Auction theory:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
San Diego, Calif. [u.a.]
Acad. Press
2005
|
| Ausgabe: | [Nachdr.] |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XI, 303 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780124262973 012426297X |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135469723680769 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
1 Single Object Auctions 11
2 Private Value Auctions: A First Look 13
2.1 The Symmetric Model 14
2.2 Second Price Auctions 15
2.3 First Price Auctions 16
2.4 Revenue Comparison 20
2.5 Reserve Prices 24
3 The Revenue Equivalence Principle 29
3.1 Main Result 29
3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle . . 31
3.2.1 Unusual Auctions 31
3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders 34
4 Qualifications and Extensions 37
4.1 Risk Averse Bidders 38
4.2 Budget Constraints 42
4.2.1 Second Price Auctions 43
vi Contents
4.2.2 First Price Auctions 45
4.2.3 Revenue Comparison 45
4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders 46
4.3.1 Asymmetric First Price Auctions with Two Bidders 46
4.3.2 Revenue Comparison 51
4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison 54
4.4 Resale and Efficiency 54
5 Mechanism Design 61
5.1 Mechanisms 62
5.1.1 The Revelation Principle 62
5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility 63
5.1.3 Individual Rationality 67
5.2 Optimal Mechanisms 67
5.2.1 Setup 67
5.2.2 Solution 68
5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation 71
5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms 75
5.3 Efficient Mechanisms 75
5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism 76
5.3.2 Budget Balance 78
5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade 80
6 Auctions with Interdependent Values 83
6.1 The Symmetric Model 86
6.2 Second Price Auctions 87
6.3 English Auctions 90
6.4 First Price Auctions 92
6.5 Revenue Comparisons 96
6.5.1 English versus Second Price Auctions 96
6.5.2 Second Price versus First Price Auctions 97
6.6 Efficiency 100
7 The Revenue Ranking ( Linkage ) Principle 103
7.1 The Main Result 103
7.2 Public Information 106
7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle 108
8 Asymmetries and Other Complications 111
8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle Ill
8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second Price Auctions 116
8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 119
8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees 121
Contents vii
9 Efficiency and the English Auction 125
9.1 The Single Crossing Condition 126
9.2 Two Bidder Auctions 127
9.3 The Average Crossing Condition 130
9.4 Three or More Bidders 131
9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2 133
9.6 Miscellany 137
10 Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values 141
10.1 Efficient Mechanisms 142
10.2 Optimal Mechanisms 146
11 Bidding Rings 151
11.1 Collusion in Second Price Auctions 152
11.1.1 Efficient Collusion 154
11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion 158
11.2 Collusion in First Price Auctions 160
11 Multiple Object Auctions 163
12 An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions 165
12.1 Sealed Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units 166
12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions 168
12.1.2 Uniform Price Auctions 169
12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions 171
12.2 Some Open Auctions 172
12.2.1 Dutch Auctions 172
12.2.2 English Auctions 172
12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions 173
13 Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values 179
13.1 The Basic Model 179
13.2 Vickrey Auctions 181
13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions 183
13.4 Uniform Price Auctions 185
13.4.1 Demand Reduction 187
13.4.2 Single Unit Demand 190
13.5 Discriminatory Auctions 191
13.5.1 Structure of Equilibria 192
13.5.2 Single Unit Demand 195
14 Some Revenue Considerations 199
14.1 Revenue Equivalence in Multiunit Auctions 200
14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example 202
viii Contents
15 Sequential Sales 209
15.1 Sequential First Price Auctions 209
15.1.1 Two Units 210
15.1.2 More than Two Units 213
15.1.3 Equilibrium Bids and Prices 216
15.2 Sequential Second Price Auctions 217
15.2.1 Revenue Equivalence 217
15.2.2 Equilibrium Bids 218
16 Nonidentical Objects 223
16.1 The Model 223
16.2 Efficient Allocations 225
16.3 Substitutes and Complements 226
16.4 Bundling 228
16.5 Some Computational Issues 230
16.6 Budget Constraints 232
17 Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values 235
17.1 One Dimensional Signals 235
17.1.1 An Efficient Direct Mechanism 236
17.1.2 Efficiency via Open Auctions 240
17.2 Multidimensional Signals 243
17.2.1 Single Object 244
17.2.2 Multiple Objects 248
III Appendices 251
A Continuous Distributions 253
B Stochastic Orders 259
C Order Statistics 265
D Affiliated Random Variables 269
E Some Linear Algebra 273
F Games of Incomplete Information 279
G Existence of Equilibrium in First Price Auctions 283
References 289
Index 299
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
1 Single Object Auctions 11
2 Private Value Auctions: A First Look 13
2.1 The Symmetric Model 14
2.2 Second Price Auctions 15
2.3 First Price Auctions 16
2.4 Revenue Comparison 20
2.5 Reserve Prices 24
3 The Revenue Equivalence Principle 29
3.1 Main Result 29
3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle . . 31
3.2.1 Unusual Auctions 31
3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders 34
4 Qualifications and Extensions 37
4.1 Risk Averse Bidders 38
4.2 Budget Constraints 42
4.2.1 Second Price Auctions 43
vi Contents
4.2.2 First Price Auctions 45
4.2.3 Revenue Comparison 45
4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders 46
4.3.1 Asymmetric First Price Auctions with Two Bidders 46
4.3.2 Revenue Comparison 51
4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison 54
4.4 Resale and Efficiency 54
5 Mechanism Design 61
5.1 Mechanisms 62
5.1.1 The Revelation Principle 62
5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility 63
5.1.3 Individual Rationality 67
5.2 Optimal Mechanisms 67
5.2.1 Setup 67
5.2.2 Solution 68
5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation 71
5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms 75
5.3 Efficient Mechanisms 75
5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism 76
5.3.2 Budget Balance 78
5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade 80
6 Auctions with Interdependent Values 83
6.1 The Symmetric Model 86
6.2 Second Price Auctions 87
6.3 English Auctions 90
6.4 First Price Auctions 92
6.5 Revenue Comparisons 96
6.5.1 English versus Second Price Auctions 96
6.5.2 Second Price versus First Price Auctions 97
6.6 Efficiency 100
7 The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle 103
7.1 The Main Result 103
7.2 Public Information 106
7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle 108
8 Asymmetries and Other Complications 111
8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle Ill
8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second Price Auctions 116
8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 119
8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees 121
Contents vii
9 Efficiency and the English Auction 125
9.1 The Single Crossing Condition 126
9.2 Two Bidder Auctions 127
9.3 The Average Crossing Condition 130
9.4 Three or More Bidders 131
9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2 133
9.6 Miscellany 137
10 Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values 141
10.1 Efficient Mechanisms 142
10.2 Optimal Mechanisms 146
11 Bidding Rings 151
11.1 Collusion in Second Price Auctions 152
11.1.1 Efficient Collusion 154
11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion 158
11.2 Collusion in First Price Auctions 160
11 Multiple Object Auctions 163
12 An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions 165
12.1 Sealed Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units 166
12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions 168
12.1.2 Uniform Price Auctions 169
12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions 171
12.2 Some Open Auctions 172
12.2.1 Dutch Auctions 172
12.2.2 English Auctions 172
12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions 173
13 Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values 179
13.1 The Basic Model 179
13.2 Vickrey Auctions 181
13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions 183
13.4 Uniform Price Auctions 185
13.4.1 Demand Reduction 187
13.4.2 Single Unit Demand 190
13.5 Discriminatory Auctions 191
13.5.1 Structure of Equilibria 192
13.5.2 Single Unit Demand 195
14 Some Revenue Considerations 199
14.1 Revenue Equivalence in Multiunit Auctions 200
14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example 202
viii Contents
15 Sequential Sales 209
15.1 Sequential First Price Auctions 209
15.1.1 Two Units 210
15.1.2 More than Two Units 213
15.1.3 Equilibrium Bids and Prices 216
15.2 Sequential Second Price Auctions 217
15.2.1 Revenue Equivalence 217
15.2.2 Equilibrium Bids 218
16 Nonidentical Objects 223
16.1 The Model 223
16.2 Efficient Allocations 225
16.3 Substitutes and Complements 226
16.4 Bundling 228
16.5 Some Computational Issues 230
16.6 Budget Constraints 232
17 Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values 235
17.1 One Dimensional Signals 235
17.1.1 An Efficient Direct Mechanism 236
17.1.2 Efficiency via Open Auctions 240
17.2 Multidimensional Signals 243
17.2.1 Single Object 244
17.2.2 Multiple Objects 248
III Appendices 251
A Continuous Distributions 253
B Stochastic Orders 259
C Order Statistics 265
D Affiliated Random Variables 269
E Some Linear Algebra 273
F Games of Incomplete Information 279
G Existence of Equilibrium in First Price Auctions 283
References 289
Index 299 |
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| subject_GND | (DE-588)4125859-9 (DE-588)4140474-9 (DE-588)4732699-2 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Auction theory |
| title_auth | Auction theory |
| title_exact_search | Auction theory |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Auction theory |
| title_full | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
| title_fullStr | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
| title_full_unstemmed | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
| title_short | Auction theory |
| title_sort | auction theory |
| topic | Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Auktion Unvollkommene Information Auktionstheorie Spieltheorie |
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