Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską: 1990 - 1995
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Warszawa
2004
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Abstract Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The implications of the Yugoslav conflict for the relations between the United States and the European Union 1990-1995 |
| Beschreibung: | 217 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 8388490559 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską |b 1990 - 1995 |c Inst. Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akad. Nauk. Agnieszka Orzelska |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1820135400654503936 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Spis
Wstęp
Rozdział I
Wspólnota Europejska i Stany Zjednoczone w obliczu
groźby rozpadu Jugosławii
Deklaracja transatlantycka z
w stosunkach między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Wspólnotą
Europejskąpo zimnej wojnie
Znaczenie konfliktu w
i Wspólnoty Europejskiej w zmienionej sytuacji geopolitycznej
Brak żywotnych interesów Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wspólnoty
Europejskiej w konflikcie w
Rozdział
Próba samodzielnego rozwiązania konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii
przez Wspólnotę Europejską przy poparciu Stanów
Zjednoczonych
Zgodność polityki Wspólnoty Europejskiej i Stanów
Zjednoczonych w obliczu rozpadu
Inicjatywy Wspólnoty Europejskiej podjęte przy poparciu
Stanów Zjednoczonych
Rozbieżności między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Wspólnotą Euro-
pejskąw kwestii uznania niepodległości Słowenii i Chorwacji.
Rozdział III
Wspólnota Europejska i Stany Zjednoczone w obliczu wybuchu
wojny w Bośni i Hercegowinie
Interesy Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wspólnoty Europejskiej
Fiasko planu Cutileiro
Uznanie Bośni i Hercegowiny oraz Macedonii
Działania Waszyngtonu i Brukseli wobec eskalacji wojny
w Bośni i Hercegowinie
Spis treści
Rozdział
Wpływ planu
Zjednoczonych ze Wspólnotą Europejską
Rozbieżności między Brukselą a Waszyngtonem w sprawie
planu
Próba przezwyciężenia różnic między Waszyngtonem
aBrukselą
Odrzucenie amerykańskiej propozycji
Znaczenie Planu Wspólnego Działania dla Europejskiej
Współpracy Politycznej
Rozdział
Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa UE
w zderzeniu z rzeczywistością
Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa w Traktacie
0 UE z
Fiasko Planu Działania
Włączenie się Stanów Zjednoczonych do wysiłków pokojowych.
Porozumienie o utworzeniu Federacji Chorwacko-Muzułmańskiej
Powstanie Grupy Kontaktowej przypieczętowaniem fiaska
Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa
Rozdział
Problemy w stosunkach transatlantyckich na drodze
do porozumienia z
Utworzenie Sił Szybkiego Reagowania
Stany Zjednoczone w obliczu groźby wycofaniaUNPROFOR
Punkt zwrotny w amerykańskiej polityce wobec Bośni
1 Hercegowiny
Rola Stanów Zjednoczonych i Unii Europejskiej
wnegocjacjachpokojowychwDayton
Rozgrywki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią
Europejską w związku z podpisaniem porozumienia
Konflikt w byłej Jugosławii a Nowa Agenda Transatlantycka
Zakończenie
Aneksy
Bibliografia
Summary
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV
CONFLICT FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Summary
The war in the former Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the re¬
lations between the USA and the
them in the new geopolitical situation after the Cold War. For the first
time since the end of World War II, Washington decided not to become
involved in solving an important conflict on the Old Continent. The
Americans left the problem of the former Yugoslavia to be solved by
the Europeans in order to see whether they were up to the task.
Initially, there were no deep divergences in approach between the
United States and the European Community over their policy towards
the former Yugoslavia. In the summer of
and Washington towards Belgrade was based on the same principles,
which included support for democracy, dialogue, human rights, mar¬
ket reform, and unity. The Americans declared their full support for the
EC's efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the Yugoslav crisis, in
particular through the conference on Yugoslavia and the arbitration
commission. But the numerous initiatives taken by the EC, such as the
troika mission, Brioni agreement, peace conference or sanctions, did
not bring about stability in the former Yugoslavia.
While in
activities of the EC viewing them as a test of Brussels' ability to tackle
a problem on its own, then in
was clear that the EC was not up to the task. However, the Americans
214 _
decided that their interests involved in resolving the conflict in the for¬
mer Yugoslavia did not justify their engagement. As James Baker put
it: „we do not have a dog in this fight".
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia showed an important feature
of the relations between Brussels and Washington after the Cold War.
It turned out that the US and the EC disagreed on many issues of major
importance. This manifested itself for example in January
unlike Brussels, Washington decided not to recognize Slovenia and
Croatia. Later, when the problem of recognition of Macedonia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina arose, the Yugoslav crisis became an occa¬
sion to improve the transatlantic relations. There were different possi¬
ble scenarios, but both the Europeans, as well as the Americans made
efforts to avoid any divergences this time. It was not very easy. Unlike
the EC, pressed by Greece, which strongly objected to recognizing
Macedonia, Washington was eager to take such a step. The Americans
also pressed for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventu¬
ally, this time the US and the EC succeeded in manifesting the appear¬
ance of unity in their policy towards the former Yugoslavia. The
United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia and along with the EC
they also decided to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the
Americans gave up taking a similar decision on Macedonia.
On May
rope to promote the American lift and strike initiative. Its aim was to
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and to use air strikes against Bosnian
Serbs. The Americans argued that the embargo should be lifted so that
the Muslims could get weapons which would allow them to defend
themselves. Whereas some Americans considered lifting the arms em¬
bargo as a cost-free way for the United States to have an effect on the
war, the Europeans, in particular the French and the British who had
their peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, vigorously opposed the idea,
which, they argued, would not only lead to the escalation of the con¬
flict, but would also expose the peacekeeping forces to Serb reprisals.
The US, who consistently refused to send their soldiers to Bosnia, were
not exposed to a similar risk. Finally, the Europeans refused to accept
the lift and strike initiative, which was like „a strong slap in the face to
Summary
Clinton", as was seen by Stephen F. Larrabee. The situation proved
that the US could not count on automatic support for their proposals
from the Europeans. Regardless of the Europeans' opinion, the Ameri¬
can Congress voted for unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia and
Herzegovina. At this point the decision of President Bill Clinton was
of crucial importance. Eventually, he decided that the United States
should not unilaterally lift the embargo.
Serious differences arose between the EC and the US over peace
plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March
ment (also known as Lisbon Plan or Cutileiro Plan), supported by the
EC, was initially accepted by the Muslims but finally
rejected the plan. Some put the blame for the failure of
Americans. A similar scheme, in which the EC supported peace pro¬
posals treated reluctantly by the Americans, was to be repeated some
months later, but in case of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan the differ¬
ences between Washington and Brussels were sharper.
It was a difficult time in the relations between Washington and
Brussels. In Europe the American lift and strike initiative was rejected,
and the blame for the fiasco of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was partly
put on the United States. At such a moment, at the US initiative France,
the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States put forward the Joint Action Plan. The EC was not even men¬
tioned in this document. According to David Owen it was like „a slap
in the face for European Political Cooperation in the foreign policy
field". The aim of the Joint Action Plan was to help extinguish the ter¬
rible war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to achieve a lasting and equi¬
table settlement, but in fact the most concrete provision of the plan
concerned the implementation of the so-called „safe areas", which
proved to be a tragic idea in the light of the events that followed for
example in Srebrenica. Some journalists wrote on the occasion of
announcing the Joint Action Plan that it was the end of an era of Ameri¬
can leadership and power in Europe.
November
of European integration, as on that day the Treaty of Maastricht came
into force. It meant that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, rep-
216
lacing European Political Cooperation, started to function. However, it
soon turned out that as far as political cooperation was concerned no
major breakthrough was achieved.
The same month, in November
war in the Balkans
put forward by the UE. Anyway, as in case of the Vance-Owen Peace
Plan, the proposal firmly supported by the
by the US and eventually failed.
A few months later the United Stated decided to become actively in¬
volved in multilateral efforts to solve the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but the problem was who should they cooperate with.
Accepting the UE as a partner had a lot of drawbacks. According to the
Maastricht Treaty, Brussels should be represented by the so-called
troika, which consisted of the state holding the presidency of the
the predecessor and the successor of the state. Thus, in the first half of
1994
in the second half of that year Greece, Germany and France. The prob¬
lem was that, according to Owen, Greece was totally out of sympathy
with the US policy over the Balkans and moreover, for Americans any
cooperation with Europe made little sense
French. Since the
tact Group was established, which consisted of the United States, Rus¬
sia, France, Great Britain and Germany. The UE was left on the side¬
lines. Creating the Contact Group seemed to be contrary to the
Maastricht Treaty and proved that the Common Foreign and Security
Policy of the
It was only in
efforts to bring an end to the conflict. One of the most important argu¬
ments for changing their policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was
the fact that the Europeans were ready to withdraw their forces from
UNPROFOR before winter, and in such a case the US were obliged to
send in about
withdrawal. This would be a humiliating action.
The activities taken by the Americans in the diplomatic and military
fields were of crucial importance for bringing the conflict in Bosnia
Summary
and Herzegovina to an end. In November
initialed in Dayton. It should be a subject of a different analysis
whether the agreement may be considered a success. Nevertheless, it
could have been welcomed by the public opinion as a common
achievement of the Europeans and the Americans, but it was
considered as a success of the American diplomats only, in particular
of one of them, namely Richard Holbrooke. It was received with some
irritation in Brussels. Carlos
President-in-Office of the Council at that time, put it this way: „The
Union is doing many things, yet it turns out that the laurels
are carried off by others. Probably this is a matter we should consider
very carefully, because what is clear is that the whole package of
solutions which the American negotiator has used to achieve this
opening up of the situation is a package which comes from the
European Union". There was a feeling in the
a prominent role in resolving that conflict, yet the full extent of that
role had not been recognized.
To sum up, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia revealed some se¬
rious differences between the US and the EC, but there was no major
break split between them. When the tensions between Washington and
Brussels became quite visible, both the Europeans and the Americans
were ready to make effort in an attempt to heal the transatlantic rift. As
Henry Kissinger put it, there is something of a painful family dispute in
the disagreements between the Americans and the Europeans, who are
bound by strong common interests, and by close historical, political,
economic and cultural ties.
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia proved that Washington and
Brussels needed each other. After the Cold War they faced a series of
new challenges, which could only be met through close transatlantic
cooperation. The events in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton
Agreement continued to have impact on the relations between Wash¬
ington and Brussels, however, they go beyond the scope of my
research. |
| adam_txt |
Spis
Wstęp
Rozdział I
Wspólnota Europejska i Stany Zjednoczone w obliczu
groźby rozpadu Jugosławii
Deklaracja transatlantycka z
w stosunkach między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Wspólnotą
Europejskąpo zimnej wojnie
Znaczenie konfliktu w
i Wspólnoty Europejskiej w zmienionej sytuacji geopolitycznej
Brak żywotnych interesów Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wspólnoty
Europejskiej w konflikcie w
Rozdział
Próba samodzielnego rozwiązania konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii
przez Wspólnotę Europejską przy poparciu Stanów
Zjednoczonych
Zgodność polityki Wspólnoty Europejskiej i Stanów
Zjednoczonych w obliczu rozpadu
Inicjatywy Wspólnoty Europejskiej podjęte przy poparciu
Stanów Zjednoczonych
Rozbieżności między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Wspólnotą Euro-
pejskąw kwestii uznania niepodległości Słowenii i Chorwacji.
Rozdział III
Wspólnota Europejska i Stany Zjednoczone w obliczu wybuchu
wojny w Bośni i Hercegowinie
Interesy Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wspólnoty Europejskiej
Fiasko planu Cutileiro
Uznanie Bośni i Hercegowiny oraz Macedonii
Działania Waszyngtonu i Brukseli wobec eskalacji wojny
w Bośni i Hercegowinie
Spis treści
Rozdział
Wpływ planu
Zjednoczonych ze Wspólnotą Europejską
Rozbieżności między Brukselą a Waszyngtonem w sprawie
planu
Próba przezwyciężenia różnic między Waszyngtonem
aBrukselą
Odrzucenie amerykańskiej propozycji
Znaczenie Planu Wspólnego Działania dla Europejskiej
Współpracy Politycznej
Rozdział
Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa UE
w zderzeniu z rzeczywistością
Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa w Traktacie
0 UE z
Fiasko Planu Działania
Włączenie się Stanów Zjednoczonych do wysiłków pokojowych.
Porozumienie o utworzeniu Federacji Chorwacko-Muzułmańskiej
Powstanie Grupy Kontaktowej przypieczętowaniem fiaska
Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa
Rozdział
Problemy w stosunkach transatlantyckich na drodze
do porozumienia z
Utworzenie Sił Szybkiego Reagowania
Stany Zjednoczone w obliczu groźby wycofaniaUNPROFOR
Punkt zwrotny w amerykańskiej polityce wobec Bośni
1 Hercegowiny
Rola Stanów Zjednoczonych i Unii Europejskiej
wnegocjacjachpokojowychwDayton
Rozgrywki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią
Europejską w związku z podpisaniem porozumienia
Konflikt w byłej Jugosławii a Nowa Agenda Transatlantycka
Zakończenie
Aneksy
Bibliografia
Summary
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV
CONFLICT FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Summary
The war in the former Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the re¬
lations between the USA and the
them in the new geopolitical situation after the Cold War. For the first
time since the end of World War II, Washington decided not to become
involved in solving an important conflict on the Old Continent. The
Americans left the problem of the former Yugoslavia to be solved by
the Europeans in order to see whether they were up to the task.
Initially, there were no deep divergences in approach between the
United States and the European Community over their policy towards
the former Yugoslavia. In the summer of
and Washington towards Belgrade was based on the same principles,
which included support for democracy, dialogue, human rights, mar¬
ket reform, and unity. The Americans declared their full support for the
EC's efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the Yugoslav crisis, in
particular through the conference on Yugoslavia and the arbitration
commission. But the numerous initiatives taken by the EC, such as the
troika mission, Brioni agreement, peace conference or sanctions, did
not bring about stability in the former Yugoslavia.
While in
activities of the EC viewing them as a test of Brussels' ability to tackle
a problem on its own, then in
was clear that the EC was not up to the task. However, the Americans
214 _
decided that their interests involved in resolving the conflict in the for¬
mer Yugoslavia did not justify their engagement. As James Baker put
it: „we do not have a dog in this fight".
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia showed an important feature
of the relations between Brussels and Washington after the Cold War.
It turned out that the US and the EC disagreed on many issues of major
importance. This manifested itself for example in January
unlike Brussels, Washington decided not to recognize Slovenia and
Croatia. Later, when the problem of recognition of Macedonia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina arose, the Yugoslav crisis became an occa¬
sion to improve the transatlantic relations. There were different possi¬
ble scenarios, but both the Europeans, as well as the Americans made
efforts to avoid any divergences this time. It was not very easy. Unlike
the EC, pressed by Greece, which strongly objected to recognizing
Macedonia, Washington was eager to take such a step. The Americans
also pressed for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventu¬
ally, this time the US and the EC succeeded in manifesting the appear¬
ance of unity in their policy towards the former Yugoslavia. The
United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia and along with the EC
they also decided to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the
Americans gave up taking a similar decision on Macedonia.
On May
rope to promote the American lift and strike initiative. Its aim was to
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and to use air strikes against Bosnian
Serbs. The Americans argued that the embargo should be lifted so that
the Muslims could get weapons which would allow them to defend
themselves. Whereas some Americans considered lifting the arms em¬
bargo as a cost-free way for the United States to have an effect on the
war, the Europeans, in particular the French and the British who had
their peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, vigorously opposed the idea,
which, they argued, would not only lead to the escalation of the con¬
flict, but would also expose the peacekeeping forces to Serb reprisals.
The US, who consistently refused to send their soldiers to Bosnia, were
not exposed to a similar risk. Finally, the Europeans refused to accept
the lift and strike initiative, which was like „a strong slap in the face to
Summary
Clinton", as was seen by Stephen F. Larrabee. The situation proved
that the US could not count on automatic support for their proposals
from the Europeans. Regardless of the Europeans' opinion, the Ameri¬
can Congress voted for unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia and
Herzegovina. At this point the decision of President Bill Clinton was
of crucial importance. Eventually, he decided that the United States
should not unilaterally lift the embargo.
Serious differences arose between the EC and the US over peace
plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March
ment (also known as Lisbon Plan or Cutileiro Plan), supported by the
EC, was initially accepted by the Muslims but finally
rejected the plan. Some put the blame for the failure of
Americans. A similar scheme, in which the EC supported peace pro¬
posals treated reluctantly by the Americans, was to be repeated some
months later, but in case of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan the differ¬
ences between Washington and Brussels were sharper.
It was a difficult time in the relations between Washington and
Brussels. In Europe the American lift and strike initiative was rejected,
and the blame for the fiasco of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was partly
put on the United States. At such a moment, at the US initiative France,
the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States put forward the Joint Action Plan. The EC was not even men¬
tioned in this document. According to David Owen it was like „a slap
in the face for European Political Cooperation in the foreign policy
field". The aim of the Joint Action Plan was to help extinguish the ter¬
rible war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to achieve a lasting and equi¬
table settlement, but in fact the most concrete provision of the plan
concerned the implementation of the so-called „safe areas", which
proved to be a tragic idea in the light of the events that followed for
example in Srebrenica. Some journalists wrote on the occasion of
announcing the Joint Action Plan that it was the end of an era of Ameri¬
can leadership and power in Europe.
November
of European integration, as on that day the Treaty of Maastricht came
into force. It meant that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, rep-
216
lacing European Political Cooperation, started to function. However, it
soon turned out that as far as political cooperation was concerned no
major breakthrough was achieved.
The same month, in November
war in the Balkans
put forward by the UE. Anyway, as in case of the Vance-Owen Peace
Plan, the proposal firmly supported by the
by the US and eventually failed.
A few months later the United Stated decided to become actively in¬
volved in multilateral efforts to solve the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but the problem was who should they cooperate with.
Accepting the UE as a partner had a lot of drawbacks. According to the
Maastricht Treaty, Brussels should be represented by the so-called
troika, which consisted of the state holding the presidency of the
the predecessor and the successor of the state. Thus, in the first half of
1994
in the second half of that year Greece, Germany and France. The prob¬
lem was that, according to Owen, Greece was totally out of sympathy
with the US policy over the Balkans and moreover, for Americans any
cooperation with Europe made little sense
French. Since the
tact Group was established, which consisted of the United States, Rus¬
sia, France, Great Britain and Germany. The UE was left on the side¬
lines. Creating the Contact Group seemed to be contrary to the
Maastricht Treaty and proved that the Common Foreign and Security
Policy of the
It was only in
efforts to bring an end to the conflict. One of the most important argu¬
ments for changing their policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was
the fact that the Europeans were ready to withdraw their forces from
UNPROFOR before winter, and in such a case the US were obliged to
send in about
withdrawal. This would be a humiliating action.
The activities taken by the Americans in the diplomatic and military
fields were of crucial importance for bringing the conflict in Bosnia
Summary
and Herzegovina to an end. In November
initialed in Dayton. It should be a subject of a different analysis
whether the agreement may be considered a success. Nevertheless, it
could have been welcomed by the public opinion as a common
achievement of the Europeans and the Americans, but it was
considered as a success of the American diplomats only, in particular
of one of them, namely Richard Holbrooke. It was received with some
irritation in Brussels. Carlos
President-in-Office of the Council at that time, put it this way: „The
Union is doing many things, yet it turns out that the laurels
are carried off by others. Probably this is a matter we should consider
very carefully, because what is clear is that the whole package of
solutions which the American negotiator has used to achieve this
opening up of the situation is a package which comes from the
European Union". There was a feeling in the
a prominent role in resolving that conflict, yet the full extent of that
role had not been recognized.
To sum up, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia revealed some se¬
rious differences between the US and the EC, but there was no major
break split between them. When the tensions between Washington and
Brussels became quite visible, both the Europeans and the Americans
were ready to make effort in an attempt to heal the transatlantic rift. As
Henry Kissinger put it, there is something of a painful family dispute in
the disagreements between the Americans and the Europeans, who are
bound by strong common interests, and by close historical, political,
economic and cultural ties.
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia proved that Washington and
Brussels needed each other. After the Cold War they faced a series of
new challenges, which could only be met through close transatlantic
cooperation. The events in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton
Agreement continued to have impact on the relations between Wash¬
ington and Brussels, however, they go beyond the scope of my
research. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Orzelska-Stączek, Agnieszka 1974- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1135502218 |
| author_facet | Orzelska-Stączek, Agnieszka 1974- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Orzelska-Stączek, Agnieszka 1974- |
| author_variant | a o s aos |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021601531 |
| callnumber-first | D - World History |
| callnumber-label | D1065 |
| callnumber-raw | D1065.U5 |
| callnumber-search | D1065.U5 |
| callnumber-sort | D 41065 U5 |
| callnumber-subject | D - General History |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)60534876 (DE-599)BVBBV021601531 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Kraje Unii Europejskiej - stosunki - Stany Zjednoczone - 1990- jhpk Stany Zjednoczone - stosunki - Kraje Unii Europejskiej - 1990- jhpk Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten USA European Union countries Foreign relations United States United States Foreign relations European Union countries Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Kraje Unii Europejskiej - stosunki - Stany Zjednoczone - 1990- Stany Zjednoczone - stosunki - Kraje Unii Europejskiej - 1990- Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten USA European Union countries Foreign relations United States United States Foreign relations European Union countries Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV021601531 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:47:51Z |
| indexdate | 2025-01-02T11:13:02Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 8388490559 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014816867 |
| oclc_num | 60534876 |
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| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 217 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
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| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Orzelska-Stączek, Agnieszka 1974- Verfasser (DE-588)1135502218 aut Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 Inst. Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akad. Nauk. Agnieszka Orzelska Warszawa 2004 217 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The implications of the Yugoslav conflict for the relations between the United States and the European Union 1990-1995 Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Wojna w krajach byłej Jugosławii (1991-1995) - wpływ jhpk Außenpolitik Jugoslawienkriege Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 Influence Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Nachfolgestaaten (DE-588)4328855-8 gnd rswk-swf Kraje Unii Europejskiej - stosunki - Stany Zjednoczone - 1990- jhpk Stany Zjednoczone - stosunki - Kraje Unii Europejskiej - 1990- jhpk Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten USA European Union countries Foreign relations United States United States Foreign relations European Union countries Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Nachfolgestaaten (DE-588)4328855-8 s Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014816867&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014816867&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Orzelska-Stączek, Agnieszka 1974- Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Wojna w krajach byłej Jugosławii (1991-1995) - wpływ jhpk Außenpolitik Jugoslawienkriege Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 Influence Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Nachfolgestaaten (DE-588)4328855-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4328855-8 (DE-588)4028966-7 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 |
| title_auth | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 |
| title_exact_search | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 |
| title_full | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 Inst. Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akad. Nauk. Agnieszka Orzelska |
| title_fullStr | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 Inst. Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akad. Nauk. Agnieszka Orzelska |
| title_full_unstemmed | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990 - 1995 Inst. Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akad. Nauk. Agnieszka Orzelska |
| title_short | Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską |
| title_sort | wplyw konfliktu w bylej jugoslawii na stosunki miedzy stanami zjednoczonymi a unia europejska 1990 1995 |
| title_sub | 1990 - 1995 |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Wojna w krajach byłej Jugosławii (1991-1995) - wpływ jhpk Außenpolitik Jugoslawienkriege Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 Influence Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Nachfolgestaaten (DE-588)4328855-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Wojna w krajach byłej Jugosławii (1991-1995) - wpływ Außenpolitik Jugoslawienkriege Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 Influence Politik Nachfolgestaaten Kraje Unii Europejskiej - stosunki - Stany Zjednoczone - 1990- Stany Zjednoczone - stosunki - Kraje Unii Europejskiej - 1990- Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten USA European Union countries Foreign relations United States United States Foreign relations European Union countries Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014816867&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014816867&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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