Termination of price wars: a signaling approach
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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Dt. Univ.-Verl.
2003
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| Series: | Gabler Edition Wissenschaft
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| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XXIV, 240 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 3824479567 |
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| adam_text | Contents
Foreword V
Preface VII
Contents IX
List of Figures XIX
List of Tables XXI
List of Abbreviations XXIII
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Background of the Research Problem 1
1.2 Scientific Contribution, Focus and Particularities of the Analysis 3
1.3 Course of the Analysis 5
2. Basic Aspects of Price Wars 9
2.1 Definition Approaches of the Term Price War 9
2.1.1 Definition of Price War : Overview on Approaches in Economics 9
2.1.2 Definition of the Term Price War :
Approaches in Marketing Literature 10
2.1.2.1 The Price War Definition Approach by Cassady 10
2.1.2.2 The Price War Definition Approach by Briihlwiler 11
2.1.2.3 The Price War Definition Approach by Heil and Helsen 11
2.1.3 Conclusions on Definition Approaches to the Term Price War 12
2.2 General Factors Leading to Price Wars 13
2.3 The Termination of Price Wars, and Rationales for their Termination 15
2.3.1 Reasons to Terminate a Price War from the Perspective of the
Involved Firm 15
2.3.1.1 Firms Strategic Rationale for Price War Termination 15
2.3.1.2 Possible Negative Effects of Price Wars on the Firms 16
2.3.2 Possible Negative Effects of Price Wars on Consumers
and the Public 17
2.3.3 Technical Approaches to Price War Termination, and Potentially
Critical Factors for Firms Termination Willingness 18
2.4 Price War Dynamics: Empiric Findings and a Phase Scheme Suggestion 19
IX
2.5 Other Types of Aggressive Competitive Pricing
and Delimitation than Price Wars 25
2.5.1 Limit Pricing 26
2.5.1.1 General Approaches to Limit Pricing 26
2.5.1.2 Critique of Traditional Limit Pricing Approaches 26
2.5.1.3 Alternative Explanatory Approaches to Limit Pricing 27
2.5.1.3.1 Structural Asymmetries 27
2.5.1.3.2 Dynamic Limit Pricing 27
2.5.2 Predatory Pricing 28
2.5.2.1 Approaches to Definitions of the Term Predatory Pricing 28
2.5.2.2 The Deep Pocket Theory of Predation, Critique,
and Reputation Aspects 29
2.5.3 Price Dumping 30
2.5.4 Comparison of the Types of Aggressive Competitive Pricing 31
2.6 Classification Approach and Conclusions on Definitions of Price Wars 32
3. Overview of the Literature on Price Wars 33
3.1 Typology of Price War Related Literature 33
3.2 Literature on Price Wars in Economics 34
3.2.1 Insights from Price War Cases by Ralph Cassady 34
3.2.2 A Model of Profitable Price Wars by Schendel and Balestra 37
3.2.3 Price War Models in Noncooperative Game Theory 39
3.2.3.1 Imperfect Monitoring Models for Price Wars 40
3.2.3.2 Cyclical Models for Price Wars 42
3.2.3.3 Learning Models for Price Wars 43
3.2.3.4 Entry and Exit Models for Price Wars 44
3.2.3.4.1 Entry Models 44
3.2.3.4.2 Exit Models 46
3.2.3.5 Firm Financial Condition Models for Price Wars 46
3.2.3.5.1 Predatory Price War Models 46
3.2.3.5.2 Bankruptcy Models 47
3.3 Price Wars in the Marketing and Business Literature 48
3.3.1 Marketing Solutions to Overheated Price Competition 48
by Briihlwiler
3.3.2 The McKinsey View of Price Wars by Garda and Mara 50
3.3.3 Suggestions on the Handling of Price Wars by A. Server 52
3.3.4 Approaches to Managing Price Wars through Marketing
by Rao et Al. 52
3.3.5 Toward an Understanding of Price Wars by Heil and Helsen 54
3.4 Conclusions on Literature on Price War 55
X
4. General Approaches to Conflict Analysis and Termination 57
4.1. Relevant Aspects for Price Wars and their Termination from Game
Theory and Economics 57
4.1.1 Basic Ideas and Assumptions of Noncooperative Game Theory 57
4.1.2 Relevant Types of Pricing Games 58
4.1.2.1 The Market Share Zero Sum Pricing Game 59
4.1.2.2 The Prisoner s Dilemma as a Representation 60
of Competitive Pricing
4.1.2.2.1 The Idea and Structure of the Prisoner s Dilemma 60
4.1.2.2.2 The Prisoner s Dilemma with Price Cuts
and Price Increases 61
4.1.2.2.2.1 The Prisoner s Dilemma of Pricing with Price Cutting,
and Related Concepts and Findings 62
4.1.2.2.2.1.1 The Prisoner s Dilemma with Price Cutting 62
4.1.2.2.2.1.2 Bertrand Competition and Nash Equilibrium 63
4.1.2.2.2.2 The Prisoner s Dilemma of Pricing with Price Increase 65
4.1.2.2.2.3 Competitor Reaction Schemes and Price Rigidity 67
4.1.2.2.2.4 Opportunistic Pricing as a Threat to Price Co operation 67
4.1.3 The Repetition of Games as a Basis for Co operative Behavior 69
4.1.3.1 Finite Repetition of a Prisoner s Dilemma Game 69
4.1.3.2 Infinite Repetition of a Prisoner s Dilemma Game, 70
and Resulting Approaches to Co operation
4.1.3.2.1 Collusive Agreements for Price Coordination 71
4.1.3.2.2 Focal Points for Price Coordination 71
4.1.3.2.3 Firm Behaviors for Price Coordination 72
4.1.3.2.3.1 Past Behavior and the Generation of Reputation 72
4.1.3.2.3.2 Signaling Approaches 73
4.1.3.2.3.2.1 Preannouncing Price Increases 73
4.1.3.2.3.2.2 Preannouncing Retaliatory Behavior 73
4.1.3.2.3.2.3 Signal Intention to Defend Markets 74
4.1.3.2.3.3 Price Leadership 75
4.1.4 A Suggestion for a Formulation of Subjective Expected Utility in
Competitive Marketing/Pricing Interaction 76
4.1.5 Critique of Game Theory, and Suggestions for Modifications 78
4.1.6 A Note on the Use of the Prisoner s Dilemma
in Experimental Settings 80
4.2 Basic Concepts of Signals and Signaling 81
4.2.1 Basic Ideas and Approaches to Signaling 81
4.2.2 Biases in Interpretations of and Reactions to Signals 84
4.2.2.1 Biases in the Relation Between Moves and Interpretations 84
4.2.2.2 Biases in the Relation Between Interpretations and Reactions 85
4.2.3 A Suggestion for a Categorization of Signals 86
XI
4.2.4 A Conception of Possible Mediation and Moderation
Effects of Signals 88
4.2.4.1 A Conception of the Mediation Role of Signals
on the Relation between Action and Reaction 88
4.2.4.2 A Possible Moderating Role of Impressions 89
4.2.5 Approaches to an Improvement of the Signaling Process 91
4.2.5.1 Considering the Attributes of Moves 91
4.2.5.2 Considering the Attributes of Signals 91
4.2.5.2.1 Signal Clarity and Noisiness 91
4.2.5.2.2 Signal Commitment and Credibility 92
4.2.5.2.3 Signal Consistency 93
4.2.5.2.4 Signal Aggressiveness 93
4.2.5.3 Considering the Similarity of the Signal Initiator
and the Signal Generator 93
4.2.6 Benefits and Costs of Signaling 94
4.2.6.1 Some Empirical Results on the Benefits of Signaling 94
4.2.6.2 The Potential Costs and Risks of Signaling 94
4.2.6.2.1 The Costs and Risks of Initiating Signals 94
4.2.6.2.2 The Costs and Risks of Generating Signals (Interpretation) 95
4.2.7 Legal Aspects and Limitations of Signaling with Concern to Pricing 95
4.3 Approaches to Conflict Resolution from other Social Sciences 97
4.3.1 Pure Reciprocity and Tit for Tat 97
4.3.1.1 Investigations on Tit for Tat Performance 98
4.3.1.2 Properties of Tit for Tat, and Related Experimental Results 99
4.3.1.3 Critique with Axelrod s Findings,
and Tit for Tat Modifications 101
4.3.2 De Escalation and Trust through GRIT 104
4.3.2.1 Trust as a Precondition for Co operation 104
4.3.2.2 The GRIT Proposal 105
4.3.2.2.1 Basic Idea and Historical Context of GRIT 105
4.3.2.2.2 The Single Points of the GRIT Proposal 106
4.3.2.2.3 Empirical Results on the Effectiveness of GRIT 108
4.3.2.2.3.1 Cases of GRIT from Diplomacy,
and GRIT Simulation Results 108
4.3.2.2.3.2 Experimental Analysis of GRIT Effectiveness:
An Overview 109
4.3.2.2.4 Potential Weaknesses of the GRIT Strategy 110
4.3.3 Tit for Tat and GRIT: Differences and Commons of the Concepts 112
4.3.4 The Use of Tit for Tat and GRIT in the Termination of Price Wars:
Approaches and Problems 113
4.3.4.1 The Use of Tit for Tat for the Termination of Price Wars:
Approaches and Problems 113
4.3.4.2 The Use of GRIT for the Termination of Price Wars:
Approaches and Problems 115
XII
5. A Signaling Approach to Price War Termination, and Hypotheses on
Price War Termination Moves and Termination Relevant Signals 117
5.1 Signaling as an Approach to Terminate Price Wars 117
5.1.1 Operationalization of Price War Termination,
and Formulation of the Basic Research Idea 117
5.1.2 Particularities of the Price War Conflict Situation
and its Termination 118
5.1.3 Signaling Aspects of Traditional Approaches to Conflict Resolution 119
5.1.3.1 Approaches from Sociology: GRIT and Tit for Tat Signaling 119
5.1.3.2 Signaling Approaches on the Basis of Expected Utility 120
5.1.3.2.1 The Use of Switch Blockers to Affect Expected Utility 120
5.1.3.2.2 Signaling Reciprocity to Affect Expected Utility 121
5.2 Hypotheses on Moves and Interpretations concerning their Potential to
Induce Co operation 122
5.2.1 Hypotheses on Moves to Avoid Brand Switching, and the Effect of
a Technically Correct Understanding 123
5.2.1.1 The Use of Individual Refund Guarantees as a Means of
Reducing Switching 123
5.2.1.2 The Use of Coupons as a Means of Reducing Brand Switching 124
5.2.1.3 The Use of Image Advertising as a Means of
Reducing Brand Switching 125
5.2.1.4 The Technical Interpretations of Moves Aiming to Reduce
Switching and its Effect on Competitor Price Reaction 127
5.2.1.5 A Comparison of Consumer Switch Blockers 127
5.2.2 Hypotheses on Moves Meant to Affect Reciprocity Awareness 129
5.2.2.1 Price Matching Guarantees to Signal Reciprocation Credibly 129
5.2.2.2 Verbal Messages to Competitors as Reciprocation Signals 130
5.2.2.3 Interpretation of Signals of Reciprocation Intent,
and the Effect on Competitor Price Reaction 131
5.2.2.4 Comparison of Moves to Signal Reciprocation 131
5.3 Hypotheses on the Impact of Other Types of Interpretations 132
5.3.1 Co operative Signals and the Effect on Competitor Price Reaction 132
5.3.2 Mediation Effects of Perceived Weakness and Hostility 133
5.3.2.1 Perceived Weakness and the Effect
on Competitor Price Reaction 133
5.3.2.2 Perceived Hostility and the Effect
on Competitor Price Reaction 135
5.3.3 Moderation Effects of Perceived Weakness and Hostility 136
5.3.3.1 Weakness and Hostility as Moderators on the Relation between
Interpretations and Competitor Reaction 136
5.3.3.2 Weakness and Hostility as Moderators on the Relation
Between Moves and Interpretations 137
XIII
6. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis for the Price War
Termination Experiment 139
6.1 Basics on Experimental Design and Interaction Analysis 139
6.1.1 Alternatives for Data Generation on Price Wars, and a Rationale
for an Experimental Approach 139
6.1.2 Basics on Experimental Design 140
6.1.2.1 Definition of Experiments, and a Notion of Causality 140
6.1.2.2 Preconditions for Valid Causal Inferences in Experiments 141
6.1.2.3 Key Aspects of Experimental Research 141
6.1.2.3.1 Key Issues in Experimental Designs 141
6.1.2.3.2 Types of Experimental Designs 142
6.1.2.3.3 Statistical Designs and Experimental Layout 142
6.1.2.3.4 Orthogonality and Goodness of an Experimental Design 143
6.1.2.4 Basics and Measurement Issues on Moderation and Mediation 143
6.1.2.4.1 Basic Considerations on Interaction Effects 144
6.1.2.4.2 Moderation Effects 144
6.1.2.4.2.1 Basics on Moderation 144
6.1.2.4.2.2 Measurement of Moderation 145
6.1.2.4.2.3 Relevant Statistical Power Aspects
of Moderation Analysis 145
6.1.2.4.3 Formal Aspects of Mediation 146
6.1.2.5 Differentiation Between Mediators and Moderators 147
6.2 Experimental Method and Data Collection 147
6.2.1 Particularities in the Design of the 147
Price War Termination Experiment
6.2.1.1 The Experimental Price War Prisoner s Dilemma
Game Structure 147
6.2.1.2 Rationale for a One shot Sequential Play Mode
for Signaling Analysis 148
6.2.2 Design of the Price War Termination Experiment,
and Subject Instructions 150
6.2.2.1 Experimental Subjects and Basic Instructions 150
6.2.2.2 Experimental Briefing and the Conception of the Experiment 150
6.2.2.3 Experimental Design, Questionnaire Formulation, Treatments,
and Coding Issues 151
6.2.3 Formulation of Variables Used in the Model 152
6.2.3.1 Subjects Price Reaction as Dependent Variable 152
6.2.3.2 Moves and Interpretations as Independent Variables 152
6.2.4 Formulation of Treatments and Coding 152
6.2.4.1 Formulations of Treatments 152
6.2.4.2 The Coding of Interpretations and Competitor Reaction 153
XIV
6.3 Basics on Regression and Logistic Regression
Data Analysis Procedures 155
6.3.1 Scaling of Variables and the Use of Data Analyzing Techniques 155
6.3.2 An Introduction to Linear Regression 156
6.3.2.1 The Linear Regression Approach 156
6.3.2.2 Validation of the Regression Model 158
6.3.2.3 Premises of the Regression Model 159
6.3.3 Logistic Regression for the Analysis of Categorical Data 160
6.3.3.1 Categorical Scaling of Data 160
6.3.3.2 Prediction of Probabilities through Logistic Regression 160
6.3.3.3 The General (Multiple) Binary Logit Model 161
6.3.3.4 Discrete Choice as Random Variable, and Distribution Issues 163
6.3.3.5 Estimation of the Logistic Regression Coefficients 165
6.3.3.5.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of
Logistic Regression Coefficients 165
6.3.3.5.2 Properties of the ML Estimator and a Comparison of
Alternative Parameter Estimation Procedures 167
6.3.3.5.3 Number of Observations or Sample Size
as a Prerequisite for Validity 167
6.3.3.6 Meaning and Interpretation of the
Logistic Regression Coefficient 168
6.3.3.6.1 Meanings of Beta Coefficients in Logistic Regression 168
6.3.3.6.2 Interpretation Approaches of the
Logistic Regression Coefficient 170
6.3.3.6.2.1 Interpretation of Pj as Partial Derivative 170
6.3.3.6.2.2 Interpretation of (3j as Sensitivity Analysis 170
6.3.3.6.2.3 The Effect Coefficient 170
6.3.3.7 Tests of Logistic Regression Model Estimation 171
6.3.3.7.1 Tests for the Entire Logistic Regression Model 171
6.3.3.7.1.1 Deviance as a Measure for Model Quality 171
6.3.3.7.1.2 Likelihood Ratio Test (F test) 172
6.3.3.7.1.3 R2 Statistics in Logistic Regression 172
6.3.3.7.1.3.1 McFadden s R2 (McF R2) 172
6.3.3.7.1.3.2 Cox Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 173
6.3.3.7.1.3.3 Adjusted R2 in Logistic Regression 173
6.3.3.7.1.4 Goodness of Fit Test in Logistic Regression 174
6.3.3.7.1.5 Conclusion on Tests for the Logistic Regression Model 174
6.3.3.7.2 Wald Test of Individual (3 Coefficients 174
6.3.3.7.3 Outlier Diagnostics in Logistic Regression 175
6.3.3.7.4 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives IIA Property 175
6.3.4 Proposal for a Logistic Mediation Model of Signaling 176
6.4 Logistic Regression Models of the Hypothesized Relations 178
6.4.1 Model of the Effects of Interpretations on Competitor Reaction 178
6.4.2 Model of the Effects of Moves on Competitor Interpretations 178
XV
6.4.3 Model of the Effects of Moves on Competitor Reaction 179
6.4.4 Models of Moderation Effects 179
6.4.5 Models of the Effects of a Matching of Moves 180
6.5 Framework of Hypothesized Relations 180
7. Results of the Signaling Experiment on Price War Termination 181
7.1 Some Descriptive Statistics on Subject Responses 181
7.2 Experimental Results of the Mediation Role of Signals on the Effects of
Moves on Competitor Reaction 181
7.2.1 Effects of Interpretations on Competitor Price Reaction
Mediation Step Two 182
7.2.2 Effects of Treatments on Interpretations Mediation Step One 184
7.2.2.1 Effects of Treatments on Technically Correct Interpretations of
Moves, and Mediation Aspects of Technically Correct
Interpretation 184
7.2.2.2 Effects of Treatments on Reciprocity Awareness,
and Mediation Aspects of Reciprocity Awareness 185
7.2.2.3 Effects of Treatments on the Generation of Price War
Termination Signals, and Mediation Aspects of Price War
Termination Signals 187
7.2.2.4 Effects of Treatments on the Generation of Signals of
Weakness, and Mediation Aspects of Signals of Weakness 189
7.2.2.5 Effects of Treatments on the Generation of Signals of Hostility,
and Mediation Aspects of Signals of Hostility 190
7.2.3 Effects of Treatments on Competitor Price Reaction,
and Complete Mediation Issues 190
7.3 Experimental Results on the Moderation Effects of Impressions 191
7.3.1 Moderation Effects of Weakness and Hostility on the Relation
between Interpretations and Competitor Reaction 191
7.3.2 Moderation Effects of Weakness and Hostility on the Relation
Between Moves and Interpretations 191
7.4 The Matching of Marketing Moves as Enhancer of the Chance
for a Co operative Price Increase 192
7.4.1 Subjects Matching of Coupons 192
7.4.2 Subjects Matching of Advertising 193
7.5 The Reactions of Non cooperative Subjects: A Closer Look 196
7.6 Discussion of the Concept and the Results of the Signaling Experiment
on Price War Termination 197
XVI
8. Research and Managerial Implications 203
8.1 Research Implications 203
8.2 Managerial Implications 204
List of Appendices 207
Bibliography 219
XVII
List of Figures
Figure 1: The courses of the JEC price wars 20
Figure 2: The courses of the price wars in the bromine industry 20
Figure 3: The course of the Vancouver gasoline price war 21
Figure 4: A general pattern of the course of a price war 22
Figure 5: General price war dynamics and urge for action 49
Figure 6: The zero sum game of pricing 59
Figure 7: The general Prisoner s Dilemma game 60
Figure 8: The Prisoner s Dilemma with price cutting 62
Figure 9: The Prisoner s Dilemma with price increase 65
Figure 10: The Prisoner s Dilemma with price increase: numerical
example 66
Figure 11: The Competitive Market Signaling process chain 83
Figure 12: Mediation of the relation between move and competitor reaction
through signals: path model
Figure 13: Possible moderation through impressions: general relations 90
Figure 14: Moderation of the effects of signals on reaction
through impressions: graph
Figure 15: Regression analysis: residuals and regression straight line 157
Figure 16: The general form of the cdf curve of a logistic regression model 164
Figure 17: The cdf curves of different Pj values in logistic regression 168
Figure 18: The cdf curves of different values of p0 in logistic regression 169
Figure 19: The relation between different log likelihood values 174
Figure 20: A framework depicting all hypothesized direct, mediation and 180
moderation effects
XIX
List of Tables
Table 1: Market structures and strategic conditions affecting
price war prevalence ^
Table 2: Phases of a price war 22
Table 3: Literature on price wars in economics and law 33
Table 4: Literature on price wars in marketing and business strategy 34
Table 5: Suggestions for moves in price wars by Rao et al. 53
Table 6: Comparison of marketing moves aiming to block 129
customer brand switching
Table 7: Overview of hypotheses 137
Table 8: Experimental multi option prisoner s dilemma to
represent a price war situation °
Table 9: Basic confirmatory techniques of data analysis 155
Table 10: Significance (F/LR test) and R2 of the model of effects of
signals on competitor price reaction
Table 11: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of
signals on competitor price reaction ^
Table 12: Cross table results: Impact of signals on INCPRICE 183
Table 13: Logistic regression coefficients of the effect of
COUP on TECHCORR l84
Table 14: Cross table results. Impact of COUP on TECHCORR (1) 184
Table 15: Cross table results. Impact of COUP on TECHCORR (2) 184
Table 16: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of
treatments on RECICON
Table 17: Cross table results. Impact of PMG on RECICON 186
Table 18: Logistic regression coefficients of the effect of PMG on
RECICON (compared to VERB A) 186
Table 19: Cross table results. Impact of PMG on RECICON
(compared to VERB A) 87
Table 20: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of
treatments on SIGTERM 88
Table 21: Cross table results. Impact of VERBA on SIGTERM 188
Table 22: Cross table results. Impact of treatments on WEAK 189
XXI
Table 23: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of treatments
on INCPRICE 190
Table 24: Interaction effect between VERBA and WEAK 191
Table 25: Logistic regression coefficient of the effects of
COUPMAT on INCPRICE 19i
Table 26: Cross table results. Impact of COUPMAT on INCPRICE 193
Table 27: Logistic Regression Coefficient of the effects of ADVMAT
on INCPRICE 1W
Table 28: Cross table results. Impact of ADVMAT on INCPRICE 194
Table 29: Overview of hypotheses and related Results 194
Please note that most of the tables were produced by the author. References are only
mentioned in cases where tables are taken from other sources (of literature).
XXII
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Foreword V
Preface VII
Contents IX
List of Figures XIX
List of Tables XXI
List of Abbreviations XXIII
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Background of the Research Problem 1
1.2 Scientific Contribution, Focus and Particularities of the Analysis 3
1.3 Course of the Analysis 5
2. Basic Aspects of Price Wars 9
2.1 Definition Approaches of the Term'Price War' 9
2.1.1 Definition of 'Price War': Overview on Approaches in Economics 9
2.1.2 Definition of the Term 'Price War':
Approaches in Marketing Literature 10
2.1.2.1 The Price War Definition Approach by Cassady 10
2.1.2.2 The Price War Definition Approach by Briihlwiler 11
2.1.2.3 The Price War Definition Approach by Heil and Helsen 11
2.1.3 Conclusions on Definition Approaches to the Term 'Price War' 12
2.2 General Factors Leading to Price Wars 13
2.3 The Termination of Price Wars, and Rationales for their Termination 15
2.3.1 Reasons to Terminate a Price War from the Perspective of the
Involved Firm 15
2.3.1.1 Firms' Strategic Rationale for Price War Termination 15
2.3.1.2 Possible Negative Effects of Price Wars on the Firms 16
2.3.2 Possible Negative Effects of Price Wars on Consumers
and the Public 17
2.3.3 Technical Approaches to Price War Termination, and Potentially
Critical Factors for Firms' Termination Willingness 18
2.4 Price War Dynamics: Empiric Findings and a Phase Scheme Suggestion 19
IX
2.5 Other Types of Aggressive Competitive Pricing
and Delimitation than Price Wars 25
2.5.1 Limit Pricing 26
2.5.1.1 General Approaches to Limit Pricing 26
2.5.1.2 Critique of Traditional Limit Pricing Approaches 26
2.5.1.3 Alternative Explanatory Approaches to Limit Pricing 27
2.5.1.3.1 Structural Asymmetries 27
2.5.1.3.2 Dynamic Limit Pricing 27
2.5.2 Predatory Pricing 28
2.5.2.1 Approaches to Definitions of the Term 'Predatory Pricing' 28
2.5.2.2 The Deep Pocket Theory of Predation, Critique,
and Reputation Aspects 29
2.5.3 Price Dumping 30
2.5.4 Comparison of the Types of Aggressive Competitive Pricing 31
2.6 Classification Approach and Conclusions on Definitions of Price Wars 32
3. Overview of the Literature on Price Wars 33
3.1 Typology of Price War Related Literature 33
3.2 Literature on Price Wars in Economics 34
3.2.1 Insights from Price War Cases by Ralph Cassady 34
3.2.2 A Model of Profitable Price Wars by Schendel and Balestra 37
3.2.3 Price War Models in Noncooperative Game Theory 39
3.2.3.1 Imperfect Monitoring Models for Price Wars 40
3.2.3.2 Cyclical Models for Price Wars 42
3.2.3.3 Learning Models for Price Wars 43
3.2.3.4 Entry and Exit Models for Price Wars 44
3.2.3.4.1 Entry Models 44
3.2.3.4.2 Exit Models 46
3.2.3.5 Firm Financial Condition Models for Price Wars 46
3.2.3.5.1 Predatory Price War Models 46
3.2.3.5.2 Bankruptcy Models 47
3.3 Price Wars in the Marketing and Business Literature 48
3.3.1 Marketing Solutions to Overheated Price Competition 48
by Briihlwiler
3.3.2 The McKinsey View of Price Wars by Garda and Mara 50
3.3.3 Suggestions on the Handling of Price Wars by A. Server 52
3.3.4 Approaches to Managing Price Wars through Marketing
by Rao et Al. 52
3.3.5 Toward an Understanding of Price Wars by Heil and Helsen 54
3.4 Conclusions on Literature on Price War 55
X
4. General Approaches to Conflict Analysis and Termination 57
4.1. Relevant Aspects for Price Wars and their Termination from Game
Theory and Economics 57
4.1.1 Basic Ideas and Assumptions of Noncooperative Game Theory 57
4.1.2 Relevant Types of Pricing Games 58
4.1.2.1 The Market Share Zero Sum Pricing Game 59
4.1.2.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma as a Representation 60
of Competitive Pricing
4.1.2.2.1 The Idea and Structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma 60
4.1.2.2.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Price Cuts
and Price Increases 61
4.1.2.2.2.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma of Pricing with Price Cutting,
and Related Concepts and Findings 62
4.1.2.2.2.1.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Price Cutting 62
4.1.2.2.2.1.2 Bertrand Competition and Nash Equilibrium 63
4.1.2.2.2.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma of Pricing with Price Increase 65
4.1.2.2.2.3 Competitor Reaction Schemes and Price Rigidity 67
4.1.2.2.2.4 Opportunistic Pricing as a Threat to Price Co operation 67
4.1.3 The Repetition of Games as a Basis for Co operative Behavior 69
4.1.3.1 Finite Repetition of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 69
4.1.3.2 Infinite Repetition of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 70
and Resulting Approaches to Co operation
4.1.3.2.1 Collusive Agreements for Price Coordination 71
4.1.3.2.2 Focal Points for Price Coordination 71
4.1.3.2.3 Firm Behaviors for Price Coordination 72
4.1.3.2.3.1 Past Behavior and the Generation of Reputation 72
4.1.3.2.3.2 Signaling Approaches 73
4.1.3.2.3.2.1 Preannouncing Price Increases 73
4.1.3.2.3.2.2 Preannouncing Retaliatory Behavior 73
4.1.3.2.3.2.3 Signal Intention to Defend Markets 74
4.1.3.2.3.3 Price Leadership 75
4.1.4 A Suggestion for a Formulation of Subjective Expected Utility in
Competitive Marketing/Pricing Interaction 76
4.1.5 Critique of Game Theory, and Suggestions for Modifications 78
4.1.6 A Note on the Use of the Prisoner's Dilemma
in Experimental Settings 80
4.2 Basic Concepts of Signals and Signaling 81
4.2.1 Basic Ideas and Approaches to Signaling 81
4.2.2 Biases in Interpretations of and Reactions to Signals 84
4.2.2.1 Biases in the Relation Between Moves and Interpretations 84
4.2.2.2 Biases in the Relation Between Interpretations and Reactions 85
4.2.3 A Suggestion for a Categorization of Signals 86
XI
4.2.4 A Conception of Possible Mediation and Moderation
Effects of Signals 88
4.2.4.1 A Conception of the Mediation Role of Signals
on the Relation between Action and Reaction 88
4.2.4.2 A Possible Moderating Role of Impressions 89
4.2.5 Approaches to an Improvement of the Signaling Process 91
4.2.5.1 Considering the Attributes of Moves 91
4.2.5.2 Considering the Attributes of Signals 91
4.2.5.2.1 Signal Clarity and Noisiness 91
4.2.5.2.2 Signal Commitment and Credibility 92
4.2.5.2.3 Signal Consistency 93
4.2.5.2.4 Signal Aggressiveness 93
4.2.5.3 Considering the Similarity of the Signal Initiator
and the Signal Generator 93
4.2.6 Benefits and Costs of Signaling 94
4.2.6.1 Some Empirical Results on the Benefits of Signaling 94
4.2.6.2 The Potential Costs and Risks of Signaling 94
4.2.6.2.1 The Costs and Risks of Initiating Signals 94
4.2.6.2.2 The Costs and Risks of Generating Signals (Interpretation) 95
4.2.7 Legal Aspects and Limitations of Signaling with Concern to Pricing 95
4.3 Approaches to Conflict Resolution from other Social Sciences 97
4.3.1 Pure Reciprocity and Tit for Tat 97
4.3.1.1 Investigations on Tit for Tat Performance 98
4.3.1.2 Properties of Tit for Tat, and Related Experimental Results 99
4.3.1.3 Critique with Axelrod's Findings,
and Tit for Tat Modifications 101
4.3.2 De Escalation and Trust through GRIT 104
4.3.2.1 Trust as a Precondition for Co operation 104
4.3.2.2 The GRIT Proposal 105
4.3.2.2.1 Basic Idea and Historical Context of GRIT 105
4.3.2.2.2 The Single Points of the GRIT Proposal 106
4.3.2.2.3 Empirical Results on the Effectiveness of GRIT 108
4.3.2.2.3.1 Cases of GRIT from Diplomacy,
and GRIT Simulation Results 108
4.3.2.2.3.2 Experimental Analysis of GRIT Effectiveness:
An Overview 109
4.3.2.2.4 Potential Weaknesses of the GRIT Strategy 110
4.3.3 Tit for Tat and GRIT: Differences and Commons of the Concepts 112
4.3.4 The Use of Tit for Tat and GRIT in the Termination of Price Wars:
Approaches and Problems 113
4.3.4.1 The Use of Tit for Tat for the Termination of Price Wars:
Approaches and Problems 113
4.3.4.2 The Use of GRIT for the Termination of Price Wars:
Approaches and Problems 115
XII
5. A Signaling Approach to Price War Termination, and Hypotheses on
Price War Termination Moves and Termination Relevant Signals 117
5.1 Signaling as an Approach to Terminate Price Wars 117
5.1.1 Operationalization of Price War Termination,
and Formulation of the Basic Research Idea 117
5.1.2 Particularities of the Price War Conflict Situation
and its Termination 118
5.1.3 Signaling Aspects of Traditional Approaches to Conflict Resolution 119
5.1.3.1 Approaches from Sociology: GRIT and Tit for Tat Signaling 119
5.1.3.2 Signaling Approaches on the Basis of Expected Utility 120
5.1.3.2.1 The Use of 'Switch Blockers' to Affect Expected Utility 120
5.1.3.2.2 Signaling Reciprocity to Affect Expected Utility 121
5.2 Hypotheses on Moves and Interpretations concerning their Potential to
Induce Co operation 122
5.2.1 Hypotheses on Moves to Avoid Brand Switching, and the Effect of
a Technically Correct Understanding 123
5.2.1.1 The Use of Individual Refund Guarantees as a Means of
Reducing Switching 123
5.2.1.2 The Use of Coupons as a Means of Reducing Brand Switching 124
5.2.1.3 The Use of Image Advertising as a Means of
Reducing Brand Switching 125
5.2.1.4 The Technical Interpretations of Moves Aiming to Reduce
Switching and its Effect on Competitor Price Reaction 127
5.2.1.5 A Comparison of Consumer Switch Blockers 127
5.2.2 Hypotheses on Moves Meant to Affect Reciprocity Awareness 129
5.2.2.1 Price Matching Guarantees to Signal Reciprocation Credibly 129
5.2.2.2 Verbal Messages to Competitors as Reciprocation Signals 130
5.2.2.3 Interpretation of Signals of Reciprocation Intent,
and the Effect on Competitor Price Reaction 131
5.2.2.4 Comparison of Moves to Signal Reciprocation 131
5.3 Hypotheses on the Impact of Other Types of Interpretations 132
5.3.1 Co operative Signals and the Effect on Competitor Price Reaction 132
5.3.2 Mediation Effects of Perceived Weakness and Hostility 133
5.3.2.1 Perceived Weakness and the Effect
on Competitor Price Reaction 133
5.3.2.2 Perceived Hostility and the Effect
on Competitor Price Reaction 135
5.3.3 Moderation Effects of Perceived Weakness and Hostility 136
5.3.3.1 Weakness and Hostility as Moderators on the Relation between
Interpretations and Competitor Reaction 136
5.3.3.2 Weakness and Hostility as Moderators on the Relation
Between Moves and Interpretations 137
XIII
6. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis for the Price War
Termination Experiment 139
6.1 Basics on Experimental Design and Interaction Analysis 139
6.1.1 Alternatives for Data Generation on Price Wars, and a Rationale
for an Experimental Approach 139
6.1.2 Basics on Experimental Design 140
6.1.2.1 Definition of Experiments, and a Notion of Causality 140
6.1.2.2 Preconditions for Valid Causal Inferences in Experiments 141
6.1.2.3 Key Aspects of Experimental Research 141
6.1.2.3.1 Key Issues in Experimental Designs 141
6.1.2.3.2 Types of Experimental Designs 142
6.1.2.3.3 Statistical Designs and Experimental Layout 142
6.1.2.3.4 Orthogonality and Goodness of an Experimental Design 143
6.1.2.4 Basics and Measurement Issues on Moderation and Mediation 143
6.1.2.4.1 Basic Considerations on Interaction Effects 144
6.1.2.4.2 Moderation Effects 144
6.1.2.4.2.1 Basics on Moderation 144
6.1.2.4.2.2 Measurement of Moderation 145
6.1.2.4.2.3 Relevant Statistical Power Aspects
of Moderation Analysis 145
6.1.2.4.3 Formal Aspects of Mediation 146
6.1.2.5 Differentiation Between Mediators and Moderators 147
6.2 Experimental Method and Data Collection 147
6.2.1 Particularities in the Design of the 147
Price War Termination Experiment
6.2.1.1 The Experimental Price War Prisoner's Dilemma
Game Structure 147
6.2.1.2 Rationale for a One shot Sequential Play Mode
for Signaling Analysis 148
6.2.2 Design of the Price War Termination Experiment,
and Subject Instructions 150
6.2.2.1 Experimental Subjects and Basic Instructions 150
6.2.2.2 Experimental Briefing and the Conception of the Experiment 150
6.2.2.3 Experimental Design, Questionnaire Formulation, Treatments,
and Coding Issues 151
6.2.3 Formulation of Variables Used in the Model 152
6.2.3.1 Subjects'Price Reaction as Dependent Variable 152
6.2.3.2 Moves and Interpretations as Independent Variables 152
6.2.4 Formulation of Treatments and Coding 152
6.2.4.1 Formulations of Treatments 152
6.2.4.2 The Coding of Interpretations and Competitor Reaction 153
XIV
6.3 Basics on Regression and Logistic Regression
Data Analysis Procedures 155
6.3.1 Scaling of Variables and the Use of Data Analyzing Techniques 155
6.3.2 An Introduction to Linear Regression 156
6.3.2.1 The Linear Regression Approach 156
6.3.2.2 Validation of the Regression Model 158
6.3.2.3 Premises of the Regression Model 159
6.3.3 Logistic Regression for the Analysis of Categorical Data 160
6.3.3.1 Categorical Scaling of Data 160
6.3.3.2 Prediction of Probabilities through Logistic Regression 160
6.3.3.3 The General (Multiple) Binary Logit Model 161
6.3.3.4 Discrete Choice as Random Variable, and Distribution Issues 163
6.3.3.5 Estimation of the Logistic Regression Coefficients 165
6.3.3.5.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of
Logistic Regression Coefficients 165
6.3.3.5.2 Properties of the ML Estimator and a Comparison of
Alternative Parameter Estimation Procedures 167
6.3.3.5.3 Number of Observations or Sample Size
as a Prerequisite for Validity 167
6.3.3.6 Meaning and Interpretation of the
Logistic Regression Coefficient 168
6.3.3.6.1 Meanings of Beta Coefficients in Logistic Regression 168
6.3.3.6.2 Interpretation Approaches of the
Logistic Regression Coefficient 170
6.3.3.6.2.1 Interpretation of Pj as Partial Derivative 170
6.3.3.6.2.2 Interpretation of (3j as Sensitivity Analysis 170
6.3.3.6.2.3 The Effect Coefficient 170
6.3.3.7 Tests of Logistic Regression Model Estimation 171
6.3.3.7.1 Tests for the Entire Logistic Regression Model 171
6.3.3.7.1.1 Deviance as a Measure for Model Quality 171
6.3.3.7.1.2 Likelihood Ratio Test (F test) 172
6.3.3.7.1.3 R2 Statistics in Logistic Regression 172
6.3.3.7.1.3.1 McFadden's R2 (McF R2) 172
6.3.3.7.1.3.2 Cox Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 173
6.3.3.7.1.3.3 Adjusted R2 in Logistic Regression 173
6.3.3.7.1.4 Goodness of Fit Test in Logistic Regression 174
6.3.3.7.1.5 Conclusion on Tests for the Logistic Regression Model 174
6.3.3.7.2 Wald Test of Individual (3 Coefficients 174
6.3.3.7.3 Outlier Diagnostics in Logistic Regression 175
6.3.3.7.4 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives IIA Property 175
6.3.4 Proposal for a Logistic Mediation Model of Signaling 176
6.4 Logistic Regression Models of the Hypothesized Relations 178
6.4.1 Model of the Effects of Interpretations on Competitor Reaction 178
6.4.2 Model of the Effects of Moves on Competitor Interpretations 178
XV
6.4.3 Model of the Effects of Moves on Competitor Reaction 179
6.4.4 Models of Moderation Effects 179
6.4.5 Models of the Effects of a Matching of Moves 180
6.5 Framework of Hypothesized Relations 180
7. Results of the Signaling Experiment on Price War Termination 181
7.1 Some Descriptive Statistics on Subject Responses 181
7.2 Experimental Results of the Mediation Role of Signals on the Effects of
Moves on Competitor Reaction 181
7.2.1 Effects of Interpretations on Competitor Price Reaction
Mediation Step Two 182
7.2.2 Effects of Treatments on Interpretations Mediation Step One 184
7.2.2.1 Effects of Treatments on Technically Correct Interpretations of
Moves, and Mediation Aspects of Technically Correct
Interpretation 184
7.2.2.2 Effects of Treatments on Reciprocity Awareness,
and Mediation Aspects of Reciprocity Awareness 185
7.2.2.3 Effects of Treatments on the Generation of Price War
Termination Signals, and Mediation Aspects of Price War
Termination Signals 187
7.2.2.4 Effects of Treatments on the Generation of Signals of
Weakness, and Mediation Aspects of Signals of Weakness 189
7.2.2.5 Effects of Treatments on the Generation of Signals of Hostility,
and Mediation Aspects of Signals of Hostility 190
7.2.3 Effects of Treatments on Competitor Price Reaction,
and Complete Mediation Issues 190
7.3 Experimental Results on the Moderation Effects of Impressions 191
7.3.1 Moderation Effects of Weakness and Hostility on the Relation
between Interpretations and Competitor Reaction 191
7.3.2 Moderation Effects of Weakness and Hostility on the Relation
Between Moves and Interpretations 191
7.4 The Matching of Marketing Moves as Enhancer of the Chance
for a Co operative Price Increase 192
7.4.1 Subjects'Matching of Coupons 192
7.4.2 Subjects'Matching of Advertising 193
7.5 The Reactions of Non cooperative Subjects: A Closer Look 196
7.6 Discussion of the Concept and the Results of the Signaling Experiment
on Price War Termination 197
XVI
8. Research and Managerial Implications 203
8.1 Research Implications 203
8.2 Managerial Implications 204
List of Appendices 207
Bibliography 219
XVII
List of Figures
Figure 1: The courses of the JEC price wars 20
Figure 2: The courses of the price wars in the bromine industry 20
Figure 3: The course of the Vancouver gasoline price war 21
Figure 4: A general pattern of the course of a price war 22
Figure 5: General price war dynamics and urge for action 49
Figure 6: The zero sum game of pricing 59
Figure 7: The general Prisoner's Dilemma game 60
Figure 8: The Prisoner's Dilemma with price cutting 62
Figure 9: The Prisoner's Dilemma with price increase 65
Figure 10: The Prisoner's Dilemma with price increase: numerical
example 66
Figure 11: The Competitive Market Signaling process chain 83
Figure 12: Mediation of the relation between move and competitor reaction
through signals: path model
Figure 13: Possible moderation through impressions: general relations 90
Figure 14: Moderation of the effects of signals on reaction
through impressions: graph
Figure 15: Regression analysis: residuals and regression straight line 157
Figure 16: The general form of the cdf curve of a logistic regression model 164
Figure 17: The cdf curves of different Pj values in logistic regression 168
Figure 18: The cdf curves of different values of p0 in logistic regression 169
Figure 19: The relation between different log likelihood values 174
Figure 20: A framework depicting all hypothesized direct, mediation and 180
moderation effects
XIX
List of Tables
Table 1: Market structures and strategic conditions affecting
price war prevalence ^
Table 2: Phases of a price war 22
Table 3: Literature on price wars in economics and law 33
Table 4: Literature on price wars in marketing and business strategy 34
Table 5: Suggestions for moves in price wars by Rao et al. 53
Table 6: Comparison of marketing moves aiming to block 129
customer brand switching
Table 7: Overview of hypotheses 137
Table 8: Experimental multi option prisoner's dilemma to
represent a price war situation ' °
Table 9: Basic confirmatory techniques of data analysis 155
Table 10: Significance (F/LR test) and R2 of the model of effects of
signals on competitor price reaction
Table 11: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of
signals on competitor price reaction ^
Table 12: Cross table results: Impact of signals on INCPRICE 183
Table 13: Logistic regression coefficients of the effect of
COUP on TECHCORR l84
Table 14: Cross table results. Impact of COUP on TECHCORR (1) 184
Table 15: Cross table results. Impact of COUP on TECHCORR (2) 184
Table 16: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of
treatments on RECICON
Table 17: Cross table results. Impact of PMG on RECICON 186
Table 18: Logistic regression coefficients of the effect of PMG on
RECICON (compared to VERB A) 186
Table 19: Cross table results. Impact of PMG on RECICON
(compared to VERB A) '87
Table 20: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of
treatments on SIGTERM '88
Table 21: Cross table results. Impact of VERBA on SIGTERM 188
Table 22: Cross table results. Impact of treatments on WEAK 189
XXI
Table 23: Logistic regression coefficients of the effects of treatments
on INCPRICE 190
Table 24: Interaction effect between VERBA and WEAK 191
Table 25: Logistic regression coefficient of the effects of
COUPMAT on INCPRICE 19i
Table 26: Cross table results. Impact of COUPMAT on INCPRICE 193
Table 27: Logistic Regression Coefficient of the effects of ADVMAT
on INCPRICE 1W
Table 28: Cross table results. Impact of ADVMAT on INCPRICE 194
Table 29: Overview of hypotheses and related Results 194
Please note that most of the tables were produced by the author. References are only
mentioned in cases where tables are taken from other sources (of literature).
XXII |
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T16:09:38Z |
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| spelling | Bungert, Michael Verfasser aut Termination of price wars a signaling approach Wiesbaden Dt. Univ.-Verl. 2003 XXIV, 240 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Gabler Edition Wissenschaft Zugl.: Mainz, Univ., Diss., 2003 Preiswettbewerb (DE-588)4175636-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Preiswettbewerb (DE-588)4175636-8 s HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015189963&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Bungert, Michael Termination of price wars a signaling approach Preiswettbewerb (DE-588)4175636-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4175636-8 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_auth | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_exact_search | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_full | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_fullStr | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_short | Termination of price wars |
| title_sort | termination of price wars a signaling approach |
| title_sub | a signaling approach |
| topic | Preiswettbewerb (DE-588)4175636-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Preiswettbewerb Spieltheorie Hochschulschrift |
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