Economics for lawyers:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ [u.a.]
Princeton Univ. Press
2005
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 421 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 069112177X 9780691146560 |
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| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton, NJ [u.a.] |b Princeton Univ. Press |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a XIX, 421 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135183519055872 |
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| adam_text | ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS RICHARD A. IPPOLITO PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD CONTENTS INTRODUCTION XV WHAT MAKES THIS BOOK
DIFFERENT XVII RECOMMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY READING XVIII CHAPTER 1 FINDING
THE OPTIMAL USE OF A LIMITED INCOME 1 I. INDIFFERENCE CURVES 1 A. THE
MAIN QUESTION 1 B. INDIFFERENCE CURVES SLOPE DOWNWARD 2 C. OTHER THINGS
TO KNOW ABOUT INDIFFERENCE CURVES 4 II. GAINS FROM TRADE USING THE
EDGEWORTH BOX DIAGRAM 6 A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE BOX 8 B. PARETO SUPERIOR
TRADES 10 C. THE CONTRACT CURVE: PARETO OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS 12 III. THE
BUDGET LINE: THE ESSENCE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 14 A. IMPACT OF INCOME
CHANGES 16 B. IMPACT OFPRICE CHANGES 16 IV. CONSUMER CHOICE: THE OPTIMUM
USE OF A LLMITED INCOME 16 A. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION 16 B.
PORTRAYING AN EXACT SOLUTION 18 C. HOW A CHANGE IN INCOME AFFECTS CHOICE
19 D. THE IMPACT OF A PRICE CHANGE ON THE OPTIMUM SOLUTION 20 V. THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE: THE DOLLAR VALUE OF CHANGES IN UTILITY 20 A.
VALUING THE UTILITY CHANGE FROM A PRICE REDUCTION 20 B. ANATOMY OF A
PRICE CHANGE: INCOME AND PRICE EFFECTS 23 VI. APPLICATIONS OF THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE 24 A. BUCKLEY S TULIPS AND MUMS PROBLEM 24 B.
DOMINIC S REPORT CARD AND COMPUTER GAMES 33 VI | CONTENTS CHAPTER 2
DEMAND CURVES AND CONSUMER SURPLUS 41 I. FROM INDIFFERENCE CURVES TO
DEMAND CURVE 41 II. CONSUMER SURPLUS 46 A. AN INTUITIVE WAY TO
UNDERSTAND CONSUMER SURPLUS 47 SS. USING THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE 49 C.
CHECKING BACK WITH THE INDIFFERENCE CURVE MAP 51 III. MARKET DEMAND
CURVE 52 A. CONSUMER SURPLUS WHEN DEMAND CURVES ARE LINEAR 55 B.
COMPLEMENTS AND SUBSTITUTES 57 C. CHANGES IN INCOME 59 IV. DEMAND
ELASTICITY 59 A. CALCULATING THE ELASTICITY FOR A LINEAR DEMAND CURVE 60
B. RELATION OF ELASTICITY TO TOTAL REVENUE 63 C. LONG-RUN VERSUS
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITY 67 V. APPLICATION: IMPOSITION OF A TAX 68 A.
SHOWING THE DISTORTION ON INDIFFERENCE CURVES 68 B. EFSSCIENCY IN A
KALDOR-HICKS SENSE 70 C. SHOWING THE DISTORTION ON THE DEMAND CURVE 73
D. TAX BUERDEN: APPLICATION OF DEMAND ELASTICITY 16 APPENDIX: CONSUMER
SURPLUS AND UNCOMPENSATED DEMAND CURVES 80 CHAPTER 3 SUPPLY CURVES AND
THE FLOW OF RESOURCES ALSO SUNK COST, OPPORTUNITY COST, AND TRANSACTIONS
COST 82 I. THE WORLD MARKET FOR NICKEL 83 A. THE SUPPLY OF NICKEL WITH
NO FIXED COSTS 83 B. PRODUCER SURPLUS 85 C. THE WORLD PRICE FOR NICKEL
86 D. SURPLUSES IN MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 88 II. THE SOLUTION WITH FIXED
COSTS AND MANY FIRMS 89 A. CONSTRUCTING THE COST CURVES 90 B.
SUSTAINABLE PRICE: EQUILIBRIUM IN A LONG-RUN SENSE 94 III. MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM: ENTRY, EXIT, AND COMPETITIVE RETURNS 95 A. HOW TO EVALUATE
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF A MARKET PRICE 95 CONTENTS I VII B. THE DYNAMICS
OFENTRY 96 C. THE CONCEPT OF LONG-RUN SUPPLY 99 IV. PRODUCER SURPLUS,
LONG AND SHORT RUN, AND ECONOMIC RENT 100 A. PRODUCER SURPLUS IN A
SHORT-RUN SENSE 100 B. THE CONCEPT OF RENT 101 C. THE DYNAMICS OF AN
INCREASE IN RENT 103 D. PORTRAYING THE SOLUTION IN THE MARKET FOR
LITIGATION SERVICES 104 E. THE LONG-RUN SUPPLY CURVE 107 V. BRINGING IT
ALL TOGETHER: RECONSIDERING A TAX ON ONEGOOD 111 A. SHORT-RUN IMPACT OF
THE TAX 111 B. LONG-RUN IMPACT OF THE TAX 113 VI. A FEW MISCELLANEOUS
COST ISSUES 115 A. SUNK COST 115 B. OPPORTUNITY COST 120 C. TRANSACTIONS
COST 122 APPENDIX: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACT OF A SUBSIDY 125 CHAPTER
4 USING DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES TO EVALUATE POLICY 127 I. SHIFTS IN
DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES 128 II. IMPACT OF A MAXIMUM PRICE: THE CASE OF
GASOLINE 131 A. SETTING UP THE PROBLEM 131 SS. THE QUEUE FOR GASOLINE 133
C. THE SOCIAL COST OFTHE QUEUE 135 D. A FIRST LESSON IN PROPERTY RIGHTS
137 E. A CANDIDATE FOR AN EVEN MORE INEFFICIENT SOLUTION: REGULATION 139
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 140 A. UNSKILLED WORKERS STILL
EMPLOYED GAIN RENT 141 B. SOME LOW-RENT WORKERS DISPLACE SOME HIGH-RENT
WORKERS 142 C. HIGH-RENT WORKERS OUTHUSTLE LOW-RENT WORKERS 143 D. RENT
TO UNSKILLED WORKERS 146 E. EFFORT ADDS VALUE, WHICH ATTENUATES JOB
LOSSES 147 F. A NOTE ON UNIONS 148 VIII | CONTENTS IV. PRICE SUPPORTS
148 A. RESTRICTION ON OUTPUT 149 SS. NO RESTRICTION ON SUPPLY 151 CHAPTER
5 THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLY 153 I. THE PRICE DECISION 154 A. THE RULE
FOR FINDING THE PROFIT-MAXIMIZING PRICE 154 B. FINDING THE OPTIMAL PRICE
156 C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MONOPOLY SOLUTION 159 II. THE SOCIAL COST
OF MONOPOLY 161 A. DEADWEIGHT LOSS 161 B. MARKET FOR MONOPOLY 163 C.
RENT EROSION 164 III. MONOPOLY PRICE DISCRIMINATION 170 A. TWO MARKETS:
ICE CREAM MONOPOLY 170 SS. PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 173 C. OTHER WAYS
TO EXTRACT CONSUMER SURPLUS 174 IV. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN COMPETITIVE
MARKETS 176 A. MOVIE THEATERS 176 B. OTHER EXAMPLES 180 V. COMPETITION
OF THE FEW 183 A. CHEATING 184 B. PRISONER S DILEMMA 185 APPENDIX A:
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILK MARKET 188 A. HOW MILK REGULATIONS WORK
188 B. THE SOCIAL COST OF REGULATION 191 APPENDIX B: THE MOVIE THEATER
COST STRUCTURE 193 CHAPTER 6 PUBLIC GOODS AND COMMON RESOURCES TOWARD
UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 194 I. AN INTRODUENON TO
PUBLIC GOODS 195 II. INNOVATIONS: CLASSIC PUBLIC GOODS 199 A. THE
SOLUTION IN AN IDEAL WORLD 200 SS. PATENT AWARDS 203 C. HOW THE PATENT
SYSTEM AFFECTS SOCIETAL SURPLUS 204 CONTENTS | IX D. THE PATENT QUANDARY
208 E. OTHER IDEAS ABOUT PATENTS 212 III. CONTRACTS UNDER DURESS: THE
COMMON RESOURCE PROBLEM 214 A. HONOR THE CONTRACT 216 SS. NULLIFY THE
CONTRACT AND IMPOSE A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT 217 C. THE OPTIMAL
SETTLEMENT RULE 21 7 D. THE MAIN PROBLEM: SETTING AVERAGE VALUE TO
MARGINAL COST 220 E. ANOTHER WAY TO THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEM 221 IV. THE
SOURCE OF RENT EROSION: POORLY DEFINED PROPERTY RIGHTS 222 CHAPTER 7
EXTERNALITIES THE COASE THEOREM 228 I. WHY EXTERNALITY ISSUES ARE
DIFFERENT 228 II. AIRPORT NOISE 230 A. SETTING UP AN EXTERNALITY MODEL
230 SS. THERE IS NO COSTLESS SOLUTION TO AN EXTERNALITY PROBLEM 233 C.
THE SOCIALLY OPTIMUM LEVEL OF EXTERNALITY 234 III. THE COASE THEOREM 235
A. AIRLINES OWN NOISE RIGHTS 235 SS. HOMEOWNERS OWN NOISE RIGHTS 236 C.
WHAT IF TRANSACTIONS COSTS ARE NOT ZERO? 237 D. CORRECTIVE TAXES 240 IV.
ALLOWING FOR NOISE ABATEMENT 241 A. STYLIZED ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY 242 SS.
A CORRECTIVE TAX WITH ABATEMENT 244 C. COASE WITH ABATEMENT 245 D.
TRADABLE NOISE PERTNITS 245 E. WHAT IF HOMEOWNERS CAN ABATE SOME NOISE?
246 CHAPTER 8 POLLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE: CONTRACT OR EXTERNALITY? AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE RULES OF LAW 247 I. COMPENSATION FOR EXPOSURE TO AIR
PARTICULATES 248 A. SETTING UP THE AIR PARTICULATE PROBLEM 249 SS. THE
DEMAND FOR CLEAN AIR 249 C. THE SUPPLY OF CLEAN AIR 250 D. THE SOCIALLY
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF CLEAN AIR 251 X | CONTENTS II. HOW DO WE OBTAIN THE
SOCIALLY EFFICIENT SOLUTION? 251 A. A CONTRACT SOLUTION (BUYER BEWARE)
251 B. REGULATORY SOLUTION 252 C. STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD 253 III. THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES 254 A. TORTS ARE THE FLIP
SIDE OF CONTRACTS 255 SS. WHAT IF JUDGMENT AMOUNTS ARE NOT ECONOMIC
DAMAGES? 258 C. TRANSACTIONS COSTS AGAIN 260 D. VALUE OFLIFE IN A
CONTRACT SETTING 261 E. VALUE OF LIFE IN A LIABILITY SETTING 262 IV.
NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS 267 A. AN EFFICIENT NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 267 B. WHAT
IF WORKERS CAN REDUCE HARM THEMSELVES? 268 C. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
269 D. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 26 9 E. STRICT LIABILITY WITH CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE 270 APPENDIX A: THE DECISION TO SMOKE AND RULES OF LAW 272
APPENDIX B: DRIVING AND ACCIDENTS 276 APPENDIX C: ABATEMENT WITH MASKS
280 CHAPTER 9 LEMONS MARKETS AND ADVERSE SELECTION SIGNALS, BONDS,
REPUTATION, AND TIE-INS AS SOLUTIONS 282 I. THE LEMONS MARKET PROBLEM
284 A. HOW A LEMONS MARKET ARISES 284 SS. A MARKET FOR INFORMATION 287
II. BONDING A PROMISE OF HIGH QUALITY 288 A. REPUTATION VALUE 289 SS.
QUALITY ASSURANCE PREMIUM: WHERE DOES REPUTATION VALUE COME FROM? 290 C.
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENTS 293 D. ADVERTISING 295 E. WARRANTIES 297 III.
PROBLEMS WHEN THE SELLER IS UNINFORMED: ADVERSE SELECTION 299 A.
TEMPORAL ADVERSE SELECTION 300 SS. CROSS-SECTION ADVERSE SELECTION 302 C.
SOME MARKET SOLUTIONS 305 CONTENTS | XI D. A TIE-IN CONTRACT 307 .
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AS A TIE-IN 30 8 IV. ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE
JOB MARKET 313 APPENDIX: AUCTIONS AS APPLICATIONS OF DEMAND THEORY AND
BONDING 316 CHAPTER 10 SORTING AS A SOLUTION TO ASYMMETRIE INFORMATION
COAXING MARKET PARTICIPANTS TO DIVULGE VALUABLE INFORMATION 321 I. BONDS
THAT ALSO PERFORM SORTING: THE BECKER-STIGLER POLICE MODEL 324 A. A
BECKER-STIGLER PENSION BOND 324 B. AN INDENTURE PREMIUM 328 C. HOW DOES
THE BOND CREATE A SORT? 328 D. AN ALTERNATIVE BOND: AN EFFICIENCY WAGE
330 E. PUTTING THE TWO BONDS TOGETHER 332 II. THE SPENCE MODEL OF
SORTING 334 A. THE IDEA IN BRIEF 334 B. APPLICATION TO LAW SCHOOL 335 C.
PURSUING THE MODEL ONE STEP FURTHER 335 III. OTHER SORTING DEVICES IN
THE LABOR MARKET 336 A. THE NOT-SO-FREE FREE SICK LEAVE 336 SS. SORTING
ON THE BASIS OF DISCOUNT RATES 338 C. 401^ PENSION PLANS: ANOTHER SORT
ON THE BASIS OF DISCOUNT RATES 341 D. A POSTSCRIPT ON BECKER-STIGLER:
ROLE OF HIGH DISCOUNTERS 342 IV. MORE EXAMPLES OF SORTS AND BONDS 344 A.
SLOTTING ALLOWANCES 344 SS. PREPARING FOR A JOB INTERVIEW 345 CHAPTER 11
MORAL HAZARD AND AGENCY PROBLEMS WHEN MISPRICING AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 348 I.
NOMENCLATURE 349 II. MORAL HAZARD 350 A. A SIMPLE WATER METER EXAMPLE
351 B. THE MORAL HAZARD OF INSURANCE 351 XII | CONTENTS C. THE
PROVERBIAL FREE LUNCH 354 D. LIMITS ON MORAL HAZARD 356 E. MORAL HAZARD
IS NOT NECESSARILY A SHOWSTOPPER 360 III. PRECOMMITMENT AS A SOLUTION
TO EX POST MORAL HAZARD: THE CASE OF HEALTH INSURANCE 362 A. THE MORAL
HAZARD PROBLEM 362 B. CONSUMER SURPLUS 364 C. CONTRACTING FOR EFFICIENT
CARE 366 D. WHAT HAPPENS IFTHE ERISA PREEMPTION IS ELIMINATED 367 IV.
AGENCY COST: A CLOSE COUSIN TO MORAL HAZARD 369 A. WHAT ARE AGENCY
COSTS? 369 SS. EXAMPLES OF AGENCY COSTS 369 V. AGENCY COSTS AND RENT
EROSION: THE CASE OF TORT LAWYERS 375 A. THE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM 375 SS.
THE PRINDPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 375 C. IMPLICATIONS OF RENT EROSION 377
CHAPTER 12 GAME THEORY AND RELATED ISSUES STRATEGIE THINKING WHEN
PLAYERS ARE FEW AND INFORMATION IS POOR 380 I. THE DATING GAME: BASIC
CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY 381 A. HOW THE GAME WORKS 381 SS. OUTCOMES WITH
DIFFERENT PAYOFFS 385 C. WHERE IS COASE? THE ROLE OF THE COOPERATIVE
SOLUTION 389 II. BEYOND THE DATING GAME: OTHER PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
389 A. GAMES IN THE HIRING PROCESS 390 SS. IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR: WHAT IF
SIGNALS ARE CROSSED? 393 C. DICK GETS MUGGED IN THE PARK 395 III.
INSTTTUTIONS AND COOPERATIVE OUTCOMES 397 A. THE PRISONER S DILEMMA
RECONSIDERED 397 SS. SOLVING THE COMMON RESOURCE PROBLEM: HOLDUPS IN THE
BUILDING TRADES 398 C. SOLVING THE PUBLIC GOODS COLLECTION PROBLEM:
PROTECTION FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD 400 V. HOW LEGAL STANDARDS CHANGE THE
PAYOFFS 401 A. DRIVERS AND CYCLISTS 401 SS. A NOISE PROBLEM 403 CONTENTS
| XIII V. APPLICATIONS TO QUASI-MONOPOLY MARKETS: SOME SIMPLE GAME
THEORY MODELS 407 A. THE COURNOT MODEL 408 B. SEQUENTIAL DECISION:
STACKEIBERG 411 C. A TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY 413 INDEX 417
|
| adam_txt |
ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS RICHARD A. IPPOLITO PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD CONTENTS INTRODUCTION XV WHAT MAKES THIS BOOK
DIFFERENT XVII RECOMMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY READING XVIII CHAPTER 1 FINDING
THE OPTIMAL USE OF A LIMITED INCOME 1 I. INDIFFERENCE CURVES 1 A. THE
MAIN QUESTION 1 B. INDIFFERENCE CURVES SLOPE DOWNWARD 2 C. OTHER THINGS
TO KNOW ABOUT INDIFFERENCE CURVES 4 II. GAINS FROM TRADE USING THE
EDGEWORTH BOX DIAGRAM 6 A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE BOX 8 B. PARETO SUPERIOR
TRADES 10 C. THE CONTRACT CURVE: PARETO OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS 12 III. THE
BUDGET LINE: THE ESSENCE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 14 A. IMPACT OF INCOME
CHANGES 16 B. IMPACT OFPRICE CHANGES 16 IV. CONSUMER CHOICE: THE OPTIMUM
USE OF A LLMITED INCOME 16 A. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION 16 B.
PORTRAYING AN EXACT SOLUTION 18 C. HOW A CHANGE IN INCOME AFFECTS CHOICE
19 D. THE IMPACT OF A PRICE CHANGE ON THE OPTIMUM SOLUTION 20 V. THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE: THE DOLLAR VALUE OF CHANGES IN UTILITY 20 A.
VALUING THE UTILITY CHANGE FROM A PRICE REDUCTION 20 B. ANATOMY OF A
PRICE CHANGE: INCOME AND "PRICE" EFFECTS 23 VI. APPLICATIONS OF THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE 24 A. BUCKLEY'S TULIPS AND MUMS PROBLEM 24 B.
DOMINIC'S REPORT CARD AND COMPUTER GAMES 33 VI | CONTENTS CHAPTER 2
DEMAND CURVES AND CONSUMER SURPLUS 41 I. FROM INDIFFERENCE CURVES TO
DEMAND CURVE 41 II. CONSUMER SURPLUS 46 A. AN INTUITIVE WAY TO
UNDERSTAND CONSUMER SURPLUS 47 SS. USING THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE 49 C.
CHECKING BACK WITH THE INDIFFERENCE CURVE MAP 51 III. MARKET DEMAND
CURVE 52 A. CONSUMER SURPLUS WHEN DEMAND CURVES ARE LINEAR 55 B.
COMPLEMENTS AND SUBSTITUTES 57 C. CHANGES IN INCOME 59 IV. DEMAND
ELASTICITY 59 A. CALCULATING THE ELASTICITY FOR A LINEAR DEMAND CURVE 60
B. RELATION OF ELASTICITY TO TOTAL REVENUE 63 C. LONG-RUN VERSUS
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITY 67 V. APPLICATION: IMPOSITION OF A TAX 68 A.
SHOWING THE DISTORTION ON INDIFFERENCE CURVES 68 B. EFSSCIENCY IN A
KALDOR-HICKS SENSE 70 C. SHOWING THE DISTORTION ON THE DEMAND CURVE 73
D. TAX BUERDEN: APPLICATION OF DEMAND ELASTICITY 16 APPENDIX: CONSUMER
SURPLUS AND UNCOMPENSATED DEMAND CURVES 80 CHAPTER 3 SUPPLY CURVES AND
THE FLOW OF RESOURCES ALSO SUNK COST, OPPORTUNITY COST, AND TRANSACTIONS
COST 82 I. THE WORLD MARKET FOR NICKEL 83 A. THE SUPPLY OF NICKEL WITH
NO FIXED COSTS 83 B. PRODUCER SURPLUS 85 C. THE WORLD PRICE FOR NICKEL
86 D. SURPLUSES IN MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 88 II. THE SOLUTION WITH FIXED
COSTS AND MANY FIRMS 89 A. CONSTRUCTING THE COST CURVES 90 B.
SUSTAINABLE PRICE: EQUILIBRIUM IN A LONG-RUN SENSE 94 III. MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM: ENTRY, EXIT, AND COMPETITIVE RETURNS 95 A. HOW TO EVALUATE
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF A MARKET PRICE 95 CONTENTS I VII B. THE DYNAMICS
OFENTRY 96 C. THE CONCEPT OF LONG-RUN SUPPLY 99 IV. PRODUCER SURPLUS,
LONG AND SHORT RUN, AND ECONOMIC RENT 100 A. PRODUCER SURPLUS IN A
SHORT-RUN SENSE 100 B. THE CONCEPT OF "RENT" 101 C. THE DYNAMICS OF AN
INCREASE IN RENT 103 D. PORTRAYING THE SOLUTION IN THE MARKET FOR
LITIGATION SERVICES 104 E. THE LONG-RUN SUPPLY CURVE 107 V. BRINGING IT
ALL TOGETHER: RECONSIDERING A TAX ON ONEGOOD 111 A. SHORT-RUN IMPACT OF
THE TAX 111 B. LONG-RUN IMPACT OF THE TAX 113 VI. A FEW MISCELLANEOUS
COST ISSUES 115 A. SUNK COST 115 B. OPPORTUNITY COST 120 C. TRANSACTIONS
COST 122 APPENDIX: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACT OF A SUBSIDY 125 CHAPTER
4 USING DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES TO EVALUATE POLICY 127 I. SHIFTS IN
DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES 128 II. IMPACT OF A MAXIMUM PRICE: THE CASE OF
GASOLINE 131 A. SETTING UP THE PROBLEM 131 SS. THE QUEUE FOR GASOLINE 133
C. THE SOCIAL COST OFTHE QUEUE 135 D. A FIRST LESSON IN PROPERTY RIGHTS
137 E. A CANDIDATE FOR AN EVEN MORE INEFFICIENT SOLUTION: REGULATION 139
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 140 A. UNSKILLED WORKERS STILL
EMPLOYED GAIN RENT 141 B. SOME LOW-RENT WORKERS DISPLACE SOME HIGH-RENT
WORKERS 142 C. HIGH-RENT WORKERS OUTHUSTLE LOW-RENT WORKERS 143 D. RENT
TO UNSKILLED WORKERS 146 E. EFFORT ADDS VALUE, WHICH ATTENUATES JOB
LOSSES 147 F. A NOTE ON UNIONS 148 VIII | CONTENTS IV. PRICE SUPPORTS
148 A. RESTRICTION ON OUTPUT 149 SS. NO RESTRICTION ON SUPPLY 151 CHAPTER
5 THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLY 153 I. THE PRICE DECISION 154 A. THE RULE
FOR FINDING THE PROFIT-MAXIMIZING PRICE 154 B. FINDING THE OPTIMAL PRICE
156 C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MONOPOLY SOLUTION 159 II. THE SOCIAL COST
OF MONOPOLY 161 A. DEADWEIGHT LOSS 161 B. MARKET FOR MONOPOLY 163 C.
RENT EROSION 164 III. MONOPOLY PRICE DISCRIMINATION 170 A. TWO MARKETS:
ICE CREAM MONOPOLY 170 SS. PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 173 C. OTHER WAYS
TO EXTRACT CONSUMER SURPLUS 174 IV. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN COMPETITIVE
MARKETS 176 A. MOVIE THEATERS 176 B. OTHER EXAMPLES 180 V. COMPETITION
OF THE FEW 183 A. CHEATING 184 B. PRISONER'S DILEMMA 185 APPENDIX A:
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILK MARKET 188 A. HOW MILK REGULATIONS WORK
188 B. THE SOCIAL COST OF REGULATION 191 APPENDIX B: THE MOVIE THEATER
COST STRUCTURE 193 CHAPTER 6 PUBLIC GOODS AND COMMON RESOURCES TOWARD
UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 194 I. AN INTRODUENON TO
PUBLIC GOODS 195 II. INNOVATIONS: CLASSIC PUBLIC GOODS 199 A. THE
SOLUTION IN AN IDEAL WORLD 200 SS. PATENT AWARDS 203 C. HOW THE PATENT
SYSTEM AFFECTS SOCIETAL SURPLUS 204 CONTENTS | IX D. THE PATENT QUANDARY
208 E. OTHER IDEAS ABOUT PATENTS 212 III. CONTRACTS UNDER DURESS: THE
COMMON RESOURCE PROBLEM 214 A. HONOR THE CONTRACT 216 SS. NULLIFY THE
CONTRACT AND IMPOSE A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT 217 C. THE OPTIMAL
SETTLEMENT RULE 21 7 D. THE MAIN PROBLEM: SETTING AVERAGE VALUE TO
MARGINAL COST 220 E. ANOTHER WAY TO THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEM 221 IV. THE
SOURCE OF RENT EROSION: POORLY DEFINED PROPERTY RIGHTS 222 CHAPTER 7
EXTERNALITIES THE COASE THEOREM 228 I. WHY EXTERNALITY ISSUES ARE
DIFFERENT 228 II. AIRPORT NOISE 230 A. SETTING UP AN EXTERNALITY MODEL
230 SS. THERE IS NO COSTLESS SOLUTION TO AN EXTERNALITY PROBLEM 233 C.
THE SOCIALLY OPTIMUM LEVEL OF EXTERNALITY 234 III. THE COASE THEOREM 235
A. AIRLINES OWN NOISE RIGHTS 235 SS. HOMEOWNERS OWN NOISE RIGHTS 236 C.
WHAT IF TRANSACTIONS COSTS ARE NOT ZERO? 237 D. CORRECTIVE TAXES 240 IV.
ALLOWING FOR NOISE ABATEMENT 241 A. STYLIZED ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY 242 SS.
A CORRECTIVE TAX WITH ABATEMENT 244 C. COASE WITH ABATEMENT 245 D.
TRADABLE NOISE PERTNITS 245 E. WHAT IF HOMEOWNERS CAN ABATE SOME NOISE?
246 CHAPTER 8 POLLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE: CONTRACT OR EXTERNALITY? AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE RULES OF LAW 247 I. COMPENSATION FOR EXPOSURE TO AIR
PARTICULATES 248 A. SETTING UP THE AIR PARTICULATE PROBLEM 249 SS. THE
DEMAND FOR CLEAN AIR 249 C. THE SUPPLY OF CLEAN AIR 250 D. THE SOCIALLY
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF CLEAN AIR 251 X | CONTENTS II. HOW DO WE OBTAIN THE
SOCIALLY EFFICIENT SOLUTION? 251 A. A CONTRACT SOLUTION (BUYER BEWARE)
251 B. REGULATORY SOLUTION 252 C. STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD 253 III. THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES 254 A. TORTS ARE THE FLIP
SIDE OF CONTRACTS 255 SS. WHAT IF JUDGMENT AMOUNTS ARE NOT ECONOMIC
DAMAGES? 258 C. TRANSACTIONS COSTS AGAIN 260 D. VALUE OFLIFE IN A
CONTRACT SETTING 261 E. VALUE OF LIFE IN A LIABILITY SETTING 262 IV.
NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS 267 A. AN EFFICIENT NEGLIGENCE STANDARD 267 B. WHAT
IF WORKERS CAN REDUCE HARM THEMSELVES? 268 C. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
269 D. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 26 9 E. STRICT LIABILITY WITH CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE 270 APPENDIX A: THE DECISION TO SMOKE AND RULES OF LAW 272
APPENDIX B: DRIVING AND ACCIDENTS 276 APPENDIX C: ABATEMENT WITH MASKS
280 CHAPTER 9 LEMONS MARKETS AND ADVERSE SELECTION SIGNALS, BONDS,
REPUTATION, AND TIE-INS AS SOLUTIONS 282 I. THE "LEMONS" MARKET PROBLEM
284 A. HOW A "LEMONS" MARKET ARISES 284 SS. A MARKET FOR INFORMATION 287
II. BONDING A PROMISE OF HIGH QUALITY 288 A. REPUTATION VALUE 289 SS.
QUALITY ASSURANCE PREMIUM: WHERE DOES REPUTATION VALUE COME FROM? 290 C.
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENTS 293 D. ADVERTISING 295 E. WARRANTIES 297 III.
PROBLEMS WHEN THE SELLER IS UNINFORMED: ADVERSE SELECTION 299 A.
TEMPORAL ADVERSE SELECTION 300 SS. CROSS-SECTION ADVERSE SELECTION 302 C.
SOME MARKET SOLUTIONS 305 CONTENTS | XI D. A "TIE-IN" CONTRACT 307 .
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AS A TIE-IN 30 8 IV. ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE
JOB MARKET 313 APPENDIX: AUCTIONS AS APPLICATIONS OF DEMAND THEORY AND
BONDING 316 CHAPTER 10 SORTING AS A SOLUTION TO ASYMMETRIE INFORMATION
COAXING MARKET PARTICIPANTS TO DIVULGE VALUABLE INFORMATION 321 I. BONDS
THAT ALSO PERFORM SORTING: THE BECKER-STIGLER POLICE MODEL 324 A. A
BECKER-STIGLER PENSION BOND 324 B. AN INDENTURE PREMIUM 328 C. HOW DOES
THE BOND CREATE A SORT? 328 D. AN ALTERNATIVE BOND: AN EFFICIENCY WAGE
330 E. PUTTING THE TWO BONDS TOGETHER 332 II. THE SPENCE MODEL OF
SORTING 334 A. THE IDEA IN BRIEF 334 B. APPLICATION TO LAW SCHOOL 335 C.
PURSUING THE MODEL ONE STEP FURTHER 335 III. OTHER SORTING DEVICES IN
THE LABOR MARKET 336 A. THE NOT-SO-FREE FREE SICK LEAVE 336 SS. SORTING
ON THE BASIS OF DISCOUNT RATES 338 C. 401^ PENSION PLANS: ANOTHER SORT
ON THE BASIS OF DISCOUNT RATES 341 D. A POSTSCRIPT ON BECKER-STIGLER:
ROLE OF HIGH DISCOUNTERS 342 IV. MORE EXAMPLES OF SORTS AND BONDS 344 A.
SLOTTING ALLOWANCES 344 SS. PREPARING FOR A JOB INTERVIEW 345 CHAPTER 11
MORAL HAZARD AND AGENCY PROBLEMS WHEN MISPRICING AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 348 I.
NOMENCLATURE 349 II. MORAL HAZARD 350 A. A SIMPLE WATER METER EXAMPLE
351 B. THE MORAL HAZARD OF INSURANCE 351 XII | CONTENTS C. THE
PROVERBIAL FREE LUNCH 354 D. LIMITS ON MORAL HAZARD 356 E. MORAL HAZARD
IS NOT NECESSARILY A "SHOWSTOPPER" 360 III. PRECOMMITMENT AS A SOLUTION
TO EX POST MORAL HAZARD: THE CASE OF HEALTH INSURANCE 362 A. THE MORAL
HAZARD PROBLEM 362 B. CONSUMER SURPLUS 364 C. CONTRACTING FOR EFFICIENT
CARE 366 D. WHAT HAPPENS IFTHE ERISA PREEMPTION IS ELIMINATED 367 IV.
AGENCY COST: A CLOSE COUSIN TO MORAL HAZARD 369 A. WHAT ARE AGENCY
COSTS? 369 SS. EXAMPLES OF AGENCY COSTS 369 V. AGENCY COSTS AND RENT
EROSION: THE CASE OF TORT LAWYERS 375 A. THE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM 375 SS.
THE PRINDPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 375 C. IMPLICATIONS OF RENT EROSION 377
CHAPTER 12 GAME THEORY AND RELATED ISSUES STRATEGIE THINKING WHEN
PLAYERS ARE FEW AND INFORMATION IS POOR 380 I. THE DATING GAME: BASIC
CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY 381 A. HOW THE GAME WORKS 381 SS. OUTCOMES WITH
DIFFERENT PAYOFFS 385 C. WHERE IS COASE? THE ROLE OF THE COOPERATIVE
SOLUTION 389 II. BEYOND THE DATING GAME: OTHER PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
389 A. GAMES IN THE HIRING PROCESS 390 SS. IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR: WHAT IF
SIGNALS ARE CROSSED? 393 C. DICK GETS MUGGED IN THE PARK 395 III.
INSTTTUTIONS AND COOPERATIVE OUTCOMES 397 A. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
RECONSIDERED 397 SS. SOLVING THE COMMON RESOURCE PROBLEM: HOLDUPS IN THE
BUILDING TRADES 398 C. SOLVING THE PUBLIC GOODS COLLECTION PROBLEM:
PROTECTION FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD 400 V. HOW LEGAL STANDARDS CHANGE THE
PAYOFFS 401 A. DRIVERS AND CYCLISTS 401 SS. A NOISE PROBLEM 403 CONTENTS
| XIII V. APPLICATIONS TO QUASI-MONOPOLY MARKETS: SOME SIMPLE GAME
THEORY MODELS 407 A. THE COURNOT MODEL 408 B. SEQUENTIAL DECISION:
STACKEIBERG 411 C. A TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY 413 INDEX 417 |
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| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
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| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| genre_facet | Einführung |
| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV021460030 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:07:24Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:36:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 069112177X 9780691146560 |
| language | English |
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| oclc_num | 441328973 |
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| physical | XIX, 421 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
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| publisher | Princeton Univ. Press |
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| spelling | Ippolito, Richard A. 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)170057178 aut Economics for lawyers Richard A. Ippolito Princeton, NJ [u.a.] Princeton Univ. Press 2005 XIX, 421 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Recht Wirtschaft Economics Law and economics Law Economic aspects United States Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd rswk-swf Jurist (DE-588)4029050-5 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4151278-9 Einführung gnd-content Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 s Jurist (DE-588)4029050-5 s DE-604 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014680016&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Ippolito, Richard A. 1948- Economics for lawyers Recht Wirtschaft Economics Law and economics Law Economic aspects United States Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd Jurist (DE-588)4029050-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4066528-8 (DE-588)4029050-5 (DE-588)4151278-9 |
| title | Economics for lawyers |
| title_auth | Economics for lawyers |
| title_exact_search | Economics for lawyers |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Economics for lawyers |
| title_full | Economics for lawyers Richard A. Ippolito |
| title_fullStr | Economics for lawyers Richard A. Ippolito |
| title_full_unstemmed | Economics for lawyers Richard A. Ippolito |
| title_short | Economics for lawyers |
| title_sort | economics for lawyers |
| topic | Recht Wirtschaft Economics Law and economics Law Economic aspects United States Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd Jurist (DE-588)4029050-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Recht Wirtschaft Economics Law and economics Law Economic aspects United States Wirtschaftswissenschaften Jurist USA Einführung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014680016&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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