Child tax allowances?: a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy
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London
Suntory-Toyota Internat. Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, The London School of Economics and Political Science
1991
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| Beschreibung: | 145 S. |
| ISBN: | 0853281246 |
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MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Parker, Hermione |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Child tax allowances? |b a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |c Hermione Parker and Holly Sutherland |
| 264 | 1 | |a London |b Suntory-Toyota Internat. Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, The London School of Economics and Political Science |c 1991 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135451679784960 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | iii
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
Page
PART1 BACKGROUND
1 THE CURRENT DEBATE 3
Since summer 1989, due to vigorous campaigning by Frank
Field MP, and the freezing of child benefit, there has been
persistent Interest In the ^Introduction child tax allowances
(CTAs). Apart from Frank Field, all the protagonists come from
within the Conservative Party. Most CTA proposals lack the
detail necessary to be able to assess them. The debate is also
bedevilled by misconceptions, e.g. the failure to take account of
the number and ages of children dependent on a given Income,
when deciding which families are rich and which are poor .
2 PURPOSE AND METHOD 9
The purpose of this study is to carry the debate forward, by
setting out four illustrative reform strategies and comparing
them against pre selected criteria. Option 1 (Residual Welfare
State) replaces child benefit by CTAs. Option 2 (Dual System)
runs CTAs alongside child benefit. Option 3 (Increased child
benefit) does as its name suggests. Option 4 (Basic Income)
replaces all income tax allowances by cash credits, payable to
adults and children alike. The criteria are: simplicity, income
distribution, work incentives and family life. The reference
year is 1989 90, and the analysis relies mainly on information
from the Family Expenditure Survey.
3 MECHANISMS 17
Three instruments of family income support are discussed.
First, tax allowances and tax credits, including taxation of
husband and wife and the tax allowance trap . Second, con¬
vertible tax credits, i.e. child benefit and basic income. Third,
targeted benefits, with special reference to the effects of
means tested benefits on the unemployment and poverty traps.
iv
Page
4 A FAMILY TAX ALLOWANCE ? 31
In 1989 a proposal was put forward by David Willetts of the
Centre for Policy Studies, to increase child benefit for the
under flves, abolish It for the over fives, and use the
expenditure savings to introduce a family tax allowance (FTA) .
Nearly 4 million of Britain s 7 million families with children
would lose. Just over 2 million would gain. Some gainers would
be In the top income deciles. Work Incentives would improve
for families with children under five, but would worsen for
those with children over five.
PART 2 REFORM STRATEGIES
5 OPTION 1: RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE 47
Child benefit Is replaced by age related child tax reliefs, with
two sub options. The first (Option 1.1) uses child tax allow¬
ances (CTAs), which can be set against the taxpayer s highest
marginal tax rate. The second (Option 1.2) uses child tax
credits (CTCs), restricted to the basic rate of tax. Both options
are revenue neutral without any other changes, and both result
In redistribution of Income from poor to rich , although this
effect Is less pronounced with CTCs than CTAs. Both options
result in more families with children being caught in the
poverty trap, but replacement ratios remain largely unaffected.
6 OPTION 2: DUAL SYSTEM 61
Child tax reliefs are reintroduced, to run alongside child
benefit, and are financed by putting an extra 2 pence on the
basic rate of Income tax. As with Option 1, a distinction is
drawn between child tax allowances (Option 2.1) and child tax
credits (Option 2.2). The families who gain most are those in
the middle Income to upper deciles. Better off families tend to
do better than poor families. Work Incentives are improved.
7 OPTION 3: INCREASED CHILD BENEFIT 73
Child benefit Is Increased to £13.25 per child per week, and
financed by an extra 2 pence on the basic rate of income tax.
Contrary to the widespread belief that increased child benefit
helps rich families more than poor families, those at the top
gain less than those at the bottom. Work incentives are
Improved.
V
Page
8 OPTION 4: BASIC INCOME 85
Basic incomes of £11.89 per week for every man, woman and
child replace personal Income tax allowances and child benefit,
and are deducted from existing social security benefits. The
basic rate of income tax goes up to 27%, and there Is a new
(non convertible) tax credit on the first £20 a week of
earnings, worth £5.40 a week. Option 4 is the most redistrib
utive from rich to poor of all the options. It also does the
most to improve work incentives.
PART 3 ASSESSMENT
9 SIMPLICITY 101
Simplicity is rated according to the Impact of each scheme on
(a) claimants, (b) administrators and (c) taxpayers. Claimants
require ease of access, tax and benefit systems they can under¬
stand, and regulations that match the lives they live.
Administrators require systems that can be automated without
fear of abuse. Taxpayers require systems that do not result in
ever increasing case loads. Increased child benefit Is rated
first, followed by basic income and a dual system, in that order.
10 INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 107
The top priority should be to invest more money in family
income support. David Willetts scheme and Option 1 churn
existing expenditures around. The former produces a haphazard
pattern of gains and losses, the latter redistributes income
upwards. Option 2 helps hard pressed families in the middle
deciles, but does little for those at the bottom. Option 4 is the
most redistributive from rich to poor , followed by Option 3.
This is partly because baste income reduces the thresholds at
which higher rate tax becomes payable.
11 WORK INCENTIVES 121
Due to recent policy changes, more families with children are at
risk of the poverty and unemployment traps. If recession bites,
even those with above average earnings could be caught In
the unemployment trap. Comparative analysis shows tantalising
improvements for families with children under 5, if child
benefit were raised to £15 ( Willetts ), but overall his scheme
makes the existing situation worse. Increased child benefit and
basic income look more effective instruments than CTAs for
lifting families with low earnings potential out of the traps.
vi
Page
12 FAMILY LIFE 127
All the schemes are compared against the following Indicators:
reinvestment in child rearing; income redistribution within
families; mothers participation in paid work; and symmetry.
Only Options 2, 3 and 4 would reverse the disinvestment in
families of the past two decades. Child tax reliefs would
redistribute income to fathers, increased child benefit and
basic Income would redistribute to mothers. Many mothers do
paid work out of necessity. Increased child benefit and basic
income are the options most likely to induce more of them to
stay at home. Overall, basic income Is Judged the most
family friendly option.
13 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 133
APPENDIX 137
NOTES AND REFERENCES 143
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
1 Numbers of children and distribution of child benefit
expenditure, 1989 90 6
2 UK main personal Income tax allowances, 1989 90 18
3 Distribution of wives earned Income, 1989 90 20
4 Main Income support rates, 1989 and 1990 25
5 Assumed family credit changes, Wllletts proposal 32
6 Cost of Willetts proposal 33
7 Willetts , net income gains/losses 35
8 Willetts , average weekly gains/losses, equivalent net
Income deciles 36
9 Willetts , %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net Income
deciles 37
10 Willetts , redistribution of income within families 37
11 Willetts , approximate gross weekly earnings at which
replacement ratios fall to 70% 41
12 Willetts proposal, net Incomes of model families 42
13 Cost of Option 1, Residual Welfare State 49
14 Options 1.1 and 1.2, net Income gains/losses 50
15 Option 1, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent
net Income deciles 51
16 Option 1, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net Income
deciles 52
17 Option 1, %s of families with children by weekly net
income change 53
18 Option 1, net incomes of model families 58
19 Cost of Option 2, Dual system 63
20 Options 2.1 and 2.2, net income gains 64
21 Option 2, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent
net Income deciles 65
22 Option 2, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net Income
deciles 66
23 Option 2, %s of families with children by weekly net
Income change 67
24 Option 2, net incomes of model families 70
25 Cost of Option 3, Increased child benefit 75
26 Option 3, net Income gains 76
27 Option 3, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent
net income deciles 77
28 Option 3, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net
income deciles 78
29 Option 3, %s of families with children by weekly
net Income change 78
30 Option 3, net Incomes of model families 82
31 Basic income, single wage married couple with
two children 87
32 Cost of Option 4, Partial Basic Income 89
33 Option 4, changes in Income maintenance 90
34 Option 4, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent net
Income deciles 91
viii
Page
35 Option 4, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net
Income deciles 92
36 Option4, %s of families with children by weekly net
Income change 93
37 Option 4, net Incomes of model families 96
38 Aggregate gains to families with dependent children 108
39 Average gains/losses In decile group 1 109
40 Percentages of families with children by weekly net
Income change 115
41 Reform options: net Income gains, married man with
2 children 122
42 Reform options: poverty trap escape points 123
43 Reform options: % changes in numbers of parents affected
by marginal tax rates above 70% 123
44 Reform options: approximate earnings levels at which
replacement ratios fall below 70% 125
45 Equivalent Income decile groups, 1989 90 141
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1 Distribution of child benefit expenditure by
Income bands of recipient families, GB 1989 90 7
2 Reform options and reform criteria 10
3 Unemployment and poverty traps, 1989 29
4 Wllletts , net Income of two parent family with
two children 39
5 Wllletts , net Income of lone mother with two children 40
6 Option 1, net Income ot two parent family with two
children 55
7 Option 1, net Income of lone parent family 56
8 Option 2, net Income of two parent family with
two children 68
9 Option 2, net Income of lone parent family with
two children 69
10 Option 3, net Income of two parent family with
two children 80
11 Option 3, net Income of lone parent family with
two children 80
12 Option 4, net Income of two parent family with
two children 9
13 Option 4, net incomes of lone parent family with
two children 95
14 Gainers, losers and no change 11°
15 Average weekly gains/losses by decile group,
equivalent net incomes, families with children 113
16 Percentages of gainers/losers by net Income decile,
families with children 116
17 Income redistribution within families 129
|
| adam_txt |
iii
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
Page
PART1 BACKGROUND
1 THE CURRENT DEBATE 3
Since summer 1989, due to vigorous campaigning by Frank
Field MP, and the 'freezing' of child benefit, there has been
persistent Interest In the ^Introduction child tax allowances
(CTAs). Apart from Frank Field, all the protagonists come from
within the Conservative Party. Most CTA proposals lack the
detail necessary to be able to assess them. The debate is also
bedevilled by misconceptions, e.g. the failure to take account of
the number and ages of children dependent on a given Income,
when deciding which families are 'rich' and which are 'poor'.
2 PURPOSE AND METHOD 9
The purpose of this study is to carry the debate forward, by
setting out four illustrative reform strategies and comparing
them against pre selected criteria. Option 1 (Residual Welfare
State) replaces child benefit by CTAs. Option 2 (Dual System)
runs CTAs alongside child benefit. Option 3 (Increased child
benefit) does as its name suggests. Option 4 (Basic Income)
replaces all income tax allowances by cash credits, payable to
adults and children alike. The criteria are: simplicity, income
distribution, work incentives and family life. The reference
year is 1989 90, and the analysis relies mainly on information
from the Family Expenditure Survey.
3 MECHANISMS 17
Three instruments of family income support are discussed.
First, tax allowances and tax credits, including taxation of
husband and wife and the tax allowance 'trap'. Second, con¬
vertible tax credits, i.e. child benefit and basic income. Third,
'targeted' benefits, with special reference to the effects of
means tested benefits on the unemployment and poverty traps.
iv
Page
4 A FAMILY TAX ALLOWANCE ? 31
In 1989 a proposal was put forward by David Willetts of the
Centre for Policy Studies, to increase child benefit for the
under flves, abolish It for the over fives, and use the
expenditure savings to introduce a family tax allowance (FTA) .
Nearly 4 million of Britain's 7 million families with children
would lose. Just over 2 million would gain. Some gainers would
be In the top income deciles. Work Incentives would improve
for families with children under five, but would worsen for
those with children over five.
PART 2 REFORM STRATEGIES
5 OPTION 1: RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE 47
Child benefit Is replaced by age related child tax reliefs, with
two sub options. The first (Option 1.1) uses child tax allow¬
ances (CTAs), which can be set against the taxpayer's highest
marginal tax rate. The second (Option 1.2) uses child tax
credits (CTCs), restricted to the basic rate of tax. Both options
are revenue neutral without any other changes, and both result
In redistribution of Income from 'poor' to 'rich', although this
effect Is less pronounced with CTCs than CTAs. Both options
result in more families with children being caught in the
poverty trap, but replacement ratios remain largely unaffected.
6 OPTION 2: DUAL SYSTEM 61
Child tax reliefs are reintroduced, to run alongside child
benefit, and are financed by putting an extra 2 pence on the
basic rate of Income tax. As with Option 1, a distinction is
drawn between child tax allowances (Option 2.1) and child tax
credits (Option 2.2). The families who gain most are those in
the middle Income to upper deciles. Better off families tend to
do better than 'poor' families. Work Incentives are improved.
7 OPTION 3: INCREASED CHILD BENEFIT 73
Child benefit Is Increased to £13.25 per child per week, and
financed by an extra 2 pence on the basic rate of income tax.
Contrary to the widespread belief that increased child benefit
helps 'rich' families more than 'poor' families, those at the top
gain less than those at the bottom. Work incentives are
Improved.
V
Page
8 OPTION 4: BASIC INCOME 85
Basic incomes of £11.89 per week for every man, woman and
child replace personal Income tax allowances and child benefit,
and are deducted from existing social security benefits. The
basic rate of income tax goes up to 27%, and there Is a new
(non convertible) tax credit on the first £20 a week of
earnings, worth £5.40 a week. Option 4 is the most redistrib
utive from 'rich' to 'poor' of all the options. It also does the
most to improve work incentives.
PART 3 ASSESSMENT
9 SIMPLICITY 101
Simplicity is rated according to the Impact of each scheme on
(a) claimants, (b) administrators and (c) taxpayers. Claimants
require ease of access, tax and benefit systems they can under¬
stand, and regulations that match the lives they live.
Administrators require systems that can be automated without
fear of abuse. Taxpayers require systems that do not result in
ever increasing case loads. Increased child benefit Is rated
first, followed by basic income and a dual system, in that order.
10 INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 107
The top priority should be to invest more money in family
income support. David Willetts' scheme and Option 1 churn
existing expenditures around. The former produces a haphazard
pattern of gains and losses, the latter redistributes income
upwards. Option 2 helps hard pressed families in the middle
deciles, but does little for those at the bottom. Option 4 is the
most redistributive from 'rich' to 'poor', followed by Option 3.
This is partly because baste income reduces the thresholds at
which higher rate tax becomes payable.
11 WORK INCENTIVES 121
Due to recent policy changes, more families with children are at
risk of the poverty and unemployment traps. If recession bites,
even those with above average earnings could be caught In
the unemployment trap. Comparative analysis shows tantalising
improvements for families with children under 5, if child
benefit were raised to £15 ('Willetts'), but overall his scheme
makes the existing situation worse. Increased child benefit and
basic income look more effective instruments than CTAs for
lifting families with low earnings potential out of the traps.
vi
Page
12 FAMILY LIFE 127
All the schemes are compared against the following Indicators:
reinvestment in child rearing; income redistribution within
families; mothers' participation in paid work; and symmetry.
Only Options 2, 3 and 4 would reverse the disinvestment in
families of the past two decades. Child tax reliefs would
redistribute income to fathers, increased child benefit and
basic Income would redistribute to mothers. Many mothers do
paid work out of necessity. Increased child benefit and basic
income are the options most likely to induce more of them to
stay at home. Overall, basic income Is Judged the most
family friendly option.
13 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 133
APPENDIX 137
NOTES AND REFERENCES 143
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
1 Numbers of children and distribution of child benefit
expenditure, 1989 90 6
2 UK main personal Income tax allowances, 1989 90 18
3 Distribution of wives' earned Income, 1989 90 20
4 Main Income support rates, 1989 and 1990 25
5 Assumed family credit changes, Wllletts' proposal 32
6 Cost of 'Willetts' proposal 33
7 'Willetts', net income gains/losses 35
8 'Willetts', average weekly gains/losses, equivalent net
Income deciles 36
9 'Willetts', %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net Income
deciles 37
10 'Willetts', redistribution of income within families 37
11 'Willetts', approximate gross weekly earnings at which
replacement ratios fall to 70% 41
12 'Willetts'proposal, net Incomes of model families 42
13 Cost of Option 1, Residual Welfare State 49
14 Options 1.1 and 1.2, net Income gains/losses 50
15 Option 1, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent
net Income deciles 51
16 Option 1, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net Income
deciles 52
17 Option 1, %s of families with children by weekly net
income change 53
18 Option 1, net incomes of model families 58
19 Cost of Option 2, Dual system 63
20 Options 2.1 and 2.2, net income gains 64
21 Option 2, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent
net Income deciles 65
22 Option 2, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net Income
deciles 66
23 Option 2, %s of families with children by weekly net
Income change 67
24 Option 2, net incomes of model families 70
25 Cost of Option 3, Increased child benefit 75
26 Option 3, net Income gains 76
27 Option 3, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent
net income deciles 77
28 Option 3, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net
income deciles 78
29 Option 3, %s of families with children by weekly
net Income change 78
30 Option 3, net Incomes of model families 82
31 Basic income, single wage married couple with
two children 87
32 Cost of Option 4, Partial Basic Income 89
33 Option 4, changes in Income maintenance 90
34 Option 4, average weekly gains/losses, by equivalent net
Income deciles 91
viii
Page
35 Option 4, %s of gainers/losers by equivalent net
Income deciles 92
36 Option4, %s of families with children by weekly net
Income change 93
37 Option 4, net Incomes of model families 96
38 Aggregate gains to families with dependent children 108
39 Average gains/losses In decile group 1 109
40 Percentages of families with children by weekly net
Income change 115
41 Reform options: net Income gains, married man with
2 children 122
42 Reform options: poverty trap escape points 123
43 Reform options: % changes in numbers of parents affected
by marginal tax rates above 70% 123
44 Reform options: approximate earnings levels at which
replacement ratios fall below 70% 125
45 Equivalent Income decile groups, 1989 90 141
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1 Distribution of child benefit expenditure by
Income bands of recipient families, GB 1989 90 7
2 Reform options and reform criteria 10
3 Unemployment and poverty traps, 1989 29
4 'Wllletts', net Income of two parent family with
two children 39
5 'Wllletts', net Income of lone mother with two children 40
6 Option 1, net Income ot two parent family with two
children 55
7 Option 1, net Income of lone parent family 56
8 Option 2, net Income of two parent family with
two children 68
9 Option 2, net Income of lone parent family with
two children 69
10 Option 3, net Income of two parent family with
two children 80
11 Option 3, net Income of lone parent family with
two children 80
12 Option 4, net Income of two parent family with
two children 9"
13 Option 4, net incomes of lone parent family with
two children 95
14 Gainers, losers and no change 11°
15 Average weekly gains/losses by decile group,
equivalent net incomes, families with children 113
16 Percentages of gainers/losers by net Income decile,
families with children 116
17 Income redistribution within families 129 |
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| format | Book |
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| geographic | Großbritannien Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Großbritannien |
| id | DE-604.BV021647016 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T15:01:52Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:40:43Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0853281246 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014861716 |
| oclc_num | 220809940 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 145 S. |
| publishDate | 1991 |
| publishDateSearch | 1991 |
| publishDateSort | 1991 |
| publisher | Suntory-Toyota Internat. Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, The London School of Economics and Political Science |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Parker, Hermione Verfasser aut Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy Hermione Parker and Holly Sutherland London Suntory-Toyota Internat. Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, The London School of Economics and Political Science 1991 145 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Family allowances Great Britain Familienpolitik (DE-588)4016418-4 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 g Familienpolitik (DE-588)4016418-4 s DE-604 Sutherland, Holly Verfasser aut HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014861716&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Parker, Hermione Sutherland, Holly Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy Family allowances Great Britain Familienpolitik (DE-588)4016418-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4016418-4 (DE-588)4022153-2 |
| title | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |
| title_auth | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |
| title_exact_search | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |
| title_full | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy Hermione Parker and Holly Sutherland |
| title_fullStr | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy Hermione Parker and Holly Sutherland |
| title_full_unstemmed | Child tax allowances? a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy Hermione Parker and Holly Sutherland |
| title_short | Child tax allowances? |
| title_sort | child tax allowances a comparison of child benefit child tax reliefs and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |
| title_sub | a comparison of child benefit, child tax reliefs, and basic incomes as instruments of family policy |
| topic | Family allowances Great Britain Familienpolitik (DE-588)4016418-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Family allowances Great Britain Familienpolitik Großbritannien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014861716&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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