Being no one: the self-model theory of subjectivity
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
2004
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. MIT Press paperback ed. |
| Schriftenreihe: | A Bradford Book
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. [635] - 662 |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 699 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262633086 0262134179 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135971532308480 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as
sefves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a
self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they
appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self,
however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is
the content of a transparent self-model. In Being
No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws
strongly on neuroscientific research to present a rep-
resentational ist and functional analysis of what a con-
sciously experienced first-person perspective actually
is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the
empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new
conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies
of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect,
blindsight. and hallucinations; and offers new sets of
multilevel constraints for the concept of conscious-
ness. Metzinger*s central question is: How exactly
does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity
emerge out of objective events in the natural world?
His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious
experience, in particular the experience of being
someone that results from the emergence of a phe-
nomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of
description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intu-
itions that subjective experiences as such can never
be reductively explained are themselves ultimately
rooted in the deeper representational structure of our
conscious minds.
Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy at the
Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat Mainz, Germany. He
is the editor of Neural Correlates of Consciousness
(MIT Press. 2000).
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
1 Questions 1
1.1 Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective l
1.2 Questions 6
1.3 Overview: The architecture of the book 9
2 Tools I 13
2.1 Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states 13
2.2 From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing,
intentional content, and conscious experience 15
2.2.1 Introspectability as attentional availability 32
2.2.2 Availability for cognitive processing 38
2.2.3 Availability for the control of action 39
2.3 From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual
experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning 43
2.4 From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia 62
2.4.1 What is a quale? 66
2.4.2 Why qualia don’t exist 69
2.4.3 An argument for the elimination of the canonical concept of a quale 83
2.4.4 Presentational content 86
2.5 Phenomenal presentation 94
2.5.1 The principle of presentationality 96
2.5.2 The principle of reality generation 98
2.5.3 The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity 100
2.5.4 The principle of object formation 104
3 The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience 107
3.1 What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum? 107
3.2 Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a
phenomenal representation? 116
3.2.1 Global availability 117
3.2.2 Activation within a window of presence 126
3.2.3 Integration into a coherent global state 131
3.2.4 Convolved holism 143
3.2.5 Dynamicity 151
3.2.6 Perspectivalness 156
3.2.7 Transparency 163
Contents
viii
3.2.8 Offline activation 179
3.2.9 Representation of intensities 184
3.2.10 “Ultrasmoothness”: The homogeneity of simple content 189
3.2.11 Adaptivity 198
3.3 Phenomenal mental models 208
4 Neurophenomenological Case Studies I 213
4.1 Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality 213
4.2 Deviant phenomenal models of reality 215
4.2.1 Agnosia 215
4.2.2 Neglect 222
4.2.3 Blindsight 228
4.2.4 Hallucinations 237
4.2.5 Dreams 251
4.3 The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality 264
5 Tools II 265
5.1 Overview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness 265
5.2 From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereologica!
intentional ity 265
5.3 From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity,
autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves 279
5.4 From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and
immediacy 285
6 The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person
Perspective 299
6.1 What is a phenomenal self-model? 299
6.2 Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural
system-model into a phenomenal self ? 305
6.2.1 Global availability of system-related information 305
6.2.2 Situatedness and virtual self-presence 310
6.2.3 Being-in-a-world: Full immersion 313
6.2.4 Convolved holism of the phenomenal self 320
6.2.5 Dynamics of the phenomenal self 324
6.2.6 Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self 330
6.2.7 Virtual phenomenal selves 340
6.2.8 Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon 344
Contents ix
6.3 Descriptive levels of the human self-model 353
6.3.1 Neural correlates 353
6.3.2 Cognitive correlates 361
6.3.3 Social correlates 362
6.4 Levels of content within the human self-model 379
6.4.1 Spatial and nonspatial content 380
6.4.2 Transparent and opaque content 386
6.4.3 The attentional subject 390
6.4.4 The cognitive subject 395
6.4.5 Agency 405
6.5 Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation 411
6.5.1 Global availability of transient subject-object relations 420
6.5.2 Phenomenal presence of a knowing seif 421
6.5.3 Phenomenal presence of an agent 422
6.6 The self-model theory of subjectivity 427
7 Neurophenomenological Case Studies II 429
7.1 Impossible egos 429
7.2 Deviant phenomenal models of the self 429
7.2.1 Anosognosia 429
7.2.2 fch-Storungen: Identity disorders and disintegrating self-models 437
7.2.3 Hallucinated selves: Phantom limbs, out-of-body-experiences, and
hallucinated agency 461
7.2.4 Multiple selves: Dissociative identity disorder 522
7.2.5 Lucid dreams 529
7.3 The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective 545
8 Preliminary Answers 547
8.1 The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the
total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness 547
8.2 Preliminary answers 558
8.3 Being no one 625
References 635
Name Index 663
Subject Index 671
|
| adam_txt |
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as
sefves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a
self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they
appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self,
however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is
the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being
No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws
strongly on neuroscientific research to present a rep-
resentational ist and functional analysis of what a con-
sciously experienced first-person perspective actually
is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the
empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new
conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies
of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect,
blindsight. and hallucinations; and offers new sets of
multilevel constraints for the concept of conscious-
ness. Metzinger*s central question is: How exactly
does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity
emerge out of objective events in the natural world?
His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious
experience, in particular the experience of being
someone that results from the emergence of a phe-
nomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of
description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intu-
itions that subjective experiences as such can never
be reductively explained are themselves ultimately
rooted in the deeper representational structure of our
conscious minds.
Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy at the
Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat Mainz, Germany. He
is the editor of Neural Correlates of Consciousness
(MIT Press. 2000).
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
1 Questions 1
1.1 Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective l
1.2 Questions 6
1.3 Overview: The architecture of the book 9
2 Tools I 13
2.1 Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states 13
2.2 From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing,
intentional content, and conscious experience 15
2.2.1 Introspectability as attentional availability 32
2.2.2 Availability for cognitive processing 38
2.2.3 Availability for the control of action 39
2.3 From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual
experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning 43
2.4 From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia 62
2.4.1 What is a quale? 66
2.4.2 Why qualia don’t exist 69
2.4.3 An argument for the elimination of the canonical concept of a quale 83
2.4.4 Presentational content 86
2.5 Phenomenal presentation 94
2.5.1 The principle of presentationality 96
2.5.2 The principle of reality generation 98
2.5.3 The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity 100
2.5.4 The principle of object formation 104
3 The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience 107
3.1 What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum? 107
3.2 Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a
phenomenal representation? 116
3.2.1 Global availability 117
3.2.2 Activation within a window of presence 126
3.2.3 Integration into a coherent global state 131
3.2.4 Convolved holism 143
3.2.5 Dynamicity 151
3.2.6 Perspectivalness 156
3.2.7 Transparency 163
Contents
viii
3.2.8 Offline activation 179
3.2.9 Representation of intensities 184
3.2.10 “Ultrasmoothness”: The homogeneity of simple content 189
3.2.11 Adaptivity 198
3.3 Phenomenal mental models 208
4 Neurophenomenological Case Studies I 213
4.1 Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality 213
4.2 Deviant phenomenal models of reality 215
4.2.1 Agnosia 215
4.2.2 Neglect 222
4.2.3 Blindsight 228
4.2.4 Hallucinations 237
4.2.5 Dreams 251
4.3 The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality 264
5 Tools II 265
5.1 Overview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness 265
5.2 From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereologica!
intentional ity 265
5.3 From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity,
autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves 279
5.4 From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and
immediacy 285
6 The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person
Perspective 299
6.1 What is a phenomenal self-model? 299
6.2 Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural
system-model into a phenomenal self ? 305
6.2.1 Global availability of system-related information 305
6.2.2 Situatedness and virtual self-presence 310
6.2.3 Being-in-a-world: Full immersion 313
6.2.4 Convolved holism of the phenomenal self 320
6.2.5 Dynamics of the phenomenal self 324
6.2.6 Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self 330
6.2.7 Virtual phenomenal selves 340
6.2.8 Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon 344
Contents ix
6.3 Descriptive levels of the human self-model 353
6.3.1 Neural correlates 353
6.3.2 Cognitive correlates 361
6.3.3 Social correlates 362
6.4 Levels of content within the human self-model 379
6.4.1 Spatial and nonspatial content 380
6.4.2 Transparent and opaque content 386
6.4.3 The attentional subject 390
6.4.4 The cognitive subject 395
6.4.5 Agency 405
6.5 Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation 411
6.5.1 Global availability of transient subject-object relations 420
6.5.2 Phenomenal presence of a knowing seif 421
6.5.3 Phenomenal presence of an agent 422
6.6 The self-model theory of subjectivity 427
7 Neurophenomenological Case Studies II 429
7.1 Impossible egos 429
7.2 Deviant phenomenal models of the self 429
7.2.1 Anosognosia 429
7.2.2 fch-Storungen: Identity disorders and disintegrating self-models 437
7.2.3 Hallucinated selves: Phantom limbs, out-of-body-experiences, and
hallucinated agency 461
7.2.4 Multiple selves: Dissociative identity disorder 522
7.2.5 Lucid dreams 529
7.3 The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective 545
8 Preliminary Answers 547
8.1 The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the
total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness 547
8.2 Preliminary answers 558
8.3 Being no one 625
References 635
Name Index 663
Subject Index 671 |
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| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 153 - Conscious mental processes & intelligence |
| dewey-raw | 153 |
| dewey-search | 153 |
| dewey-sort | 3153 |
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| discipline | Psychologie Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Psychologie Philosophie |
| edition | 1. MIT Press paperback ed. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV021996572 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T16:10:53Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:48:59Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262633086 0262134179 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015211249 |
| oclc_num | 442763478 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | XII, 699 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | A Bradford Book |
| spelling | Metzinger, Thomas 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)121599353 aut Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity 1. MIT Press paperback ed. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 2004 XII, 699 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier A Bradford Book Literaturverz. S. [635] - 662 Consciousness Duševnost Filozofija Mentality Philosophy Psihologija Psychology Zavest Philosophie Cognitive neuroscience Self psychology Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd rswk-swf Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd rswk-swf Selbstreflexion (DE-588)4132370-1 gnd rswk-swf Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd rswk-swf Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 gnd rswk-swf Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd rswk-swf Neurophysiologie (DE-588)4041897-2 gnd rswk-swf Neurophysiologie (DE-588)4041897-2 s DE-604 Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 s Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 s Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 s Selbstreflexion (DE-588)4132370-1 s Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 s Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 s 1\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015211249&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015211249&sequence=000002&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Metzinger, Thomas 1958- Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity Consciousness Duševnost Filozofija Mentality Philosophy Psihologija Psychology Zavest Philosophie Cognitive neuroscience Self psychology Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd Selbstreflexion (DE-588)4132370-1 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 gnd Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd Neurophysiologie (DE-588)4041897-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4045660-2 (DE-588)4045791-6 (DE-588)4132370-1 (DE-588)4006349-5 (DE-588)4058323-5 (DE-588)4193780-6 (DE-588)4041897-2 |
| title | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_auth | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_exact_search | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_full | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_fullStr | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Being no one the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| title_short | Being no one |
| title_sort | being no one the self model theory of subjectivity |
| title_sub | the self-model theory of subjectivity |
| topic | Consciousness Duševnost Filozofija Mentality Philosophy Psihologija Psychology Zavest Philosophie Cognitive neuroscience Self psychology Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd Selbstreflexion (DE-588)4132370-1 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 gnd Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd Neurophysiologie (DE-588)4041897-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Consciousness Duševnost Filozofija Mentality Philosophy Psihologija Psychology Zavest Philosophie Cognitive neuroscience Self psychology Phänomenologie Selbstreflexion Bewusstsein Subjektivität Kognitionswissenschaft Neurophysiologie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015211249&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015211249&sequence=000002&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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