Coup d'oeil: strategic intuition in Army planning
In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Carlisle Barracks, Pa.]
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
2005
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He applies this new research to the Army's core methods of analytical decisionmaking as found in Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The result is "strategic intuition," which bears remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz's idea of coup d'oeil in his classic work, "On War". Dr. Duggan's monograph provides a theoretical ethical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account -- Foreword. |
| Beschreibung: | "November 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-45) -- In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He |
| Beschreibung: | VI, 59 S. graph. Darst. 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 1584872187 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV021790402 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20070822 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 061031s2005 xxud||| ||||z00||| eng d | ||
| 010 | |a 2006360979 | ||
| 020 | |a 1584872187 |9 1-58487-218-7 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)62732079 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV021790402 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a UB210 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 355.6/830973 |2 22 | |
| 084 | |a 8 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Duggan, William R. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Coup d'oeil |b strategic intuition in Army planning |c William Duggan |
| 264 | 1 | |a [Carlisle Barracks, Pa.] |b Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a VI, 59 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 23 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a "November 2005." | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-45) -- In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He | ||
| 520 | 8 | |a In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He applies this new research to the Army's core methods of analytical decisionmaking as found in Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The result is "strategic intuition," which bears remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz's idea of coup d'oeil in his classic work, "On War". Dr. Duggan's monograph provides a theoretical ethical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account -- Foreword. | |
| 610 | 2 | 4 | |a United States |b Army |x Planning |x Evaluation |
| 650 | 4 | |a Führung | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making |x Methodology | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Leadership | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Military planning | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Entscheidungsfindung |0 (DE-588)4113446-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Führung |0 (DE-588)4018776-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Militärische Planung |0 (DE-588)4169951-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Militärische Planung |0 (DE-588)4169951-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Entscheidungsfindung |0 (DE-588)4113446-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Führung |0 (DE-588)4018776-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015003052 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135700910571520 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Duggan, William R. |
| author_facet | Duggan, William R. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Duggan, William R. |
| author_variant | w r d wr wrd |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021790402 |
| callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
| callnumber-label | UB210 |
| callnumber-raw | UB210 |
| callnumber-search | UB210 |
| callnumber-sort | UB 3210 |
| callnumber-subject | UB - Military Administration |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)62732079 (DE-599)BVBBV021790402 |
| dewey-full | 355.6/830973 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 355 - Military science |
| dewey-raw | 355.6/830973 |
| dewey-search | 355.6/830973 |
| dewey-sort | 3355.6 6830973 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| discipline_str_mv | Militärwissenschaft |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04079nam a2200529zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV021790402</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20070822 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">061031s2005 xxud||| ||||z00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="010" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2006360979</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1584872187</subfield><subfield code="9">1-58487-218-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)62732079</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV021790402</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">UB210</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">355.6/830973</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Duggan, William R.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Coup d'oeil</subfield><subfield code="b">strategic intuition in Army planning</subfield><subfield code="c">William Duggan</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">[Carlisle Barracks, Pa.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College</subfield><subfield code="c">2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">VI, 59 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">23 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"November 2005."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-45) -- In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He applies this new research to the Army's core methods of analytical decisionmaking as found in Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The result is "strategic intuition," which bears remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz's idea of coup d'oeil in his classic work, "On War". Dr. Duggan's monograph provides a theoretical ethical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account -- Foreword.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="2" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">United States</subfield><subfield code="b">Army</subfield><subfield code="x">Planning</subfield><subfield code="x">Evaluation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Führung</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Decision making</subfield><subfield code="x">Methodology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Leadership</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Military planning</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsfindung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113446-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Führung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4018776-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Militärische Planung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4169951-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Militärische Planung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4169951-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsfindung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113446-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Führung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4018776-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015003052</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV021790402 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T15:44:25Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:44:41Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1584872187 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2006360979 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015003052 |
| oclc_num | 62732079 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | VI, 59 S. graph. Darst. 23 cm |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Duggan, William R. Verfasser aut Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning William Duggan [Carlisle Barracks, Pa.] Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2005 VI, 59 S. graph. Darst. 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "November 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-45) -- In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He In our military professions, formal analytical methods coexist with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when they knew they should have "gone with their gut," but followed instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong's recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom Guly 2004. But must it be so? Dr. Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He applies this new research to the Army's core methods of analytical decisionmaking as found in Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The result is "strategic intuition," which bears remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz's idea of coup d'oeil in his classic work, "On War". Dr. Duggan's monograph provides a theoretical ethical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account -- Foreword. United States Army Planning Evaluation Führung Decision making Methodology Leadership Military planning Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd rswk-swf Führung (DE-588)4018776-7 gnd rswk-swf Militärische Planung (DE-588)4169951-8 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Militärische Planung (DE-588)4169951-8 s Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 s Führung (DE-588)4018776-7 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Duggan, William R. Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning United States Army Planning Evaluation Führung Decision making Methodology Leadership Military planning Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd Führung (DE-588)4018776-7 gnd Militärische Planung (DE-588)4169951-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4113446-1 (DE-588)4018776-7 (DE-588)4169951-8 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning |
| title_auth | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning |
| title_exact_search | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning |
| title_full | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning William Duggan |
| title_fullStr | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning William Duggan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coup d'oeil strategic intuition in Army planning William Duggan |
| title_short | Coup d'oeil |
| title_sort | coup d oeil strategic intuition in army planning |
| title_sub | strategic intuition in Army planning |
| topic | United States Army Planning Evaluation Führung Decision making Methodology Leadership Military planning Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd Führung (DE-588)4018776-7 gnd Militärische Planung (DE-588)4169951-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | United States Army Planning Evaluation Führung Decision making Methodology Leadership Military planning Entscheidungsfindung Militärische Planung USA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dugganwilliamr coupdoeilstrategicintuitioninarmyplanning |