The overlooked option: self-regulation in infrastructure industries
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Lohmar [u.a.]
Eul
2005
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. Aufl. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zugl.: Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Kath. Univ., Diss., 2004 |
| Beschreibung: | XIV, 332 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 3899364155 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Meier, Christoph |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The overlooked option |b self-regulation in infrastructure industries |c Christoph Meier |
| 250 | |a 1. Aufl. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Lohmar [u.a.] |b Eul |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a XIV, 332 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zugl.: Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Kath. Univ., Diss., 2004 | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Private Infrastrukturinvestition / Selbstverpflichtung / Regulierung / Verhandlungstheorie / Telekommunikation / Schienenverkehr / Internet / Gaswirtschaft / Elektrizitätswirtschaft / Theorie / USA / Deutschland | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Institutionenökonomie |0 (DE-588)4027208-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Selbstregulation |0 (DE-588)4236708-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Infrastrukturleistung |0 (DE-588)4516519-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Regulierung |0 (DE-588)4201190-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Deutschland |0 (DE-588)4011882-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Deutschland |0 (DE-588)4011882-4 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Infrastrukturleistung |0 (DE-588)4516519-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Regulierung |0 (DE-588)4201190-5 |D s |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135303870414848 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | TABLE OF CONTENTS VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE V
TABLE OF CONTENTS VIII
ABBREVIATIONS XII
EXHIBITS XIV
I THE OVERLOOKED OPTION: SELF REGULATION 1
II THE INFRASTRUCTURE DILEMMA STRUCTURE AND INCOMPLETE
BARGAINS 7
II. 1 The Infrastructure Dilemma Structure : Substantial and Specific Investment,
Lock in and Hold up 7
11.2 The Regulatory Bargain and Credible Commitment 13
11.2.1 Creating Commitment 13
11.2.2 Making Commitment Credible 15
11.2.3 The Regulatory Bargain in Constitutional and Regulatory Economics 20
11.3 Incomplete Bargains and Feedback 25
II. 3.1 Incomplete Bargains and Commitments 26
II. 3.2 Chances and Risks for the Provider: German Gas Concessions in the Ht 1 Century 2H
11.3.3 Business Feedback: The Invisible Hand 33
11.3.4 Political Feedback: Countervailing Power 36
11.4 The Provider s Challenge: Commitment and Flexibility 41
III FILLING THE REGULATORY BARGAIN: ALTERNATIVES 43
III. 1 Spot Markets 43
111.2 State Regulation 45
111.2.1 Credible Commitments of Providers 46
111.2.2 Limited Credibility of the User s and Competitor s Commitment 47
111.2.3 Dealing with Incompleteness: Cost Benchmarks 4H
111.2.4 Deregulation and Incentive Regulation: Solutions and Ne» Problems 49
111.2.5 Disasters: British Rail and the Californian Electricity Crisis 53
111.2.6 Credibility at a High Price 55
111.3 Self regulation 55
111.3.1 Self regulation in Economic Theory: Rent seeking 56
HI.3.2 Advantages for Providers (and Users) 57
III.3.3 Self regulating Providers and Self regulating Industry 61
III. 3.4 The Involvement of Users (5(5
III.3.5 Types of Self regulation 6H
111.4 Cases Studies in Institutional History 70
Vm TARI.F. OF CONTENTS
IV US TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE POWER OF FEEDBACK 72
IV. 1 The Rise of Bell s Monopoly 73
IV.2 Dual Service: Unleashing Business Feedback 76
IV.3 Vail s Bargain: State Regulation for Consolidation 79
IV.4 Unraveling State Regulation: Business and Political Feedback through MCI s
Entry 85
iv.5 a new bargain for state regulation: at t s divestiture and the 1996
Telecommunications Act 91
IV.6 Power of Feedback, and the Limitations of State Regulation 94
V US TELEGRAPH: CREDIBILITY THROUGH LOWER BARRIERS OF ENTRY 97
V. 1 Overcoming Precarious User Commitment via Government Subsidies 97
V.2 Rapid Expansion, Competition and the Failure of Negotiated Self regulation ... 99
V.3 Self regulation by Western Union through Lower Barriers of Entry 100
V.4 Credible Commitment through Lower Barriers of Entry 105
VI US RAILROADS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF VARIANTS OF SELF
REGULATION................................................................................................................. 107
VI. 1 Overcoming Precarious User Commitment via Land Grants 108
VI.2 Successful Self regulation: Interconnecting Rail Networks via Associations
and Express Companies 113
VI.3 System Building and Competition 115
VI.4 Failed Self regulation (I): Voluntary Rate Associations 119
VI.5 Failed Self regulation (II): Consolidation Community of Interests and
Trusts 124
VI.6 Failed Self regulation (III): The ICC as Enforcer 126
VI.7 The Stable Regulatory Bargain: The ICC as State Regulator 128
VI.8 Temporarily Supressing Business Feedback: Expanding State Regulation on
Competing Modes 132
VI.9 The Final Unraveling of State Regulation: Barriers to Change and
Breakdown 134
VI.IOSuccessful Self regulation (II): Deregulation with Long term Contracts 135
VI. 11 The Opportunities and Pitfalls of Self regulation 136
VII INTERNET BACKBONE INDUSTRY: CREDIBILITY WITHOUT
PROFITABILITY 138
VII. 1 Internet Technology and its Economic Implications 139
VH.2 Development of the Internet Backbone Industry 143
VII.2.1 Sponsoring by the US Government 143
VII.2.2 System building and Intense Competition 146
VII.3 Interplay of State Regulation and Self regulation 148
VII.3.1 State Regulation: Only Antitrust Oversight 14H
VII.3.2 Self regulation with Peering and Transit Contracts 151
VII.3.3 Attempts to Change the Institutional Framework 152
VII.4 Endurance of the Balance of Power and Looming Feedback 155
TABLE OF CONTENTS IX
VII. 4.1 Strong Incentives for Universal Connectivity 156
VII.4.2 Weak Incentives for Investment 162
VI1.4.3 Insufficient Incentives for QoS Roll out 173
VII.5 Ways out of the Deadlock: Lessons from other Infrastructure Industries 175
VII.6 Credibility instead of Profitability 178
VIII GERMAN GAS: TAILOR MADE PRIVATE CONTRACTS 180
VIII. 1 State Regulation via Municipal Concession Contracts 180
VIII.2 Competition: Dual Concessions and Electricity 183
VIII.3 State Operation instead of State Regulation 184
VIII.4 Self regulation I: The Wholesale Market 185
VIII.5 Self regulation II: The Retail Market 188
VIII.6 Carefully Tailored Self regulation 193
IX GERMAN ELECTRICITY: COMBINING STATE AND SELF REGULATION... 195
IX.1 Innovation I: Mixed Enterprises 196
IX.1.1 Explosive Growth 196
IX.1.2 HugoStinnes Vision: Mixed Enterprises 199
IX.1.3 Political Feedback: Electro wars 202
IX.2 Innovation II: Light handed Regulation 203
IX.2.1 Self regulation of Competition: Demarcation Contracts 204
IX.2.2 Self regulation of Interconnection: Trade Associations 204
IX.2.3 Self regulation between Users and Providers: Long term Contracts 206
IX.2.4 Backup by Light handed Regulation 207
IX.2.5 Industry Structure in the Second Half of the 20° Century. 209
IX.3 Innovation III: The Associations Agreement 211
IX.3.1 Born out of Necessity: The Associations Agreement 211
IX. 3.2 The Congenital Defect: Non binding and Limited Legitimation 216
IX.3.3 The New Energy Industry Act and the Associations Agreement 1 21H
IX.3.3.1 Key Elements of the New Act and the Associations Agreement 218
IX.3.3.2 A Positive Sum Game: Rents for Users, Providers and the State 221
IX.3.3.3 Problems: The Providers Commitment, Structural Reasons and Entry Strategy .... 230
IX.3.4 Evolutionary Development of the Associations Agreement 23K
IX.3.4.1 Providers Trade Associations: Making Commitments Credible 238
IX.3.4.2 Users Trade Associations: Increasing Bargaining Power without Undermining
Legitimation 241
IX.3.4.3 Department of Commerce: Management by Delegation 243
IX.3.4.4 The Cartel Authorities: Management by Intervention 246
IX.3.4.5 Changes through AA II and AA II Plus 252
IX.3.5 Unraveling the Bargain 255
IX.3.5.1 What Is the Bargain? 256
IX.3.5.2 First Step toward Unraveling: Some Providers Do Not Stick to the Associations
Agreement 257
IX.3.5.3 The Second Step toward Unraveling: Users Call for the Federal Cartel Authority.. 260
X tari F OF CONTENTS
IX.3.5.4 The Third Step toward Unraveling: Providers Demand a Legally binding
Associations Agreement 261
IX.3.5.5 Problems with the Gas Associations Agreement and with the EU 263
IX.3.5.6 The EnWG Amendment Fails 264
IX.4 Ways out of the Deadlock 266
IX.4.1 Reasons for Failure: Congenital Defects Not Addressed 267
IX.4.2 Reform Proposal 268
IX.4.3 Additional Problems Ahead 274
IX.4.3.1 Lacking Incentives to Realize Efficiency Gains 274
IX.4.3.2 Inefficiencies Ahead 279
IX.5 Complements, Not Substitutes 284
X MANY OPPORTUNITIES, BUT NO WONDER CURE 285
X. 1 The Providers Challenge: Commitment and Flexibility 286
X.2 The Tightrope Act of Self regulation: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility29 1
X.3 Homogeneity and Few Stakeholders as Key Success Factors 294
X.4 Influence of Providers on the Regulatory Framework 296
X.5 Stability of Self regulation 299
X.6 Self regulation: Not Only in the Interest of Providers? 301
RFFFRFNCES 304
EXHIBITS XIII
EXHIBITS
Exhibit II—1 r Division of Gains 11
Exhibit II 2: Payoffs for Utility and Railroad 12
Exhibit II 3: Payoff after Commitment 14
Exhibit II 4: Overview of Commitment Mechanisms 20
Exhibit II 5: Gas Concession Contracts in 19* Century Germany 28
Exhibit II 6: Flexibility Mechanisms 32
Exhibit II 7: Business and Political Feedback 40
Exhibit II 8: The Provider s Challenge 42
Exhibit III— 1: Types of Self regulation 69
Exhibit III 2: Commitment and Flexibility of the Three Generic Regulatory Frameworks 69
Exhibit IV 1: Telephone Growth, 1877 1929 77
Exhibit IV 2: Growth of Bell s Real Cost and Revenue per Phone, 1885 1960 78
Exhibit IV 3: Interconnection between Bell / Independents, 1894 1929 80
Exhibit 1V 4: Lost Interconnections, 1894 1929 81
Exhibit V l: Western Union Net Income and Return on Sales (ROS), 1866 1913 100
Exhibit V 2: Telegraph Messages and Average Price per Message, 1866 1910 103
Exhibit V 3: Percentage Changes in Average Revenue per Message and Number of Messages 104
Exhibit VI 1: Railroad Track, 1830 1920 117
Exhibit VI 2: Track in Receivership 130
Exhibit VI 3: Productivity Increases after Deregulation 136
Exhibit VII 1: Telephone and Internet Architecture 140
Exhibit VII 2: Internet Traffic Growth and Backbone Upgrades 147
Exhibit VII 3: Market Share of Internet Backbone Providers 150
Exhibit VIM: Hot Potato Routing 157
Exhibit VII 5: Cutting Interconnection Decision (All Providers of Equal Size) 159
Exhibit VII 6: Cutting Interconnection Decision (Providers of Different Size) 160
Exhibit VI1 7: Capacity Expansion Plans 163
Exhibit VII 8: Price Changes for Bandwidth on the London New York Route
since 1999 as a % 164
Exhibit VII 9: Revenue Growth Rates of IBPs 165
Exhibit VII 10:EBIDTA Margin, 1997 2001 166
Exhibit VII 11: Depreciation and Interest as a % of Revenues of Pure Players 166
Exhibit VII 12: Net Losses 167
Exhibit VII 13: Profitability of IBP and Other Business of CW 167
Exhibit VII 14: Profitabibility of IBP and Other Business of Qwest 168
Exhibit VII 15: EBITDA Margin Integrated Telephone Companies 168
Exhibit VII 16: Bankruptcy Prices 169
Exhibit VII 17: Capital Expenditure, 1997 2001 170
Exhibit VII 18: Stock Prices, 1997 2002 171
Xjy F.XHIBITS
Exhibit VIII 1: Private and Municipal Gas Companies, 1829 1894 184
Exhibit VIII 2: Structure of the German Gas Industry in 1995 186
Exhibit VIII 3: Non Gas Costs in 1992 in Several European Countries 191
Exhibit VIII 4: Breakdown of Non Gas Costs 1994, Large European Gas Companies 192
Exhibit IX 1: Growth of the German Electricity Industry 196
Exhibit IX 2: Ownership of Electricity Utilities 197
Exhibit IX 3: Electricity Consumption 198
Exhibit IX 4: Share of Mixed Enterprises in the Electricity Industry in 1997 202
Exhibit IX 5: The Institutional Framework before 1998 208
Exhibit IX 6: Light handed Regulation 209
Exhibit IX 7: Structure of the German Electricity Industry in 1994 210
Exhibit 1X 8: Minimum Market Opening Requirements in the Electricity Directive 213
Exhibit IX 9: Comparison between EnWG 1935 and EnWG 1998 219
Exhibit IX 10: Key Content of Associations Agreements I 220
Exhibit IX 11: Electricity Price Changes since Deregulation (Industrial / Residential) 222
Exhibit IX 12: Revenue Effects of Liberalization 223
Exhibit IX 13: EU wide Comparison of Overall Price Changes since 1998 224
Exhibit IX 14: Price Changes for Subgroups 224
Exhibit IX 15: Price Developments in different Customer Groups 225
Exhibit IX 16: Employment Development in the Electricity Industry 226
Exhibit IX 17: Generation Capacity and Utilization, 1994 2000 226
Exhibit IX 18: Profitability before and after Liberalization 228
Exhibit IX 19: Rent Increases for Users, the State and Providers between 1996 and 2001 229
Exhibit 1X 20: Switching Rates of Residential and Industrial Users 230
Exhibit IX 21: Barriers to Entry for Competitors 233
Exhibit IX 22: Price Structure for Different Customer Segments 234
Exhibit IX 23: Network Access Fees by Different Network Operators in 2001 236
Exhibit IX 24: Influence of FCA Investigations on Network Access Fees 249
Exhibit IX 25: Effect on Low Voltage Fees 250
Exhibit IX 26: Effect on Medium Voltage Fees 251
Exhibit IX 27: Effect on High Voltage Fees 251
Exhibit IX 28: Development ofthe Associations Agreements 253
Exhibit IX 29: Segment Profitability of Municipal Utilities between 1999 and 2001 259
Exhibit 1X 30: Income Implications ofthe Federal Cartel Authority s Decision for TEAG 262
Exhibit IX 31: Proposal for a New Regulatory System 271
Exhibit IX 32: Development of Network Access Fees over Time 276
Exhibit 1X 33: Relationship between the Relative Fee Level and Fee Changes 277
Exhibit IX 34: Total Changes in Network Access Fees in the Sample 278
Exhibit IX 35: Decreasing Reserve Margins Worldwide 281
|
| adam_txt |
TABLE OF CONTENTS VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE V
TABLE OF CONTENTS VIII
ABBREVIATIONS XII
EXHIBITS XIV
I THE OVERLOOKED OPTION: SELF REGULATION 1
II THE INFRASTRUCTURE DILEMMA STRUCTURE AND INCOMPLETE
BARGAINS 7
II. 1 The Infrastructure Dilemma Structure : Substantial and Specific Investment,
Lock in and Hold up 7
11.2 The Regulatory Bargain and Credible Commitment 13
11.2.1 Creating Commitment 13
11.2.2 Making Commitment Credible 15
11.2.3 The Regulatory Bargain in Constitutional and Regulatory Economics 20
11.3 Incomplete Bargains and Feedback 25
II. 3.1 Incomplete Bargains and Commitments 26
II. 3.2 Chances and Risks for the Provider: German Gas Concessions in the Ht"1 Century 2H
11.3.3 Business Feedback: The Invisible Hand 33
11.3.4 Political Feedback: Countervailing Power 36
11.4 The Provider's Challenge: Commitment and Flexibility 41
III FILLING THE REGULATORY BARGAIN: ALTERNATIVES 43
III. 1 Spot Markets 43
111.2 State Regulation 45
111.2.1 Credible Commitments of Providers 46
111.2.2 Limited Credibility of the User's and Competitor's Commitment 47
111.2.3 Dealing with Incompleteness: Cost Benchmarks 4H
111.2.4 Deregulation and Incentive Regulation: Solutions and Ne»' Problems 49
111.2.5 Disasters: British Rail and the Californian Electricity Crisis 53
111.2.6 Credibility at a High Price 55
111.3 Self regulation 55
111.3.1 Self regulation in Economic Theory: Rent seeking 56
HI.3.2 Advantages for Providers (and Users) 57
III.3.3 Self regulating Providers and Self regulating Industry 61
III. 3.4 The Involvement of Users (5(5
III.3.5 Types of Self regulation 6H
111.4 Cases Studies in Institutional History 70
Vm TARI.F. OF CONTENTS
IV US TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE POWER OF FEEDBACK 72
IV. 1 The Rise of Bell's Monopoly 73
IV.2 Dual Service: Unleashing Business Feedback 76
IV.3 Vail's Bargain: State Regulation for Consolidation 79
IV.4 Unraveling State Regulation: Business and Political Feedback through MCI's
Entry 85
iv.5 a new bargain for state regulation: at t's divestiture and the 1996
Telecommunications Act 91
IV.6 Power of Feedback, and the Limitations of State Regulation 94
V US TELEGRAPH: CREDIBILITY THROUGH LOWER BARRIERS OF ENTRY 97
V. 1 Overcoming Precarious User Commitment via Government Subsidies 97
V.2 Rapid Expansion, Competition and the Failure of Negotiated Self regulation . 99
V.3 Self regulation by Western Union through Lower Barriers of Entry 100
V.4 Credible Commitment through Lower Barriers of Entry 105
VI US RAILROADS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF VARIANTS OF SELF
REGULATION. 107
VI. 1 Overcoming Precarious User Commitment via Land Grants 108
VI.2 Successful Self regulation: Interconnecting Rail Networks via Associations
and Express Companies 113
VI.3 System Building and Competition 115
VI.4 Failed Self regulation (I): Voluntary Rate Associations 119
VI.5 Failed Self regulation (II): Consolidation Community of Interests and
Trusts 124
VI.6 Failed Self regulation (III): The ICC as Enforcer 126
VI.7 The Stable Regulatory Bargain: The ICC as State Regulator 128
VI.8 Temporarily Supressing Business Feedback: Expanding State Regulation on
Competing Modes 132
VI.9 The Final Unraveling of State Regulation: Barriers to Change and
Breakdown 134
VI.IOSuccessful Self regulation (II): Deregulation with Long term Contracts 135
VI. 11 The Opportunities and Pitfalls of Self regulation 136
VII INTERNET BACKBONE INDUSTRY: CREDIBILITY WITHOUT
PROFITABILITY 138
VII. 1 Internet Technology and its Economic Implications 139
VH.2 Development of the Internet Backbone Industry 143
VII.2.1 Sponsoring by the US Government 143
VII.2.2 System building and Intense Competition 146
VII.3 Interplay of State Regulation and Self regulation 148
VII.3.1 State Regulation: Only Antitrust Oversight 14H
VII.3.2 Self regulation with Peering and Transit Contracts 151
VII.3.3 Attempts to Change the Institutional Framework 152
VII.4 Endurance of the Balance of Power and Looming Feedback 155
TABLE OF CONTENTS IX
VII. 4.1 Strong Incentives for Universal Connectivity 156
VII.4.2 Weak Incentives for Investment 162
VI1.4.3 Insufficient Incentives for QoS Roll out 173
VII.5 Ways out of the Deadlock: Lessons from other Infrastructure Industries 175
VII.6 Credibility instead of Profitability 178
VIII GERMAN GAS: TAILOR MADE PRIVATE CONTRACTS 180
VIII. 1 State Regulation via Municipal Concession Contracts 180
VIII.2 Competition: Dual Concessions and Electricity 183
VIII.3 State Operation instead of State Regulation 184
VIII.4 Self regulation I: The Wholesale Market 185
VIII.5 Self regulation II: The Retail Market 188
VIII.6 Carefully Tailored Self regulation 193
IX GERMAN ELECTRICITY: COMBINING STATE AND SELF REGULATION. 195
IX.1 Innovation I: Mixed Enterprises 196
IX.1.1 Explosive Growth 196
IX.1.2 HugoStinnes' Vision: Mixed Enterprises 199
IX.1.3 Political Feedback: 'Electro wars' 202
IX.2 Innovation II: Light handed Regulation 203
IX.2.1 Self regulation of Competition: Demarcation Contracts 204
IX.2.2 Self regulation of Interconnection: Trade Associations 204
IX.2.3 Self regulation between Users and Providers: Long term Contracts 206
IX.2.4 Backup by Light handed Regulation 207
IX.2.5 Industry Structure in the Second Half of the 20°" Century. 209
IX.3 Innovation III: The Associations' Agreement 211
IX.3.1 Born out of Necessity: The Associations' Agreement 211
IX. 3.2 The Congenital Defect: Non binding and Limited Legitimation 216
IX.3.3 The New Energy Industry Act and the Associations' Agreement 1 21H
IX.3.3.1 Key Elements of the New Act and the Associations' Agreement 218
IX.3.3.2 A Positive Sum Game: Rents for Users, Providers and the State 221
IX.3.3.3 Problems: The Providers' Commitment, Structural Reasons and Entry Strategy . 230
IX.3.4 Evolutionary Development of the Associations' Agreement 23K
IX.3.4.1 Providers' Trade Associations: Making Commitments Credible 238
IX.3.4.2 Users' Trade Associations: Increasing Bargaining Power without Undermining
Legitimation 241
IX.3.4.3 Department of Commerce: Management by Delegation 243
IX.3.4.4 The Cartel Authorities: Management by Intervention 246
IX.3.4.5 Changes through AA II and AA II Plus 252
IX.3.5 Unraveling the Bargain 255
IX.3.5.1 What Is the Bargain? 256
IX.3.5.2 First Step toward Unraveling: Some Providers Do Not Stick to the Associations'
Agreement 257
IX.3.5.3 The Second Step toward Unraveling: Users Call for the Federal Cartel Authority. 260
X tari F OF CONTENTS
IX.3.5.4 The Third Step toward Unraveling: Providers Demand a Legally binding
Associations' Agreement 261
IX.3.5.5 Problems with the Gas Associations' Agreement and with the EU 263
IX.3.5.6 The EnWG Amendment Fails 264
IX.4 Ways out of the Deadlock 266
IX.4.1 Reasons for Failure: Congenital Defects Not Addressed 267
IX.4.2 Reform Proposal 268
IX.4.3 Additional Problems Ahead 274
IX.4.3.1 Lacking Incentives to Realize Efficiency Gains 274
IX.4.3.2 Inefficiencies Ahead 279
IX.5 Complements, Not Substitutes 284
X MANY OPPORTUNITIES, BUT NO WONDER CURE 285
X. 1 The Providers' Challenge: Commitment and Flexibility 286
X.2 The Tightrope Act of Self regulation: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility29 1
X.3 Homogeneity and Few Stakeholders as Key Success Factors 294
X.4 Influence of Providers on the Regulatory Framework 296
X.5 Stability of Self regulation 299
X.6 Self regulation: Not Only in the Interest of Providers? 301
RFFFRFNCES 304
EXHIBITS XIII
EXHIBITS
Exhibit II—1 r Division of Gains 11
Exhibit II 2: Payoffs for Utility and Railroad 12
Exhibit II 3: Payoff after Commitment 14
Exhibit II 4: Overview of Commitment Mechanisms 20
Exhibit II 5: Gas Concession Contracts in 19* Century Germany 28
Exhibit II 6: Flexibility Mechanisms 32
Exhibit II 7: Business and Political Feedback 40
Exhibit II 8: The Provider's Challenge 42
Exhibit III— 1: Types of Self regulation 69
Exhibit III 2: Commitment and Flexibility of the Three Generic Regulatory Frameworks 69
Exhibit IV 1: Telephone Growth, 1877 1929 77
Exhibit IV 2: Growth of Bell's Real Cost and Revenue per Phone, 1885 1960 78
Exhibit IV 3: Interconnection between Bell / Independents, 1894 1929 80
Exhibit 1V 4: Lost Interconnections, 1894 1929 81
Exhibit V l: Western Union Net Income and Return on Sales (ROS), 1866 1913 100
Exhibit V 2: Telegraph Messages and Average Price per Message, 1866 1910 103
Exhibit V 3: Percentage Changes in Average Revenue per Message and Number of Messages 104
Exhibit VI 1: Railroad Track, 1830 1920 117
Exhibit VI 2: Track in Receivership 130
Exhibit VI 3: Productivity Increases after Deregulation 136
Exhibit VII 1: Telephone and Internet Architecture 140
Exhibit VII 2: Internet Traffic Growth and Backbone Upgrades 147
Exhibit VII 3: Market Share of Internet Backbone Providers 150
Exhibit VIM: Hot Potato Routing 157
Exhibit VII 5: Cutting Interconnection Decision (All Providers of Equal Size) 159
Exhibit VII 6: Cutting Interconnection Decision (Providers of Different Size) 160
Exhibit VI1 7: Capacity Expansion Plans 163
Exhibit VII 8: Price Changes for Bandwidth on the London New York Route
since 1999 as a % 164
Exhibit VII 9: Revenue Growth Rates of IBPs 165
Exhibit VII 10:EBIDTA Margin, 1997 2001 166
Exhibit VII 11: Depreciation and Interest as a % of Revenues of Pure Players 166
Exhibit VII 12: Net Losses 167
Exhibit VII 13: Profitability of IBP and Other Business of CW 167
Exhibit VII 14: Profitabibility of IBP and Other Business of Qwest 168
Exhibit VII 15: EBITDA Margin Integrated Telephone Companies 168
Exhibit VII 16: Bankruptcy Prices 169
Exhibit VII 17: Capital Expenditure, 1997 2001 170
Exhibit VII 18: Stock Prices, 1997 2002 171
Xjy F.XHIBITS
Exhibit VIII 1: Private and Municipal Gas Companies, 1829 1894 184
Exhibit VIII 2: Structure of the German Gas Industry in 1995 186
Exhibit VIII 3: Non Gas Costs in 1992 in Several European Countries 191
Exhibit VIII 4: Breakdown of Non Gas Costs 1994, Large European Gas Companies 192
Exhibit IX 1: Growth of the German Electricity Industry 196
Exhibit IX 2: Ownership of Electricity Utilities 197
Exhibit IX 3: Electricity Consumption 198
Exhibit IX 4: Share of Mixed Enterprises in the Electricity Industry in 1997 202
Exhibit IX 5: The Institutional Framework before 1998 208
Exhibit IX 6: Light handed Regulation 209
Exhibit IX 7: Structure of the German Electricity Industry in 1994 210
Exhibit 1X 8: Minimum Market Opening Requirements in the Electricity Directive 213
Exhibit IX 9: Comparison between EnWG 1935 and EnWG 1998 219
Exhibit IX 10: Key Content of Associations' Agreements I 220
Exhibit IX 11: Electricity Price Changes since Deregulation (Industrial / Residential) 222
Exhibit IX 12: Revenue Effects of Liberalization 223
Exhibit IX 13: EU wide Comparison of Overall Price Changes since 1998 224
Exhibit IX 14: Price Changes for Subgroups 224
Exhibit IX 15: Price Developments in different Customer Groups 225
Exhibit IX 16: Employment Development in the Electricity Industry 226
Exhibit IX 17: Generation Capacity and Utilization, 1994 2000 226
Exhibit IX 18: Profitability before and after Liberalization 228
Exhibit IX 19: Rent Increases for Users, the State and Providers between 1996 and 2001 229
Exhibit 1X 20: Switching Rates of Residential and Industrial Users 230
Exhibit IX 21: Barriers to Entry for Competitors 233
Exhibit IX 22: Price Structure for Different Customer Segments 234
Exhibit IX 23: Network Access Fees by Different Network Operators in 2001 236
Exhibit IX 24: Influence of FCA Investigations on Network Access Fees 249
Exhibit IX 25: Effect on Low Voltage Fees 250
Exhibit IX 26: Effect on Medium Voltage Fees 251
Exhibit IX 27: Effect on High Voltage Fees 251
Exhibit IX 28: Development ofthe Associations' Agreements 253
Exhibit IX 29: Segment Profitability of Municipal Utilities between 1999 and 2001 259
Exhibit 1X 30: Income Implications ofthe Federal Cartel Authority's Decision for TEAG 262
Exhibit IX 31: Proposal for a New Regulatory System 271
Exhibit IX 32: Development of Network Access Fees over Time 276
Exhibit 1X 33: Relationship between the Relative Fee Level and Fee Changes 277
Exhibit IX 34: Total Changes in Network Access Fees in the Sample 278
Exhibit IX 35: Decreasing Reserve Margins Worldwide 281 |
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| author | Meier, Christoph |
| author_facet | Meier, Christoph |
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| building | Verbundindex |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. Aufl. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV021548751 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:30:48Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:38:22Z |
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| spelling | Meier, Christoph Verfasser aut The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries Christoph Meier 1. Aufl. Lohmar [u.a.] Eul 2005 XIV, 332 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zugl.: Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Kath. Univ., Diss., 2004 Private Infrastrukturinvestition / Selbstverpflichtung / Regulierung / Verhandlungstheorie / Telekommunikation / Schienenverkehr / Internet / Gaswirtschaft / Elektrizitätswirtschaft / Theorie / USA / Deutschland Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd rswk-swf Selbstregulation (DE-588)4236708-6 gnd rswk-swf Infrastrukturleistung (DE-588)4516519-1 gnd rswk-swf Regulierung (DE-588)4201190-5 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 g Infrastrukturleistung (DE-588)4516519-1 s Regulierung (DE-588)4201190-5 s Selbstregulation (DE-588)4236708-6 s Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014764858&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Meier, Christoph The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries Private Infrastrukturinvestition / Selbstverpflichtung / Regulierung / Verhandlungstheorie / Telekommunikation / Schienenverkehr / Internet / Gaswirtschaft / Elektrizitätswirtschaft / Theorie / USA / Deutschland Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Selbstregulation (DE-588)4236708-6 gnd Infrastrukturleistung (DE-588)4516519-1 gnd Regulierung (DE-588)4201190-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4027208-4 (DE-588)4236708-6 (DE-588)4516519-1 (DE-588)4201190-5 (DE-588)4011882-4 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries |
| title_auth | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries |
| title_exact_search | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries |
| title_full | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries Christoph Meier |
| title_fullStr | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries Christoph Meier |
| title_full_unstemmed | The overlooked option self-regulation in infrastructure industries Christoph Meier |
| title_short | The overlooked option |
| title_sort | the overlooked option self regulation in infrastructure industries |
| title_sub | self-regulation in infrastructure industries |
| topic | Private Infrastrukturinvestition / Selbstverpflichtung / Regulierung / Verhandlungstheorie / Telekommunikation / Schienenverkehr / Internet / Gaswirtschaft / Elektrizitätswirtschaft / Theorie / USA / Deutschland Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Selbstregulation (DE-588)4236708-6 gnd Infrastrukturleistung (DE-588)4516519-1 gnd Regulierung (DE-588)4201190-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Private Infrastrukturinvestition / Selbstverpflichtung / Regulierung / Verhandlungstheorie / Telekommunikation / Schienenverkehr / Internet / Gaswirtschaft / Elektrizitätswirtschaft / Theorie / USA / Deutschland Institutionenökonomie Selbstregulation Infrastrukturleistung Regulierung Deutschland USA Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014764858&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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