Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry:
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| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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2005
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| Beschreibung: | XII, 261 S. |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |c Stefan Clemens Carstens |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a XII, 261 S. | ||
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| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 502 | |a Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss. | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | in
Table of Contents
page
List of tables VII
List of symbols IX
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Transfer pricing a centennial problem 1
1.2 Extension to multiperiod transfer pricing 1
1.3 Structure of the analysis 3
1.4 Characterization of transfer pricing 3
1.4.1 Definition of transfer trice 3
1.4.2 Criteria for structuring transfer prices 4
1.4.3 Functions of transfer prices 7
1.4.3.1 Accounting , cost control , and planning function 7
1.4.3.2 Evaluation and motivation function 7
1.4.3.3 Coordination function 7
1.4.3.4 Goal conflicts 8
2 Agency theoretic transfer pricing models and multiperiod agency models ... 10
2.1 Transfer pricing under information asymmetry 10
2.1.1 Transfer pricing under precontract information 10
2.1.2 Transfer pricing under postcontract information 14
2.1.3 Coordination of intrafirm cooperation for ancillary trade 16
2.1.4 Management of accounting information and transfer pricing 19
2.1.5 Intrafirm resource allocation via transfer pricing under the revelation
principle 22
2.1.6 Transfer pricing vs. quantity based compensation 23
2.1.7 Transfer pricing for internal trade with specific investments 25
2.1.8 Cost based transfer pricing under limited communication 27
2.1.9 Investment budgets vs. transfer pricing 30
2.2 Multiperiod agency models with information asymmetry 34
IV
page
3 Two period transfer pricing models with information asymmetry 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 Managers with longterm contracts 38
3.2.1 Independent realization of private information in each period 38
3.2.1.1 The model 38
3.2.1.2 First best scenario 40
3.2.1.2.1 Solution under information symmetry 40
3.2.1.2.2 Implementation of the first best solution via transfer prices 40
3.2.1.3 Solution under information asymmetry 42
3.2.1.3.1 The principal s maximization problem 42
3.2.1.3.2 Solution under myopic behavior 44
3.2.1.3.2.1 Optimal myopic contract 44
3.2.1.3.2.2 Implementation of the myopic contract of the single period mode! 45
via transfer prices
3.2.1.3.3 Second best solution 46
3.2.1.3.3.1 Optimal multiperiod contract 46
3.2.1.3.3.2 Implementation of the multiperiod contract via transfer prices 50
3.2.1.3.4 Second best solution for special case n = 2 58
3.2.1.3.4.1 Optimal contract for n = 2 58
3.2.1.3.4.2 Implementation of the second best solution for n = 2 via transfer
prices 61
3.2.1.3.4.3 Discussion of special case n = 2 65
3.2.1.4 Discussion 66
3.2.2 Private information remains constant 68
3.2.2.1 The model 68
3.2.2.2 Solution under information symmetry (first best solution) 72
3.2.2.3 Solution under information asymmetry 72
3.2.2.3.1 Solution under myopic behavior 73
3.2.2.3.2 Second best solution 75
3.2.2.3.2.1 Corporate Center s maximization problem 75
3.2.2.3.2.2 Some general results 77
3.2.2.3.2.3 Conditions for improvements via two period transfer pricing
schemes 78
3.2.2.4 Discussion 82
V
page
3.3 Managers with shortterm contracts 85
3.3.1 The model 85
3.3.2 Substitutive relationship between first and second period consumption 89
3.3.2.1 Solution under symmetric information 89
3.3.2.1.1 Solution under myopic behavior of Corporate Center 89
3.3.2.1.2 First best solution 91
3.3.2.1.3 Comparison of first best solution with solution under myopic
behavior 93
3.3.2.1.4 Implementation of the first best solution via transfer pricing 94
3.3.2.2 Solution under information asymmetry 101
3.3.2.2.1 Private information of the distribution manager 102
3.3.2.2.1.1 Second best solution 102
3.3.2.2.1.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing .... 108
3.3.2.2.2 Private information for both managers in period 1 Ill
3.3.2.2.2.1 Second best solution Ill
3.3.2.2.2.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing .... 123
3.3.3 Complementary relationship between first and second period consumption 130
3.3.3.1 Solution under symmetric information 131
3.3.3.1.1 Solution under myopic behavior of Corporate Center 131
3.3.3.1.2 First best solution 132
3.3.3.1.3 Comparison of the first best solution with solution under myopic
behavior 134
3.3.3.1.4 Implementation of the first best solution via linear transfer pricing .... 136
3.3.3.2 Solution under information asymmetry in the complementary scenario .. 141
3.3.3.2.1 Private information for the distribution manager 141
3.3.3.2.1.1 Second best solution 141
3.3.3.2.1.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing .... 146
3.3.3.2.2 Private information of both managers in period 1 149
3.3.3.2.2.1 Second best solution 149
3.3.3.2.2.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing .... 158
3.3.4 Discussion 165
VI
4 The role of transfer pricing in multiperiod settings 167
Appendix A 171
Appendix B 180
Appendix C 187
References 253
Curriculum Vitae 261
VII
List of tables
Table Title Page
I.I Criteria for structuring transfer prices 4
LC.l Possible contracts with two rates of return 59
LC.2 Efficiency losses with respect to the first best solution 60
5.1 Sequence of events 88
5.2 Comparison of results of the myopic solution and the first best solution
(substitutive scenario) 94
5.3 Possible cases regarding the sign of xil and xiH (substitutive scenario) 105
5.4 Possible combinations of signs of the first period amounts (substitutive
scenario) 117
5.5 Amounts in period 1 for cases I through V (substitutive scenario) 118
5.6 Compensation of distribution manager in period 1 for cases I through V
(substitutive scenario) 118
5.7 Compensation for the manufacturing manager in period 1 for cases I
through V (substitutive scenario) 119
S. 8 Expected profits for cases I through V (substitutive scenario) 119
S. 9 Agency costs for cases I through V (substitutive scenario) 120
S. 10 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case I (substitutive
scenario) 126
S. 11 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case I
(substitutive scenario) 126
S. 12 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case I
(substitutive scenario) 126
S. 13 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case II (substitutive
scenario) 127
S. 14 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case II
(substitutive scenario) 127
S. 15 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case II
(substitutive scenario) 127
S. 16 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case III (substitutive
scenario) 127
S. 17 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case III
(substitutive scenario) 128
S. 18 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case III
(substitutive scenario) 128
S. 19 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case IV (substitutive
scenario) 128
5.20 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case IV
(substitutive scenario) 128
5.21 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case IV
(substitutive scenario) 129
5.22 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case V (substitutive
scenario) 129
5.23 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case V
(substitutive scenario) 129
5.24 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case V
(substitutive scenario) 129
5.25 Comparison of results of the myopic solution and the first best solution
(complementary scenario) 135
VIII
Table Title Page
5.26 Possible cases regarding the sign of xiL and xih (complementary scenario) 143
5.27 Possible combinations of signs of the first period amounts (complementary
scenario) 154
5.28 Amounts in period 1 for cases I through V (complementary scenario) 155
5.29 Compensation of distribution manager in period 1 for cases I through V
(complementary scenario) 155
5.30 Compensation for the manufacturing manager in period 1 for cases I
through V (complementary scenario) 156
5.31 Expected profits for cases I through V (complementary scenario) 156
5.32 Agency costs for cases I through V (complementary scenario) 157
5.33 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case I (complementary
scenario) 161
5.34 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case I
(complementary scenario) 161
5.35 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case I
(complementary scenario 161
5.36 Report based yolume dependent transfer prices in case II (complementary
scenario) 162
5.37 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case II
(complementary scenario) 162
5.38 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case II
(complementary scenario) 162
5.39 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case III (complementary
scenario) 162
5.40 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case III
(complementary scenario) 163
5.41 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case III
(complementary scenario) 163
5.42 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case IV (complementary
scenario) 163
5.43 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case IV
(complementary scenario) 163
5.44 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case IV
(complementary scenario) 164
5.45 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case V (complementary
scenario) 164
5.46 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case V
(complementary scenario) 164
5.47 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case V
(complementary scenario) 164
5.48 Conditions for constellations of model parameters (complementary
scenario) 165
|
| adam_txt |
in
Table of Contents
page
List of tables VII
List of symbols IX
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Transfer pricing a centennial problem 1
1.2 Extension to multiperiod transfer pricing 1
1.3 Structure of the analysis 3
1.4 Characterization of transfer pricing 3
1.4.1 Definition of transfer trice 3
1.4.2 Criteria for structuring transfer prices 4
1.4.3 Functions of transfer prices 7
1.4.3.1 Accounting , cost control , and planning function 7
1.4.3.2 Evaluation and motivation function 7
1.4.3.3 Coordination function 7
1.4.3.4 Goal conflicts 8
2 Agency theoretic transfer pricing models and multiperiod agency models . 10
2.1 Transfer pricing under information asymmetry 10
2.1.1 Transfer pricing under precontract information 10
2.1.2 Transfer pricing under postcontract information 14
2.1.3 Coordination of intrafirm cooperation for ancillary trade 16
2.1.4 Management of accounting information and transfer pricing 19
2.1.5 Intrafirm resource allocation via transfer pricing under the revelation
principle 22
2.1.6 Transfer pricing vs. quantity based compensation 23
2.1.7 Transfer pricing for internal trade with specific investments 25
2.1.8 Cost based transfer pricing under limited communication 27
2.1.9 Investment budgets vs. transfer pricing 30
2.2 Multiperiod agency models with information asymmetry 34
IV
page
3 Two period transfer pricing models with information asymmetry 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 Managers with longterm contracts 38
3.2.1 Independent realization of private information in each period 38
3.2.1.1 The model 38
3.2.1.2 First best scenario 40
3.2.1.2.1 Solution under information symmetry 40
3.2.1.2.2 Implementation of the first best solution via transfer prices 40
3.2.1.3 Solution under information asymmetry 42
3.2.1.3.1 The principal's maximization problem 42
3.2.1.3.2 Solution under myopic behavior 44
3.2.1.3.2.1 Optimal myopic contract 44
3.2.1.3.2.2 Implementation of the myopic contract of the single period mode! 45
via transfer prices
3.2.1.3.3 Second best solution 46
3.2.1.3.3.1 Optimal multiperiod contract 46
3.2.1.3.3.2 Implementation of the multiperiod contract via transfer prices 50
3.2.1.3.4 Second best solution for special case n = 2 58
3.2.1.3.4.1 Optimal contract for n = 2 58
3.2.1.3.4.2 Implementation of the second best solution for n = 2 via transfer
prices 61
3.2.1.3.4.3 Discussion of special case n = 2 65
3.2.1.4 Discussion 66
3.2.2 Private information remains constant 68
3.2.2.1 The model 68
3.2.2.2 Solution under information symmetry (first best solution) 72
3.2.2.3 Solution under information asymmetry 72
3.2.2.3.1 Solution under myopic behavior 73
3.2.2.3.2 Second best solution 75
3.2.2.3.2.1 Corporate Center's maximization problem 75
3.2.2.3.2.2 Some general results 77
3.2.2.3.2.3 Conditions for improvements via two period transfer pricing
schemes 78
3.2.2.4 Discussion 82
V
page
3.3 Managers with shortterm contracts 85
3.3.1 The model 85
3.3.2 Substitutive relationship between first and second period consumption 89
3.3.2.1 Solution under symmetric information 89
3.3.2.1.1 Solution under myopic behavior of Corporate Center 89
3.3.2.1.2 First best solution 91
3.3.2.1.3 Comparison of first best solution with solution under myopic
behavior 93
3.3.2.1.4 Implementation of the first best solution via transfer pricing 94
3.3.2.2 Solution under information asymmetry 101
3.3.2.2.1 Private information of the distribution manager 102
3.3.2.2.1.1 Second best solution 102
3.3.2.2.1.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing . 108
3.3.2.2.2 Private information for both managers in period 1 Ill
3.3.2.2.2.1 Second best solution Ill
3.3.2.2.2.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing . 123
3.3.3 Complementary relationship between first and second period consumption 130
3.3.3.1 Solution under symmetric information 131
3.3.3.1.1 Solution under myopic behavior of Corporate Center 131
3.3.3.1.2 First best solution 132
3.3.3.1.3 Comparison of the first best solution with solution under myopic
behavior 134
3.3.3.1.4 Implementation of the first best solution via linear transfer pricing . 136
3.3.3.2 Solution under information asymmetry in the complementary scenario . 141
3.3.3.2.1 Private information for the distribution manager 141
3.3.3.2.1.1 Second best solution 141
3.3.3.2.1.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing . 146
3.3.3.2.2 Private information of both managers in period 1 149
3.3.3.2.2.1 Second best solution 149
3.3.3.2.2.2 Implementation of the second best solution via transfer pricing . 158
3.3.4 Discussion 165
VI
4 The role of transfer pricing in multiperiod settings 167
Appendix A 171
Appendix B 180
Appendix C 187
References 253
Curriculum Vitae 261
VII
List of tables
Table Title Page
I.I Criteria for structuring transfer prices 4
LC.l Possible contracts with two rates of return 59
LC.2 Efficiency losses with respect to the first best solution 60
5.1 Sequence of events 88
5.2 Comparison of results of the myopic solution and the first best solution
(substitutive scenario) 94
5.3 Possible cases regarding the sign of xil and xiH (substitutive scenario) 105
5.4 Possible combinations of signs of the first period amounts (substitutive
scenario) 117
5.5 Amounts in period 1 for cases I through V (substitutive scenario) 118
5.6 Compensation of distribution manager in period 1 for cases I through V
(substitutive scenario) 118
5.7 Compensation for the manufacturing manager in period 1 for cases I
through V (substitutive scenario) 119
S. 8 Expected profits for cases I through V (substitutive scenario) 119
S. 9 Agency costs for cases I through V (substitutive scenario) 120
S. 10 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case I (substitutive
scenario) 126
S. 11 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case I
(substitutive scenario) 126
S. 12 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case I
(substitutive scenario) 126
S. 13 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case II (substitutive
scenario) 127
S. 14 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case II
(substitutive scenario) 127
S. 15 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case II
(substitutive scenario) 127
S. 16 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case III (substitutive
scenario) 127
S. 17 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case III
(substitutive scenario) 128
S. 18 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case III
(substitutive scenario) 128
S. 19 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case IV (substitutive
scenario) 128
5.20 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case IV
(substitutive scenario) 128
5.21 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case IV
(substitutive scenario) 129
5.22 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case V (substitutive
scenario) 129
5.23 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case V
(substitutive scenario) 129
5.24 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case V
(substitutive scenario) 129
5.25 Comparison of results of the myopic solution and the first best solution
(complementary scenario) 135
VIII
Table Title Page
5.26 Possible cases regarding the sign of xiL and xih (complementary scenario) 143
5.27 Possible combinations of signs of the first period amounts (complementary
scenario) 154
5.28 Amounts in period 1 for cases I through V (complementary scenario) 155
5.29 Compensation of distribution manager in period 1 for cases I through V
(complementary scenario) 155
5.30 Compensation for the manufacturing manager in period 1 for cases I
through V (complementary scenario) 156
5.31 Expected profits for cases I through V (complementary scenario) 156
5.32 Agency costs for cases I through V (complementary scenario) 157
5.33 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case I (complementary
scenario) 161
5.34 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case I
(complementary scenario) 161
5.35 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case I
(complementary scenario 161
5.36 Report based yolume dependent transfer prices in case II (complementary
scenario) 162
5.37 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case II
(complementary scenario) 162
5.38 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case II
(complementary scenario) 162
5.39 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case III (complementary
scenario) 162
5.40 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case III
(complementary scenario) 163
5.41 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case III
(complementary scenario) 163
5.42 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case IV (complementary
scenario) 163
5.43 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case IV
(complementary scenario) 163
5.44 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case IV
(complementary scenario) 164
5.45 Report based volume dependent transfer prices in case V (complementary
scenario) 164
5.46 Report based fix component for distribution manager in case V
(complementary scenario) 164
5.47 Report based fix component for the manufacturing manager in case V
(complementary scenario) 164
5.48 Conditions for constellations of model parameters (complementary
scenario) 165 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Carstens, Stefan Clemens 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)13145000X |
| author_facet | Carstens, Stefan Clemens 1969- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Carstens, Stefan Clemens 1969- |
| author_variant | s c c sc scc |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021704272 |
| classification_rvk | QC 100 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)615549615 (DE-599)BVBBV021704272 |
| dewey-full | 658.1511 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.1511 |
| dewey-search | 658.1511 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.1511 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| id | DE-604.BV021704272 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T15:18:21Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:42:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014918183 |
| oclc_num | 615549615 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 DE-945 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-945 DE-188 |
| physical | XII, 261 S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Carstens, Stefan Clemens 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)13145000X aut Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry Stefan Clemens Carstens 2005 XII, 261 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss. Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd rswk-swf Mehr-Perioden-Modell (DE-588)4388956-6 gnd rswk-swf Lenkpreis (DE-588)4123633-6 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Lenkpreis (DE-588)4123633-6 s Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 s DE-604 Mehr-Perioden-Modell (DE-588)4388956-6 s DE-188 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014918183&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Carstens, Stefan Clemens 1969- Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Mehr-Perioden-Modell (DE-588)4388956-6 gnd Lenkpreis (DE-588)4123633-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4120934-5 (DE-588)4388956-6 (DE-588)4123633-6 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |
| title_auth | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |
| title_exact_search | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |
| title_full | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry Stefan Clemens Carstens |
| title_fullStr | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry Stefan Clemens Carstens |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry Stefan Clemens Carstens |
| title_short | Multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |
| title_sort | multiperiod transfer pricing under information asymmetry |
| topic | Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Mehr-Perioden-Modell (DE-588)4388956-6 gnd Lenkpreis (DE-588)4123633-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Asymmetrische Information Mehr-Perioden-Modell Lenkpreis Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014918183&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT carstensstefanclemens multiperiodtransferpricingunderinformationasymmetry |