Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta: 1916 - 1919 g.
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Bulgarian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Sofija
Akad. Izdat. "Prof. Prof. Marin Drinov"
2006
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. izd. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | PST: The Great War and the Bulgarian guard between Central Europe and the Orient. - In kyrill. Schr., bulg. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 401 S. |
| ISBN: | 9543220727 9789543220724 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta |b 1916 - 1919 g. |c Georgi Markov |
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| 264 | 1 | |a Sofija |b Akad. Izdat. "Prof. Prof. Marin Drinov" |c 2006 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1806960598322249728 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Съдържание
Нов принос към осмислянето на българското участие в Първата световна
война
(акад. К.
Кьосев)
. 7
Въведение
. 9
Първа глава
Разпъване на три фронта
. 15
Овладяване на Тутраканската крепост, ад на Каймакчалан
. 15
Пробив на Кубадинската позиция, боеве в Завоя на Черна
. 38
Разгромът на Румъния
—
през Дунав към Серет
. 62
Втора глава
Възпиране на Източните армии
. 73
Лавров венец
с
маслинено клонче
. 74
Окопаване срещу „мелницата на полкове"
. 96
Още един противник
—
Гърция
. 123
Трета глава
Видения за скорошен мир
. 143
Търкания по съюзнически
. 143
Измамни надежди
от Брест-
Литовск
. 154
Ощетени от Букурещ
. 186
Четвърта глава
Оттатък предела на изнемогването
. 225
Преумората натежава, отбраната се пропуква
. 225
„Черните петъци" на Западния фронт
. 246
Злото на Добро поле и славата при Дойранското езеро
. 272
Пета глава
Горко на българите
. 311
Метежът, примирието и абдикацията
. 311
Съглашенската окупация
. 339
Пред съда на победителите в Париж
. 351
Ньойският диктат
—
победените са виновни
. 366
Жътвата на жертвените поля
. 383
Извори и изследвания
. 389
Резюме
. 399
The Great War and the Bulgarian Guard between
Central Europe and the Orient
1916-1919
Georgi
Markov
(Summary)
Bulgaria was "the Guard of the Balkans" in the coalition strategy of the Qua¬
druple Alliance whose road to the Orient (to Asia Minor, the Near East and the Per¬
sian Gulf) was the only way out of the continental blockade of the Entente. For the
Bulgarians the need to preserve the obtained national unification justified the defense
of the communications between Central Europe and the Orient. The present study
provides explanations of how and why they won their "little" wars in Southeast Europe
while the underestimation of the Southern front led them sign the first armistice of the
Quadruple Alliance and leave the Great War. The evidence for the complicated events
is drawn from various sources in order to juxtapose, compare and assess different
points of view. The approach of investigation follows a line from the whole to its com¬
ponents and vice versa because the Great War was decided on the main fronts.
In this book, as in his previous studies the author concentrates his attention on
the foreign policy, diplomacy and military strategy of Bulgaria taking into consider¬
ation the extremely difficult conditions of the long war whose victorious end was drift¬
ing away like a mirage in the desert. He stresses the three responsible factors for the
leading of the war
-
the Monarchic institution, the Council of Ministers and the High
Command with their recognized merits alternating with delusions, mistakes and fail¬
ures. The co-ordination or the contradictions between the main levers in the belliger¬
ent Bulgarian state helped or impeded the successes, decreased or increased the num¬
ber of victims. The authoritative factors did not want one more catastrophe but did
not do all they could to avoid it.
Bulgaria prevented the Allies from saving Serbia, Rumania and Russia and de¬
tained on the Southern front the armies of four Great powers and four Balkan states.
Within a period of six years she was leading her third war for national unification
exerting all her strength and keeping with the colours one million of her sons. The
enlargement of the state borders created prerequisites for political independence and
economical development.
The Bulgarian soldier waded across the Balkans from the Albanian mountains
to the
Seret
river in Moldavia, from the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean to the
Adriatic Sea and Lake of Ostrovo in order to liberate his brothers beyond Ludogorie,
the Strandzha Mountain, the Rhodopes and the
Rila
Mountain. The Bulgarians in
the Ottoman Empire had possessed at least churches, schools and reading clubs
closed down by the Serbian, Greek and Rumanian authorities. What is more, they even
did not recognize them as Bulgarians!
As a smaller country, drawn into the vortex of the "big politics" Bulgaria perused
her own aims in the war. The responsible politicians could not swear allegiance to
Germany and at the same time made up to the Entente. Bulgaria is a Balkan country
and her adversaries were in this part of Europe. Therefore she was obliged to consider
and combine the Balkan dimensions in the "Big strategy" of the coalition war. The
politics of feelings should not replace the politics of interests.
No one wants to remember the lost wars. The won wars are celebrated loudly and
proudly. However, the lessons of the former are more valuable than the pompous
399
speeches
about the latter. It is not true that the victors are better soldiers and military
commanders than the vanquished because commensurability means also consider¬
ation of proportion of forces. The Great War was decided on the Western front. The
neighbouring countries lost their battles and in the end won the war together with "the
powers that be". At the same time it would not be fare to justify the sins of the politi¬
cians with awkward diplomatic moves. The Bulgarian diplomats did their job but their
perspicacious views left the monarch and the ministers cold.
The historian is obliged to avoid the usual shift of responsibility. The faults of the
domestic factors occupy the inner circle because theirs are the most fateful decisions.
The next circle encompasses the politicians from the neighbouring countries who take
advantage of their rivals' mistakes. The outer circle includes the Great Powers whose
interests in world affairs make senseless any attempt at "being angry with them" about
the damages they caused. Politicians usually grade and arrange the responsibilities
"from the outside inwards" so that they can excuse themselves with the outside factors.
However, such an approach is as convenient for them as vicious because the one-side
accusations do not contribute to disentangling the intricate knot of responsibilities.
The "big politics" was reflected in the three international conferences in Brest-
Litovsk, Bucharest and Paris. The belligerent coalitions would not even think of
peace until they made sure of "full retribution for the past" and "firm guarantee for
the future". The impact of the interested powers, together or separately as well as
their relations with their Balkan enemies were multidirectional and often decisive.
The partners also made difficulties. Devotion to the "brothers-in-arms" and demon¬
strations of discontent undermining the common base of the coalition succeeded
each other.
Bulgaria entered the Great War siding with the Central Empires to obtain her
ultimate goal
-
the national unification. Her territorial demands were based mainly on
ethnical and historical rights. Therefore the Bulgarian society was unpleasantly sur¬
prised that the allies insisted on compensations in Dobrudzha (Germany), south of
the Danube (Austria-Hungary) and in Thrace (the Ottoman Empire). And what is
more, while the territories in the Caucasus were entirely and directly ceded to the Sub¬
lime Porte, a condominium of Northern Dobrudzha was established. The internal fric¬
tions and contradictions became stronger and evident placing under question the
compatibility of interests of the different allies.
"Sacred egoism" relies on a short memory. Being benevolently neutral to the Otto¬
man Empire while letting arms and people pass, Bulgaria increased the resistant
forces at the Dardanelles in
1915.
Her interference in the war against the Entente fi¬
nally frustrated Churchill's plans to take hold of Constantinople and the Straits. The
Bulgarian army "with arms at the order" prevented Rumania attacking Austria-Hun¬
gary in the end of
1914
when the Serbs crossed the Danube and the Russians threat¬
ened to invade the Hungarian plain. It was again the Bulgarian army that in the au¬
tumn of
1915
enabled Austria-Hungary to cope with her enemies to the south and in
the autumn of
1916
through the stunning blows in Dobrudzha and Wallachia con¬
tributed to the counter-offensive in Transylvania and then to Bucharest.
Tsar Ferdinand was wrong about the duration of the war and could not foresee
its outcome. He did not join the probable victors and was against them to the end but
war is such a dangerous undertaking that measures should be taken in advance
against the worst to come. The irresponsibility of the monarch under the Constitution
was not countervailed with the responsibilities of the ministers who did not dare make
objections to the extremely ambitious sovereign.
Bulgaria
had been preparing for a
"little" war and not for such a long and exhausting "Great War". It is an old truth that
"the tactics win the battles while the strategy and administration win the war". The
400
outcome of the war was no longer only on the forward fighting line but deep in the
rear as well.
Wars are led so that they never end "in a draw", i.e. without victors and van¬
quished. The grading and the arrangement of the political aims are compatible with
the obvious and expected risks for the people and the state. Tsar Ferdinand was a
maximalist as far as foreign policy was concerned which meant confrontation with
more enemies in the strategy of war. He was not within his rights to demand that "his"
people fulfilled his "dreams" of Constantinople and
Salónica,
of a common border
with Austria-Hungary and an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Such bloody strains were be¬
yond the powers of one generation and ultimately what remained for the Bulgarians
was the glory of the battles while the neighbours gained the territorial acquisitions.
The declared principles of a plebiscite and national self-determination proved
to be desired illusions for those who laid down arms with the hope for some justice
even if relative. The establishment of new states in Europe in the name of national
freedom did not mean that it should be denied to other "hostile" peoples. The Bulgar¬
ians reached the heights of diplomacy and won laurels in the battlefields. However,
providence could not always help them since the politicians either missed the
favourable day for solution or were impatient to wait for it.
The "rights and justice" in the Balkans promised by President Woodrow Wilson
remained on paper. The forcibly imposed geopolitics of the Allies did not recognize
the plebiscite and made a cult of the "strategic boundaries". The swollen-headed vic¬
tors introduced their "Versailles order" under which the "guilty peoples" were pun¬
ished for the faults of the politicians. The lost World War caused social cataclysms,
civil conflicts and created prerequisites for the rise of the totalitarian dictatorships.
On the top of that all the victors "blamed" the vanquished for unleashing the war.
The world received a "break" of two decades between the two world wars. The
victors referred to Bismarck that "the treaties are for the weaker to observe them". Then
they menacingly added that "revision meant war". The vanquished answered them in
anger: "There are no everlasting treaties!"
26
Голямата
uoìhm.
401 |
| adam_txt |
Съдържание
Нов принос към осмислянето на българското участие в Първата световна
война
(акад. К.
Кьосев)
. 7
Въведение
. 9
Първа глава
Разпъване на три фронта
. 15
Овладяване на Тутраканската крепост, ад на Каймакчалан
. 15
Пробив на Кубадинската позиция, боеве в Завоя на Черна
. 38
Разгромът на Румъния
—
през Дунав към Серет
. 62
Втора глава
Възпиране на Източните армии
. 73
Лавров венец
с
маслинено клонче
. 74
Окопаване срещу „мелницата на полкове"
. 96
Още един противник
—
Гърция
. 123
Трета глава
Видения за скорошен мир
. 143
Търкания по съюзнически
. 143
Измамни надежди
от Брест-
Литовск
. 154
Ощетени от Букурещ
. 186
Четвърта глава
Оттатък предела на изнемогването
. 225
Преумората натежава, отбраната се пропуква
. 225
„Черните петъци" на Западния фронт
. 246
Злото на Добро поле и славата при Дойранското езеро
. 272
Пета глава
Горко на българите
. 311
Метежът, примирието и абдикацията
. 311
Съглашенската окупация
. 339
Пред съда на победителите в Париж
. 351
Ньойският диктат
—
победените са виновни
. 366
Жътвата на жертвените поля
. 383
Извори и изследвания
. 389
Резюме
. 399
The Great War and the Bulgarian Guard between
Central Europe and the Orient
1916-1919
Georgi
Markov
(Summary)
Bulgaria was "the Guard of the Balkans" in the coalition strategy of the Qua¬
druple Alliance whose road to the Orient (to Asia Minor, the Near East and the Per¬
sian Gulf) was the only way out of the continental blockade of the Entente. For the
Bulgarians the need to preserve the obtained national unification justified the defense
of the communications between Central Europe and the Orient. The present study
provides explanations of how and why they won their "little" wars in Southeast Europe
while the underestimation of the Southern front led them sign the first armistice of the
Quadruple Alliance and leave the Great War. The evidence for the complicated events
is drawn from various sources in order to juxtapose, compare and assess different
points of view. The approach of investigation follows a line from the whole to its com¬
ponents and vice versa because the Great War was decided on the main fronts.
In this book, as in his previous studies the author concentrates his attention on
the foreign policy, diplomacy and military strategy of Bulgaria taking into consider¬
ation the extremely difficult conditions of the long war whose victorious end was drift¬
ing away like a mirage in the desert. He stresses the three responsible factors for the
leading of the war
-
the Monarchic institution, the Council of Ministers and the High
Command with their recognized merits alternating with delusions, mistakes and fail¬
ures. The co-ordination or the contradictions between the main levers in the belliger¬
ent Bulgarian state helped or impeded the successes, decreased or increased the num¬
ber of victims. The authoritative factors did not want one more catastrophe but did
not do all they could to avoid it.
Bulgaria prevented the Allies from saving Serbia, Rumania and Russia and de¬
tained on the Southern front the armies of four Great powers and four Balkan states.
Within a period of six years she was leading her third war for national unification
exerting all her strength and keeping with the colours one million of her sons. The
enlargement of the state borders created prerequisites for political independence and
economical development.
The Bulgarian soldier waded across the Balkans from the Albanian mountains
to the
Seret
river in Moldavia, from the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean to the
Adriatic Sea and Lake of Ostrovo in order to liberate his brothers beyond Ludogorie,
the Strandzha Mountain, the Rhodopes and the
Rila
Mountain. The Bulgarians in
the Ottoman Empire had possessed at least churches, schools and reading clubs
closed down by the Serbian, Greek and Rumanian authorities. What is more, they even
did not recognize them as Bulgarians!
As a smaller country, drawn into the vortex of the "big politics" Bulgaria perused
her own aims in the war. The responsible politicians could not swear allegiance to
Germany and at the same time made up to the Entente. Bulgaria is a Balkan country
and her adversaries were in this part of Europe. Therefore she was obliged to consider
and combine the Balkan dimensions in the "Big strategy" of the coalition war. The
politics of feelings should not replace the politics of interests.
No one wants to remember the lost wars. The won wars are celebrated loudly and
proudly. However, the lessons of the former are more valuable than the pompous
399
speeches
about the latter. It is not true that the victors are better soldiers and military
commanders than the vanquished because commensurability means also consider¬
ation of proportion of forces. The Great War was decided on the Western front. The
neighbouring countries lost their battles and in the end won the war together with "the
powers that be". At the same time it would not be fare to justify the sins of the politi¬
cians with awkward diplomatic moves. The Bulgarian diplomats did their job but their
perspicacious views left the monarch and the ministers cold.
The historian is obliged to avoid the usual shift of responsibility. The faults of the
domestic factors occupy the inner circle because theirs are the most fateful decisions.
The next circle encompasses the politicians from the neighbouring countries who take
advantage of their rivals' mistakes. The outer circle includes the Great Powers whose
interests in world affairs make senseless any attempt at "being angry with them" about
the damages they caused. Politicians usually grade and arrange the responsibilities
"from the outside inwards" so that they can excuse themselves with the outside factors.
However, such an approach is as convenient for them as vicious because the one-side
accusations do not contribute to disentangling the intricate knot of responsibilities.
The "big politics" was reflected in the three international conferences in Brest-
Litovsk, Bucharest and Paris. The belligerent coalitions would not even think of
peace until they made sure of "full retribution for the past" and "firm guarantee for
the future". The impact of the interested powers, together or separately as well as
their relations with their Balkan enemies were multidirectional and often decisive.
The partners also made difficulties. Devotion to the "brothers-in-arms" and demon¬
strations of discontent undermining the common base of the coalition succeeded
each other.
Bulgaria entered the Great War siding with the Central Empires to obtain her
ultimate goal
-
the national unification. Her territorial demands were based mainly on
ethnical and historical rights. Therefore the Bulgarian society was unpleasantly sur¬
prised that the allies insisted on compensations in Dobrudzha (Germany), south of
the Danube (Austria-Hungary) and in Thrace (the Ottoman Empire). And what is
more, while the territories in the Caucasus were entirely and directly ceded to the Sub¬
lime Porte, a condominium of Northern Dobrudzha was established. The internal fric¬
tions and contradictions became stronger and evident placing under question the
compatibility of interests of the different allies.
"Sacred egoism" relies on a short memory. Being benevolently neutral to the Otto¬
man Empire while letting arms and people pass, Bulgaria increased the resistant
forces at the Dardanelles in
1915.
Her interference in the war against the Entente fi¬
nally frustrated Churchill's plans to take hold of Constantinople and the Straits. The
Bulgarian army "with arms at the order" prevented Rumania attacking Austria-Hun¬
gary in the end of
1914
when the Serbs crossed the Danube and the Russians threat¬
ened to invade the Hungarian plain. It was again the Bulgarian army that in the au¬
tumn of
1915
enabled Austria-Hungary to cope with her enemies to the south and in
the autumn of
1916
through the stunning blows in Dobrudzha and Wallachia con¬
tributed to the counter-offensive in Transylvania and then to Bucharest.
Tsar Ferdinand was wrong about the duration of the war and could not foresee
its outcome. He did not join the probable victors and was against them to the end but
war is such a dangerous undertaking that measures should be taken in advance
against the worst to come. The irresponsibility of the monarch under the Constitution
was not countervailed with the responsibilities of the ministers who did not dare make
objections to the extremely ambitious sovereign.
Bulgaria
had been preparing for a
"little" war and not for such a long and exhausting "Great War". It is an old truth that
"the tactics win the battles while the strategy and administration win the war". The
400
outcome of the war was no longer only on the forward fighting line but deep in the
rear as well.
Wars are led so that they never end "in a draw", i.e. without victors and van¬
quished. The grading and the arrangement of the political aims are compatible with
the obvious and expected risks for the people and the state. Tsar Ferdinand was a
maximalist as far as foreign policy was concerned which meant confrontation with
more enemies in the strategy of war. He was not within his rights to demand that "his"
people fulfilled his "dreams" of Constantinople and
Salónica,
of a common border
with Austria-Hungary and an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Such bloody strains were be¬
yond the powers of one generation and ultimately what remained for the Bulgarians
was the glory of the battles while the neighbours gained the territorial acquisitions.
The declared principles of a plebiscite and national self-determination proved
to be desired illusions for those who laid down arms with the hope for some justice
even if relative. The establishment of new states in Europe in the name of national
freedom did not mean that it should be denied to other "hostile" peoples. The Bulgar¬
ians reached the heights of diplomacy and won laurels in the battlefields. However,
providence could not always help them since the politicians either missed the
favourable day for solution or were impatient to wait for it.
The "rights and justice" in the Balkans promised by President Woodrow Wilson
remained on paper. The forcibly imposed geopolitics of the Allies did not recognize
the plebiscite and made a cult of the "strategic boundaries". The swollen-headed vic¬
tors introduced their "Versailles order" under which the "guilty peoples" were pun¬
ished for the faults of the politicians. The lost World War caused social cataclysms,
civil conflicts and created prerequisites for the rise of the totalitarian dictatorships.
On the top of that all the victors "blamed" the vanquished for unleashing the war.
The world received a "break" of two decades between the two world wars. The
victors referred to Bismarck that "the treaties are for the weaker to observe them". Then
they menacingly added that "revision meant war". The vanquished answered them in
anger: "There are no everlasting treaties!"
26
Голямата
uoìhm.
401 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Markov, Georgi 1946- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)12486404X |
| author_facet | Markov, Georgi 1946- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Markov, Georgi 1946- |
| author_variant | g m gm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022207421 |
| classification_rvk | NP 4410 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)162272208 (DE-599)BVBBV022207421 |
| discipline | Geschichte |
| discipline_str_mv | Geschichte |
| edition | 1. izd. |
| era | Geschichte 1916-1919 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1916-1919 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Bulgarien |
| id | DE-604.BV022207421 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T16:25:57Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T01:05:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9543220727 9789543220724 |
| language | Bulgarian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015418789 |
| oclc_num | 162272208 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 401 S. |
| psigel | BSBWK1 BSBWKE |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Akad. Izdat. "Prof. Prof. Marin Drinov" |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Markov, Georgi 1946- Verfasser (DE-588)12486404X aut Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. Georgi Markov 1. izd. Sofija Akad. Izdat. "Prof. Prof. Marin Drinov" 2006 401 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier PST: The Great War and the Bulgarian guard between Central Europe and the Orient. - In kyrill. Schr., bulg. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Friedensvertrag von Neuilly-sur-Seine 1919 November 27 (DE-588)1165582309 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1916-1919 gnd rswk-swf Erster Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079163-4 gnd rswk-swf Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd rswk-swf Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 g Erster Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079163-4 s Friedensvertrag von Neuilly-sur-Seine 1919 November 27 (DE-588)1165582309 u Geschichte 1916-1919 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015418789&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015418789&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Markov, Georgi 1946- Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. Friedensvertrag von Neuilly-sur-Seine 1919 November 27 (DE-588)1165582309 gnd Erster Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079163-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)1165582309 (DE-588)4079163-4 (DE-588)4008866-2 |
| title | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. |
| title_auth | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. |
| title_exact_search | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. |
| title_full | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. Georgi Markov |
| title_fullStr | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. Georgi Markov |
| title_full_unstemmed | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916 - 1919 g. Georgi Markov |
| title_short | Goljamata vojna i Bălgarskata straža meždu Sredna Evropa i Orienta |
| title_sort | goljamata vojna i balgarskata straza mezdu sredna evropa i orienta 1916 1919 g |
| title_sub | 1916 - 1919 g. |
| topic | Friedensvertrag von Neuilly-sur-Seine 1919 November 27 (DE-588)1165582309 gnd Erster Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079163-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Friedensvertrag von Neuilly-sur-Seine 1919 November 27 Erster Weltkrieg Bulgarien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015418789&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015418789&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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