Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Lithuanian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Vilnius
Aidai
2006
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T: Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Lithuania |
| Beschreibung: | 335 S. |
| ISBN: | 9955656298 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV021788819 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20070905 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 061030s2006 |||| 00||| lit d | ||
| 020 | |a 9955656298 |9 9955-656-29-8 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)81147186 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV021788819 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a lit | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a D749.5.R8 | |
| 084 | |a 8 |2 ssgn | ||
| 084 | |a 7,41 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Šepetys, Nerijus |d 1973- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)125844468 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva |c Nerijus Šepetys |
| 264 | 1 | |a Vilnius |b Aidai |c 2006 | |
| 300 | |a 335 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T: Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Lithuania | ||
| 610 | 2 | 4 | |a Germany. |t Treaties, etc. |g Soviet Union |d 1939 Aug. 23 |
| 630 | 0 | 7 | |a Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt |0 (DE-588)4011957-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1939-1940 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Außenpolitik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geschichte | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Deutschland | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Sowjetunion | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Germany |x Foreign relations |z Soviet Union | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Lithuania |x History |y Soviet occupation, 1940-1941 | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Soviet Union |x Foreign relations |z Germany | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Litauen |0 (DE-588)4074266-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Litauen |0 (DE-588)4074266-0 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt |0 (DE-588)4011957-9 |D u |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1939-1940 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 940 | 1 | |n DHB | |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 940 | 1 | |q DHB_BSB_DDC1 | |
| 940 | 1 | |q DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015001500 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09043 |g 4793 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09043 |g 947.08 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09043 |g 43 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135698032230400 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | TURJNYS
PRATARMÈ
ţ
I. SLAPTIEJI PROTOKOLAI
TARP POLITINES ISTORIJOS
I.
I.
1.
I.
protokoli^ iššukis
I.
(ne)atkürimo
1,3.
I.
I.
I.
I.
atkurimo pagrindai
1.
II.
II.
II.
antitotalitarizmas / 83
II.
II.
IL
irjonunykimas
Ц.
koncepcijos
II.
IL
interpretaciju
II.
II.
iki sovietízacijos planu
II.
III.
KURSAS I
Ш.
Ш.
ПІЛ.
III. Ì.C. Sovietinè
prieštaravimai
III.
III.
III.
rusiškaj;
III.
III.
III.
III.
ПІ.
III.
ПІ.
III.
priežastingumas
III.
III.
IV. INTEREST SFERy PASIDALIJIMAI
SSRS PLANUOSE
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV. 2.A. Tarp^endrngarantiju
IV.
IV.
IV.
ir
IV.
rv.3.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IŠVADOS
DOKUMENTINIAI PRIEDAI
SANTRUMPOS
LITERATURA
SUMMARY
ASMENVARDŽILJ RODYKLÉ
MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT AND LITHUANIA
SUMMARY
The book presents a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the history of Lithuanian statehood.
mines the Nazi-Soviet
both as a pivotal event and as an important historical source;
lyses and reconstructs the
examines the Pact and the German-Soviet secret agreements as a possible
cause of the beginning of the Second World War and the loss of Lithuania s
statehood and
to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty
The monograph consists of four parts, plus a conclusion. The first part in¬
vestigates the history of publicising and implementing the secret protocols, and
does this from two perspectives: Lithuanian historical consciousness, and the
policy of (anti)-Soviet history. The second part discusses diachronically the
paradigms of the Pact s historiography and examines how far the Pact achie¬
ved the objectives of Soviet foreign policy at the end of the
part analyses the diplomatic, textual and ideological history of the Nazi-Soviet
Non-aggression Pact between March and August
the process by which Lithuania lost its independence in policy-making and
considers the possibilities it had of preserving its independence in the context
of the dissociation of Nazi-Soviet spheres of interest. The principal contentions
that the book seeks to prove are the following:
1.
in summer
ternational evaluation of the conception of the Second World War as the
outcome of the criminal policy of national-socialist Germany. The histori¬
cal evaluation of the Pact or secret protocols throughout the entire epoch of
the Cold war depended on the political conjuncture and one s world outlo¬
ok: can or cannot communism be equalled to national-socialism. The ques¬
tion about the effect of the
dissociation of spheres of interest initiated by the Secret Additional Proto¬
col of the 23rd of August
324
SUMMARY
acquired a real historical and political significance only in the epoch of the
downfall of the USSR. This effect was underlined in societies of the libera¬
ting Baltic States and was fiercely denied by the USSR authorities.
2.
null and void and to abolish the consequences of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact
in Lithuania in
legal basis for Lithuania s (self)liberation. The vision of re-establishing
status quo ante of the independence of the League of Freedom of Lithu¬
ania, and the programme for acquiring a gradual political sovereignty of
the independent Communist Party of Lithuania made use of this basis.
Both of these as if opposite positions were related ftom the point of view of
political awareness because they implied the following:
a) Lithuania s passive position in the case of regaining freedom (the
League: the Soviets deprived Lithuania of freedom, so now let them
give it back; the communists: since the USSR actually rules Lithuania,
its status cannot be changed without Moscow s decision).
b) Actual recognition of legality of the existing status of occupa¬
tion Lithuania or that of a soviet republic (the League demanded a
referendum, after the occupying army has been withdrawn; the com¬
munists proposed to hold real negotiations on the re-establishment of
sovereignty .
3.
totally denied any link of agreements made with Germany in
existing status of Baltic Republics . Even having recognised the existence
of the secret protocols and having condemned them, right to its downfall
the USSR retained an official attitude to the Non-aggression pact as an
inevitable step to preserve peace. From the point of view of the Russian
Federation, a successor to the USSR, Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is, first and
foremost, a tool of the present foreign policy and important precedent of
international relations rather than the fact of the past.
4.
Movement deepening, experience of independent political activity broade¬
ning and the responsibility for one s own country strengthening, the vision
of the re-establishment of statehood that was no longer dependent on the
condition of abolishing the consequences of the secret protocols was be¬
coming more obvious. An active restoration of execution of the sovereign
powers of Lithuanian state, which maintained international recognition
and which was not legally destroyed by criminal occupation and incorpo-
325
SUMMARY
ration into the USSR, rather than a passive one based on decolonisation or
the right to self-determination, was chosen.
5.Having reviewed the actual re-establishment of the Independence of
Lithuania, as well as the history of receive the German-Soviet secret pro¬
tocols, during the periods of ideological disguise
exposition
that the most suitable way to elucidate the historical links between the Pact
and the loss of Lithuania s Independence is the investigation of the conti¬
nuity of the foreign policy and strategic goals of the USSR (before and after
the Pact).
6.Different understanding of the foreign policy of the USSR in the
caused the disagreements between the investigators of the Pact history. A
few studies of the Pact carried out in the West during the Cold war period
were based either on the statement of the USSR aggressiveness {Fabry), or
its peacefulness
protocols were the top state secret right to the collapse of communism.
Public agreements signed with Germany in
viating according to Stalin s teaching: that was a forced, inevitable but right
and peaceful step that the Government of the USSR made.
7.The collapse of the USSR accompanied by the case of condemning
the secret protocols provided a new powerful stimulus for the research of
the Pact s history both in the West and in the East. The conception of the
Second World War developed by Victor Suvorov played a special role the¬
re. In historiography, which is quite favourable to Suvorov s conception,
one can discern the major contrast between the statement that in concluding
the Pact the USSR made a forced move in the game imposed by Hitler
and the statement that the Pact was Stalin s well-considered and deceptive
move in the game he started a long time ago.
8.Modern historians who investigate the sources of the Second World
War have to verify carefully the
toriography of the USSR s foreign policy during the second part of the
1930s.
of Comintern weakened the foreign policy of the USSR lost it expansionary
nature; b) after the Spanish Civil War it has undergone an ever-strengthe¬
ning international isolation; c) after the Anschluss of Austria it felt a strong
threat of German aggression. Investigations of the USSR s role during the
crisis in Czechoslovakia in
Soviets did not try to stop the German expansion or rather hoped that the
326
SUMMARY
German-Czechoslovakian conflict would grow into a larger-scale war. The
USSR s behaviour in the presence of the Munich pact shows that unlike
the passive policy of Western democracies, the Soviet foreign policy was
independent of the external course of events speeded up by Hitler. Simply
the events of the international policy themselves either depended or not on
the soviet policy during the inter-war period.
^Political relations between the USSR and Germany were gradually
improving from the spring
mary sources permits us to state that it was the Soviets who generated the
initiative of political negotiations, the Non-aggression pact and the idea of
regulating interests by secret agreement. A detailed comparison of the exis¬
ting drafts of the Non-aggression pact with the final text leaves no doubts
about the fact that Stalin was the real author of the Pact. At the same time
it should be noted that Germany made first real steps towards rapproche¬
ment during July-August because at that time it was very interested in the
USSR s neutrality before the war, which Germany planned in Poland.
10.
which looked for the agreements with them, and determination of the Wes¬
tern states to curb Germany s aggression by any means. Therefore, in the
spring and summer of
and conducting secret negotiations with Germany, followed the same tacti¬
cs of the negotiations
conditions or withdrawing them, which enabled them to achieve the desired
results
11.
of the USSR with the Western countries and Germany, some soviet ideolo¬
gical sources published after
at Politburo on the 19th of August , the authorship and authenticity of the
contents of which raise no doubts) allow us to state that the
objective of the USSR in the summer
political agreement but to create the international situation in which war
between Germany and the Western states would be inevitable. The Non-
aggression pact with Germany accompanied by a secret boundary drawn in
the spheres of interest in Eastern Europe was chosen as the most suitable
means to achieve this purpose. According to Stalin, the war had to last as
long as possible so that it should exhaust both parties, the USSR had at first
to support Germany as a strategically weaker part. At the right moment, the
purposefully prepared Red Army had to deliver a fatal blow to Germany,
327
SUMMARY
which had conquered Europe, but had exhausted its all resources and to
liberate subjugated European nations from the fascist occupant and from
the yoke of their own bourgeoisie .
12.
implement, we shall see the issue of the beginning of the Second World War
in a different light. Germany adventurously attacked Poland and indeed
made the first decisive step in a chain of events, which later was conside¬
red as the Second World War. Finally Germany found itself
against the three largest and most powerful superpowers, and its catastrop¬
hic defeat was inevitable. Germany neither wanted nor planned such a war,
and also was not prepared to fight it. Looking from this perspective, the Se¬
cond World War was not caused but it broke out, however, it was calculated
into the strategic plans of a single state, the Soviet Union. The USSR did
everything to make this war start and tried to end it as the only winner.
13.
tern Europe that was initiated by the Soviets is understood best from the
perspective of military plans. The Soviet Union was not so much concer¬
ned about the recovering lost territories or ice-free ports (as the Western
countries and Germany thought) as to ensure the strategic base for a further
planned revolutionary expansion to the West and to have a group of small
states as a proving ground for the experiment of sovietisation. Plans and
deadlines of the Soviets political territorial changes depended on whether
the anticipated Second World War in Europe was going on according to the
Soviet scenario.
14.
place in the Soviets plans not because the USSR had no common border
with Lithuania but, first and foremost, because Lithuania was a potential
breeding ground of the conflict between Germany and Poland, which ide¬
ally corresponded with the interests of the Soviets. However, the USSR
did not refuse claims, in case of need, to involve Lithuania in its sphere of
interest
in
15.
August
events
parties thought that this war was inevitable, however, they imagined its
outcome quite differently. The seizure of the USSR s sphere of interest, its
course and nature as well as the fate of Lithuania that was assigned to Ger-
328
SUMMARY
many, depended on the final solution of Poland issue, which both countries
undertook to make when time came.
16.
interference from the spring
ved the status of a neutral and sovereign state. At that time separate actions
or proposals of diplomats did not provide any real alternative to a passive
policy of complete neutrality, intensive attempts made by Germany and
Poland to turn Lithuania s neutrality into a friendly one on the eve of the
war failed to change the course of Lithuanian foreign policy.
17.
and soldiers made on the 9th
carry out the local operation of taking back Vilnius . Such proposals could
be determined by the unclear USSR s position with the respect to its sp¬
here of interest in Poland, which raised a lot of problems to the Germans.
Lithuania s march to Vilnius, from the German point of view, could fill in
at least part of the political vacuum in the Eastern Poland that was more
difficult for the Germans to reach, and at the same time to make it easier
to
march because considered it as dangerous, ungrounded and morally imper¬
missible adventure. However, Lithuania s determination not to march (or
non-determination to march) to Vilnius did not have any noticeable impact
on the plans of either Germany or the USSR: the Soviets planned military
occupation of Vilnius from the beginning of September, and the Germans
intended to turn Lithuania into its protectorate.
18.
21st -22nd of September (the invitation of
foreseeing the possibility of military occupation of Lithuania (Directive of
the 25th of September to
imaginary refused or set conditions, but due to the change of Hitler and
Ribbentrop s plans. The lessened interest that Germany took in Lithuania
after Poland had disappeared as an independent political factor, and more
clear position of the USSR on the final solution of Poland s issue, and, per¬
haps, even the hope of peace with the West that was cherished in Berlin for
some time could course this change of plans. For the Germans it was not
convenient to subjugate Lithuania in such situation.
19.
25th of September was not born in an empty space. The official motivation
of the USSR s intervention to Poland on the 17th of September paved the
329
SUMMARY
way for this proposal. The
of Central Poland for Lithuania. This offer was caused by the obvious desi¬
re to posses the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea and also by the unwillingness
to take responsibility for the political future of the territories inhabited by
the ethnic Poles. Military strategic plans of the USSR were less obvious:
after the exchange of spheres of interest the USSR got a direct exit to the
borders of the Third Reich, and the entire configuration of the new USSR-
German border had to facilitate the mission of the Red Army, i.e. to libera¬
te the Europe. It is possible, that Stalin s demand for Lithuania during the
negotiations with Ribbentrop on the 28th of September was determined also
by the fact that according to the military plans of the USSR the main blow
to Germany had to be struck in Lithuania.
20.
of self-determination, non-determination or mistake. Such explanations are
historically inaccurate. The fate of Lithuania could not be mechanically de¬
rived from the deal of two dictators . Resolution demonstrated by the So¬
viets to take over Lithuania from Germany and insufficient interests of the
Germans to keep Lithuania as well as meagre possibilities to resist Stalin s
pressure determined the fact that Lithuania found itself in the sphere of
interest of the USSR. Lithuania had no real chances to change the situati¬
on; Germany s freedom of action was also limited. It was only the Soviet
Union that preserved freedom of action. Of course, Lithuania always had
the possibility to resist the USSR s pressure and dictate, however, the me¬
aning and the value of resistance, as well as the limits and the inevitability
of capitulation require the separate investigation.
Translated by
330
|
| adam_txt |
TURJNYS
PRATARMÈ
ţ
I. SLAPTIEJI PROTOKOLAI
TARP POLITINES ISTORIJOS
I.
I.
1.
I.
protokoli^ iššukis
I.
(ne)atkürimo
1,3.
I.
I.
I.
I.
atkurimo pagrindai
1.
II.
II.
II.
antitotalitarizmas / 83
II.
II.
IL
irjonunykimas
Ц.
koncepcijos
II.
IL
interpretaciju
II.
II.
iki sovietízacijos planu
II.
III.
KURSAS I
Ш.
Ш.
ПІЛ.
III. Ì.C. Sovietinè
prieštaravimai
III.
III.
III.
rusiškaj;
III.
III.
III.
III.
ПІ.
III.
ПІ.
III.
priežastingumas
III.
III.
IV. INTEREST SFERy PASIDALIJIMAI
SSRS PLANUOSE
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV. 2.A. Tarp^endrngarantiju"
IV.
IV.
IV.
ir
IV.
rv.3.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IV.
IŠVADOS
DOKUMENTINIAI PRIEDAI
SANTRUMPOS
LITERATURA
SUMMARY
ASMENVARDŽILJ RODYKLÉ
MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT AND LITHUANIA
SUMMARY
The book presents a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the history of Lithuanian statehood.
mines the Nazi-Soviet
both as a pivotal event and as an important historical source;
lyses and reconstructs the
examines the Pact and the "German-Soviet secret agreements" as a possible
cause of "the beginning of the Second World War" and "the loss of Lithuania's
statehood" and
to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty
The monograph consists of four parts, plus a conclusion. The first part in¬
vestigates the history of publicising and implementing the secret protocols, and
does this from two perspectives: Lithuanian historical consciousness, and the
policy of (anti)-Soviet history. The second part discusses diachronically the
paradigms of the Pact's historiography and examines how far the Pact achie¬
ved the objectives of Soviet foreign policy at the end of the
part analyses the diplomatic, textual and ideological history of the Nazi-Soviet
Non-aggression Pact between March and August
the process by which Lithuania lost its independence in policy-making and
considers the possibilities it had of preserving its independence in the context
of the dissociation of Nazi-Soviet spheres of interest. The principal contentions
that the book seeks to prove are the following:
1.
in summer
ternational evaluation of the conception of the Second World War as the
outcome of the criminal policy of national-socialist Germany. The histori¬
cal evaluation of the Pact or secret protocols throughout the entire epoch of
the Cold war depended on the political conjuncture and one's world outlo¬
ok: can or cannot communism be equalled to national-socialism. The ques¬
tion about the effect of the
dissociation of spheres of interest initiated by the Secret Additional Proto¬
col of the 23rd of August
324
SUMMARY
acquired a real historical and political significance only in the epoch of the
downfall of the USSR. This effect was underlined in societies of the libera¬
ting Baltic States and was fiercely denied by the USSR authorities.
2.
null and void and to abolish the consequences of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact
in Lithuania in
legal basis for Lithuania's (self)liberation. The vision of re-establishing
status quo ante of the independence of the League of Freedom of Lithu¬
ania, and the programme for acquiring a gradual political sovereignty of
the "independent Communist Party of Lithuania" made use of this basis.
Both of these as if opposite positions were related ftom the point of view of
political awareness because they implied the following:
a) Lithuania's passive position in the case of regaining freedom (the
League: the Soviets deprived Lithuania of freedom, so now let them
give it back; the communists: since the USSR actually rules Lithuania,
its status cannot be changed without Moscow's decision).
b) Actual recognition of legality of the existing status of "occupa¬
tion" Lithuania or that of a "soviet republic" (the League demanded a
referendum, after the occupying army has been withdrawn; the com¬
munists proposed to hold real negotiations on "the re-establishment of
sovereignty".
3.
totally denied any link of agreements made with Germany in
existing status of "Baltic Republics". Even having recognised the existence
of the "secret protocols" and having condemned them, right to its downfall
the USSR retained an official attitude to the Non-aggression pact as an
inevitable step to preserve peace. From the point of view of the Russian
Federation, a successor to the USSR, Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is, first and
foremost, a tool of the present foreign policy and important precedent of
international relations rather than the fact of the past.
4.
Movement deepening, experience of independent political activity broade¬
ning and the responsibility for one's own country strengthening, the vision
of the re-establishment of statehood that was no longer dependent on the
condition of abolishing the consequences of the "secret protocols" was be¬
coming more obvious. An active "restoration of execution of the sovereign
powers" of Lithuanian state, which maintained international recognition
and which was not legally destroyed by criminal occupation and incorpo-
325
SUMMARY
ration into the USSR, rather than a passive one based on decolonisation or
the right to self-determination, was chosen.
5.Having reviewed the actual re-establishment of the Independence of
Lithuania, as well as the history of receive the German-Soviet secret pro¬
tocols, during the periods of "ideological disguise"
exposition"
that the most suitable way to elucidate the historical links between the Pact
and the loss of Lithuania's Independence is the investigation of the conti¬
nuity of the foreign policy and strategic goals of the USSR (before and after
the Pact).
6.Different understanding of the foreign policy of the USSR in the
caused the disagreements between the investigators of the Pact' history. A
few studies of the Pact carried out in the West during the Cold war period
were based either on the statement of the USSR aggressiveness {Fabry), or
its peacefulness
protocols were the top "state secret" right to the collapse of communism.
Public agreements signed with Germany in
viating according to Stalin's teaching: that was a forced, inevitable but right
and peaceful step that the Government of the USSR made.
7.The collapse of the USSR accompanied by the case of condemning
the secret protocols provided a new powerful stimulus for the research of
the Pact's history both in the West and in the East. The conception of the
Second World War developed by Victor Suvorov played a special role the¬
re. In historiography, which is quite favourable to Suvorov's conception,
one can discern the major contrast between the statement that in concluding
the Pact the USSR made a forced move in the game imposed by Hitler
and the statement that the Pact was Stalin's well-considered and deceptive
move in the game he started a long time ago.
8.Modern historians who investigate the sources of the Second World
War have to verify carefully the
toriography of the USSR's foreign policy during the second part of the
1930s.
of Comintern weakened the foreign policy of the USSR lost it expansionary
nature; b) after the Spanish Civil War it has undergone an ever-strengthe¬
ning international isolation; c) after the Anschluss of Austria it felt a strong
threat of German aggression. Investigations of the USSR's role during the
crisis in Czechoslovakia in
Soviets did not try to stop the German expansion or rather hoped that the
326
SUMMARY
German-Czechoslovakian conflict would grow into a larger-scale war. The
USSR's behaviour in the presence of the "Munich pact" shows that unlike
the passive policy of Western democracies, the Soviet foreign policy was
independent of the external course of events speeded up by Hitler. Simply
the events of the international policy themselves either depended or not on
the soviet policy during the inter-war period.
^Political relations between the USSR and Germany were gradually
improving from the spring
mary sources permits us to state that it was the Soviets who generated the
initiative of political negotiations, the Non-aggression pact and the idea of
regulating interests by secret agreement. A detailed comparison of the exis¬
ting drafts of the Non-aggression pact with the final text leaves no doubts
about the fact that Stalin was the real "author" of the Pact. At the same time
it should be noted that Germany made first real steps towards rapproche¬
ment during July-August because at that time it was very interested in the
USSR's neutrality before the war, which Germany planned in Poland.
10.
which looked for the agreements with them, and determination of the Wes¬
tern states to curb Germany's aggression by any means. Therefore, in the
spring and summer of
and conducting secret negotiations with Germany, followed the same tacti¬
cs of the negotiations
conditions or withdrawing them, which enabled them to achieve the desired
results
11.
of the USSR with the Western countries and Germany, some soviet ideolo¬
gical sources published after
at Politburo on the 19th of August", the authorship and authenticity of the
contents of which raise no doubts) allow us to state that the
objective of the USSR in the summer
political agreement but to create the international situation in which war
between Germany and the Western states would be inevitable. The Non-
aggression pact with Germany accompanied by a secret boundary drawn in
the spheres of interest in Eastern Europe was chosen as the most suitable
means to achieve this purpose. According to Stalin, the war had to last as
long as possible so that it should exhaust both parties, the USSR had at first
to support Germany as a strategically weaker part. At the right moment, the
purposefully prepared Red Army had to deliver a fatal blow to Germany,
327
SUMMARY
which had conquered Europe, but had exhausted its all resources and to
liberate subjugated European nations from the "fascist occupant" and from
the "yoke of their own bourgeoisie".
12.
implement, we shall see the issue of the beginning of the Second World War
in a different light. Germany adventurously attacked Poland and indeed
made the first decisive step in a chain of events, which later was conside¬
red as the Second World War. Finally Germany found itself
against the three largest and most powerful superpowers, and its catastrop¬
hic defeat was inevitable. Germany neither wanted nor planned such a war,
and also was not prepared to fight it. Looking from this perspective, the Se¬
cond World War was not caused but it broke out, however, it was calculated
into the strategic plans of a single state, the Soviet Union. The USSR did
everything to make this war start and tried to end it as the only winner.
13.
tern Europe that was initiated by the Soviets is understood best from the
perspective of military plans. The Soviet Union was not so much concer¬
ned about the recovering lost territories or "ice-free ports" (as the Western
countries and Germany thought) as to ensure the strategic base for a further
planned revolutionary expansion to the West and to have a group of small
states as a "proving ground" for the experiment of sovietisation. Plans and
deadlines of the Soviets "political territorial changes" depended on whether
the anticipated Second World War in Europe was going on according to the
Soviet scenario.
14.
place in the Soviets' plans not because the USSR had no common border
with Lithuania but, first and foremost, because Lithuania was a potential
breeding ground of the conflict between Germany and Poland, which ide¬
ally corresponded with the interests of the Soviets. However, the USSR
did not refuse claims, in case of need, to involve Lithuania in its sphere of
interest
in
15.
August
events
parties thought that this war was inevitable, however, they imagined its
outcome quite differently. The seizure of the USSR's sphere of interest, its
course and nature as well as the fate of Lithuania that was assigned to Ger-
328
SUMMARY
many, depended on the final solution of Poland issue, which both countries
undertook to make when time came.
16.
interference from the spring
ved the status of a neutral and sovereign state. At that time separate actions
or proposals of diplomats did not provide any real alternative to a passive
policy of complete neutrality, intensive attempts made by Germany and
Poland to turn Lithuania's neutrality into a friendly one on the eve of the
war failed to change the course of Lithuanian foreign policy.
17.
and soldiers made on the 9th
carry out the local operation of "taking back Vilnius". Such proposals could
be determined by the unclear USSR's position with the respect to its sp¬
here of interest in Poland, which raised a lot of problems to the Germans.
Lithuania's march to Vilnius, from the German point of view, could fill in
at least part of the political vacuum in the Eastern Poland that was more
difficult for the Germans to reach, and at the same time to make it easier
to
march because considered it as dangerous, ungrounded and morally imper¬
missible adventure. However, Lithuania's determination not to march (or
non-determination to march) to Vilnius did not have any noticeable impact
on the plans of either Germany or the USSR: the Soviets planned military
occupation of Vilnius from the beginning of September, and the Germans
intended to turn Lithuania into its protectorate.
18.
21st -22nd of September (the invitation of
foreseeing the possibility of military occupation of Lithuania (Directive of
the 25th of September to
imaginary refused or set conditions, but due to the change of Hitler and
Ribbentrop's plans. The lessened interest that Germany took in Lithuania
after Poland had disappeared as an independent political factor, and more
clear position of the USSR on the final solution of Poland's issue, and, per¬
haps, even the hope of peace with the West that was cherished in Berlin for
some time could course this change of plans. For the Germans it was not
convenient to subjugate Lithuania in such situation.
19.
25th of September was not born in an empty space. The official motivation
of the USSR's intervention to Poland on the 17th of September paved the
329
SUMMARY
way for this proposal. The
of Central Poland for Lithuania. This offer was caused by the obvious desi¬
re to posses the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea and also by the unwillingness
to take responsibility for the political future of the territories inhabited by
the ethnic Poles. Military strategic plans of the USSR were less obvious:
after the exchange of spheres of interest the USSR got a "direct exit" to the
borders of the Third Reich, and the entire configuration of the new USSR-
German border had to facilitate the mission of the Red Army, i.e. to "libera¬
te" the Europe. It is possible, that Stalin's demand for Lithuania during the
negotiations with Ribbentrop on the 28th of September was determined also
by the fact that according to the military plans of the USSR the main blow
to Germany had to be struck in Lithuania.
20.
of self-determination, non-determination or mistake. Such explanations are
historically inaccurate. The fate of Lithuania could not be mechanically de¬
rived from the "deal of two dictators". Resolution demonstrated by the So¬
viets to take over Lithuania from Germany and insufficient interests of the
Germans to keep Lithuania as well as meagre possibilities to resist Stalin's
pressure determined the fact that Lithuania found itself in the sphere of
interest of the USSR. Lithuania had no real chances to change the situati¬
on; Germany's freedom of action was also limited. It was only the Soviet
Union that preserved freedom of action. Of course, Lithuania always had
the possibility to resist the USSR's pressure and dictate, however, the me¬
aning and the value of resistance, as well as the limits and the inevitability
of capitulation require the separate investigation.
Translated by
330 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Šepetys, Nerijus 1973- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)125844468 |
| author_facet | Šepetys, Nerijus 1973- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Šepetys, Nerijus 1973- |
| author_variant | n š nš |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021788819 |
| callnumber-first | D - World History |
| callnumber-label | D749 |
| callnumber-raw | D749.5.R8 |
| callnumber-search | D749.5.R8 |
| callnumber-sort | D 3749.5 R8 |
| callnumber-subject | D - General History |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)81147186 (DE-599)BVBBV021788819 |
| era | Geschichte 1939-1940 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1939-1940 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02340nam a2200589 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV021788819</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20070905 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">061030s2006 |||| 00||| lit d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9955656298</subfield><subfield code="9">9955-656-29-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)81147186</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV021788819</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">lit</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">D749.5.R8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7,41</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Šepetys, Nerijus</subfield><subfield code="d">1973-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)125844468</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva</subfield><subfield code="c">Nerijus Šepetys</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Vilnius</subfield><subfield code="b">Aidai</subfield><subfield code="c">2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">335 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T: Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Lithuania</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="2" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Germany.</subfield><subfield code="t">Treaties, etc.</subfield><subfield code="g">Soviet Union</subfield><subfield code="d">1939 Aug. 23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="630" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011957-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1939-1940</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Außenpolitik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Deutschland</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Sowjetunion</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Germany</subfield><subfield code="x">Foreign relations</subfield><subfield code="z">Soviet Union</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Lithuania</subfield><subfield code="x">History</subfield><subfield code="y">Soviet occupation, 1940-1941</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Soviet Union</subfield><subfield code="x">Foreign relations</subfield><subfield code="z">Germany</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Litauen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4074266-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Litauen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4074266-0</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011957-9</subfield><subfield code="D">u</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1939-1940</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">DHB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">DHB_BSB_DDC1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">DHB_JDG_ISBN_1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015001500</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09043</subfield><subfield code="g">4793</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09043</subfield><subfield code="g">947.08</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09043</subfield><subfield code="g">43</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Deutschland Sowjetunion Germany Foreign relations Soviet Union Lithuania History Soviet occupation, 1940-1941 Soviet Union Foreign relations Germany Litauen (DE-588)4074266-0 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Deutschland Sowjetunion Germany Foreign relations Soviet Union Lithuania History Soviet occupation, 1940-1941 Soviet Union Foreign relations Germany Litauen |
| id | DE-604.BV021788819 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T15:43:49Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:44:38Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9955656298 |
| language | Lithuanian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015001500 |
| oclc_num | 81147186 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 335 S. |
| psigel | DHB_BSB_DDC1 DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Aidai |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Šepetys, Nerijus 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)125844468 aut Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva Nerijus Šepetys Vilnius Aidai 2006 335 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T: Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Lithuania Germany. Treaties, etc. Soviet Union 1939 Aug. 23 Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1939-1940 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik Geschichte Deutschland Sowjetunion Germany Foreign relations Soviet Union Lithuania History Soviet occupation, 1940-1941 Soviet Union Foreign relations Germany Litauen (DE-588)4074266-0 gnd rswk-swf Litauen (DE-588)4074266-0 g Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 u Geschichte 1939-1940 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Šepetys, Nerijus 1973- Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva Germany. Treaties, etc. Soviet Union 1939 Aug. 23 Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 gnd Außenpolitik Geschichte |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4011957-9 (DE-588)4074266-0 |
| title | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva |
| title_auth | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva |
| title_exact_search | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva |
| title_full | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva Nerijus Šepetys |
| title_fullStr | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva Nerijus Šepetys |
| title_full_unstemmed | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva Nerijus Šepetys |
| title_short | Molotovo-Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva |
| title_sort | molotovo ribbentropo paktas ir lietuva |
| topic | Germany. Treaties, etc. Soviet Union 1939 Aug. 23 Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt (DE-588)4011957-9 gnd Außenpolitik Geschichte |
| topic_facet | Germany. Treaties, etc. Soviet Union 1939 Aug. 23 Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt Außenpolitik Geschichte Deutschland Sowjetunion Germany Foreign relations Soviet Union Lithuania History Soviet occupation, 1940-1941 Soviet Union Foreign relations Germany Litauen |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015001500&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sepetysnerijus molotovoribbentropopaktasirlietuva |