Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta: 1941 - 1945. 2 Srbija pod okupacijom
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| Beschreibung: | 563 S. Ill. |
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| adam_text | Историм Равногорског покрета II
националне части” Комиоца )е доставл ала Управи народних добара и захтеве
за привремену државну управу (секвестраци] у) имовине „народних непри] ател։а’.’
Суд части ]е радио само на територии Срби|е, а казнена политика била )е неу-
поредиво оштри^а у односу на друге делове Іугослави^е. Осуду на временску или
смртну казну пратило ¡е и одузимаше имовине како би се постелено елимини-
сала приватна сво)ина и да би о]ачао соци)алистички сектор у привреди.
Поражени у српском граБанском рату имали су злехуду судбину. После
надирагьа Црвене арми^е и победоносног партизанског похода веЬина бораца
)ВУО повукла се у Босну, где }е доживела сво^у голготу и коначно распеБе.
Ништа бол е нису прошли ни они ко;и су остали. Іедан од начина спасавагьа
главе био )е и одазив на мобилизаци)у ко]у ]е спроводила нова власт.
Мобилисани ро) алисти третирани су више као затвореници него као во^ка.
Изложени подозрешу, увек су били слабо наоружани и бацани у надеже битке.
Морали су да иду напред, да буду рагьавани и да гину. Милости ни]е било.
Многи од гьих оставили су сво]е кости на западу }угослави)е. Ретки по)единци
отишли су преко границе, у беспуЬе емиграцгце и горчину живота у туБини.
Ро)алистички покрет доживео )е пораз у Другом светском рату, али )е то био
и пораз друштва ко)е )е он бранио. Пет )е кл учних дугорочних последица тог
пораза за послератну историку српског народа: 1) губитак династіє и монар-
хистичког система власти - изгубл ена ;е изворна народна династи]а; 2) Српска
православна црква изгубила )е сво) утица] на државу и друштво; 3) Срби^а )е
сведена на територи] у од пре балканских ратова; 4) структура )угословенске
арми)е радикално се променила: ЩУО )е наставл ала традиціє српске войске од
пре Првог светског рата и н ен пораз означио )е краі ]едне епохе; 5) Срби су
изгубили могуБност равноправног учешЬа у политици нове државе. Све што се
касни)с догаБало било )е само логичан исход ¡едне погрешене политике.
Уз генерала МихаиловиБа све до последнее битке остали су у на|веБем
бро)у ро^алисти из централне Срби^е. Многи од гьих остали су у земл и и
одмах су проглашени за народне непри]ател е. Изгубили су граБанска права
и више од пола века носили су хипотеку националне издаде. У два велика
судска процеса (1945. и 1946) многи ро]алистички прваци осуБени су на дуго-
годиипье затворске казне, ко)е су издржавали у Сремско) Митровици. Све
до почетка 50-их година прошлог века деца „народних непри)ател а” могла
су да завршаваіу само основну школу. У послератно) Іугослави]и „четници”
и генерал МихаиловиБ непрестано су били на идеолошком удару кому՜
нистичке власти, чи)и )е цил био да избрише сеЬаше на н их и сваки траг о
гьиховоі делатности. На)више )е на удару био сам генерал МихаиловиБ. Он
}е био персонивикаци^а националне иде)е српског народа и било каквог
националног рада и као такав био ]е мета свих напада. Али, та акциза се
показала као неуспешна и време ]е показало ко ]е био у праву.
534
SUMMARY
The History of Ravna Gora Movement
The development of the Ravna Gora movement during the Second World War
was marked by a number of contradictions. From a small group of officers and
soldiers who gathered on Ravna Gora on 11 May, 1941, a resistance movement
developed, which in time came to symbolize the Serbian peoples struggle for
national rights. The appearance of General Mihailovic and his men was met with
enthusiasm in the „free world” as the first sign of resistance in occupied Europe.
Praised and glorified at first, the general and his men would be rejected towards
the end of the war and branded as traitors of their people. The Movement consisted
of soldiers of the former Yugoslav army and of civilians bound to a common cause
by patriotic sentiments. As a result, the course of the entire Movement was often
determined by nationalistic zeal rather than by rational decisions, and its members
relied more on „divine justice” than on any realistic assessment of the situation.
The Yugoslav army in fatherland was a Serbian anti-fascist organization based
on royalist sentiments, which caused the greatest perplexity in Yugoslav post-war
historiography. Despite indisputable evidence to the contrary the Yugoslav Army were
described as having collaborated with the Axis powers. The Movements concept of
defense was based on assessments of German military strength, while their military
strategy, inherited from the former Yugoslav army and involving the conscription of
recruits and military drills, involved forming an army intended as a striking force to
be used in a prospective general uprising against the foreign enemy. This concept of
defense was primarily meant to avoid heavy losses among the Serbian population.
The fighters who represented the core of the illegal organization were supposed to
rouse the fighting spirit among the people, and to perform minor diversions and acts
of sabotage useful for the common Allied cause without provoking German reprisals.
Their instructions were to obstruct traffic along the Belgrade-Nis-Sofia-Salonica
railroad line, of vital importance for the German forces, and to prevent the collection
of food and shipment abroad of Serbian national wealth. In addition to this, the
Movement’s fighters were supposed to protect the population against looting and to
serve as a constant threat to German and quisling forces.
The defense strategy of the resistance movement was based on the military
heritage deriving from the Serbian people’s struggle for freedom in the 19th
535
WCTOPMJA PABHOrOPCKOT ilOKPETA II
century, which consisted of two alternative approaches, either charging against
the enemy or adapting to given circumstances. In 1941 Mihailovic employed the
first heroic tactic. This revolt was not only defeated as a result of the greater
strength of the German forces but was also followed by terrible reprisals. The
resistance movement then employed the other strategy of waiting for a more
favorable opportunity, using this time to expand and strengthen their organization
while reducing open activity to a minimum in order to preserve their army and
the civil population. The former, unsuccessful revolt had been provoked by the
appearance of a second anti-fascist movement whose leaders insisted on the
necessity of open defiance at all costs. In the summer of 1941 a premature revolt
was organized which did not cause serious losses to the German army
(approximately 200 German soldiers were killed and 400 were wounded).
Nevertheless, this act of rebellion provoked great devastation and massive reprisals
against the civil population (about 4.000 rebels were killed fighting and 35.000
hostages were shot) from the beginning of September until the end of December.
Three decisive factors influenced the formation and development of the
resistance movement. The first of these was the quick and inglorious defeat of
the Yugoslav Army in April 1941. The second, the appearance of the Communists
and their desire to destroy the old world and to build a new one, a world they
did not wish to base on old traditions, but on an illusory proletarian equality
that was to be established among the Yugoslav peoples. The third factor were
the German reprisals and genocide performed over the Serbian population
threatened with total annihilation. The civil war which broke out during the
revolt increased the discord between the country s internal forces, decided the
further course of the war in Serbia and Yugoslavia, and left lasting consequences
that proved impossible to heal. The events of that autumn in 1941. plunged the
two resistance movements into an insuperable mutual antagonism from which
they emerged as bitter opponents, more intent on destroying each other than
on fighting the common enemy.
The Second World War involved the conflict of three different ideologies -
bourgeois democracy, fascism and communism ֊ and differed in this respect from
the war that broke out in 1914 and was nationalistic in character. This ideological
triangle led to various shifts of position, views, and sides in the war of each warring
party. In the course of the war the West made concessions to Hider and encouraged
his aggression against the Soviet Union, while Stalin signed a treaty with Hitler
against Western interests before the anti-fascist coalition was finally formed. Serbia
with its historical heritage and general mentality could not escape being torn by
similar ideological conflicts. The ideological discord was deepened by religious
differences between the various peoples of Yugoslavia and by the genocide
performed over the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia. Together these
factors hampered the resistance against fascism; an example of this was the conflict
between the Cetniks and „the volunteers” which became more important for the
536
Summary
former than fighting the Germans. There is no doubt, however, that the gravest
consequences were caused by the conflict between the Cetniks and the Partizāns.
The Yugoslav army in fatherland was popular in character, both in regard to
its objectives and the tradition whence it derived and because it was a movement
which addressed the ordinary people. Contrary to the widespread historiographic
stereotype depicting Mihailovič as the defender of the pre-war class system stands
the fact that the vast majority of Yugoslav army members were peasants of modest
means, petty craftsmen, and laborers. In fact, the members of those classes that
had the greatest interest in fighting the communists usually remained passive or
supported M. Nedic, they occasionally assisted the Cetniks, and did not exclude
even cooperation with the Partizāns. Often children from the wealthiest homes
joined the Partizāns or took active part in Partizan propaganda in towns.
Prosperous farmers from Srem who joined the ranks of the Partizāns showed
no qualms about fighting against the poor of Herzegovina and Montenegro. The
Yugoslav army was mostly made up of peasants who had joined the army as
volunteers, and had the general traits of a defense militia organized according to
the territorial principle. It was difficult to motivate these soldiers for action
outside their immediate environment, away from their homes, farms and villages.
They often said that if they had to die they wanted those who remained behind
to know at least where their graves were located. Armies such as this are often
characterized by anarchy and poor discipline, which corresponds to the general
Serbian attitude to warfare. The actions of the Yugoslav army in fatherland,
however, often exceeded „admissible” limits when led by commanders who
seemed to have emerged from the dark corners of Balkan history and to be
directly influenced by the terrible heritage of the Turkish dominion. Nevertheless,
apart from Craiova’s Polish army the Yugoslav army in fatherland was the most
powerful non-communist army in occupied Europe, far ahead of organizations
such as the one led by Colonel Napoleon Zervas in Greece. The Yugoslav army
in fatherland was the last defense of the old Serbian society, the last gleam of past
glory, condemned to defeat just like the world it was trying to salvage.
The members of the Yugoslav army in fatherland were also attracted to the
illusion of uniting the various people of Yugoslavia. The contemplation of Yugoslav
unity was prompted by the state of international relations at the time and from
a specific national feeling that Serbia had invested too much in Yugoslavia’s
creation, its sovereignty, its glorious traditions and history, and its victorious
army, to abandon the idea easily. Consequently, the united Yugoslav state was
considered worth keeping, provided the supremacy of the Serbs and their federal
unity was ensured in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. The idea was that the
constitution of Serbian territory into a single federal unit would help prevent the
repetition of past mistakes, and that it would act as a safeguard against renewed
genocide of the Serbs, a factor particularly affecting national policy. Obviously
these ideas were quite unacceptable both for some members of the international
537
MCTOPHJA PABHOTOPCKOr flOKPETA II
community and for those peoples who had gained their national affirmation
through the program of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
The primary idea of the people s revolution was the building of a new state,
which would protect the rights of the poorest and least able segments of society.
In this social state the power of the political and financial oligarchy would be stricdy
outlined and limited, including the restriction of private capital. Issues such as
morality and family were considered the basis of a sound society and held an
important place in this program of reform, as did the concept of rural life, viewed
as the heart and soul of Serbian society. Despite its specific character the program
of the Ravna Gora Movement was closest to social-democratic concepts. Along
with the reform of society this program proposed various changes in the organization
of the state. Yugoslavia was to remain a monarchy, but one based on new, federal
principles. The country would be divided into three federal units - the Serbian,
Croatian, and the Slovenian. The greatest part of Bosnia and Herzegovina would
acquire substantial religious and political freedom to establish cultural and religious
ties with Islamic countries. The delineation of borders between the Serbian and
Croatian units would be done after the war, and was envisioned as possibly including
the mutual exchange of citizens. The idea of establishing collective responsibility
was still under consideration as a possible solution to the question of Albanian and
German ethnic minority groups. Each federal unit was conceived as having its own
federal assembly and significant political autonomy within the federation. The
federal assembly would have two governing bodies, consisting of elected and
delegated representatives. Besides the Crown other shared institutions would be
the army, the ministry of transportation, foreign and financial policy, together
indicating an almost confederate concept of government.
The Second World War caused both the making and the unmaking of the
Yugoslav army in fatherland. In the autumn of 1944 she defeated in Serbia. The
outcome of the civil war had been decided by the arrival of the Red Army. General
Mihailovic withdrew with the majority of his forces to Bosnia in an unrealistic hope
that the ideological conflict between the West and the Soviets might bring certain
changes. The Yugoslav army in fatherland, which had been the initiator of armed
resistance against the occupying forces ended up defeated, sharing the fate of their
German foes that had been intent on destroying them during the war.
The system of government established in Serbia after 1944 had ambitious
plans for solving the most essential problems of human existence, presuming even
to play the role of a new religion, which would find the „just” solution to the
people s greatest problem, that of poverty. The new regime proposed to „free” the
people of the restrictions imposed by nature and duty, and to relieve them of all
suffering. The Yugoslav communists did not wish only to solve the country s social
problems, but to create a comprehensive religious teaching, which would provide
explanations eve regarding such questions as the meaning of life and the purpose
of history. They preached their communist morality, created their own communist
538
Summary
science and art, and they subjected every sphere of life to the economic imperative.
The communists insisted that theirs was a unique view of life, the view that the
socialist world would be a world reborn and that the new society would represent
a process transcending history (or marking the beginning of a new history).
The new apostles had no mercy for the individual ֊ the individual was not
an end by merely the means for creating the proletarian „heaven”. The individual
could be oppressed in every way and stripped of all rights in the name of the
ultimate objectives of socialism. Berdyaiev had warned long before: „Uniformity
and some sort of abstract mediocre values shall reign”. The new socialist religion
simplified all social relations to an extreme - what had existed before the
revolution had been evil (capitalism). The culture of past ages was presented as
resting on economic exploitation of the working man and history before the
revolution as consisting entirely of class struggle. After the revolution the world
was supposedly transformed, exploitation was wiped out and replaced by truth
and eternal justice. The birth of socialism was not referred to as a simple historical
fact - it was represented as something exceptional and unique, a sort of mystical
transformation in the very foundations of history.
The socialist religion resolutely denied the past and a constructive mode of
thinking was not highly valued, on the contrary, the dignity of the model revolutionary
depended on the distance of opponents he could persecute, his strength was measured
by the force of his hatred for „the evil” and not by the power of his love for what was
good, except in the materialistic sense. Morality was founded on negative merits - the
elimination of „the evil” that had reigned in the past. A person was not accepted for
his individual qualities independently of social circumstances. The proletarian was
idealized, he was depicted as being the driving force of the future, the ultimate
criterion for determining truth. Equality between men was interpreted as meaning
uniformity of the masses. Physical labor acquired a cult-like significance: all of life’s
values were subjected to economic production. Social status could only be acquired
through direct participation in production, while the value of intellectual work and
the quality of work in general became less important.
The defeat of the Yugoslav army in fatherland had five long-term effects on
Serbian postwar history: 1) The loss of the monarchy and the monarchic system
of government - The original, national dynasty was abolished and was replaced
by the government of an individual of Croat nationality; 2) The influence of the
Serbian Orthodox Church on the government and the society became practically
nonexistent ֊ The Serbs became an atheist and godless people; 3) Serbian territory
was reduced to the area preceding the Balkan Wars; 4) The structure of the
Yugoslav army was radically changed - The army led by Mihailovic had maintained
the traditions established in the Serbian army before the First World War, and
the defeat of his army marked the end of an era; 5) The Serbs lost the right of
participating on equal terms in the politics of the new state. The ensuing events
came as the logical outcome of a misguided policy.
539
Садржа]
I, ІУГОСЛОВЕНСКА BOJCKA У ОТАЦБИНИ 1942-1944..........................7
1. Нова BojHa организаци)а..................................... 11
2. ,,Haj6oA։Mx - увек je наемаше”.................................34
3. Іугословенска равногорска омладина.............................97
II. ПРОТИВ НЕМАЧКЕ BOJCKE......................................... 117
1. „Легализацій”.................................................122
2. Отпор и жртве.................................................126
3. Мисика Хермана Hoj6axepa......................................159
III. СРПСКЕ ДЕ0БЕ 1942-1943. ...................................... 175
1. Против „издаіника и са лева и са десна”......................177
2. Колабораци)а у Срби^и........................................180
3. „Смрт фашизму и комунизму”...................................192
4. „Искорен иван е комунизма” у Србгци..........................221
IV. КОМУНИСТИЧКА ИДИ МОНАРХИСТИЧКАМОСЛАВША?....................231
1. Револуци)а................................................233
2. Светосавски конгрес.......................................241
3. У интересно^ сфери Сов^етског Савеза......................253
4. САД и гра!)ански рат у Србиі и............................290
V. БИТКА ЗА СРБШУ1944.........................
1. Пролеѣна офанзива HOBJ..................
2. „Непри|ател и и савезници”..............
3. „Борба je била крвава, на живот и смрт”.
4. Оча^ници................................
5. Изгон...................................
6. Мисика „Halyard” (Ваздушни мост)........
7. Мисика Роберта Мекдауела................
8. Црвена арми;а у Срби^и..................
309
316
323
346
363
370
388
392
399
9. „Реакционарна Cp buja”.
10. Жртвовани савезник...
... .421
... .429
¥1 СЛОМ 1945, .................................................. 441
1. На путу без повратка.......................................444
2. У Словенцу или у CpÖHjy?...................................458
3. Bojaca живих костура.......................................469
Vii. КОМУ НИЗАМ У СРБИІИ..................
1. Репресира и „народна демократка”
2. Федерата у федерацій.............
3. CpÔHja у ново) іугославиіи.......
483
486
494
507
|
| adam_txt |
Историм Равногорског покрета II
националне части” Комиоца )е доставл ала Управи народних добара и захтеве
за привремену државну управу (секвестраци]'у) имовине „народних непри]'ател։а’.’
Суд части ]е радио само на територии Срби|е, а казнена политика била )е неу-
поредиво оштри^а у односу на друге делове Іугослави^е. Осуду на временску или
смртну казну пратило ¡е и одузимаше имовине како би се постелено елимини-
сала приватна сво)ина и да би о]ачао соци)алистички сектор у привреди.
Поражени у српском граБанском рату имали су злехуду судбину. После
надирагьа Црвене арми^е и победоносног партизанског похода веЬина бораца
)ВУО повукла се у Босну, где }е доживела сво^у голготу и коначно распеБе.
Ништа бол е нису прошли ни они ко;и су остали. Іедан од начина спасавагьа
главе био )е и одазив на мобилизаци)у ко]у ]е спроводила нова власт.
Мобилисани ро)'алисти третирани су више као затвореници него као во^ка.
Изложени подозрешу, увек су били слабо наоружани и бацани у надеже битке.
Морали су да иду напред, да буду рагьавани и да гину. Милости ни]е било.
Многи од гьих оставили су сво]е кости на западу }угослави)е. Ретки по)единци
отишли су преко границе, у беспуЬе емиграцгце и горчину живота у туБини.
Ро)алистички покрет доживео )е пораз у Другом светском рату, али )е то био
и пораз друштва ко)е )е он бранио. Пет )е кл учних дугорочних последица тог
пораза за послератну историку српског народа: 1) губитак династіє и монар-
хистичког система власти - изгубл ена ;е изворна народна династи]а; 2) Српска
православна црква изгубила )е сво) утица] на државу и друштво; 3) Срби^а )е
сведена на територи]'у од пре балканских ратова; 4) структура )угословенске
арми)е радикално се променила: ЩУО )е наставл ала традиціє српске войске од
пре Првог светског рата и н ен пораз означио )е краі ]едне епохе; 5) Срби су
изгубили могуБност равноправног учешЬа у политици нове државе. Све што се
касни)с догаБало било )е само логичан исход ¡едне погрешене политике.
Уз генерала МихаиловиБа све до последнее битке остали су у на|веБем
бро)у ро^алисти из централне Срби^е. Многи од гьих остали су у земл и и
одмах су проглашени за народне непри]ател е. Изгубили су граБанска права
и више од пола века носили су хипотеку националне издаде. У два велика
судска процеса (1945. и 1946) многи ро]алистички прваци осуБени су на дуго-
годиипье затворске казне, ко)е су издржавали у Сремско) Митровици. Све
до почетка 50-их година прошлог века деца „народних непри)ател а” могла
су да завршаваіу само основну школу. У послератно) Іугослави]и „четници”
и генерал МихаиловиБ непрестано су били на идеолошком удару кому՜
нистичке власти, чи)и )е цил био да избрише сеЬаше на н их и сваки траг о
гьиховоі делатности. На)више )е на удару био сам генерал МихаиловиБ. Он
}е био персонивикаци^а националне иде)е српског народа и било каквог
националног рада и као такав био ]е мета свих напада. Али, та акциза се
показала као неуспешна и време ]е показало ко ]е био у праву.
534
SUMMARY
The History of Ravna Gora Movement
The development of the Ravna Gora movement during the Second World War
was marked by a number of contradictions. From a small group of officers and
soldiers who gathered on Ravna Gora on 11 May, 1941, a resistance movement
developed, which in time came to symbolize the Serbian peoples struggle for
national rights. The appearance of General Mihailovic and his men was met with
enthusiasm in the „free world” as the first sign of resistance in occupied Europe.
Praised and glorified at first, the general and his men would be rejected towards
the end of the war and branded as traitors of their people. The Movement consisted
of soldiers of the former Yugoslav army and of civilians bound to a common cause
by patriotic sentiments. As a result, the course of the entire Movement was often
determined by nationalistic zeal rather than by rational decisions, and its members
relied more on „divine justice” than on any realistic assessment of the situation.
The Yugoslav army in fatherland was a Serbian anti-fascist organization based
on royalist sentiments, which caused the greatest perplexity in Yugoslav post-war
historiography. Despite indisputable evidence to the contrary the Yugoslav Army were
described as having collaborated with the Axis powers. The Movements concept of
defense was based on assessments of German military strength, while their military
strategy, inherited from the former Yugoslav army and involving the conscription of
recruits and military drills, involved forming an army intended as a striking force to
be used in a prospective general uprising against the foreign enemy. This concept of
defense was primarily meant to avoid heavy losses among the Serbian population.
The fighters who represented the core of the illegal organization were supposed to
rouse the fighting spirit among the people, and to perform minor diversions and acts
of sabotage useful for the common Allied cause without provoking German reprisals.
Their instructions were to obstruct traffic along the Belgrade-Nis-Sofia-Salonica
railroad line, of vital importance for the German forces, and to prevent the collection
of food and shipment abroad of Serbian national wealth. In addition to this, the
Movement’s fighters were supposed to protect the population against looting and to
serve as a constant threat to German and quisling forces.
The defense strategy of the resistance movement was based on the military
heritage deriving from the Serbian people’s struggle for freedom in the 19th
535
WCTOPMJA PABHOrOPCKOT ilOKPETA II
century, which consisted of two alternative approaches, either charging against
the enemy or adapting to given circumstances. In 1941 Mihailovic employed the
first heroic tactic. This revolt was not only defeated as a result of the greater
strength of the German forces but was also followed by terrible reprisals. The
resistance movement then employed the other strategy of waiting for a more
favorable opportunity, using this time to expand and strengthen their organization
while reducing open activity to a minimum in order to preserve their army and
the civil population. The former, unsuccessful revolt had been provoked by the
appearance of a second anti-fascist movement whose leaders insisted on the
necessity of open defiance at all costs. In the summer of 1941 a premature revolt
was organized which did not cause serious losses to the German army
(approximately 200 German soldiers were killed and 400 were wounded).
Nevertheless, this act of rebellion provoked great devastation and massive reprisals
against the civil population (about 4.000 rebels were killed fighting and 35.000
hostages were shot) from the beginning of September until the end of December.
Three decisive factors influenced the formation and development of the
resistance movement. The first of these was the quick and inglorious defeat of
the Yugoslav Army in April 1941. The second, the appearance of the Communists
and their desire to destroy the old world and to build a new one, a world they
did not wish to base on old traditions, but on an illusory proletarian equality
that was to be established among the Yugoslav peoples. The third factor were
the German reprisals and genocide performed over the Serbian population
threatened with total annihilation. The civil war which broke out during the
revolt increased the discord between the country's internal forces, decided the
further course of the war in Serbia and Yugoslavia, and left lasting consequences
that proved impossible to heal. The events of that autumn in 1941. plunged the
two resistance movements into an insuperable mutual antagonism from which
they emerged as bitter opponents, more intent on destroying each other than
on fighting the common enemy.
The Second World War involved the conflict of three different ideologies -
bourgeois democracy, fascism and communism ֊ and differed in this respect from
the war that broke out in 1914 and was nationalistic in character. This ideological
triangle led to various shifts of position, views, and sides in the war of each warring
party. In the course of the war the West made concessions to Hider and encouraged
his aggression against the Soviet Union, while Stalin signed a treaty with Hitler
against Western interests before the anti-fascist coalition was finally formed. Serbia
with its historical heritage and general mentality could not escape being torn by
similar ideological conflicts. The ideological discord was deepened by religious
differences between the various peoples of Yugoslavia and by the genocide
performed over the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia. Together these
factors hampered the resistance against fascism; an example of this was the conflict
between the Cetniks and „the volunteers” which became more important for the
536
Summary
former than fighting the Germans. There is no doubt, however, that the gravest
consequences were caused by the conflict between the Cetniks and the Partizāns.
The Yugoslav army in fatherland was popular in character, both in regard to
its objectives and the tradition whence it derived and because it was a movement
which addressed the ordinary people. Contrary to the widespread historiographic
stereotype depicting Mihailovič as the defender of the pre-war class system stands
the fact that the vast majority of Yugoslav army members were peasants of modest
means, petty craftsmen, and laborers. In fact, the members of those classes that
had the greatest interest in fighting the communists usually remained passive or
supported M. Nedic, they occasionally assisted the Cetniks, and did not exclude
even cooperation with the Partizāns. Often children from the wealthiest homes
joined the Partizāns or took active part in Partizan propaganda in towns.
Prosperous farmers from Srem who joined the ranks of the Partizāns showed
no qualms about fighting against the poor of Herzegovina and Montenegro. The
Yugoslav army was mostly made up of peasants who had joined the army as
volunteers, and had the general traits of a defense militia organized according to
the territorial principle. It was difficult to motivate these soldiers for action
outside their immediate environment, away from their homes, farms and villages.
They often said that if they had to die they wanted those who remained behind
to know at least where their graves were located. Armies such as this are often
characterized by anarchy and poor discipline, which corresponds to the general
Serbian attitude to warfare. The actions of the Yugoslav army in fatherland,
however, often exceeded „admissible” limits when led by commanders who
seemed to have emerged from the dark corners of Balkan history and to be
directly influenced by the terrible heritage of the Turkish dominion. Nevertheless,
apart from Craiova’s Polish army the Yugoslav army in fatherland was the most
powerful non-communist army in occupied Europe, far ahead of organizations
such as the one led by Colonel Napoleon Zervas in Greece. The Yugoslav army
in fatherland was the last defense of the old Serbian society, the last gleam of past
glory, condemned to defeat just like the world it was trying to salvage.
The members of the Yugoslav army in fatherland were also attracted to the
illusion of uniting the various people of Yugoslavia. The contemplation of Yugoslav
unity was prompted by the state of international relations at the time and from
a specific national feeling that Serbia had invested too much in Yugoslavia’s
creation, its sovereignty, its glorious traditions and history, and its victorious
army, to abandon the idea easily. Consequently, the united Yugoslav state was
considered worth keeping, provided the supremacy of the Serbs and their federal
unity was ensured in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. The idea was that the
constitution of Serbian territory into a single federal unit would help prevent the
repetition of past mistakes, and that it would act as a safeguard against renewed
genocide of the Serbs, a factor particularly affecting national policy. Obviously
these ideas were quite unacceptable both for some members of the international
537
MCTOPHJA PABHOTOPCKOr flOKPETA II
community and for those peoples who had gained their national affirmation
through the program of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
The primary idea of the people s revolution was the building of a new state,
which would protect the rights of the poorest and least able segments of society.
In this social state the power of the political and financial oligarchy would be stricdy
outlined and limited, including the restriction of private capital. Issues such as
morality and family were considered the basis of a sound society and held an
important place in this program of reform, as did the concept of rural life, viewed
as the heart and soul of Serbian society. Despite its specific character the program
of the Ravna Gora Movement was closest to social-democratic concepts. Along
with the reform of society this program proposed various changes in the organization
of the state. Yugoslavia was to remain a monarchy, but one based on new, federal
principles. The country would be divided into three federal units - the Serbian,
Croatian, and the Slovenian. The greatest part of Bosnia and Herzegovina would
acquire substantial religious and political freedom to establish cultural and religious
ties with Islamic countries. The delineation of borders between the Serbian and
Croatian units would be done after the war, and was envisioned as possibly including
the mutual exchange of citizens. The idea of establishing collective responsibility
was still under consideration as a possible solution to the question of Albanian and
German ethnic minority groups. Each federal unit was conceived as having its own
federal assembly and significant political autonomy within the federation. The
federal assembly would have two governing bodies, consisting of elected and
delegated representatives. Besides the Crown other shared institutions would be
the army, the ministry of transportation, foreign and financial policy, together
indicating an almost confederate concept of government.
The Second World War caused both the making and the unmaking of the
Yugoslav army in fatherland. In the autumn of 1944 she defeated in Serbia. The
outcome of the civil war had been decided by the arrival of the Red Army. General
Mihailovic withdrew with the majority of his forces to Bosnia in an unrealistic hope
that the ideological conflict between the West and the Soviets might bring certain
changes. The Yugoslav army in fatherland, which had been the initiator of armed
resistance against the occupying forces ended up defeated, sharing the fate of their
German foes that had been intent on destroying them during the war.
The system of government established in Serbia after 1944 had ambitious
plans for solving the most essential problems of human existence, presuming even
to play the role of a new religion, which would find the „just” solution to the
people's greatest problem, that of poverty. The new regime proposed to „free” the
people of the restrictions imposed by nature and duty, and to relieve them of all
suffering. The Yugoslav communists did not wish only to solve the country's social
problems, but to create a comprehensive religious teaching, which would provide
explanations eve regarding such questions as the meaning of life and the purpose
of history. They preached their communist morality, created their own communist
538
Summary
science and art, and they subjected every sphere of life to the economic imperative.
The communists insisted that theirs was a unique view of life, the view that the
socialist world would be a world reborn and that the new society would represent
a process transcending history (or marking the beginning of a new history).
The new apostles had no mercy for the individual ֊ the individual was not
an end by merely the means for creating the proletarian „heaven”. The individual
could be oppressed in every way and stripped of all rights in the name of the
ultimate objectives of socialism. Berdyaiev had warned long before: „Uniformity
and some sort of abstract mediocre values shall reign”. The new socialist religion
simplified all social relations to an extreme - what had existed before the
revolution had been evil (capitalism). The culture of past ages was presented as
resting on economic exploitation of the working man and history before the
revolution as consisting entirely of class struggle. After the revolution the world
was supposedly transformed, exploitation was wiped out and replaced by truth
and eternal justice. The birth of socialism was not referred to as a simple historical
fact - it was represented as something exceptional and unique, a sort of mystical
transformation in the very foundations of history.
The socialist religion resolutely denied the past and a constructive mode of
thinking was not highly valued, on the contrary, the dignity of the model revolutionary
depended on the distance of opponents he could persecute, his strength was measured
by the force of his hatred for „the evil” and not by the power of his love for what was
good, except in the materialistic sense. Morality was founded on negative merits - the
elimination of „the evil” that had reigned in the past. A person was not accepted for
his individual qualities independently of social circumstances. The proletarian was
idealized, he was depicted as being the driving force of the future, the ultimate
criterion for determining truth. Equality between men was interpreted as meaning
uniformity of the masses. Physical labor acquired a cult-like significance: all of life’s
values were subjected to economic production. Social status could only be acquired
through direct participation in production, while the value of intellectual work and
the quality of work in general became less important.
The defeat of the Yugoslav army in fatherland had five long-term effects on
Serbian postwar history: 1) The loss of the monarchy and the monarchic system
of government - The original, national dynasty was abolished and was replaced
by the government of an individual of Croat nationality; 2) The influence of the
Serbian Orthodox Church on the government and the society became practically
nonexistent ֊ The Serbs became an atheist and godless people; 3) Serbian territory
was reduced to the area preceding the Balkan Wars; 4) The structure of the
Yugoslav army was radically changed - The army led by Mihailovic had maintained
the traditions established in the Serbian army before the First World War, and
the defeat of his army marked the end of an era; 5) The Serbs lost the right of
participating on equal terms in the politics of the new state. The ensuing events
came as the logical outcome of a misguided policy.
539
Садржа]'
I, ІУГОСЛОВЕНСКА BOJCKA У ОТАЦБИНИ 1942-1944.7
1. Нова BojHa организаци)а. 11
2. ,,Haj6oA։Mx - увек je наемаше”.34
3. Іугословенска равногорска омладина.97
II. ПРОТИВ НЕМАЧКЕ BOJCKE. 117
1. „Легализацій”.122
2. Отпор и жртве.126
3. Мисика Хермана Hoj6axepa.159
III. СРПСКЕ ДЕ0БЕ 1942-1943. . 175
1. Против „издаіника и са лева и са десна”.177
2. Колабораци)а у Срби^и.180
3. „Смрт фашизму и комунизму”.192
4. „Искорен иван е комунизма” у Србгци.221
IV. КОМУНИСТИЧКА ИДИ МОНАРХИСТИЧКАМОСЛАВША?.231
1. Револуци)а.233
2. Светосавски конгрес.241
3. У интересно^ сфери Сов^етског Савеза.253
4. САД и гра!)ански рат у Србиі'и.290
V. БИТКА ЗА СРБШУ1944.
1. Пролеѣна офанзива HOBJ.
2. „Непри|ател и и савезници”.
3. „Борба je била крвава, на живот и смрт”.
4. Оча^ници.
5. Изгон.
6. Мисика „Halyard” (Ваздушни мост).
7. Мисика Роберта Мекдауела.
8. Црвена арми;а у Срби^и.
309
316
323
346
363
370
388
392
399
9. „Реакционарна Cp buja”.
10. Жртвовани савезник.
. .421
. .429
¥1 СЛОМ 1945, . 441
1. На путу без повратка.444
2. У Словенцу или у CpÖHjy?.458
3. Bojaca живих костура.469
Vii. КОМУ НИЗАМ У СРБИІИ.
1. Репресира и „народна демократка”
2. Федерата у федерацій.
3. CpÔHja у ново) іугославиіи.
483
486
494
507 |
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| physical | 563 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateSearch | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | Zavod za udžbenike |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Nikolić, Kosta 1963- Verfasser (DE-588)14087271X aut Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. 2 Srbija pod okupacijom Kosta Nikolić Beograd Zavod za udžbenike 2014 563 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Geschichte 1942-1944 gnd rswk-swf Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd rswk-swf Četnici (DE-588)4147514-8 gnd rswk-swf Besetzung (DE-588)4006020-2 gnd rswk-swf Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 gnd rswk-swf Serbien (DE-588)4054598-2 g Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 s Besetzung (DE-588)4006020-2 s Četnici (DE-588)4147514-8 s Geschichte 1942-1944 z DE-604 (DE-604)BV021536969 2 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014753250&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014753250&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Nikolić, Kosta 1963- Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd Četnici (DE-588)4147514-8 gnd Besetzung (DE-588)4006020-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4079167-1 (DE-588)4147514-8 (DE-588)4006020-2 (DE-588)4054598-2 |
| title | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. |
| title_auth | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. |
| title_exact_search | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. |
| title_full | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. 2 Srbija pod okupacijom Kosta Nikolić |
| title_fullStr | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. 2 Srbija pod okupacijom Kosta Nikolić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 - 1945. 2 Srbija pod okupacijom Kosta Nikolić |
| title_short | Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta |
| title_sort | istorija ravnogorskog pokreta 1941 1945 srbija pod okupacijom |
| title_sub | 1941 - 1945. |
| topic | Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd Četnici (DE-588)4147514-8 gnd Besetzung (DE-588)4006020-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Zweiter Weltkrieg Četnici Besetzung Serbien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014753250&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014753250&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV021536969 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nikolickosta istorijaravnogorskogpokreta194119452 |