ordinary"; however, later on it transformed into a serious problem. The
accommodation of the affected people and the coordination of different
crisis management actors from different levels that have just assumed
their posts seemed to be the most demanding tasks. None of the civil
protection staff managed to meet in full number, while the majority of
their tasks were accomplished by the professional services of local and
state administrations. The latter could play a more prominent role in the
early stages of future disasters. The event warned that the role of civil
protection commander and staff should be reconsidered.
The communication with the mass media was the most critical and
poorly accomplished task. At that time, the mayor of the town did not
424
have his own public relations service, whereas a member of civil protec¬
tion staff responsible for media relations was not present at the scene of
disaster. The mass media was allowed to move almost freely at the scene,
which caused a relatively contradictory and one-sided reporting. The
absence of public relations strategy forced the media to search for infor¬
mation on their own, which produced incomplete and biased reporting.
Some mass media had quite a sensational approach to the disaster. Once
again, the accident proved that the importance of adequate crisis com¬
munication could not be overstressed.
Oil spill at Ortnek warehouse in
the disaster with such broad dimensions occurred at all. Municipal civil
protection staff in a nearby town Ribnica was cognisant of the potential
danger, but it did not have an insight into the quality of maintenance of
the warehouse. Many deficiencies were discovered after the disaster.
We can start with the perception of the crisis. The employees of the
company S-trade responsible for the oil warehouse noticed the oil spill,
but made a judgement that it was a small one, not too dangerous and
controllable. They decided not to report it. This decision influenced fur¬
ther organisation of intervention and recovery. It especially influenced
the reaction time of intervention services and it dramatically limited the
adoption of all subsequent decisions. The company S-trade did not main¬
tain the warehouse according to the standards for flammable substances
and it did not have the basic equipment required.
The intervention was characterised with improvisation, whereas the
lack of information on the quantity of oil in question hampered the pre¬
vention of further pollution. On the other hand, high motivation of crisis
management actors, fruitful improvisation, good coordination of all
human and material resources, effective leadership and command,
improved the quality of intervention, which was successful at the end.
Two general remarks could be made as well: First, Carst region with
limy stone and a lot of underground waters is not suitable at all to store
oil and other dangerous substances. Second, environmental issues are
not solved in a satisfactory fashion in the Slovenian legal documents,
although the situation is improving quickly due to the
2004.
General findings
In the previous chapter we introduced the selected findings offered by
the examined cases. We will continue by presenting some general con¬
clusions that, together with specific ones, provide the basis for the
improvement and upgrading of crisis management system in Slovenia:
1.
SUMMARY
do not take all precautions needed to cope with them. The fact is that some
measures to be taken are too costly: for example in the case of floods,
there is a huge hydro-economic project needed to prevent them; how¬
ever, at the same time, it is true that people approached rivers despite
the warnings and they built houses and even enterprises in threatened
areas. In the case of an earthquake, the only effective prevention is
safe construction, which is too late at least for buildings older than
years. Namely, the very first safe construction act was adopted in the
former Yugoslavia when the country experienced two devastating
earthquakes in the sixties. However, in the case of Kosovo crisis, the
course of events was predictable, but suitable preparedness of the
state bodies was not reached.
2.
diction with the rules and planned procedures. There was a lot of shifting
or simply assuming responsibility, improvisations, and ad hoc solu¬
tions. E.g. Civil Protection commander could appoint an incident com¬
mander to deal with the crisis on the ground; however, in two cases
the Civil Protection commander simply took over and led the interven¬
tion, while neglecting his coordination function. In one case, there
were two incident commanders operating concurrently. In another
case, there were two of them operating successively. And finally, in
one case there was nobody specifically appointed as an incident com¬
mander. However, it seems that the quality of people involved in crisis
management was more important for the success of the operation
than simply following the rules and formal procedures.
3.
ple who have already experienced a similar disaster, or more of them,
are prone to develop a so called "crisis subculture" and they are able to
perceive the threat in due time, take necessary measures, and assume
"crisis roles". That was the case of floods and earthquake that repeat¬
ed in the same area
in the case of the oil spill, the employees in the warehouse, being with¬
out previous experience, did not perceive it as an accident and they
thought they would handle it on their own. Unfortunately, they were
wrong and it took
accident occurred. The underground waters in Carst area have already
been polluted. In the case of Kolizej building collapse in Ljubljana, the
accident was perceived in a smaller scope than it actually occurred.
4.
however, the relationship between different actors on the disaster site
was not always clear enough. The mix of local, regional, state, military
and non-governmental actors sometimes produces a certain degree of
tension and confusion regarding the responsibility and competencies.
In the case of a minor local disaster, which involves only local actors,
the cooperation is much better, because it is based upon the acquain-
426
tance
the so-called "local practices", which do not necessarily correspond to
the legal solutions, but they are functional as long as the crisis is local.
In the case of a regional or state disaster, the cooperation or simply
composing of different local practices among themselves with regional
and state actors might be difficult.
5.
and defence resource activation for the purpose of protection, rescuing
and help, if the available civilian forces and resources do not suffice,
and the military is not performing other military tasks. However, it
seems that civilian authorities are reluctant to ask the military for help
in case of a disaster, while the expectations of affected people are
rather high in this respect. We witnessed such situation during the
floods, in which the military were in the barracks and they couldn't
help the people in the neighbouring apartment buildings, because the
civilian authorities did not ask them to do so. The military was finally
activated, but mainly participated in the recovery phase of the crisis.
In the case of the earthquake, the military help was promised on Sun¬
day when the disaster occurred, whereas the limited military help
came a few days later, on Wednesday.
6.
tant, especially in revealing the deficiencies of the system and creating
public pressure to improve the situation. It seems that the mass media
themselves play an ambivalent role in this process
an opportunity for the mass media to enlarge the audience or increase
the intensity of media attention, while on the other hand, the mass
media are, according to the law, part of crisis management
expected to help in mitigating severe consequences brought about by
the crisis (see
out a doubt, it is extremely desirable that the mass media find the ade¬
quate balance between their business (profit) interest and crisis com¬
munication role.
7.
affected people with the "outside", normal surroundings, which helped
them in psychological terms: people knew they were not alone in their
unfortunate destiny, the affected people were able to communicate
their problems to the broader audience, there was a lot of readiness
among the citizens to provide help, and media reported about that.
Another important fact was that the flow of information, which
reached the affected people, reduced a sense of uncertainty among them,
and consequently reduced the level of fear, often induced by such uncer¬
tainty. Nevertheless, the media interviews with the affected people
revealed they lacked prompt, concrete and accurate information
released by a credible (local and state administration) source. Hence,
we face at least one ostensible contradiction or information paradox
SUMMARY
a lot of information provided by the media on one hand, and the lack
of information by the affected people on the other hand. It means that
in a crisis, the quality and source
8.
lems and difficulties on the scene of the disaster. Although state repre¬
sentatives claimed that some information was actually disinformation,
some mass media continued to use it in order to make "their case" of
incompetent authorities dealing with the crisis. The "state" also
entered a "vicious circle" in relation to the media
tives offered promises and deadlines to the affected people that were
not realistic and were not fulfilled. Media gladly used that fact to criti¬
cise the "state", resulting in unrealistic promises by state representa¬
tives. Many mutual accusations were expressed in several explored
cases, most notably in the cases of Y2K crisis, earthquake, floods and
fire in
ed, the media created an impression that crisis management was
much better in the past than in the present. The syntagm ideal past vs.
chaotic present could be applied here, although the reality displayed
that there were a lot of difficulties (if not more) in past crisis manage¬
ment, as well.
9.
seen above, the relationship between the authorities and the media is
far from ideal. Y2K case and
were the cases to prove that. There were also difficulties in crisis com¬
munication between the crisis managers of different government sec¬
tors and various levels of political organisation (local, regional and
state). The analysis revealed that some crisis managers were also not
appropriately trained to use their personal communication devices,
especially designed for crisis management.
10.
in some of them (earthquake and floods) it seemed that other coun¬
tries respected international obligations and solidarity did work.
Sometimes, the neighbouring and other countries offered even more
help than needed in a certain case. It seems that the level of
tionalisation
some crises are not severe and are of local scope, others affect regions,
and some of them even an entire country. A political crisis, such as the
war in Slovenia in
international dimension. As far as war is concerned, we could say that
the international actors, individual states and organisations, con¬
tributed a lot to the relatively quick and smooth solution of the crisis.
However, not only the attitude of the international actors, who
canalised and limited the behaviour of belligerent parties, was impor¬
tant in crisis management, but also the favourable circumstances in
the international community in general
428
of Europe, the unification of East and West Germany, the collapse of
Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Not to mention
the general trend of political, law, value, and economic
tion
11.
tioned already that Slovenian crisis management system is in a rather
good condition. On the other hand, timely reactions are one of the
fields where the system could be improved. In the case of the earth¬
quake, the authorities needed one hour to notify the professional and
general public that a disaster occurred. Italian mass media reported
about the earthquake before our civil protection authorities even new
about it. In the case of Ortnek oil spill, the employees needed
to recognise that they were not able to deal with the accident on their
own and to notify the authorities. Fire in
minutes for the fire brigade to arrive to the accident site; however, the
building has been burning for at least
brigade was notified. In some cases, timely reaction is crucial for the
survival of people and protection of material commodities
pressure requires concurrent decision-making full of tensions and
stress for the decision-makers. Other cases bring low time pressure
and give a possibility for consecutive decision-making, which allows
contemplation and choice of adequate decisions. In all cases, time is
crucial in the recovery phase. The recovery phases of
and floods have not been finished yet. And many disasters occurred
afterwards.
12.
of crisis management, whereas, we often neglect the political-symbolic
dimension of the process. The cases we explored offered a lot of action
and inaction that had symbolic value: e.g. the immediate arrival of
high state or local officials and politicians to the disaster scene had a
high symbolic value with a positive psychological impact and vice
versa, if politicians did not arrive or arrived rather late to the disaster
scene, or if they did not even make a phone call, then, the symbolic
message to the affected area was rather poor. In the case of a gas
explosion in
civil protection commander ordered a bus as an instant solution to
accommodate the affected people, he also decided to organize an
information service in a nearby apartment building, and positive psy¬
chological effects were more than evident. In the case of
quake, it was important what kind of signs and colours should the cri¬
sis managers use in order to designate the damaged buildings,
because people still recalled those signs from previous experience
avoid confusion and worries, it was important to use the same signs
and colours as
ter management also had positive impact on the feelings of affected
summary
people. Therefore, it is important to combine the (prevalent) function¬
al and (supplementary) constructivist approaches in order to grasp the
crisis in its complex and comprehensive nature.
13.
reports from the affected area. Many reports warned that the context of
solidarity has changed due to the thorough political and economic
reform that occurred in Slovenia in the early nineties of the 20th centu¬
ry. Nevertheless, the content of media reports were frequently personal
experiences of affected people, their uncertain destinies and misery.
The aim of such editorial policy was most probably not only simply to
report, but also to trigger the compassion among the readers and to
stimulate them to help the victims. Such reports were often followed by
the bank account numbers, where financial help was collected. Interna¬
tional solidarity was reported by the media as well, namely, all neigh¬
bouring and some other countries offered immediate help to Slovenia.
The offered help was not always in conformity with the needs; there¬
fore, the government made a list of crucial items. The mass media was
critical due to the fact that state authorities sometimes complicated too
much with procedures and delayed the process of obtaining the help
from abroad. In the case of
huge scope of solidarity as far as donors, forms and types of help were
concerned. There was help coming from the international community,
the Slovenian state bodies, enterprises and banks, the citizens of Slove¬
nia helped. The affected people and their relatives showed solidarity to
each other, and finally, the state authorities introduced a special "soli¬
darity tax" paid by all employed and retired citizens of Slovenia. The
public accepted it as a coercive solidarity, especially due to the fact that
many people have helped already before the solidarity tax was dis¬
cussed and adopted by the Parliament. It is interesting to mention that
individuals, enterprises, and institutions offered mainly financial and
material help, while psychological help was neglected in the process,
although the victims of the disaster would sometimes need only a visit,
symbolic help or friendly conversation.
To conclude, it seems that every disaster brings about a clear picture of
society and its readiness to cope with the crisis in a broader sense. Do we
have adequate stand-by mechanisms to cope with the crisis, do we have
budget reserves to cover the immediate costs, are material reserves avail¬
able, is community well organised and prepared to cope with the crisis,
are crisis management solutions adequate and efficient, is research poli¬
cy adopted to the needs of the community in severe times, do people,
institutions and enterprises express enough material and also less tangi¬
ble solidarity with the affected area? It seems that fair answers to all
these questions could have a cathartic effect on the society, allowing it to
emerge better from the crisis.
430
Lessons learned in the explored cases could be of a great benefit for
the crisis management system of Slovenia; however, it is important to
emphasize that the lessons should not only be learned, but also applied
in crisis management practice. As a result of preliminary research find¬
ings, some crisis management dimensions have already been improved:
the authorities became more prone to deal with and invest into hydro-
economic measures to prevent floods, the earthquake recovery phase is
slow and financially demanding, but, as a consequence of the previous
experience, it is thorough and with long-term positive effects. New earth¬
quake monitoring stations have been installed since. Environmental dis¬
asters forced the authorities to create a national programme on environ¬
mental protection and to adopt the environment protection act. Local
attitude toward the oil warehouse in Ortnek is different today
tants are regularly informed about the situation through the local media,
the notification system has improved, and the local fire brigades are
equipped and trained to deal with potential environmental disasters in
the Carst area. Fires in the coastal area and the damage caused, forced
the regional authorities to develop a fire prevention system. Coastal fire
brigade grew in numbers and the training curriculum was enhanced,
including psychological treatment of firemen in post-crisis phase. Crisis
management plans are constantly updated, although our analysis
revealed that the plan, as a document, is of limited value in crisis; howev¬
er, planning as a process proved to be extremely important. The very fact
that crisis managers were a new and crucial element of the plan, that
they were trained and equipped according to it, helped a substantially to
increase the crisis management success.
KAZALO
PREDGOVOR
UVOD
I.
PREUČEVANJA KRIZE
П.
Ш.
NA ZRJ-IMPLIKACIJE ZA SLOVENIJO
IV.
RAČUNALNIŠKEGA PREHODA
V.
VI.
VII.
Vín.
SEPTEMBRA
IX.
V
X.
XI.
SKLEP
SUMMARY
DODATEK:
KRIZNEGA UPRAVLJANJA
STVARNO
OAVTORJIH |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022242267 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)238817728 (DE-599)BVBBV022242267 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02007nam a2200469 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022242267</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20070508 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070125s2004 d||| |||| 00||| slv d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9612351503</subfield><subfield code="9">961-235-150-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)238817728</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV022242267</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">slv</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7,41</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji</subfield><subfield code="b">izzivi in priložnosti</subfield><subfield code="c">uredil Marjan Malešič</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ljubljana</subfield><subfield code="b">Fak. za Družbene Vede</subfield><subfield code="c">2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">454 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Knjižna zbirka Varnostne študije</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zsfassung in engl. Sprache</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Krisenmanagement</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4127374-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Führungslehre</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4247908-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Zivilschutz</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4067915-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Slowenien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055302-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4143413-4</subfield><subfield code="a">Aufsatzsammlung</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Slowenien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055302-4</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Krisenmanagement</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4127374-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Slowenien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055302-4</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Zivilschutz</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4067915-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Führungslehre</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4247908-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Malešič, Marjan</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015453174</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Aufsatzsammlung |
| geographic | Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Slowenien |
| id | DE-604.BV022242267 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T16:36:24Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:53:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9612351503 |
| language | Slovenian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015453174 |
| oclc_num | 238817728 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 454 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | Fak. za Družbene Vede |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Knjižna zbirka Varnostne študije |
| spelling | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti uredil Marjan Malešič Ljubljana Fak. za Družbene Vede 2004 454 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Knjižna zbirka Varnostne študije Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Krisenmanagement (DE-588)4127374-6 gnd rswk-swf Führungslehre (DE-588)4247908-3 gnd rswk-swf Zivilschutz (DE-588)4067915-9 gnd rswk-swf Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 g Krisenmanagement (DE-588)4127374-6 s DE-604 Zivilschutz (DE-588)4067915-9 s Führungslehre (DE-588)4247908-3 s Malešič, Marjan Sonstige oth Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti Krisenmanagement (DE-588)4127374-6 gnd Führungslehre (DE-588)4247908-3 gnd Zivilschutz (DE-588)4067915-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4127374-6 (DE-588)4247908-3 (DE-588)4067915-9 (DE-588)4055302-4 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti |
| title_auth | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti |
| title_exact_search | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti |
| title_full | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti uredil Marjan Malešič |
| title_fullStr | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti uredil Marjan Malešič |
| title_full_unstemmed | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji izzivi in priložnosti uredil Marjan Malešič |
| title_short | Krizno upravljanje in vodenje v Sloveniji |
| title_sort | krizno upravljanje in vodenje v sloveniji izzivi in priloznosti |
| title_sub | izzivi in priložnosti |
| topic | Krisenmanagement (DE-588)4127374-6 gnd Führungslehre (DE-588)4247908-3 gnd Zivilschutz (DE-588)4067915-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Krisenmanagement Führungslehre Zivilschutz Slowenien Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015453174&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT malesicmarjan kriznoupravljanjeinvodenjevslovenijiizziviinpriloznosti |