The law and economics of article 82 EC:
Gespeichert in:
| Späterer Titel: | O'Donoghue, Robert The law and economics of article 102 TFEU |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Hart
2006
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | LXVII, 782 S. |
| ISBN: | 9781841135021 184113502X |
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| adam_text | THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC ROBERT O DONOGHUE AND A JORGE
PADILLA *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2006 TABLE OF
CONTENTS FOREWORD VII AUTHORS PREFACE XI TABLE OFCASES XXV TABLE OF
LEGISLATION LXIII 1. INTRODUCTION, SCOPE OF APPLICATION, AND BASIC
FRAMEWORK 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND
MODERNISATION OF ARTICLE 82 EC 7 1.2.1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ARTICLE
82 EC 8 1.2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 82 EC 12 1.2.3 THE MODERNISATION OF
ARTICLE 82 EC 16 1.3 ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES BOUND BY ARTICLE 82 EC 21
1.3.1 THE DEFINITION OF AN UNDERTAKING 21 1.3.1.1 GENERALLY 21 1.3.1.2
PUBLIC BODIES AS UNDERTAKINGS 22 1.3.1.3 SPORTING AND CULTURAL
ACTIVITIES 27 1.3.2 STATE ACTION DEFENCE 28 1.3.3 PARENT LIABILITY FOR A
SUBSIDIARY S ACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 33 1.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 36 1.4.1 ARTICLE 82 EC AND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW 36 1.4.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ARTICLE 82 EC AND ARTICLE 81 EC 38 1.4.3 ARTICLE 82 EC AND MERGER
CONTROL LAWS 39 1.4.4 ARTICLE 82 EC AND THE RULES ON STATE ACTION 42
1.4.5 ARTICLE 82 EC AND REGULATION 45 1.4.6 ARTICLE 82 EC AND NATIONAL
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE LAWS 48 1.4.7 ARTICLE 82 EC AND ARBITRATION 51 1.5
THE BASIC PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 52 1.5.1 COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK
OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 54 1.5.2 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION
AND NATIONAL COURTS 56 1.5.3 GUIDANCE LETTERS 57 1.5.4 METHODSOFBRINGING
ARTICLE 82 EC CLAIMS 58 1.5.5 THE CONDUCT OF COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS 59
1.5.6 SECTOR INQUIRIES 60 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS 2. MARKET DEFINITION 63
2.1 INTRODUCTION 63 2.2 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION: BASIC CONCEPTS 69
2.2.1 DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTION 69 2.2.2 SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTION 71
2.2.3 CHAINS OF SUBSTITUTION 75 2.3 RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS: FROM
THEORY TOPRACTICE 76 2.3.1 HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST: OVERVIEW 76
2.3.2 ASSESSING DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTION UNDER THE HMT 78 2.3.2.1
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES 78 2.3.2.2 QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 86 2.3.2.3 OTHER
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 88 2.3.3 ASSESSING SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTION UNDER
THE HMT 89 2.4 GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION 91 2.4.1 KEYCONCEPTS 91
2.4.2 DEFINING GEOGRAPHIE MARKETS IN PRACTICE 93 2.5 SELECTED ISSUES ON
MARKET DEFINITION 98 2.5.1 IMPACT OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION ON MARKET
DEFINITION 98 2.5.2 MARKET DEFINITION IN TYING AND BUNDLING CASES 100
2.5.3 AFTERMARKETS 102 2.5.4 MARKET DEFINITION IN TWO-SIDED INDUSTRIES
105 3. DOMINANCE 107 3.1 INTRODUCTION 107 3.2 SINGLE FIRM DOMINANCE 108
3.2.1 BASIC APPROACH 108 3.2.2 THE STARTING POINT: MARKET SHARES 109
3.2.3 BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXPANSION 116 3.2.3.1 DEFINITION OF BARRIERS
TO ENTRY 117 3.2.3.2 CHARACTERISTICS INHERENT IN THE RELEVANT MARKET 119
3.2.3.3 CHARACTERISTICS SPEEIFIE TO THE ALLEGEDLY DOMINANT FIRM 124
3.2.3.4 CONDUCT OF THE ALLEGEDLY DOMINANT FIRM 128 3.2.4 COUNTERVAILING
BUYER POWER 129 3.2.5 EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL COMPETITION ON THE RELEVANT
MARKET 134 3.2.6 CONCLUSION 136 3.3 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 137 3.3.1
INTRODUCTION 137 3.3.2 THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 138 TABLE
OF CONTENTS XVII 3.3.2.1 FIRMS HAVE THE INCENTIVE TO AVOID COMPETING 139
3.3.2.2 REACHING AND MAINTAINING A TACIT AGREEMENT ISFEASIBLE 141
3.3.2.3 CONCLUSION 146 3.3.3 LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COLLECTIVE
DOMINANCE 146 3.3.3.1 EVOLUTION 146 3.3.3.2 ESTABLISHING COLLECTIVE
DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 151 3.3.3 SELECTED ISSUES ON COLLECTIVE
DOMINANCE 161 3.4 DOMINANT BUYERS 165 3.5 SUPERDOMINANCE 166 3.6
COMPARING DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER COMMUNITY LEGISLATION
169 3.7 SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMON MARKET 173 4. TH E GENERAL
CONCEPT OF AN ABUSE 174 4.1 INTRODUCTION 174 4.2 THE ECONOMICS OF
ABUSIVE UNILATERAL CONDUCT 178 4.2.1 EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THINKING ON
UNILATERAL CONDUCT 178 4.2.2 DESIGNING ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL RULES FOR
UNILATERAL CONDUCT 182 4.2.3 RECENT ADVANCES IN DEFINING EXCLUSIONARY
CONDUCT 184 4.2.3.1 THE PROFIT SACRIFICE TEST AND ITS CLOSE RELATIONS
185 4.2.3.2 EQUALLY EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 189 4.2.3.3 CONSUMER
WELFARE TEST 191 4.3 THE CATEGORIES OF ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 194
4.3.1 EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES (ARTICLE 82(A)) 195 4.3.2 EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES
(ARTICLE 82(B)) 196 4.3.3 DISCRIMINATORY ABUSES (ARTICLE 82(C)) 202
4.3.4 TYING ABUSES (ARTICLE 82(D)) 206 4.3.5 LEVERAGING ABUSES 207 4.3.6
THE LIST OF ABUSES IN ARTICLE 82 EC: ILLUSTRATIVE OR EXHAUSTIVE? 213 4.4
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 215 4.4.1 THE NEED FOR
CAUSATION BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND THE ABUSE ..215 4.4.2 THE STANDARD FOR
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC..217 4.4.3 IDENTIFYING
ACTUAL OR LIKELY ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 221 4.4.4 HARM TO CONSUMERS
UNDER THE FOUR CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 82 EC 224 XVIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
4.4.5 THE ROLE OF INTENT EVIDENCE 225 4.5 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 227 5.
PREDATORY PRICING 235 5.1 INTRODUCTION 235 5.2 THE ECONOMICS OF
PREDATORY PRICING 236 5.2.1 BASIC COST DEFINITIONS 237 5.2.2 STRATEGIE
CONSIDERATIONS 243 5.3 THE BASIC RULES ON BELOW-COST PRICE CUTTING UNDER
ARTICLE 82 EC 245 5.3.1 PRICING BELOW AVC 246 5.3.2 PRICING ABOVE
AVC/AAC BUT BELOW ATC 249 5.4 SPECIFICISSUES WITH BELOW-COST PRICING
UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 252 5.4.1 RECOUPMENT 253 5.4.2 DEALING WITH JOINT
AND COMMON COSTS 260 5.4.3 CROSS-SUBSIDIES 265 5.4.4 SITUATIONS
INVOLVING HIGH FIXED AND LOW VARIABLE COSTS 269 5.4.5 SITUATIONS IN
WHICH A PRODUCT INCURS INEVITABLE START-UP LOSSES 272 5.5 EXCLUSIONARY
ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 274 5.6 OBJECTIVE
JUSTIFICATION 283 5.6.1 INTRODUCTION 283 5.6.2 MEETING COMPETITION 284
5.6.3 SHORT-TERM PROMOTIONAL OFFERS 290 5.6.4 MARKET-EXPANDING
EFFICIENCIES 292 5.6.5 LOSS-LEADING AND FOLLOW ON REVENUES 296 5.6.6
EXCESS CAPACITY AND LOSS-MINIMISING 300 5.6.7 MISCELLANEOUS DEFENCES 301
6. MARGIN SQUEEZE 303 6.1 INTRODUCTION 303 6.2 THE ECONOMICS OF MARGIN
SQUEEZE 304 6.2.1 TYPES OF MARGIN SQUEEZE 304 6.2.2 BASIC ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE 305 6.2.3 ANTICOMPETITIVE MOTIVATION FOR
A MARGIN SQUEEZE 307 6.3 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE 309
TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX 6.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARGIN SQUEEZE AND
OTHER ABUSES 321 6.4.1 MARGIN SQUEEZE AND EXCESSIVE PRICING 321 6.4.2
MARGIN SQUEEZE AND PURE PREDATORY PRICING 322 6.4.3 MARGIN SQUEEZE AND
CROSS SUBSIDIES 324 6.4.4 MARGIN SQUEEZE AND REFUSAL TO DEAL UNDER
ARTICLE 82 EC 325 6.5 DIFFICULTIES WITH IDENTIFYING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE
MARGIN SQUEEZE IN PRACTICE 327 6.6 DISCRIMINATORY MARGIN SQUEEZES AND
RELATED STRATEGIES 339 6.6.1 PROBLEM STATED 339 6.6.2 EXAMPLES OF
DISCRIMINATION BY A VERTICALLY INTEGRATED DOMINANT FIRM 340 6.7
CONFLICTS BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW IN MARGIN SQUEEZE CASES
345 7. EXCLUSIVE DEALING, LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, AND RELATED PRACTICES 351
7.1 INTRODUCTION 351 7.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING 352 7.2.1 ECONOMICS OF
EXCLUSIVE DEALING 352 7.2.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 357
7.2.2.1 EVOLUTION OF THE DECISIONAL PRACTICE AND CASE LAW 358 7.2.2.2
ASSESSING EXCLUSIVE DEALING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 361 7.2.3 PRACTICES
FALLING SHORT OF OUTRIGHT EXCLUSIVITY 368 7.3 LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 374
7.3.1 ECONOMICS OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 375 7.3.2 ASSESSMENT OF LOYALTY
DISCOUNTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 381 7.3.2.1 TREATMENT OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS
UNDER THE CASE LAW 381 7.3.2.2 FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 389 7.3.2.3 ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE
ASSESSMENT OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 393 7.3.3 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 399
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 403 8. REFUSAL TO DEAL 407 8.1 INTRODUCTION
407 XX TABLE OF CONTENTS 8.2 THE ECONOMICS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL 415 8.2.1
IPRIGHTS 415 8.2.2 PHYSICAL PROPERTY 421 8.3 THE DUTY TO DEAL WITH
COMPETITORS 423 8.3.1 EVOLUTION OF THE DECISIONAL PRACTICE AND CASE LAW
423 8.3.2 THE LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A DUTY TO DEAL WITH RIVALS UNDER
ARTICLE 82 EC 433 8.3.2.1 FIRST CONTRACTS OR LICENCES 434 8.3.2.2 HOW
MANY CONTRACTS MUST BE CONCLUDED BY THE DOMINANT FIRM 454 8.3.2.3
TERMINATING A COURSE OF DEALING 458 8.3.2.4 RELEVANCE OF THE SOURCE AND
PERCEIVED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT 462 8.4 DUTY TO DEAL WITH
CUSTOMERS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 463 8.4.1 THE DUTY TO SUPPLY INPUTS TO
CUSTOMERS 464 8.4.2 REFUSALS TO DEAL ARISING AT THE LEVEL OF
DISTRIBUTION ORRESALE 467 8.4.3 REFUSAL TO DEAL AND PARALLEL TRADE 471
9. TYING AND BUNDLING 477 9.1. INTRODUCTION 477 9.2 THE ECONOMICS OF
TYING AND BUNDLING 480 9.2.1 EFFICIENCY MOTIVATIONS 481 9.2.2 POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS 483 9.2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 489 9.2.4
CONCLUSIONS 491 9.3 THE APPROACH TO TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER ARTICLE 82
EC 491 9.3.1 CONTRACTUAL TYING 492 9.3.2 TECHNOLOGICAL TYING 495 9.3.3
MICROSOFT 49 6 9.3.4 MIXED BUNDLING 500 9.3.4.1 OVERVIEW 500 9.3.4.2 THE
LEGAL TREATMENT OF MIXED BUNDLING 501 9.3.5 TYING IN AFTERMARKETS 508
9.3.6 CLASSIFYING THE OVERALL APPROACH TO TYING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 509
9.4 SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TYING 511 9.5 CONCLUSIONS 517
TABLE OF CONTENTS XXI 10. EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES 519 10.1
INTRODUCTION 519 10.2 EXAMPLES OF EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES 522
10.2.1 PREDATORY DESIGN CHANGES/PRODUCT INTRODUCTION 523 10.2.2
VEXATIOUS LITIGATION 526 10.2.3 USE AND ABUSE OF REGULATORY OR
GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES 529 10.2.4 ABUSES IN STANDARD-SETTING
ORGANISATIONS 535 10.2.5 ABUSIVE ACQUISITION OR ACCUMULATION OF IPRS 543
10.2.6 MISCELLANEOUS PRACTICES 548 11. ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION 552 11.1
INTRODUCTION 552 11.2 THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 556 11.2.1
CONDITIONS FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION 556 11.2.2 WEIFARE EFFECTS OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION 558 11.2.3 CONCLUSION 561 11.3 LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR
ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION 562 11.3.1 EQUIVALENT TRANSACTIONS 563 11.3.2
DISSIMILAR CONDITIONS 567 11.3.3 COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 568 11.4
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 82(C) 573
11.4.1 PURE SECONDARY-LINE DISCRIMINATION 574 11.4.2 NATIONALITY
DISCRIMINATION 578 11.4.3 DISCRIMINATION INTENDED TO PARTITION NATIONAL
MARKETS 580 11.4.4 MOST-FAVOURED COMPANY CLAUSES 585 11.4.5
DISCRIMINATORY SUPPLIES IN TIMES OF SHORTAGE 591 11.5 OBJECTIVE
JUSTIFICATION 592 11.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 601 12. EXCESSIVE PRICES
603 12.1 INTRODUCTION 603 12.2 THE ECONOMICS OF EXCESSIVE PRICES 605
12.3 THE LEGAL TEST(S) FOR EXCESSIVE PRICES 608 12.4 DIFFICULTIES WITH
THE CURRENT APPROACH TO EXCESSIVE PRICES UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 621 12.5
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXCESSIVE PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 628 XXII
TABLE OF CONTENTS 12.6 CONCLUSION 637 13. OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES 639
13.1 INTRODUCTION 639 13.2 ABUSE OF MONOPSONY PURCHASING POWER 640
13.2.1 BASIC ECONOMICS OF MONOPSONY POWER 640 13.2.2 CONDITIONS FOR A
POSSIBLE ABUSE 642 13.3 UNFAIR AND EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACT TERMS 646
13.3.1 REASONS FOR A LIMITED CASE LAW 646 13.3.2 LEGAL TEST FOR ABUSIVE
AND UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS 648 13.3.3 CONCLUSION 657 14. EFFECT ON TRADE
659 14.1 INTRODUCTION 659 14.2 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR EFFECT ON
TRADE 660 14.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECT ON TRADE CONCEPT 666
14.3.1 ABUSES COVERING SEVERAL MEMBER STATES 667 14.3.2 ABUSES COVERING
A SINGLE MEMBER STATE 668 14.3.3 ABUSES COVERING ONLY A PART OF A MEMBER
STATE 671 14.3.4 ABUSES CONCERNING TRADE OUTSIDE THE EU 673 15. REMEDIES
676 15.1 INTRODUCTION 676 15.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REMEDIES 677
15.2.1 OBJECTIVESOFREMEDIES 677 15.2.2 REMEDIES MUST BE EFFECTIVE 680
15.2.3 REMEDIES MUST BE PROPORTIONATE 682 15.3 PRINCIPAL TYPES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 683 15.3.1 INTERIM MEASURES 683 15.3.2
COMMITMENT DECISIONS 690 15.3.2.1 OVERVIEW 690 15.3.2.2 COMMITMENT
DECISION PROCEDURE 695 15.3.2.3 LEGAL EFFECT OF COMMITMENT DECISIONS 699
15.3.3 UNDERTAKINGS 706 15.3.4 FINAL INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS 708 15.4
PRINICIPAL TYPES OF REMEDIES 708 15.4.1 FINES 708 15.4.2 BEHAVIOURAL
REMEDIES 718 TABLE OF CONTENTS XXIUE 15.4.2.1 EXCLUSIONARY PRICING ABUSES
719 15.4.2.2 REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE PRICING 720 15.4.2.3 REMEDIES IN
DISCRIMINATION CASES 721 15.4.2.4 COMPULSORY DEALING REMEDIES 723
15.4.2.5 REMEDIES IN TYING CASES 731 15.4.3 STRUCTURAL REMEDIES 733
15.4.3.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 733 15.4.3.2 CONDITIONS FOR ORDERING
A STRUCTURAL REMEDY 735 15.4.3.3 CASE STUDY: MICROSOFT 738 15.5 PRIVATE
LITIGATION AND REMEDIES 739 15.5.1 INTRODUCTION 739 15.5.2 GOALS OF
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 740 15.5.3 LEGAL BASIS FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 742
15.5.4 OBSTACLESTO EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 745 15.5.5 CONCLUSION
751 INDEX 753
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| adam_txt |
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC ROBERT O'DONOGHUE AND A JORGE
PADILLA *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2006 TABLE OF
CONTENTS FOREWORD VII AUTHORS' PREFACE XI TABLE OFCASES XXV TABLE OF
LEGISLATION LXIII 1. INTRODUCTION, SCOPE OF APPLICATION, AND BASIC
FRAMEWORK 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND
MODERNISATION OF ARTICLE 82 EC 7 1.2.1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ARTICLE
82 EC 8 1.2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 82 EC 12 1.2.3 THE MODERNISATION OF
ARTICLE 82 EC 16 1.3 ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES BOUND BY ARTICLE 82 EC 21
1.3.1 THE DEFINITION OF AN UNDERTAKING 21 1.3.1.1 GENERALLY 21 1.3.1.2
PUBLIC BODIES AS UNDERTAKINGS 22 1.3.1.3 SPORTING AND CULTURAL
ACTIVITIES 27 1.3.2 STATE ACTION DEFENCE 28 1.3.3 PARENT LIABILITY FOR A
SUBSIDIARY'S ACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 33 1.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 36 1.4.1 ARTICLE 82 EC AND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW 36 1.4.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ARTICLE 82 EC AND ARTICLE 81 EC 38 1.4.3 ARTICLE 82 EC AND MERGER
CONTROL LAWS 39 1.4.4 ARTICLE 82 EC AND THE RULES ON STATE ACTION 42
1.4.5 ARTICLE 82 EC AND REGULATION 45 1.4.6 ARTICLE 82 EC AND NATIONAL
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE LAWS 48 1.4.7 ARTICLE 82 EC AND ARBITRATION 51 1.5
THE BASIC PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 52 1.5.1 COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK
OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 54 1.5.2 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION
AND NATIONAL COURTS 56 1.5.3 GUIDANCE LETTERS 57 1.5.4 METHODSOFBRINGING
ARTICLE 82 EC CLAIMS 58 1.5.5 THE CONDUCT OF COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS 59
1.5.6 SECTOR INQUIRIES 60 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS 2. MARKET DEFINITION 63
2.1 INTRODUCTION 63 2.2 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION: BASIC CONCEPTS 69
2.2.1 DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTION 69 2.2.2 SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTION 71
2.2.3 CHAINS OF SUBSTITUTION 75 2.3 RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS: FROM
THEORY TOPRACTICE 76 2.3.1 HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST: OVERVIEW 76
2.3.2 ASSESSING DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTION UNDER THE HMT 78 2.3.2.1
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES 78 2.3.2.2 QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 86 2.3.2.3 OTHER
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 88 2.3.3 ASSESSING SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSTITUTION UNDER
THE HMT 89 2.4 GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION 91 2.4.1 KEYCONCEPTS 91
2.4.2 DEFINING GEOGRAPHIE MARKETS IN PRACTICE 93 2.5 SELECTED ISSUES ON
MARKET DEFINITION 98 2.5.1 IMPACT OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION ON MARKET
DEFINITION 98 2.5.2 MARKET DEFINITION IN TYING AND BUNDLING CASES 100
2.5.3 AFTERMARKETS 102 2.5.4 MARKET DEFINITION IN TWO-SIDED INDUSTRIES
105 3. DOMINANCE 107 3.1 INTRODUCTION 107 3.2 SINGLE FIRM DOMINANCE 108
3.2.1 BASIC APPROACH 108 3.2.2 THE STARTING POINT: MARKET SHARES 109
3.2.3 BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXPANSION 116 3.2.3.1 DEFINITION OF BARRIERS
TO ENTRY 117 3.2.3.2 CHARACTERISTICS INHERENT IN THE RELEVANT MARKET 119
3.2.3.3 CHARACTERISTICS SPEEIFIE TO THE ALLEGEDLY DOMINANT FIRM 124
3.2.3.4 CONDUCT OF THE ALLEGEDLY DOMINANT FIRM 128 3.2.4 COUNTERVAILING
BUYER POWER 129 3.2.5 EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL COMPETITION ON THE RELEVANT
MARKET 134 3.2.6 CONCLUSION 136 3.3 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 137 3.3.1
INTRODUCTION 137 3.3.2 THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 138 TABLE
OF CONTENTS XVII 3.3.2.1 FIRMS HAVE THE INCENTIVE TO AVOID COMPETING 139
3.3.2.2 REACHING AND MAINTAINING A TACIT AGREEMENT ISFEASIBLE 141
3.3.2.3 CONCLUSION 146 3.3.3 LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COLLECTIVE
DOMINANCE 146 3.3.3.1 EVOLUTION 146 3.3.3.2 ESTABLISHING COLLECTIVE
DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 151 3.3.3 SELECTED ISSUES ON COLLECTIVE
DOMINANCE 161 3.4 DOMINANT BUYERS 165 3.5 "SUPERDOMINANCE" 166 3.6
COMPARING DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER COMMUNITY LEGISLATION
169 3.7 SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMON MARKET 173 4. TH E GENERAL
CONCEPT OF AN ABUSE 174 4.1 INTRODUCTION 174 4.2 THE ECONOMICS OF
ABUSIVE UNILATERAL CONDUCT 178 4.2.1 EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THINKING ON
UNILATERAL CONDUCT 178 4.2.2 DESIGNING ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL RULES FOR
UNILATERAL CONDUCT 182 4.2.3 RECENT ADVANCES IN DEFINING EXCLUSIONARY
CONDUCT 184 4.2.3.1 THE PROFIT SACRIFICE TEST AND ITS CLOSE RELATIONS
185 4.2.3.2 EQUALLY EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 189 4.2.3.3 CONSUMER
WELFARE TEST 191 4.3 THE CATEGORIES OF ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 194
4.3.1 EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES (ARTICLE 82(A)) 195 4.3.2 EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES
(ARTICLE 82(B)) 196 4.3.3 DISCRIMINATORY ABUSES (ARTICLE 82(C)) 202
4.3.4 TYING ABUSES (ARTICLE 82(D)) 206 4.3.5 LEVERAGING ABUSES 207 4.3.6
THE LIST OF ABUSES IN ARTICLE 82 EC: ILLUSTRATIVE OR EXHAUSTIVE? 213 4.4
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 215 4.4.1 THE NEED FOR
CAUSATION BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND THE ABUSE .215 4.4.2 THE STANDARD FOR
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC.217 4.4.3 IDENTIFYING
ACTUAL OR LIKELY ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 221 4.4.4 HARM TO CONSUMERS
UNDER THE FOUR CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 82 EC 224 XVIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
4.4.5 THE ROLE OF INTENT EVIDENCE 225 4.5 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 227 5.
PREDATORY PRICING 235 5.1 INTRODUCTION 235 5.2 THE ECONOMICS OF
PREDATORY PRICING 236 5.2.1 BASIC COST DEFINITIONS 237 5.2.2 STRATEGIE
CONSIDERATIONS 243 5.3 THE BASIC RULES ON BELOW-COST PRICE CUTTING UNDER
ARTICLE 82 EC 245 5.3.1 PRICING BELOW AVC 246 5.3.2 PRICING ABOVE
AVC/AAC BUT BELOW ATC 249 5.4 SPECIFICISSUES WITH BELOW-COST PRICING
UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 252 5.4.1 RECOUPMENT 253 5.4.2 DEALING WITH JOINT
AND COMMON COSTS 260 5.4.3 CROSS-SUBSIDIES 265 5.4.4 SITUATIONS
INVOLVING HIGH FIXED AND LOW VARIABLE COSTS 269 5.4.5 SITUATIONS IN
WHICH A PRODUCT INCURS INEVITABLE START-UP LOSSES 272 5.5 EXCLUSIONARY
ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 274 5.6 OBJECTIVE
JUSTIFICATION 283 5.6.1 INTRODUCTION 283 5.6.2 MEETING COMPETITION 284
5.6.3 SHORT-TERM PROMOTIONAL OFFERS 290 5.6.4 MARKET-EXPANDING
EFFICIENCIES 292 5.6.5 LOSS-LEADING AND "FOLLOW ON" REVENUES 296 5.6.6
EXCESS CAPACITY AND LOSS-MINIMISING 300 5.6.7 MISCELLANEOUS DEFENCES 301
6. MARGIN SQUEEZE 303 6.1 INTRODUCTION 303 6.2 THE ECONOMICS OF MARGIN
SQUEEZE 304 6.2.1 TYPES OF MARGIN SQUEEZE 304 6.2.2 BASIC ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE 305 6.2.3 ANTICOMPETITIVE MOTIVATION FOR
A MARGIN SQUEEZE 307 6.3 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE 309
TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX 6.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARGIN SQUEEZE AND
OTHER ABUSES 321 6.4.1 MARGIN SQUEEZE AND EXCESSIVE PRICING 321 6.4.2
MARGIN SQUEEZE AND "PURE" PREDATORY PRICING 322 6.4.3 MARGIN SQUEEZE AND
CROSS SUBSIDIES 324 6.4.4 MARGIN SQUEEZE AND REFUSAL TO DEAL UNDER
ARTICLE 82 EC 325 6.5 DIFFICULTIES WITH IDENTIFYING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE
MARGIN SQUEEZE IN PRACTICE 327 6.6 DISCRIMINATORY MARGIN SQUEEZES AND
RELATED STRATEGIES 339 6.6.1 PROBLEM STATED 339 6.6.2 EXAMPLES OF
DISCRIMINATION BY A VERTICALLY INTEGRATED DOMINANT FIRM 340 6.7
CONFLICTS BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW IN MARGIN SQUEEZE CASES
345 7. EXCLUSIVE DEALING, LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, AND RELATED PRACTICES 351
7.1 INTRODUCTION 351 7.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING 352 7.2.1 ECONOMICS OF
EXCLUSIVE DEALING 352 7.2.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 357
7.2.2.1 EVOLUTION OF THE DECISIONAL PRACTICE AND CASE LAW 358 7.2.2.2
ASSESSING EXCLUSIVE DEALING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 361 7.2.3 PRACTICES
FALLING SHORT OF OUTRIGHT EXCLUSIVITY 368 7.3 LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 374
7.3.1 ECONOMICS OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 375 7.3.2 ASSESSMENT OF LOYALTY
DISCOUNTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 381 7.3.2.1 TREATMENT OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS
UNDER THE CASE LAW 381 7.3.2.2 FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 389 7.3.2.3 ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE
ASSESSMENT OF LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 393 7.3.3 OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 399
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 403 8. REFUSAL TO DEAL 407 8.1 INTRODUCTION
407 XX TABLE OF CONTENTS 8.2 THE ECONOMICS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL 415 8.2.1
IPRIGHTS 415 8.2.2 PHYSICAL PROPERTY 421 8.3 THE DUTY TO DEAL WITH
COMPETITORS 423 8.3.1 EVOLUTION OF THE DECISIONAL PRACTICE AND CASE LAW
423 8.3.2 THE LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A DUTY TO DEAL WITH RIVALS UNDER
ARTICLE 82 EC 433 8.3.2.1 FIRST CONTRACTS OR LICENCES 434 8.3.2.2 HOW
MANY CONTRACTS MUST BE CONCLUDED BY THE DOMINANT FIRM 454 8.3.2.3
TERMINATING A COURSE OF DEALING 458 8.3.2.4 RELEVANCE OF THE SOURCE AND
PERCEIVED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT 462 8.4 DUTY TO DEAL WITH
CUSTOMERS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 463 8.4.1 THE DUTY TO SUPPLY INPUTS TO
CUSTOMERS 464 8.4.2 REFUSALS TO DEAL ARISING AT THE LEVEL OF
DISTRIBUTION ORRESALE 467 8.4.3 REFUSAL TO DEAL AND PARALLEL TRADE 471
9. TYING AND BUNDLING 477 9.1. INTRODUCTION 477 9.2 THE ECONOMICS OF
TYING AND BUNDLING 480 9.2.1 EFFICIENCY MOTIVATIONS 481 9.2.2 POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS 483 9.2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 489 9.2.4
CONCLUSIONS 491 9.3 THE APPROACH TO TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER ARTICLE 82
EC 491 9.3.1 CONTRACTUAL TYING 492 9.3.2 TECHNOLOGICAL TYING 495 9.3.3
MICROSOFT 49 6 9.3.4 MIXED BUNDLING 500 9.3.4.1 OVERVIEW 500 9.3.4.2 THE
LEGAL TREATMENT OF MIXED BUNDLING 501 9.3.5 TYING IN AFTERMARKETS 508
9.3.6 CLASSIFYING THE OVERALL APPROACH TO TYING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 509
9.4 SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TYING 511 9.5 CONCLUSIONS 517
TABLE OF CONTENTS XXI 10. EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES 519 10.1
INTRODUCTION 519 10.2 EXAMPLES OF EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES 522
10.2.1 PREDATORY DESIGN CHANGES/PRODUCT INTRODUCTION 523 10.2.2
VEXATIOUS LITIGATION 526 10.2.3 USE AND ABUSE OF REGULATORY OR
GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES 529 10.2.4 ABUSES IN STANDARD-SETTING
ORGANISATIONS 535 10.2.5 ABUSIVE ACQUISITION OR ACCUMULATION OF IPRS 543
10.2.6 MISCELLANEOUS PRACTICES 548 11. ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION 552 11.1
INTRODUCTION 552 11.2 THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 556 11.2.1
CONDITIONS FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION 556 11.2.2 WEIFARE EFFECTS OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION 558 11.2.3 CONCLUSION 561 11.3 LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR
ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION 562 11.3.1 EQUIVALENT TRANSACTIONS 563 11.3.2
DISSIMILAR CONDITIONS 567 11.3.3 COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 568 11.4
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 82(C) 573
11.4.1 PURE SECONDARY-LINE DISCRIMINATION 574 11.4.2 NATIONALITY
DISCRIMINATION 578 11.4.3 DISCRIMINATION INTENDED TO PARTITION NATIONAL
MARKETS 580 11.4.4 MOST-FAVOURED COMPANY CLAUSES 585 11.4.5
DISCRIMINATORY SUPPLIES IN TIMES OF SHORTAGE 591 11.5 OBJECTIVE
JUSTIFICATION 592 11.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 601 12. EXCESSIVE PRICES
603 12.1 INTRODUCTION 603 12.2 THE ECONOMICS OF EXCESSIVE PRICES 605
12.3 THE LEGAL TEST(S) FOR EXCESSIVE PRICES 608 12.4 DIFFICULTIES WITH
THE CURRENT APPROACH TO EXCESSIVE PRICES UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 621 12.5
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXCESSIVE PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC 628 XXII
TABLE OF CONTENTS 12.6 CONCLUSION 637 13. OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES 639
13.1 INTRODUCTION 639 13.2 ABUSE OF MONOPSONY PURCHASING POWER 640
13.2.1 BASIC ECONOMICS OF MONOPSONY POWER 640 13.2.2 CONDITIONS FOR A
POSSIBLE ABUSE 642 13.3 UNFAIR AND EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACT TERMS 646
13.3.1 REASONS FOR A LIMITED CASE LAW 646 13.3.2 LEGAL TEST FOR ABUSIVE
AND UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS 648 13.3.3 CONCLUSION 657 14. EFFECT ON TRADE
659 14.1 INTRODUCTION 659 14.2 BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR EFFECT ON
TRADE 660 14.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECT ON TRADE CONCEPT 666
14.3.1 ABUSES COVERING SEVERAL MEMBER STATES 667 14.3.2 ABUSES COVERING
A SINGLE MEMBER STATE 668 14.3.3 ABUSES COVERING ONLY A PART OF A MEMBER
STATE 671 14.3.4 ABUSES CONCERNING TRADE OUTSIDE THE EU 673 15. REMEDIES
676 15.1 INTRODUCTION 676 15.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REMEDIES 677
15.2.1 OBJECTIVESOFREMEDIES 677 15.2.2 REMEDIES MUST BE EFFECTIVE 680
15.2.3 REMEDIES MUST BE PROPORTIONATE 682 15.3 PRINCIPAL TYPES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 683 15.3.1 INTERIM MEASURES 683 15.3.2
COMMITMENT DECISIONS 690 15.3.2.1 OVERVIEW 690 15.3.2.2 COMMITMENT
DECISION PROCEDURE 695 15.3.2.3 LEGAL EFFECT OF COMMITMENT DECISIONS 699
15.3.3 UNDERTAKINGS 706 15.3.4 FINAL INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS 708 15.4
PRINICIPAL TYPES OF REMEDIES 708 15.4.1 FINES 708 15.4.2 BEHAVIOURAL
REMEDIES 718 TABLE OF CONTENTS XXIUE 15.4.2.1 EXCLUSIONARY PRICING ABUSES
719 15.4.2.2 REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE PRICING 720 15.4.2.3 REMEDIES IN
DISCRIMINATION CASES 721 15.4.2.4 COMPULSORY DEALING REMEDIES 723
15.4.2.5 REMEDIES IN TYING CASES 731 15.4.3 STRUCTURAL REMEDIES 733
15.4.3.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 733 15.4.3.2 CONDITIONS FOR ORDERING
A STRUCTURAL REMEDY 735 15.4.3.3 CASE STUDY: MICROSOFT 738 15.5 PRIVATE
LITIGATION AND REMEDIES 739 15.5.1 INTRODUCTION 739 15.5.2 GOALS OF
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 740 15.5.3 LEGAL BASIS FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 742
15.5.4 OBSTACLESTO EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 745 15.5.5 CONCLUSION
751 INDEX 753 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:07:21Z |
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| spelling | O'Donoghue, Robert 1974- Verfasser (DE-588)1043383824 aut The law and economics of article 82 EC Robert O'Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2006 LXVII, 782 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Monopolies European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Mißbrauchsschutz gnd rswk-swf Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Mißbrauchsschutz f DE-604 Padilla, Atilano Jorge 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)129674443 aut 2. Aufl. u.d.T. O'Donoghue, Robert The law and economics of article 102 TFEU (DE-604)BV041366114 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014679851&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | O'Donoghue, Robert 1974- Padilla, Atilano Jorge 1965- The law and economics of article 82 EC Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Monopolies European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 |
| title | The law and economics of article 82 EC |
| title_auth | The law and economics of article 82 EC |
| title_exact_search | The law and economics of article 82 EC |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The law and economics of article 82 EC |
| title_full | The law and economics of article 82 EC Robert O'Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla |
| title_fullStr | The law and economics of article 82 EC Robert O'Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla |
| title_full_unstemmed | The law and economics of article 82 EC Robert O'Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla |
| title_new | O'Donoghue, Robert The law and economics of article 102 TFEU |
| title_short | The law and economics of article 82 EC |
| title_sort | the law and economics of article 82 ec |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Monopolies European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Monopolies European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Mißbrauchsschutz |
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