Principles of contemporary corporate governance:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2005
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Table of contents Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | XXII, 395 S. 22 cm |
| ISBN: | 0521617839 9780521617833 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Du Plessis, Jean J. |d 1959- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)13343334X |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Principles of contemporary corporate governance |c Jean Jacques du Plessis ; James McConvill ; Mirko Bagaric |
| 250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge [u.a.] |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a XXII, 395 S. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Corporate governance |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Droit comparé | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Gouvernement d'entreprise - Droit | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Recht | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate governance |x Law and legislation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Comparative law | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a McConvill, James |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Bagaric, Mirko |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135304589737984 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Table of cases xiv
Table of statutes xvi
Preface xxi
PART ONE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW
1 The concept corporate governance and essential corporate
governance principles l
1.1 The meaning of corporate governance 1
1.1.1 Generally 1
1.1.2 Origins of the corporate governance debate and the stakeholder
debate 3
1.1.3 Definition of corporate governance 6
1.2 Essential corporate governance principles 7
1.2.1 Generally 7
1.2.2 The King Report (2002) 7
1.2.3 The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance
Council s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations 8
1.2.4 Is good corporate governance important and does it add value? 11
1.3 Concluding remarks 13
2 Stakeholders in corporate governance 14
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Stakeholders in the corporation: an overview 16
2.2.1 What is a stakeholder? 16
2.2.2 Discussion of different stakeholders 18
2.2.2.1 Shareholders 19
2.2.2.2 Employees 19
2.2.2.3 Creditors 23
2.2.2.4 Customers 24
2.2.2.5 The community 24
2.2.2.6 The environment 25
2.2.2.7 Government 28
2.3 Stakeholders interests and the corporation: the role of the law 28
2.3.1 The Australian position 29
2.3.2 Analysis: the appropriate boundaries of corporate governance
regulation 33
2.3.3 Overseas position: a snapshot 35
2.3.3.1 OECD 36
2.3.3.2 European Union (EU) 36
2.3.3.3 United States 37
2.3.3.4 South Africa 37
2.3.3.5 United Kingdom 38
2.3.3.6 New Zealand 42
2.4 Stakeholder interests, good governance and the interests of the
corporation: a mutual relationship 44
2.4.1 General analysis 44
2.4.2 Case study on James Hardie s asbestos compensation settlement 47
2.5 Concluding remarks: a case for shareholder primacy 51
3 Board functions and structures 53
3.1 The organs of governance 53
3.2 Board functions 54
3.3 Board structures 58
3.3.1 The unitary* and two tier1 structures compared 58
3.4 Board structures in the broader context of a good corporate
governance model 64
3.4.1 Overview 64
3.4.2 Effective board structure 65
3.4.3 Effective support mechanisms to assist the board in fulfilling its
functions properly 66
3.4.4 Effective statutory provisions 66
3.4.5 Effective regulators 67
3.4.6 Effective charters, policies and codes of best practice and
conduct 68
4 Types of company directors and officers 70
4.1 Definition of director 70
4.1.1 De jure and de facto directors covered 70
4.1.2 Shadow director 71
4.2 Definition of officer 72
4.2.1 Statutory definition 72
4.2.2 Senior employees and senior executives as officers 73
4.2.3 Middle management as officers ? 73
4.3 Types of company officers 74
4.3.1 Executive and non executive directors 74
4.3.2 Independent non executive directors 75
4.3.3 Lead independent directors or senior independent directors 79
4.3.4 The manager director or chief executive officer (CEO) 80
4.3.5 Chairperson 80
4.3.6 Alternate director 81
4.3.7 Secretary 82
4.4 Training and induction of directors 83
4.4.1 Training 83
4.4.2 Induction of new directors 84
4.5 Ethical behaviour by directors 85
CONTENTS vii
PART TWO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA
5 Corporate governance in Australia — background and business
initiatives 88
5.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in Australia 88
5.2 The Bosch Report 91
5.2.1 Background 91
5.2.2 Bosch Report (1991) 91
5.2.3 Bosch Report (1993) 93
5.2.4 The Bosch Report (1995) 95
5.3 Divergence from UK practice: 1995 early 2003 96
5.4 The Hilmer Report 97
5.4.1 Background 97
5.4.2 Hilmer Report (1993) 98
5.4.3 Hilmer Report (1998) 100
5.5 The virtues of good corporate governance in Australia between 1991
and 1998 100
5.6 The IFSA Blue Book 101
5.7 Concluding remarks 106
6 Regulation of corporate governance 107
6.1 Overview 107
6.2 Regulation generally 108
6.3 Objectives in regulating corporate governance 110
6.4 Sources of regulation in Australia 112
6.4.1 Hard law 113
6.4.1.1 Statutory regulation corporate law 113
6.4.1.2 Statutory regulation other than corporate law 116
6.4.1.3 Corporate governance and the judges the place of
judge made law 116
6.4.2 Hybrids 117
6.4.2.1 ASX Listing Rules 117
6.4.2.2 ASX Best Practice Recommendations 118
6.4.2.3 Accounting standards 119
6.4.2.4 Auditing standards 120
6.4.3 Soft law1 120
6.4.4 The role of market forces 122
6.5 Towards an effective corporate governance framework in Australia
analysis and reform proposal 124
6.5.1 OECD s guidelines for achieving an effective governance
framework 124
6.5.2 Proposed MOU on corporate governance between ASX and
ASIC 126
6.6 Conclusion 129
7 The role of the regulators: ASX and ASIC 131
I 7.1 The Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (ASX) 131
1 7.1.1 Slow to get out of the blocks 131
I 7.1.2 Rapid change in attitude since the end of 2002 132
Viii CONTENTS
7.1.3 ASX Corporate Governance Council s Principles of Good Corporate
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 133
7.1.3.1 Structure 133
7.1.3.2 Recommendations 134
7.1.3.3 A few concluding remarks 136
7.2 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 137
7.2.1 History 137
7.2.2 Constitution and some statutory powers 138
7.2.3 Initial steps by ASIC after the HIH collapse 138
7.2.4 Actions instituted by ASIC against directors after the HIH
collapse 139
7.2.4.1 Actions by ASIC 139
7.2.4.2 Court orders 140
7.2.5 Some considerations regarding the period of disqualification 140
7.2.6 Criminal prosecutions 141
7.2.7 ASIC s aim with high profile prosecutions 142
7.2.8 ASIC enforcement patterns 143
7.2.9 The role of ASIC in corporate governance 144
7.2.10 Limits of ASIC s powers and responsibilities? 145
7.3 Concluding remarks 145
8 CLERP 9 reforms to the Corporations Act 147
8.1 Overview 147
8.2 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) 149
8.3 Impetus for CLERP 9: responding to corporate collapses 154
8.4 Explanation of key CLERP 9 reforms 160
8.4.1 Audit reform 161
8.4.2 Corporate disclosure 161
8.4.2.1 Remuneration of directors and executives 161
8.4.2.2 Financial reporting 162
8.4.2.3 Continuous disclosure 163
8.4.2.4 Shareholder participation 164
8.4.2.5 Whistleblowers 165
8.4.2.6 Disclosure rules 166
8.4.3 Miscellaneous 167
8.4.3.1 Managing conflict by financial services licensees 167
8.4.3.2 Register of relevant interests 168
8.4.3.3 Officers, senior managers and employees 169
8.4.3.4 Enforcement 170
8.4.3.5 Proportionate liability 170
8.5 Corporate law reform post CLERP 9 171
8.5.1 Part One of Report 174
8.5.2 Part Two of Report 175
8.6 Concluding remarks 178
PART THREE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE
9 Implementation of the ASX Best Practice Recommendations: charters,
policies and codes 181
CONTENTS ix
9.1 Implementing the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and
Best Practice Recommendations 181
9.2 Best Practice Recommendations requiring charters and policies 185
9.3 Practical examples of implementation of ASX Best Practice
Recommendations 187
9.3.1 Charters 188
9.3.1.1 The Board Charter 188
9.3.1.2 Charters of the main board committees 188
9.3.1.2.1 Nomination Committee Charter 192
9.3.1.2.2 Audit Committee Charter 192
9.3.1.2.3 Remuneration Committee Charter 196
9.3.2 Company Policies and Codes 204
9.3.2.1 Code of Conduct 204
9.3.2.2 Trading Policy 208
9.3.2.3 Disclosure Policy 217
9.3.2 A Shareholder Communication Policy 223
9.3.2.5 Risk Management Policy 229
9.3.2.6 Remuneration Policy 231
9.4 Concluding remarks 236
10 Auditors and audits 238
10.1 Introduction: The audit role and where it fits into corporate
governance 238
10.1.1 Overview of the audit role 238
10.1.2 The link between the audit role and corporate governance 239
10.2 Wholesale recent changes to audit role 241
10.3 Auditor independence 243
10.3.1 Overview of rationale behind independence requirement 243
10.3.2 General requirement for auditor independence 244
10.3.3 Meaning of conflict of interest situation 244
10.3.4 Disclosing and resolving conflicts 245
10.3.5 Specific independence requirements minimising conflict of interest
through employment and financial restrictions 245
10.3.6 Auditor rotation 247
10.3.7 Disclosure of non audit services 248
10.4 Auditors and the AGM 248
10.5 Auditors duties 249
10.6 Reducing the legal exposure of auditors 250
10.6.1 Overview of auditors liability 250
10.6.2 Registration of audit companies 252
10.6.3 Proportionate liability 252
10.7 Qualification of auditors 254
10.8 Uniform auditing standards 255
10.9 Audit oversight 256
10.10 Concluding remarks 257
11 Directors duties and liability 258
11.1 Introduction 258
X CONTENTS
11.2 Part 9.4B Civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty
provisions 260
11.2.1 Overview 260
11.2.2 The civil penalty provisions in particular 262
11.2.2.1 Section 180: Duty of care and diligence civil
obligation 262
11.2.2.2 Section 181: Duty of good faith civil obligation 263
11.2.2.3 Sections 182 and 183: Duty not to use position or
information to gain personally or cause detriment to the
corporation 264
11.2.2.4 Part 2E: Duty relating to related party transactions 264
11.2.2.5 Part 2H: Duty relating to share capital transactions 266
11.2.2.6 Part 2M.2 and 2M.3: Duty relating to requirements for
financial reports 266
11.2.2.7 Part 5.7B: Duty to prevent insolvent trading 266
11.2.2.8 Part 5C: Duties relating to managed investment
schemes 267
11.2.2.9 Chapter 6CA: Duty relating to continuous disclosure 267
11.2.2.10 Part 7.10: Duty not to be involved in market misconduct
and other prohibited conduct relating to financial products
and financial services 268
11.2.2.10.1 Market manipulation 268
11.2.2.10.2 False trading and market rigging 268
11.2.2.10.3 Dissemination of information about illegal
transactions 269
11.2.2.10.4 Insider trading 269
11.2.2.11 Subclause 29(6) of Schedule 4: Duty relating to disclosure
for proposed demutualisation 270
11.3 Case study regarding civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty
provisions: ASICvAdler 271
11.3.1 Overview 271
11.3.2 Summary of the facts 271
11.3.3 Contravention of civil penalty provisions 273
11.3.3.1 Related party transactions (Chapter 2E) 273
11.3.3.2 Financial assistance (Part 2J.3) 273
11.3.3.3 Duty of care and diligence (s 180) 274
11.3.3.4 Duty of good faith (s 181) 274
11.3.3.5 Use of position to gain advantage for oneself or another or
to cause detriment to the corporation (s 182) 275
11.3.3.6 Improper use of information (s 183) 275
11.3.4 Court orders 276
11.4 Enforcement of directors duties 276
11.4.1 Overview 276
11.4.2 The statutory derivative action: Part 2F.1A 276
11.4.2.1 The case to introduce a statutory derivative action 276
11.4.2.2 Eligible applicant 277
11.4.2.3 Cause of action 278
11.4.2.4 Leave of court required to institute the statutory derivative
action 279
CONTENTS Xi
11.4.3 Oppressive conduct of affairs: Part 2F.1 279
11.4.3.1 Type of conduct covered by Part 2F.1 279
11.4.3.2 Who may apply for relief under Part 2F.1? 280
11.4.3.3 Nature of relief available under Part 2F.1 280
11.4.4 Section 1324 injunctions 281
11.4.4.1 Introduction 281
11.4.4.2 Section 1324(1) 282
11.4.4.3 Court s discretion 283
11.4.4.4 Remedies in particular 283
11.5 Criminal liability of directors 284
11.5.1 The importance of the criminal sanction in the corporations
law 284
11.5.2 Selected criminal offences directors and other officers can commit
under the Corporations Act 289
11.5.2.1 General 289
11.5.2.2 Specific offences for breaches of duties 290
11.6 Conclusion 291
PART FOUR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
12 Corporate governance in selected jurisdictions and the OECD principles
of corporate governance 292
12.1 United States 292
12.1.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in the USA 292
12.1.2 The American Law Institute s involvement in the corporate
governance debate 293
12.1.2.1 Basic aims of the project 293
12.1.2.2 Impact and importance of the project 294
12.1.2.3 Some of key aspects addressed 294
12.1.3 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 the US response to collapses such
as Enron and WorldCom 296
12.1.3.1 Backdrop 296
12.1.3.2 Aims and objectives 296
12.1.4 NYSE: sections 303 and 303A corporate governance rules 299
12.1.4.1 Background 299
12.1.4.2 Summary of the most important NYSE corporate
governance rules 299
12.2 United Kingdom 301
12.2.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in the
UK 301
12.2.2 The Cadbury Report and the unfolding of the concept of corporate
governance in the UK 301
12.2.2.1 Context of the Cadbury Report 301
12.2.2.2 Code of Best Practice 302
12.2.2.3 Further developments 303
12.2.3 The Greenbury, Hampel, Smith and Higgs Reports 304
12.2.3.1 The Greenbury Report (1995) 304
12.2.3.2 The Hampel Report (1998) 305
Xii CONTENTS
12.2.3.3 The Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report
(2003) 305
12.2.4 The UK Combined Code 306
12.3 Germany 307
12.3.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in Germany 307
12.3.2 The German Corporate Governance Code 310
12.3.2.1 Background to its adoption 310
12.3.2.2 Structure and explanatory nature of the German
Code 311
12.3.3 Employee participation at supervisory board level
codetermination 312
12.3.4 The German board structure 314
12.4 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 315
12.4.1 Background to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 315
12.4.2 Broad aims and application 316
12.4.3 Structure 316
12.4.4 Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance
framework 317
12.4.5 Disclosure and transparency 318
PART FIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: GOING FORWARD
13 The case for enhanced shareholder participation in corporate
decision making 320
13.1 Introduction 320
13.1.1 Overview 321
13.1.2 Outline of independence thesis 321
13.1.3 Outline of multiple shakeholder thesis 322
13.1.4 What is an independent director? 323
13.2 The primacy of shareholder interests: arguments in favour of greater
shareholder participation in management 324
13.2.1 Shareholders own the company 324
13.2.2 Shareholder interests are most closely aligned with those of the
company 324
13.3 The independence thesis 327
13.3.1 Does diverse ownership naturally lead to exclusion of owners from
decision making? 327
13.3.2 Does independence lead to better decision making and higher
profitability? 328
13.4 Multiple stakeholder thesis 330
13.4.1 The managerial quality argument 331
13.4.2 Independent directors care more about fringe players 331
13.5 Law reform in a climate where relevant empirical evidence is
lacking 332
13.6 Where to now? 334
13.6.1 Non independent directors 334
13.6.2 Shareholder committees 334
13.6.2.1 Composition 335
CONTENTS Xiii
13.6.2.2 Functions 336
13.6.2.3 Powers 338
13.6.2.4 General 340
13.7 Concluding remarks 341
14 The ethical obligations of corporations 343
14.1 Introduction 343
14.2 The threshold issue: Is there a role for ethical considerations in
business? 345
14.2.1 A short look at the short history of business ethics 345
14.2.2 The disunity between business and ethics arguments 346
14.2.3 Morality applies to business because moral judgements are
universalisable 347
14.2.4 Exception to universalistion activities with internal settled
rules? 348
14.2.5 Are moral norms too vague to apply to business? 349
14.2.6 Promise to shareholders to maximise profits as basis for rejecting
application of moral principles to business? 350
14.2.7 Summary of the general link between business and ethics 351
14.3 Application of moral principles to business setting 351
14.3.1 Types of duties imposed on corporations proscriptions against
causing harm, lying and environmental damage already legally
enforced 351
14.3.2 Additional duties imposed on corporations a duty of
benevolence? 354
14.3.2.1 Acts and omissions doctrine serves to minimise obligations
on corporations 354
14.3.2.2 Principal duty is for corporations to comply with law
business is morally neutral 356
14.3.2.3 A more elaborate duty extreme wealth and a maxim of
positive duty 357
14.3.2.4 Requirement to pay social dividend 359
14.3.3 Extreme wealth and duty not to frustrate access to justice 361
14.4 Summary 362
15 Reflections on contemporary corporate governance and its future
direction 363
15.1 Introduction 363
15.2 Regulatory pyramid and the cycles of regulation: a perspective on
contemporary corporate governance regulation 364
15.3 Interaction of cycles of regulation and law and norms discourse 368
15.3.1 The significance of norms 368
15.3.2 Norms, corporate governance and the utility of behavioural
analysis 374
15.4 Concluding remarks: corporate governance regulation going
forward 382
Index 387
Table of cases
Adler v ASIC; Williams v ASIC (2003) 46 ASCR 504 275 n52
Airpeak Pty Ltd v Jetstream Aircraft (1997) 15 ACLC 715 282 n70, 284 n78
Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp ltd (1987) 9 NSWL 310 250 n32
Allen vAtalay (1993) 11 ASCR 753 282 n70
ASC v Donovan; Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited [1991] ATPR 52 135 262
ASIC v Adler 4 Ors [2002] NSWSC 43 (30 May 2002) 262
ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80 140, 143, 271 6
ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 171 (14 March 2002) 139 40, 271
ASIC v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 341 121 2
ASIC v Rich [2003] NSWSC 85 (24 February 2003) 81
ASIC v Rich and Ors [2003] NSWSC 186 (21 March 2003) 140
ASIC v Triton Understanding Insurance Agency Pty Ltd and Others (2003) 48 ACSR
244 283 n76
Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure (1923) 33 CLR199 259 n3
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Whitlam (No 2) (2002) 20 ACLC
1333 81
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer Suisse Securities Ltd
(2002) 42 ACSR 605 283
AWA Ltd v Daniels (Trading as Deloitte Haskins Selb Ors) (1992) 7 ACSR 759 54,
56, 56 nl8, 60 n29, 75 nlO, 97
AWA Ltd v Daniels (Trading as Deloitte Haskins Sells) (No 2) (1992) 9 ACSR 983
251 n35
BGJ Holdings Pty Ltd v Touche Ross Co (1987) 12 ACLR 481 239 n7
Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371 73
Charterhouse Investment Trust Ltd v Tempest Diesels Ltd [1986] PCLC 1 273
Columbia Coffee Tea Pty Ltd v Churchillt/as Nelson Parkhill (1992) 29 NSWLR 141
251 n33
Commonwealth Bank v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 759 56 n 18
Daniels vAnderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614 56 nl8, 74, 97, 259
Esanda Finance Corp Ltdv Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 251 n33,
251 n34
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 278
Frankston Hastings Corp v Cohen (1960) 102 CLR 607 250 n31
Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432 44 n63
Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 640 (25 July 2002)
278 n62
Harris v Sheperd (1975) 1 ACLR 50 (on appeal) [1976] ACLC 28,614 72
Hely HutchisonvBrayheadLtd [1968] 1 QB 549 81
Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Nitrate Syndicate Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 392 259 n4
xiv
TABLE OF CASES XV
Lennard s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 53
Metyor Inc v Queensland Electronic Switching P/L [2002] QCA 269 (30 July 2002)
277 n59
Natcomp Technology Australia PtyLtd v Graiche [2001] NSWCA120 (30 April 2001)
72
Niord Pty Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1990) 8 ACLC 684 280 n69
Northumberland Insurance Ltd (in liq) v Alexander (1988) 13 ACLR 170 250 n32
NRMA v Parkin (2004) 49 ACSR 386 172 n28
NRMA v Snodgrass (2002) 42 ACSR 371
Pacific Acceptance Corporation v Forsyth (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 29 240 n8
Parke v The Daily News [1962] Ch 627 39
Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 258 ni
RvDytham [1979] QB 722 356 n34
RvPittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 356 n33
Re a Company [1989] BCLC 13 72
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance CoLtd [1925] Ch407 259 n5, 262 nl3
Re Kingston Cotton Mill (No 2) [1896] 2 Ch 270 240 n8
Re Tasbian (No 3) [1992] BCC 358 71
Rich vASIC [2004] HCA 42 (9 September 2004) [62] 89, 101 n61
RTP Holdings Pty Ltd v Roberts [2000] SASC 386 (8 November 2000) 279
Strategic Minerals Corp NL v Basham (1996) 15 ACLC 1155 251 n33
Tekinvest Pty Ltd v Lazarom [2004] NSWSC 940 (11 October 2004) 283 n76
Tesco Supermarkets vNattrass [1971] 2 ALL ER127 285 n82
Turnbull v NRMA (2004) 50 ACSR 44 172 n28
United States v Arthur Young (1984) 465 US 805 244
Vanmarc Holdings Pty Ltd v PWJess Associates Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 222 284
Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 35 JJ 324 n 11
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Table of cases xiv
Table of statutes xvi
Preface xxi
PART ONE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW
1 The concept 'corporate governance' and essential corporate
governance principles l
1.1 The meaning of corporate governance 1
1.1.1 Generally 1
1.1.2 Origins of the corporate governance debate and the stakeholder
debate 3
1.1.3 Definition of'corporate governance' 6
1.2 Essential corporate governance principles 7
1.2.1 Generally 7
1.2.2 The King Report (2002) 7
1.2.3 The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance
Council's Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations 8
1.2.4 Is 'good corporate governance' important and does it add value? 11
1.3 Concluding remarks 13
2 Stakeholders in corporate governance 14
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Stakeholders in the corporation: an overview 16
2.2.1 What is a stakeholder? 16
2.2.2 Discussion of different stakeholders 18
2.2.2.1 Shareholders 19
2.2.2.2 Employees 19
2.2.2.3 Creditors 23
2.2.2.4 Customers 24
2.2.2.5 The community 24
2.2.2.6 The environment 25
2.2.2.7 Government 28
2.3 Stakeholders' interests and the corporation: the role of the law 28
2.3.1 The Australian position 29
2.3.2 Analysis: the appropriate boundaries of corporate governance
regulation 33
2.3.3 Overseas position: a snapshot 35
2.3.3.1 OECD 36
2.3.3.2 European Union (EU) 36
2.3.3.3 United States 37
2.3.3.4 South Africa 37
2.3.3.5 United Kingdom 38
2.3.3.6 New Zealand 42
2.4 Stakeholder interests, good governance and the interests of the
corporation: a mutual relationship 44
2.4.1 General analysis 44
2.4.2 Case study on James Hardie's asbestos compensation settlement 47
2.5 Concluding remarks: a case for shareholder primacy 51
3 Board functions and structures 53
3.1 The organs of governance 53
3.2 Board functions 54
3.3 Board structures 58
3.3.1 The 'unitary* and 'two tier1 structures compared 58
3.4 Board structures in the broader context of a good corporate
governance model 64
3.4.1 Overview 64
3.4.2 Effective board structure 65
3.4.3 Effective support mechanisms to assist the board in fulfilling its
functions properly 66
3.4.4 Effective statutory provisions 66
3.4.5 Effective regulators 67
3.4.6 Effective charters, policies and codes of best practice and
conduct 68
4 Types of company directors and officers 70
4.1 Definition of'director' 70
4.1.1 De jure and de facto directors covered 70
4.1.2 Shadow director 71
4.2 Definition of'officer' 72
4.2.1 Statutory definition 72
4.2.2 Senior employees and senior executives as 'officers' 73
4.2.3 Middle management as 'officers'? 73
4.3 Types of company officers 74
4.3.1 Executive and non executive directors 74
4.3.2 Independent non executive directors 75
4.3.3 Lead independent directors or senior independent directors 79
4.3.4 The manager director or chief executive officer (CEO) 80
4.3.5 Chairperson 80
4.3.6 Alternate director 81
4.3.7 Secretary 82
4.4 Training and induction of directors 83
4.4.1 Training 83
4.4.2 Induction of new directors 84
4.5 Ethical behaviour by directors 85
CONTENTS vii
PART TWO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA
5 Corporate governance in Australia — background and business
initiatives 88
5.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in Australia 88
5.2 The Bosch Report 91
5.2.1 Background 91
5.2.2 Bosch Report (1991) 91
5.2.3 Bosch Report (1993) 93
5.2.4 The Bosch Report (1995) 95
5.3 Divergence from UK practice: 1995 early 2003 96
5.4 The Hilmer Report 97
5.4.1 Background 97
5.4.2 Hilmer Report (1993) 98
5.4.3 Hilmer Report (1998) 100
5.5 The virtues of good corporate governance in Australia between 1991
and 1998 100
5.6 The IFSA Blue Book 101
5.7 Concluding remarks 106
6 Regulation of corporate governance 107
6.1 Overview 107
6.2 Regulation generally 108
6.3 Objectives in regulating corporate governance 110
6.4 Sources of regulation in Australia 112
6.4.1 'Hard law' 113
6.4.1.1 Statutory regulation corporate law 113
6.4.1.2 Statutory regulation other than corporate law 116
6.4.1.3 'Corporate governance and the judges' the place of
judge made law 116
6.4.2 'Hybrids' 117
6.4.2.1 ASX Listing Rules 117
6.4.2.2 ASX Best Practice Recommendations 118
6.4.2.3 Accounting standards 119
6.4.2.4 Auditing standards 120
6.4.3 'Soft law1 120
6.4.4 The role of market forces 122
6.5 Towards an effective corporate governance framework in Australia
analysis and reform proposal 124
6.5.1 OECD's guidelines for achieving an effective governance
framework 124
6.5.2 Proposed MOU on corporate governance between ASX and
ASIC 126
6.6 Conclusion 129
7 The role of the regulators: ASX and ASIC 131
I 7.1 The Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (ASX) 131
1 7.1.1 Slow to get out of the blocks 131
I 7.1.2 Rapid change in attitude since the end of 2002 132
Viii CONTENTS
7.1.3 ASX Corporate Governance Council's Principles of Good Corporate
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 133
7.1.3.1 Structure 133
7.1.3.2 Recommendations 134
7.1.3.3 A few concluding remarks 136
7.2 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 137
7.2.1 History 137
7.2.2 Constitution and some statutory powers 138
7.2.3 Initial steps by ASIC after the HIH collapse 138
7.2.4 Actions instituted by ASIC against directors after the HIH
collapse 139
7.2.4.1 Actions by ASIC 139
7.2.4.2 Court orders 140
7.2.5 Some considerations regarding the period of disqualification 140
7.2.6 Criminal prosecutions 141
7.2.7 ASIC's aim with high profile prosecutions 142
7.2.8 ASIC enforcement patterns 143
7.2.9 The role of ASIC in corporate governance 144
7.2.10 Limits of ASIC's powers and responsibilities? 145
7.3 Concluding remarks 145
8 CLERP 9 reforms to the Corporations Act 147
8.1 Overview 147
8.2 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) 149
8.3 Impetus for CLERP 9: responding to corporate collapses 154
8.4 Explanation of key CLERP 9 reforms 160
8.4.1 Audit reform 161
8.4.2 Corporate disclosure 161
8.4.2.1 Remuneration of directors and executives 161
8.4.2.2 Financial reporting 162
8.4.2.3 Continuous disclosure 163
8.4.2.4 Shareholder participation 164
8.4.2.5 Whistleblowers 165
8.4.2.6 Disclosure rules 166
8.4.3 Miscellaneous 167
8.4.3.1 Managing conflict by financial services licensees 167
8.4.3.2 Register of relevant interests 168
8.4.3.3 Officers, senior managers and employees 169
8.4.3.4 Enforcement 170
8.4.3.5 Proportionate liability 170
8.5 Corporate law reform post CLERP 9 171
8.5.1 Part One of Report 174
8.5.2 Part Two of Report 175
8.6 Concluding remarks 178
PART THREE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE
9 Implementation of the ASX Best Practice Recommendations: charters,
policies and codes 181
CONTENTS ix
9.1 Implementing the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and
Best Practice Recommendations 181
9.2 Best Practice Recommendations requiring charters and policies 185
9.3 Practical examples of implementation of ASX Best Practice
Recommendations 187
9.3.1 Charters 188
9.3.1.1 The Board Charter 188
9.3.1.2 Charters of the main board committees 188
9.3.1.2.1 Nomination Committee Charter 192
9.3.1.2.2 Audit Committee Charter 192
9.3.1.2.3 Remuneration Committee Charter 196
9.3.2 Company Policies and Codes 204
9.3.2.1 Code of Conduct 204
9.3.2.2 Trading Policy 208
9.3.2.3 Disclosure Policy 217
9.3.2 A Shareholder Communication Policy 223
9.3.2.5 Risk Management Policy 229
9.3.2.6 Remuneration Policy 231
9.4 Concluding remarks 236
10 Auditors and audits 238
10.1 Introduction: The audit role and where it fits into corporate
governance 238
10.1.1 Overview of the audit role 238
10.1.2 The link between the audit role and corporate governance 239
10.2 Wholesale recent changes to audit role 241
10.3 Auditor independence 243
10.3.1 Overview of rationale behind independence requirement 243
10.3.2 General requirement for auditor independence 244
10.3.3 Meaning of 'conflict of interest situation' 244
10.3.4 Disclosing and resolving conflicts 245
10.3.5 Specific independence requirements minimising conflict of interest
through employment and financial restrictions 245
10.3.6 Auditor rotation 247
10.3.7 Disclosure of non audit services 248
10.4 Auditors and the AGM 248
10.5 Auditors'duties 249
10.6 Reducing the legal exposure of auditors 250
10.6.1 Overview of auditors'liability 250
10.6.2 Registration of audit companies 252
10.6.3 Proportionate liability 252
10.7 Qualification of auditors 254
10.8 Uniform auditing standards 255
10.9 Audit oversight 256
10.10 Concluding remarks 257
11 Directors' duties and liability 258
11.1 Introduction 258
X CONTENTS
11.2 Part 9.4B Civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty
provisions 260
11.2.1 Overview 260
11.2.2 The civil penalty provisions in particular 262
11.2.2.1 Section 180: Duty of care and diligence civil
obligation 262
11.2.2.2 Section 181: Duty of good faith civil obligation 263
11.2.2.3 Sections 182 and 183: Duty not to use position or
information to gain personally or cause detriment to the
corporation 264
11.2.2.4 Part 2E: Duty relating to related party transactions 264
11.2.2.5 Part 2H: Duty relating to share capital transactions 266
11.2.2.6 Part 2M.2 and 2M.3: Duty relating to requirements for
financial reports 266
11.2.2.7 Part 5.7B: Duty to prevent insolvent trading 266
11.2.2.8 Part 5C: Duties relating to managed investment
schemes 267
11.2.2.9 Chapter 6CA: Duty relating to continuous disclosure 267
11.2.2.10 Part 7.10: Duty not to be involved in market misconduct
and other prohibited conduct relating to financial products
and financial services 268
11.2.2.10.1 Market manipulation 268
11.2.2.10.2 False trading and market rigging 268
11.2.2.10.3 Dissemination of information about illegal
transactions 269
11.2.2.10.4 Insider trading 269
11.2.2.11 Subclause 29(6) of Schedule 4: Duty relating to disclosure
for proposed demutualisation 270
11.3 Case study regarding civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty
provisions: ASICvAdler 271
11.3.1 Overview 271
11.3.2 Summary of the facts 271
11.3.3 Contravention of civil penalty provisions 273
11.3.3.1 Related party transactions (Chapter 2E) 273
11.3.3.2 Financial assistance (Part 2J.3) 273
11.3.3.3 Duty of care and diligence (s 180) 274
11.3.3.4 Duty of good faith (s 181) 274
11.3.3.5 Use of position to gain advantage for oneself or another or
to cause detriment to the corporation (s 182) 275
11.3.3.6 Improper use of information (s 183) 275
11.3.4 Court orders 276
11.4 Enforcement of directors'duties 276
11.4.1 Overview 276
11.4.2 The statutory derivative action: Part 2F.1A 276
11.4.2.1 The case to introduce a statutory derivative action 276
11.4.2.2 Eligible applicant 277
11.4.2.3 Cause of action 278
11.4.2.4 Leave of court required to institute the statutory derivative
action 279
CONTENTS Xi
11.4.3 Oppressive conduct of affairs: Part 2F.1 279
11.4.3.1 Type of conduct covered by Part 2F.1 279
11.4.3.2 Who may apply for relief under Part 2F.1? 280
11.4.3.3 Nature of relief available under Part 2F.1 280
11.4.4 Section 1324 injunctions 281
11.4.4.1 Introduction 281
11.4.4.2 Section 1324(1) 282
11.4.4.3 Court's discretion 283
11.4.4.4 Remedies in particular 283
11.5 Criminal liability of directors 284
11.5.1 The importance of the criminal sanction in the corporations
law 284
11.5.2 Selected criminal offences directors and other officers can commit
under the Corporations Act 289
11.5.2.1 General 289
11.5.2.2 Specific offences for breaches of duties 290
11.6 Conclusion 291
PART FOUR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
12 Corporate governance in selected jurisdictions and the OECD principles
of corporate governance 292
12.1 United States 292
12.1.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in the USA 292
12.1.2 The American Law Institute's involvement in the corporate
governance debate 293
12.1.2.1 Basic aims of the project 293
12.1.2.2 Impact and importance of the project 294
12.1.2.3 Some of key aspects addressed 294
12.1.3 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 the US response to collapses such
as Enron and WorldCom 296
12.1.3.1 Backdrop 296
12.1.3.2 Aims and objectives 296
12.1.4 NYSE: sections 303 and 303A corporate governance rules 299
12.1.4.1 Background 299
12.1.4.2 Summary of the most important NYSE corporate
governance rules 299
12.2 United Kingdom 301
12.2.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in the
UK 301
12.2.2 The Cadbury Report and the unfolding of the concept of 'corporate
governance' in the UK 301
12.2.2.1 Context of the Cadbury Report 301
12.2.2.2 Code of Best Practice 302
12.2.2.3 Further developments 303
12.2.3 The Greenbury, Hampel, Smith and Higgs Reports 304
12.2.3.1 The Greenbury Report (1995) 304
12.2.3.2 The Hampel Report (1998) 305
Xii CONTENTS
12.2.3.3 The Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report
(2003) 305
12.2.4 The UK Combined Code 306
12.3 Germany 307
12.3.1 Background to the corporate governance debate in Germany 307
12.3.2 The German Corporate Governance Code 310
12.3.2.1 Background to its adoption 310
12.3.2.2 Structure and explanatory nature of the German
Code 311
12.3.3 Employee participation at supervisory board level
codetermination 312
12.3.4 The German board structure 314
12.4 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 315
12.4.1 Background to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 315
12.4.2 Broad aims and application 316
12.4.3 Structure 316
12.4.4 Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance
framework 317
12.4.5 Disclosure and transparency 318
PART FIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: GOING FORWARD
13 The case for enhanced shareholder participation in corporate
decision making 320
13.1 Introduction 320
13.1.1 Overview 321
13.1.2 Outline of independence thesis 321
13.1.3 Outline of multiple shakeholder thesis 322
13.1.4 What is an independent director? 323
13.2 The primacy of shareholder interests: arguments in favour of greater
shareholder participation in management 324
13.2.1 Shareholders own the company 324
13.2.2 Shareholder interests are most closely aligned with those of the
company 324
13.3 The independence thesis 327
13.3.1 Does diverse ownership naturally lead to exclusion of owners from
decision making? 327
13.3.2 Does independence lead to better decision making and higher
profitability? 328
13.4 Multiple stakeholder thesis 330
13.4.1 The managerial quality argument 331
13.4.2 Independent directors care more about fringe players 331
13.5 Law reform in a climate where relevant empirical evidence is
lacking 332
13.6 Where to now? 334
13.6.1 Non independent directors 334
13.6.2 Shareholder committees 334
13.6.2.1 Composition 335
CONTENTS Xiii
13.6.2.2 Functions 336
13.6.2.3 Powers 338
13.6.2.4 General 340
13.7 Concluding remarks 341
14 The ethical obligations of corporations 343
14.1 Introduction 343
14.2 The threshold issue: Is there a role for ethical considerations in
business? 345
14.2.1 A short look at the short history of business ethics 345
14.2.2 The disunity between business and ethics arguments 346
14.2.3 Morality applies to business because moral judgements are
universalisable 347
14.2.4 Exception to universalistion activities with internal settled
rules? 348
14.2.5 Are moral norms too vague to apply to business? 349
14.2.6 Promise to shareholders to maximise profits as basis for rejecting
application of moral principles to business? 350
14.2.7 Summary of the general link between business and ethics 351
14.3 Application of moral principles to business setting 351
14.3.1 Types of duties imposed on corporations proscriptions against
causing harm, lying and environmental damage already legally
enforced 351
14.3.2 Additional duties imposed on corporations a duty of
benevolence? 354
14.3.2.1 Acts and omissions doctrine serves to minimise obligations
on corporations 354
14.3.2.2 Principal duty is for corporations to comply with law
business is morally neutral 356
14.3.2.3 A more elaborate duty extreme wealth and a maxim of
positive duty 357
14.3.2.4 Requirement to pay social dividend 359
14.3.3 Extreme wealth and duty not to frustrate access to justice 361
14.4 Summary 362
15 Reflections on contemporary corporate governance and its future
direction 363
15.1 Introduction 363
15.2 Regulatory pyramid and the cycles of regulation: a perspective on
contemporary corporate governance regulation 364
15.3 Interaction of cycles of regulation and 'law and norms' discourse 368
15.3.1 The significance of norms 368
15.3.2 Norms, corporate governance and the utility of behavioural
analysis 374
15.4 Concluding remarks: corporate governance regulation going
forward 382
Index 387
Table of cases
Adler v ASIC; Williams v ASIC (2003) 46 ASCR 504 275 n52
Airpeak Pty Ltd v Jetstream Aircraft (1997) 15 ACLC 715 282 n70, 284 n78
Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp ltd (1987) 9 NSWL 310 250 n32
Allen vAtalay (1993) 11 ASCR 753 282 n70
ASC v Donovan; Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited [1991] ATPR 52 135 262
ASIC v Adler 4 Ors [2002] NSWSC 43 (30 May 2002) 262
ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80 140, 143, 271 6
ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 171 (14 March 2002) 139 40, 271
ASIC v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 341 121 2
ASIC v Rich [2003] NSWSC 85 (24 February 2003) 81
ASIC v Rich and Ors [2003] NSWSC 186 (21 March 2003) 140
ASIC v Triton Understanding Insurance Agency Pty Ltd and Others (2003) 48 ACSR
244 283 n76
Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure (1923) 33 CLR199 259 n3
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Whitlam (No 2) (2002) 20 ACLC
1333 81
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer Suisse Securities Ltd
(2002) 42 ACSR 605 283
AWA Ltd v Daniels (Trading as Deloitte Haskins Selb Ors) (1992) 7 ACSR 759 54,
56, 56 nl8, 60 n29, 75 nlO, 97
AWA Ltd v Daniels (Trading as Deloitte Haskins Sells) (No 2) (1992) 9 ACSR 983
251 n35
BGJ Holdings Pty Ltd v Touche Ross Co (1987) 12 ACLR 481 239 n7
Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371 73
Charterhouse Investment Trust Ltd v Tempest Diesels Ltd [1986] PCLC 1 273
Columbia Coffee Tea Pty Ltd v Churchillt/as Nelson Parkhill (1992) 29 NSWLR 141
251 n33
Commonwealth Bank v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 759 56 n 18
Daniels vAnderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614 56 nl8, 74, 97, 259
Esanda Finance Corp Ltdv Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 251 n33,
251 n34
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 278
Frankston Hastings Corp v Cohen (1960) 102 CLR 607 250 n31
Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432 44 n63
Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 640 (25 July 2002)
278 n62
Harris v Sheperd (1975) 1 ACLR 50 (on appeal) [1976] ACLC 28,614 72
Hely HutchisonvBrayheadLtd [1968] 1 QB 549 81
Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Nitrate Syndicate Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 392 259 n4
xiv
TABLE OF CASES XV
Lennard's Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 53
Metyor Inc v Queensland Electronic Switching P/L [2002] QCA 269 (30 July 2002)
277 n59
Natcomp Technology Australia PtyLtd v Graiche [2001] NSWCA120 (30 April 2001)
72
Niord Pty Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1990) 8 ACLC 684 280 n69
Northumberland Insurance Ltd (in liq) v Alexander (1988) 13 ACLR 170 250 n32
NRMA v Parkin (2004) 49 ACSR 386 172 n28
NRMA v Snodgrass (2002) 42 ACSR 371
Pacific Acceptance Corporation v Forsyth (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 29 240 n8
Parke v The Daily News [1962] Ch 627 39
Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 258 ni
RvDytham [1979] QB 722 356 n34
RvPittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 356 n33
Re a Company [1989] BCLC 13 72
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance CoLtd [1925] Ch407 259 n5, 262 nl3
Re Kingston Cotton Mill (No 2) [1896] 2 Ch 270 240 n8
Re Tasbian (No 3) [1992] BCC 358 71
Rich vASIC [2004] HCA 42 (9 September 2004) [62] 89, 101 n61
RTP Holdings Pty Ltd v Roberts [2000] SASC 386 (8 November 2000) 279
Strategic Minerals Corp NL v Basham (1996) 15 ACLC 1155 251 n33
Tekinvest Pty Ltd v Lazarom [2004] NSWSC 940 (11 October 2004) 283 n76
Tesco Supermarkets vNattrass [1971] 2 ALL ER127 285 n82
Turnbull v NRMA (2004) 50 ACSR 44 172 n28
United States v Arthur Young (1984) 465 US 805 244
Vanmarc Holdings Pty Ltd v PWJess Associates Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 222 284
Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 35 JJ 324 n 11 |
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| genre | 1\p (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Lehrbuch |
| id | DE-604.BV021549264 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:31:00Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:38:23Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521617839 9780521617833 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2005008712 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014765364 |
| oclc_num | 58729306 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-945 DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-945 DE-M382 |
| physical | XXII, 395 S. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Du Plessis, Jean J. 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)13343334X aut Principles of contemporary corporate governance Jean Jacques du Plessis ; James McConvill ; Mirko Bagaric 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2005 XXII, 395 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Corporate governance gtt Droit comparé Gouvernement d'entreprise - Droit Recht Corporate governance Law and legislation Comparative law Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s DE-604 McConvill, James Verfasser aut Bagaric, Mirko Verfasser aut http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0510/2005008712.html Table of contents HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014765364&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Du Plessis, Jean J. 1959- McConvill, James Bagaric, Mirko Principles of contemporary corporate governance Corporate governance gtt Droit comparé Gouvernement d'entreprise - Droit Recht Corporate governance Law and legislation Comparative law Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4123623-3 |
| title | Principles of contemporary corporate governance |
| title_auth | Principles of contemporary corporate governance |
| title_exact_search | Principles of contemporary corporate governance |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Principles of contemporary corporate governance |
| title_full | Principles of contemporary corporate governance Jean Jacques du Plessis ; James McConvill ; Mirko Bagaric |
| title_fullStr | Principles of contemporary corporate governance Jean Jacques du Plessis ; James McConvill ; Mirko Bagaric |
| title_full_unstemmed | Principles of contemporary corporate governance Jean Jacques du Plessis ; James McConvill ; Mirko Bagaric |
| title_short | Principles of contemporary corporate governance |
| title_sort | principles of contemporary corporate governance |
| topic | Corporate governance gtt Droit comparé Gouvernement d'entreprise - Droit Recht Corporate governance Law and legislation Comparative law Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Corporate governance Droit comparé Gouvernement d'entreprise - Droit Recht Corporate governance Law and legislation Comparative law Corporate Governance Lehrbuch |
| url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0510/2005008712.html http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014765364&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT duplessisjeanj principlesofcontemporarycorporategovernance AT mcconvilljames principlesofcontemporarycorporategovernance AT bagaricmirko principlesofcontemporarycorporategovernance |