Modeling financial incentives to get unemployed back to work:

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-sp...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Boone, Jan (VerfasserIn), Ours, Jan C. van 1954- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Bonn IZA 2000
Schriftenreihe:Discussion paper / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 108
Schlagworte:
Zusammenfassung:We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 36 - 39
Beschreibung:48, 3 S. graph. Darst.

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