Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law: criticism of a legal paradox
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Hart
2007
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Span. Ausg. u.d.T.: Ortiz Blanco, Luis: Las conferencias maritimas frente al derecho antitrust de la Comunidad Europea. 2007 |
| Beschreibung: | XLIV, 654 S. |
| ISBN: | 1841135275 9781841135274 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | SHIPPING CONFERENCES UNDER EC ANTITRUST LAW CRITICISM OF A LEGAL PARADOX
LUIS ORTIZ BLANCO TRANSLATED BY ANDREW READ *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND
PORTLAND, OREGON 2007 CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS XVII TABLE OF REGULATIONS,
DIRECTIVES AND OTHER COMMUNITY ACTS XIX TABLE OF LEGISLATION XXV TABLE
OF CASES XXVI 1 THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION OF MARITIME
CARTELS 1 1.1 LINER SHIPPING IN THE WORLD AND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1
1.2 THE CARTELISATION OF THE SEA 3 1.2.1 ORIGINS OF LINER CONFERENCES 3
1.2.2 A CENTURY OF CONFERENCES: 1875 TO 1966 6 1.2.3 THE CONTAINER
REVOLUTION 10 1.2.4 NEW REALITIES, NEW AGREEMENTS 14 1.3 CONFERENCES AND
THEIR AGREEMENTS 16 1.3.1 ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS, OBJECTIVES AND
LEGAL NATURE OF LINER CONFERENCES 16 1.3.2 EVOLUTION OF THE TERM LINER
CONFERENCE AND THE DEFINITION OF CONFERENCE 18 1.3.3 AGREEMENTS AND
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES OF CONFERENCES: TRADITION AND RENEWAL 19 1.4
INITIAL REACTIONS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO CONFERENCES 20 1.4.1
CONFERENCES BEFORE THE UK AND US COURTS 20 1.4.1.1 THE MOGUL CASE 20
1.4.1.2 FIRST ACTIONS AGAINST CONFERENCES BROUGHT BY THE US DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 22 1.4.2 FIRST INVESTIGATIONS INTO CONFERENCES: THE BRITISH
AND UNITED STATES COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY 22 1.4.2.1 FIRST COMMISSIONS OF
INQUIRY INTO THE PRACTICES OF CONFERENCES IN TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA 23 1.4.2.2 ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SHIPPING RINGS 23 1.4.2.3 ALEXANDER COMMITTEE 26 1.4.2.4. OTHER
SUBSEQUENT INQUIRIES INTO LINER CONFERENCES 28 1.5 US REGULATION OF
CONFERENCES 30 1.5.1 SHIPPING ACT 1916 30 1.5.2 THE 1961 REFORM AND
EROSION OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 33 1.5.3 SHIPPING ACT 1984 35 1.5.4 THE
1998 REFORM AND EROSION OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER 40 1.6
EUROPEAN SELF-REGULATION 45 VIII CONTENTS 1.6.1 UNREGULATED
SELF-REGULATION (1875-1963) 45 1.6.2 PRIVATE RULES GOVERNING
SELF-REGULATION (1963-1974) 47 1.6.2.1 APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW
CRITERIA TO LINER CONFERENCES IN THE USA AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE
DEFENCE OF THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM 47 1.6.2.2 INCREASED DISSATISFACTION
WITH MARITIME CONFERENCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND REACTIONS TO THEM
IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 51 1.7 PARTIAL REGULATION OF SELF-REGULATION:
OTHER REGULATORY SYSTEMS UP TO 1970 56 1.8 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
LINER CONFERENCES 58 1.9 UNCTAD AND MARITIME TRANSPORT 63 1.10 LINER
CONFERENCES IN UNCTAD: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
CONFERENCES 66 1.10.1 LINER CONFERENCES IN UNCTAD I AND UNCTAD II: THE
COMMON MEASURE OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE NEW DELHI CONCLUSIONS 66 1.10.2
THE ROCHDALE REPORT, THE CENSA CODE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE UNCTAD CODE
69 1.11 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CONFERENCES: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES 72 1.11.1
DEFINITIONS, CONTENT AND RULES FOR PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES 72
1.11.2 RELATIONS BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND SHIPPERS: CONSULTATION
MACHINERY 77 1.11.3 FREIGHT RATES, TARIFFS AND SURCHARGES 78 1.11.4
ADEQUACY OF SERVICES 80 1.11.5 LOYALTY AGREEMENTS 82 1.11.6 DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MACHINERY AND FINAL CLAUSES 84 1.12 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY S
REACTION TO THE CODE OF CONDUCT 85 1.12.1 THE THIRD WORLD, THE UNCTAD
CODE AND THE CODIST PHILOSOPHY 86 1.12.2 THE OECD COUNTRIES AND THE
UNCTAD CODE 88 1.12.2.1 MARITIME POLICY OF THE OECD AND FREIGHT RATE
CONFERENCES 88 1.12.2.2 THE OECD COUNTRIES AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
LINER CONFERENCES 97 1.13 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY S APPROACH TO THE CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES AND THE PHENOMENON OF CONFERENCES 98
1.13.1 ORIGINS OF EC MARITIME TRANSPORT POLICY 98 1.13.2 CODE OF CONDUCT
AS THE CATALYST FOR COMMUNITY MARITIME POLICY AND THE BRUSSELS PACKAGE
100 1.13.3 IMPORTANCE, CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTENT OF THE BRUSSELS
PACKAGE 104 1.13.4 THE BRUSSELS PACKAGE AND THE COMPETITION RULES 108
1.13.5 INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE BRUSSELS PACKAGE 110 1.13.6
MARITIME TRANSPORT POLICY OF THE COMMUNITY AND OF THE OECD AFTER THE
BRUSSELS PACKAGE 114 1.13.6.1 A TIME OF CHANGE FOR COMMUNITY MARITIME
TRANSPORT POLICY 114 1.13.6.2 THE 1985 SHIPPING MEMORANDUM 116 1.13.6.3
THE 1986 PACKAGE OF REGULATIONS: FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, COMMERCIAL
DEFENCE, FREE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRADE AND FREEDOM OF COMPETITION IN
COMMUNITY LEGISLATION 118 CONTENTS IX 1.14 APPLICATION OF THE
COMPETITION RULES TO TRANSPORT AND THE ORIGINS OF REGULATION 4056/86 119
1.14.1 COMPETITION RULES IN THE EC TREATY: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 AND
GENERAL REGULATIONS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 119 1.14.2 CONTROVERSY
SURROUNDING THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE TREATY TITLE DEVOTED TO TRANSPORT
AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE EC TREATY 125 1.14.3 REGULATION 17,
REGULATION 141 AND REGULATION 1017/68: A BRIEF HISTORY 128 1.14.4 FRENCH
SEAMEN: A MILESTONE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN THE
TRANSPORT SECTOR 133 1.14.5 ADOPTION OF REGULATIONS 4056/86 AND 3975/87
137 1.14.6 PROCEDURE APPLICABLE IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW AS REGARDS
THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 140 1.15 THE APPLICATION OF REGULATION 4056/86 BY
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 140 1.16 THE REVIEW PROCESS AND THE DEROGATION
OF REGULATION 4056/86 144 2 COUNCIL REGULATION 4056/86 AND THE BLOCK
EXEMPTION FOR LINER CONFERENCES 147 2. 1 DUAL NATURE OF REGULATION
4056/86 147 2.1.1 REGULATION 4056/86 WITHIN COMMUNITY POLICIES 147
2.1.1.1 REGULATION 4056/86: A COMPETITION REGULATION 147 2.1.1.2
REGULATION 4056/86 AS PART OF COMMUNITY TRANSPORT POLICY 150 2.1.1.3
OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION 4056/86 153 2.1.2 TWO LEGAL BASES FOR
REGULATION 4056/86 156 2.1.2.1 ARTICLE 87 OF THE EEC TREATY AS A LEGAL
BASIS FOR REGULATION 4056/86 157 2.1.2.2 ARTICLE 84(2) OF THE EEC TREATY
AS THE SECOND LEGAL BASIS FOR REGULATION 4056/86: INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
AND PROCEDURE FOR THE ADOPTION OF DECISIONS 158 2.2 SCOPE AND GENERAL
CONTENT OF REGULATION 4056/86 160 2.2.1 SCOPE OF REGULATION 4056/86 160
2.2.1.1 SCOPE OF REGULATION 4056/86 COMPARED WITH THAT OF ARTICLES 81
AND 82 OF THE EC TREATY 160 2.2.1.2 EXCLUSION OF NON-MARITIME TRANSPORT
AND THE DOUBTS CONCERNING CARGO-HANDLING SERVICES IN PORTS 163 2.2.1.3
CABOTAGE 166 2.2.1.4 EXCLUSION OF TRAMP SERVICES 167 2.2.1.5 EXCLUSION
OF MARITIME TRANSPORT BETWEEN PORTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND THE REGIME
FOR SERVICES ANCILLARY TO MARITIME TRANSPORT 172 2.2.1.6 LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXCLUSION OF TRAMP AND CABOTAGE SHIPPING 175 2.2.2
PROCEDURAL CONTENT OF REGULATION 4056/86 AS A SPECIFIC REGULATION FOR
CERTAIN FORMS OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 176 2.2.3 SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF
REGULATION 4056/86 AS A BLOCK EXEMPTION FOR LINER CONFERENCES 180 2.3
EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS: ARTICLE 2 OF REGULATION 4056/86 181 2.3.1
ORIGIN OF ARTICLE 2 OF REGULATION 4056/86: ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION
1017/68 181 X CONTENTS 2.3.2 LEGAL EFFECT OF EXCEPTIONS FOR TECHNICAL
AGREEMENTS IN THE TRANSPORT REGULATIONS 184 2.3.3 EXCEPTION IN FAVOUR OF
TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS IN MARITIME TRANSPORT 185 2.4 EXEMPTION UNDER
ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION 4056: GENERAL ASPECTS 187 2.5 DEFINITION OF
LINER CONFERENCE IN REGULATION 4056/86 188 2.5.1 LACK OF FORMAL
REQUIREMENTS 189 2.5.2 ACTIVITY OF CONFERENCE MEMBERS 190 2.5.2.1
REQUIREMENT OF OPERATING VESSELS AND THE NVOC REGIME 190 2.5.2.2
EXCLUSION OF TRAMP AND CABOTAGE SERVICES: THE POSITION OF NEO-BULK
TRANSPORT 192 2.5.2.3 CARGO CONFERENCES AND PASSENGER CONFERENCES 193
2.5.3 GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF CONFERENCES; SUPERCONFERENCES; VARIOUS
CONFERENCES IN ONE TRADE 194 2.5.4 ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LINER
CONFERENCES 198 2.6 REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 AND AGREEMENTS AUTHORISED
BY IT: THE SCOPE OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION 200 2.6.1 BASIC SCOPE OF THE
BLOCK EXEMPTION: ARTICLE 3 AS A CATCH-ALL EXEMPTION 200 2.6.2 AGREEMENTS
AUTHORISED AS PREREQUISITES FOR EXEMPTION 201 2.6.2.1 FIXING OF FREIGHT
RATES AS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT OF THE EXEMPTION 201 2.6.2.2 NEED
FOR OTHER RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS TO OBTAIN THE EXEMPTION 202 2.6.3
CERTAIN PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE FIXING OF FREIGHT TARIFFS FOR LINER
CONFERENCES 205 2.6.3.1 EXISTENCE OF MALPRACTICES WITHIN CONFERENCES AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES 205 2.6.3.2 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PRODUCTS IN
CONFERENCE TARIFFS 207 2.6.4 AGREEMENTS EXPRESSLY AUTHORISED BY THE
EXEMPTION 209 2.6.4.1 RATIONALISATION AGREEMENTS: AGREEMENTS CONCERNING
THE SUPPLY OF LINER SHIPPING SERVICES 209 2.6.4.2 POOL AGREEMENTS 213
2.6.5 UNSPECIFIED AGREEMENTS ANCILLARY TO THE BASIC CONFERENCE
AGREEMENTS 214 2.6.5.1 RULES CONCERNING PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES:
RULES OF ENTRY AND WITHDRAWAL (OPEN AND CLOSED CONFERENCES; GIVING
NOTICE) 216 2.6.5.2 INTERNAL REGULATIONS: ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING;
SELF-POLICING 222 2.6.5.3 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MACHINERY 226 2.6.5.4
AGREEMENTS ON DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING OF SERVICES (AGENTS AND FREIGHT
FORWARDERS) 227 2.6.6 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF SEVERAL CONFERENCES
233 2.7 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND THEIR INDEPENDENT COMPETITORS
AND THE LIMITS OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 OF
REGULATION 4056/86 235 2.8 NON-AUTHORISED CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS:
APPLICABILITY OF THE EXEMPTION, PARTIAL NULLITY AND SEVERABILITY OF
AGREEMENTS 238 2.9 CONDITIONS AND OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON LINER
CONFERENCES 244 2.10 CONDITION OF NON-DISCRIMINATION CONTAINED IN
ARTICLE 4 OF REGULATION 4056/86 245 CONTENTS XI 2.10.1 DISCRIMINATION
BETWEEN PORTS AND COUNTRIES AND COMMUNITY LINER CONFERENCES 246 2.10.2
CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH OF THE CONDITION: NULLITY AND SEVERABILITY OF
DISCRIMINATORY AGREEMENTS 250 2.11 OBLIGATIONS ATTACHED TO THE EXEMPTION
FOR LINER CONFERENCES: ARTICLE 5 OF REGULATION 4056/86 252 2.11.1
CONSULTATIONS WITH SHIPPERS AND SELF-REGULATION IN MARITIME TRANSPORT
253 2.11.2 REGULATION OF LOYALTY ARRANGEMENTS 255 2.11.3 SERVICES NOT
COVERED BY FREIGHT RATES 262 2.11.4 OBLIGATION TO PUBLISH TARIFFS 264
2.11.5 OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY CONCILIATORS RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ARBITRATION AWARDS 266 2.11.6 CONSEQUENCES OF BREACH OF THE OBLIGATIONS
268 2.12 EXEMPTION FOR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND USERS, AND
BETWEEN USERS 269 2.13 MONITORING OF EXEMPTED AGREEMENTS AND CONFERENCE
PRACTICES: WITHDRAWAL OF THE BENEFIT OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES 7 AND 8 OF REGULATION 4056/86 272 2.13.1 BREACH
OF AN OBLIGATION 273 2.13.2 BREACH OF THE BASIC EXEMPTION CONDITIONS:
EFFECTS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE EC TREATY 273 2.13.3
WITHDRAWAL OF THE EXEMPTION FOR ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION: ARTICLE 8
OF THE REGULATION AS A PROCEDURAL PROVISION 279 2.14 RULES IN CONFLICTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES, PARTICIPATION OF SHIPPERS
AND INDISPENSABILITY OF LINER CONFERENCES 287 3.1 GENERAL QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81(3) TO LINER CONFERENCES 287 3.2
FIRST CONDITION FOR OBTAINING AN EXEMPTION: THE ECONOMIC OR TECHNICAL
ADVANTAGES OF CERTAIN RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR
AUTHORISATION IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW 294 3.3 ADVANTAGES OF LINER
CONFERENCES 299 3.4 THEORETICAL REASONS FOR THE ADVANTAGES OF
CONFERENCES 302 3.4.1 MARKET EFFICIENCY AS OPPOSED TO TECHNICAL
EFFICIENCY 302 3.4.2 DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION AND INSTABILITY IN THE
LINER MARKET: THE EMPTY CORE THEORY 304 3.5 THE STABILITY ARGUMENT: A
CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF FREIGHT RATE
FIXING IN SCHEDULED MARITIME TRANSPORT 312 3.5.1 MEANING OF (AN
ADVANTAGE CALLED) STABILITY 312 3.5.2 GENERALLY ILLEGAL NATURE OF
PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW AND EXCEPTIONS TO
THIS RULE 315 3.5.3 ADVANTAGE OF PRICE FIXING UNDER REGULATION 4056/86
320 3.5.4 DUBIOUS ADVANTAGES OF FREIGHT RATE STABILITY 323 3.5.5
CONFERENCES LACK OF STABILISING EFFECTS 325 XII CONTENTS 3.5.5.1
FREQUENCY OF GENERAL INCREASES IN FREIGHT RATES 326 3.5.5.2 COMPETITION
AS REGARDS THE QUALITY OF SERVICES AS A DESTABILISING FACTOR 327 3.5.5.3
DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS ACCORDING TO PRODUCTS IMPOSED BY CONFERENCES 329
3.5.5.4 MALPRACTICES WITHIN CONFERENCES 330 3.5.5.5 ROLE OF CONFERENCES
IN PRICE WARS 333 3.5.5.6 IMPOSITION OF SURCHARGES 334 3.5.6 CONCLUSIONS
REGARDING STABILITY 335 3.6 ADEQUACY AND EFFICIENCY OF SERVICES 336
3.6.1 CONCEPTS OF ADEQUACY AND EFFICIENCY 336 3.6.2 RATIONALISATION OF
SERVICES AS AN ALLEGED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF INEFFICIENCY IN THE
LINER MARKET 338 3.6.3 A CRITIQUE OF THE EFFICIENCY, ADEQUACY AND
RATIONALISATION OF CONFERENCES 340 3.6.3.1 LINER SHIPPING AND
MONOPOLISATION 340 3.6.3.2 ACHIEVEMENTS OF CONFERENCES AS REGARDS
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 344 3.6.3.3 LINER CONFERENCES AND RATIONALISATION
345 3.6.3.4 RATIONALISING CAPACITY OF OTHER TYPES OF AGREEMENTS AND OF
INDEPENDENTS COMPARED TO THAT OF CONFERENCES 348 3.6.4 CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING THE EFFICIENCY AND ADEQUACY THAT CONFERENCES PROVIDE 350 3.7
CONCLUSIONS ON THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF CONFERENCES 352 3.8 A FAIR
SHARE FOR CONSUMERS OF THE BENEFIT RESULTING FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF
LINER CONFERENCES: SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS 352 3.9 TRADITIONAL THEORY
CONCERNING THE RESULTING BENEFITS OF CONFERENCES FOR CONSUMERS AND
REGULATION 4056/86 358 3.10 SURVIVAL OF THE TRADITIONAL BENEFITS OF
CONFERENCES AND THEIR PERCEPTION BY USERS 360 3.11 ON BALANCE, DO LINER
CONFERENCES HAVE POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE EFFECTS? 366 3.12
INDISPENSABLE NATURE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION AGREED BY
CONFERENCE MEMBERS: GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE THIRD CONDITION OF
ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE EC TREATY 372 3.13 DUBIOUSLY INDISPENSABLE NATURE
OF FIXING FREIGHT RATES: LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES 376 3.13.1 ACTS
OF CONFERENCES THEMSELVES AS PROOF OF THE SUBJECTIVE DISPENSABILITY OF
FREIGHT RATE FIXING 376 3.13.1.1 CONTINGENT NATURE OF BELONGING TO LINER
CONFERENCES FOR SHIPOWNERS 376 3.13.1.2 BREACH OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS
BY THEIR MEMBERS: MALPRACTICE REVISITED 378 3.13.2 EXISTENCE OF LESS
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PRICE STABILITY:
NON-DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS AND LONG-TERM SERVICE CONTRACTS 379 3.13.2.1
OBJECTIVE DISPENSABILITY OF DISCRIMINATION ACCORDING TO TYPE OF CARGO
IN CONFERENCE TARIFFS 380 3.13.2.2 SERVICE CONTRACTS AS AN HISTORICAL
ALTERNATIVE TO PRICE FIXING IN SCHEDULED MARITIME TRANSPORT: COMMON
CARRIAGE AND CONTRACT CARRIAGE 380 CONTENTS XIII 3.13.2.3 REVIVAL OF
LONG-TERM CONTRACTS IN THE USA AND RETURN TO THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN SERVICE CONTRACTS AND FREIGHT RATES 382 3.13.2.4 EXPANSION OF
CONTRACT CARRIAGE AND THE END OF INSTABILITY THROUGH ADEQUATE AND
EFFICIENT MEANS 384 3.13.2.5 SERVICE CONTRACTS IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION
LAW 387 3.14 INDISPENSABILITY OF MARKET-SHARING AND RATIONALISATION
AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO WITHIN LINER CONFERENCES AND THE CONTROL OF
SUPPLY BY PART OF THEIR MEMBERS 396 3.15 OPEN OR CLOSED CONFERENCES IN
THE LIGHT OF THE THIRD CONDITION FOR THE EXEMPTION 399 3.16
INDISPENSABLE NATURE OF OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION AUTHORISED BY
LINER CONFERENCE MEMBERS: AGREEMENTS RESULTING FROM CONSULTATIONS
BETWEEN SHIPPERS AND CONFERENCES AND LOYALTY AGREEMENTS 401 3.17
UNLIMITED DURATION OF EXEMPTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE THIRD CONDITION OF
ARTICLE 81 (3) OF THE EC TREATY AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY 404 4 THE MARKET POWER OF LINER CONFERENCES 407 4.1
INTRODUCTION 407 4.2 ECONOMIC POWER UNDER ARTICLE 81(3)(B) OF THE EC
TREATY: THE CONDITION OF NOT ELIMINATING COMPETITION IN RESPECT OF A
SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MARKET 407 4.2.1 GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE
FOURTH CONDITION FOR THE EXEMPTION 407 4.2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ARTICLES 81(3) AND 82 OF THE EC TREATY 412 4.2.3 THEORIES CONCERNING THE
RELATION BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF DOMINANT POSITION AND ELIMINATION OF
COMPETITION IN RESPECT OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MARKET 416 4.2.4
TOTAL INCOMPATIBILITY OF DOMINANT POSITIONS RESULTING FROM A RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENT WITH ARTICLE 81 (3) (B) OF THE EC TREATY 421 4.2.4.1
COLLECTIVE DOMINANT POSITIONS IN GENERAL 421 4.2.4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE
COLLECTIVE POSITION AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 422 4.2.4.3
COLLECTIVE (DOMINANT) POSITIONS RESULTING FROM RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS
428 4.2 A A ANALYSIS OF MARKET POWER IN SITUATIONS WHERE A COLLECTIVE
DOMINANT POSITION EXISTS 431 4.3 DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET IN
LINER SHIPPING: ANALYSIS OF LINER MARKETS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 432
4.3.1 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCT MARKET 433 4.3.2 GEOGRAPHICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCT MARKET 441 4.3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
MARKET 442 4.4 COLLECTIVE POSITION OF LINER CONFERENCES: THE PROBLEM
OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 443 4.4.1 UNEQUIVOCAL COLLECTIVE POSITION OF
CONFERENCES 444 4.4.2 PROBLEM OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 448 4.5 DOMINANT
POSITION OF CONFERENCES 452 4.5.1 STRUCTURE OF SUPPLY 455 4.5.1.1
INTRODUCTION 455 XIV CONTENTS 4.5.1.2 ABSOLUTE MARKET SHARES: STABILITY,
DURABILITY AND IMPORTANCE; THE NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF CONFERENCES 456
4.5.1.3 RELATIVE MARKET SHARES: QUALITY OF SERVICES AND QUALITY OF
COMPETITION FROM THE INDEPENDENTS; THEIR ROLE ON LINER MARKETS 463
4.5.1.4 COMPETITION FROM NON-VESSEL OPERATORS 470 4.5.1.5 DEGREE OF
MARKET CONCENTRATION 473 4.5.2 POTENTIAL COMPETITION 476 4.5.2.1
TRADITIONAL POTENTIAL COMPETITION 477 4.5.2.2 THEORY OF CONTESTABLE
MARKETS 482 4.5.3 STRUCTURE OF DEMAND AND THE COUNTERVAILING POWER OF
USERS 486 4.5.4 OTHER ANCILLARY CRITERIA OF A STRUCTURAL NATURE 501
4.5.5 ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOUR: THE MARKET POWER OF CONFERENCES IN THE
LIGHT OF THEIR PRACTICES 501 4.5.5.1 ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION IN
GENERAL: CONCEPTS AND EXAMPLES 502 4.5.5.2 ABUSES COMMITTED BY LINER
CONFERENCES IN COMMUNITY DECISIONS 503 4.5.5.3 PRACTICES CAPABLE OF
BEING CONSIDERED ABUSIVE AUTHORISED BY REGULATION 4056/86: INCREASE OF
FREIGHT RATES, IMPOSITION OF SURCHARGES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
DIFFERENT TYPES OF CARGO AND LOYALTY ARRANGEMENTS 505 4.6 CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF NON-ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION AND THE
MARKET POWER OF LINER CONFERENCES 520 5 THE FUTURE OF LINER CONFERENCES
523 5.1 ATYPICAL ORIGIN OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION FOR LINER CONFERENCES 523
5.2 THE DUBIOUS MERITS OF LINER CONFERENCES 526 5.2.1 THE PARADOX OF
STABILITY 528 5.2.2 SHIPPERS AND PATERNALISM 531 5.2.3 WEIGHING UP THE
PROS AND CONS 533 5.2.4 DISPENSING WITH INDISPENSABILITY 533 5.2.5
MARKET POWER OF LINER CONFERENCES 535 5.3 STABILITY AND EFFECTIVE
COMPETITION 536 5.4 REGULATION 4056/86 AS AN EXAMPLE OF ABUSE OF THE
BLOCK EXEMPTION SYSTEM 542 5.4.1 ACCEPTABLE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION
IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW 542 5.4.2 CONFERENCES AND THE LIMITS OF
SELF-REGULATION IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW 545 5.4.3 MANIPULATION OF
ARTICLE 81(3) FOR MARITIME POLICY ENDS 548 5.5 LINER CONFERENCES AT THE
COMMUNITY CROSS-ROADS 552 5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 552 5.5.2 APPLICATION OF
THE COMPETITION RULES TO MARITIME TRANSPORT AND ITS RISKS 553 5.5.2.1 AN
EXAMPLE OF A STEP BACKWARDS: THE US POLICY TOWARDS LINER CONFERENCES 555
5.5.2.2 CONTROL POLICIES IN THE USA AND EUROPE AFTER 1984 559 5.5.2.3
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE AUTHORISATION OF CONFERENCES IN
THE USA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 561 5.5.2.4 NEW CONTENT FOR US COMITY 562
CONTENTS XV 5.5.3 THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UN CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE
OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN MARITIME TRANSPORT 564 5.5.3.1 THE
UNCTAD CODE AND EC LAW 565 5.5.3.2 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT 567 5.6 BUILDING A NEW
MODEL: THE REVIEW OF REGULATION 4056/86 AND THE END OF LINER CONFERENCES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 568 5.6.1 ORIGIN AND SURVIVAL OF MARITIME
CONFERENCES IN THE WORLD: IDEOLOGICAL MARKETING AND SHIPOWNERS PRESSURE
GROUPS 571 5.6.2 END OF THE SPECIFICITY OF LINER SHIPPING 574 5.6.3 THE
EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES 578 5.7 THE FUTURE OF THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY
580 5.7.1 INTRODUCTION 580 5.7.2 A WORLD WITHOUT MARITIME CARTELS 581
5.7.2.1 THE UNLIKELY APOCALYPSE OF FREE COMPETITION 581 5.7.2.2 PRICE
FORMATION IN THE NEW WORLD OF SCHEDULED MARITIME TRANSPORT 584 5.7.3 THE
NEW ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES: OLIGOPOLISTIC CONCENTRATION
AND THE SURVIVAL OF DISCRIMINATION 586 5.7.4 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN SHIPOWNERS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONFERENCES 590 5.8 FINAL
CONSIDERATIONS 594 BIBLIOGRAPHY 603 INDEX 629
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SHIPPING CONFERENCES UNDER EC ANTITRUST LAW CRITICISM OF A LEGAL PARADOX
LUIS ORTIZ BLANCO TRANSLATED BY ANDREW READ *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND
PORTLAND, OREGON 2007 CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS XVII TABLE OF REGULATIONS,
DIRECTIVES AND OTHER COMMUNITY ACTS XIX TABLE OF LEGISLATION XXV TABLE
OF CASES XXVI 1 THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION OF MARITIME
CARTELS 1 1.1 LINER SHIPPING IN THE WORLD AND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1
1.2 THE CARTELISATION OF THE SEA 3 1.2.1 ORIGINS OF LINER CONFERENCES 3
1.2.2 A CENTURY OF CONFERENCES: 1875 TO 1966 6 1.2.3 THE CONTAINER
REVOLUTION 10 1.2.4 NEW REALITIES, NEW AGREEMENTS 14 1.3 CONFERENCES AND
THEIR AGREEMENTS 16 1.3.1 ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS, OBJECTIVES AND
LEGAL NATURE OF LINER CONFERENCES 16 1.3.2 EVOLUTION OF THE TERM 'LINER
CONFERENCE' AND THE DEFINITION OF 'CONFERENCE' 18 1.3.3 AGREEMENTS AND
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES OF CONFERENCES: TRADITION AND RENEWAL 19 1.4
INITIAL REACTIONS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO CONFERENCES 20 1.4.1
CONFERENCES BEFORE THE UK AND US COURTS 20 1.4.1.1 THE MOGUL CASE 20
1.4.1.2 FIRST ACTIONS AGAINST CONFERENCES BROUGHT BY THE US DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 22 1.4.2 FIRST INVESTIGATIONS INTO CONFERENCES: THE BRITISH
AND UNITED STATES COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY 22 1.4.2.1 FIRST COMMISSIONS OF
INQUIRY INTO THE PRACTICES OF CONFERENCES IN TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA 23 1.4.2.2 ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SHIPPING RINGS 23 1.4.2.3 ALEXANDER COMMITTEE 26 1.4.2.4. OTHER
SUBSEQUENT INQUIRIES INTO LINER CONFERENCES 28 1.5 US REGULATION OF
CONFERENCES 30 1.5.1 SHIPPING ACT 1916 30 1.5.2 THE 1961 REFORM AND
EROSION OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 33 1.5.3 SHIPPING ACT 1984 35 1.5.4 THE
1998 REFORM AND EROSION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'COMMON CARRIER' 40 1.6
EUROPEAN 'SELF-REGULATION' 45 VIII CONTENTS 1.6.1 UNREGULATED
'SELF-REGULATION' (1875-1963) 45 1.6.2 PRIVATE RULES GOVERNING
SELF-REGULATION (1963-1974) 47 1.6.2.1 APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW
CRITERIA TO LINER CONFERENCES IN THE USA AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE
DEFENCE OF THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM 47 1.6.2.2 INCREASED DISSATISFACTION
WITH MARITIME CONFERENCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND REACTIONS TO THEM
IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 51 1.7 PARTIAL REGULATION OF SELF-REGULATION:
OTHER REGULATORY SYSTEMS UP TO 1970 56 1.8 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
LINER CONFERENCES 58 1.9 UNCTAD AND MARITIME TRANSPORT 63 1.10 LINER
CONFERENCES IN UNCTAD: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
CONFERENCES 66 1.10.1 LINER CONFERENCES IN UNCTAD I AND UNCTAD II: THE
COMMON MEASURE OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE NEW DELHI CONCLUSIONS 66 1.10.2
THE ROCHDALE REPORT, THE CENSA CODE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE UNCTAD CODE
69 1.11 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CONFERENCES: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES 72 1.11.1
DEFINITIONS, CONTENT AND RULES FOR PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES 72
1.11.2 RELATIONS BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND SHIPPERS: CONSULTATION
MACHINERY 77 1.11.3 FREIGHT RATES, TARIFFS AND SURCHARGES 78 1.11.4
ADEQUACY OF SERVICES 80 1.11.5 LOYALTY AGREEMENTS 82 1.11.6 DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MACHINERY AND FINAL CLAUSES 84 1.12 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
REACTION TO THE CODE OF CONDUCT 85 1.12.1 THE THIRD WORLD, THE UNCTAD
CODE AND THE 'CODIST' PHILOSOPHY 86 1.12.2 THE OECD COUNTRIES AND THE
UNCTAD CODE 88 1.12.2.1 MARITIME POLICY OF THE OECD AND FREIGHT RATE
CONFERENCES 88 1.12.2.2 THE OECD COUNTRIES AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
LINER CONFERENCES 97 1.13 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S APPROACH TO THE CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES AND THE PHENOMENON OF CONFERENCES 98
1.13.1 ORIGINS OF EC MARITIME TRANSPORT POLICY 98 1.13.2 CODE OF CONDUCT
AS THE CATALYST FOR COMMUNITY MARITIME POLICY AND THE BRUSSELS PACKAGE
100 1.13.3 IMPORTANCE, CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTENT OF THE BRUSSELS
PACKAGE 104 1.13.4 THE BRUSSELS PACKAGE AND THE COMPETITION RULES 108
1.13.5 INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE BRUSSELS PACKAGE 110 1.13.6
MARITIME TRANSPORT POLICY OF THE COMMUNITY AND OF THE OECD AFTER THE
BRUSSELS PACKAGE 114 1.13.6.1 A TIME OF CHANGE FOR COMMUNITY MARITIME
TRANSPORT POLICY 114 1.13.6.2 THE 1985 SHIPPING MEMORANDUM 116 1.13.6.3
THE 1986 PACKAGE OF REGULATIONS: FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES, COMMERCIAL
DEFENCE, FREE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRADE AND FREEDOM OF COMPETITION IN
COMMUNITY LEGISLATION 118 CONTENTS IX 1.14 APPLICATION OF THE
COMPETITION RULES TO TRANSPORT AND THE ORIGINS OF REGULATION 4056/86 119
1.14.1 COMPETITION RULES IN THE EC TREATY: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 AND
GENERAL REGULATIONS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 119 1.14.2 CONTROVERSY
SURROUNDING THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE TREATY TITLE DEVOTED TO TRANSPORT
AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE EC TREATY 125 1.14.3 REGULATION 17,
REGULATION 141 AND REGULATION 1017/68: A BRIEF HISTORY 128 1.14.4 FRENCH
SEAMEN: A MILESTONE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN THE
TRANSPORT SECTOR 133 1.14.5 ADOPTION OF REGULATIONS 4056/86 AND 3975/87
137 1.14.6 PROCEDURE APPLICABLE IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW AS REGARDS
THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 140 1.15 THE APPLICATION OF REGULATION 4056/86 BY
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 140 1.16 THE REVIEW PROCESS AND THE DEROGATION
OF REGULATION 4056/86 144 2 COUNCIL REGULATION 4056/86 AND THE BLOCK
EXEMPTION FOR LINER CONFERENCES 147 2. 1 DUAL NATURE OF REGULATION
4056/86 147 2.1.1 REGULATION 4056/86 WITHIN COMMUNITY POLICIES 147
2.1.1.1 REGULATION 4056/86: A COMPETITION REGULATION 147 2.1.1.2
REGULATION 4056/86 AS PART OF COMMUNITY TRANSPORT POLICY 150 2.1.1.3
OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION 4056/86 153 2.1.2 TWO LEGAL BASES FOR
REGULATION 4056/86 156 2.1.2.1 ARTICLE 87 OF THE EEC TREATY AS A LEGAL
BASIS FOR REGULATION 4056/86 157 2.1.2.2 ARTICLE 84(2) OF THE EEC TREATY
AS THE SECOND LEGAL BASIS FOR REGULATION 4056/86: INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
AND PROCEDURE FOR THE ADOPTION OF DECISIONS 158 2.2 SCOPE AND GENERAL
CONTENT OF REGULATION 4056/86 160 2.2.1 SCOPE OF REGULATION 4056/86 160
2.2.1.1 SCOPE OF REGULATION 4056/86 COMPARED WITH THAT OF ARTICLES 81
AND 82 OF THE EC TREATY 160 2.2.1.2 EXCLUSION OF NON-MARITIME TRANSPORT
AND THE DOUBTS CONCERNING CARGO-HANDLING SERVICES IN PORTS 163 2.2.1.3
CABOTAGE 166 2.2.1.4 EXCLUSION OF TRAMP SERVICES 167 2.2.1.5 EXCLUSION
OF MARITIME TRANSPORT BETWEEN PORTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND THE REGIME
FOR 'SERVICES ANCILLARY TO' MARITIME TRANSPORT 172 2.2.1.6 LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXCLUSION OF TRAMP AND CABOTAGE SHIPPING 175 2.2.2
PROCEDURAL CONTENT OF REGULATION 4056/86 AS A SPECIFIC REGULATION FOR
CERTAIN FORMS OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 176 2.2.3 SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF
REGULATION 4056/86 AS A BLOCK EXEMPTION FOR LINER CONFERENCES 180 2.3
EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS: ARTICLE 2 OF REGULATION 4056/86 181 2.3.1
ORIGIN OF ARTICLE 2 OF REGULATION 4056/86: ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION
1017/68 181 X CONTENTS 2.3.2 LEGAL EFFECT OF 'EXCEPTIONS' FOR TECHNICAL
AGREEMENTS IN THE TRANSPORT REGULATIONS 184 2.3.3 EXCEPTION IN FAVOUR OF
TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS IN MARITIME TRANSPORT 185 2.4 EXEMPTION UNDER
ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION 4056: GENERAL ASPECTS 187 2.5 DEFINITION OF
'LINER CONFERENCE' IN REGULATION 4056/86 188 2.5.1 LACK OF FORMAL
REQUIREMENTS 189 2.5.2 ACTIVITY OF CONFERENCE MEMBERS 190 2.5.2.1
REQUIREMENT OF OPERATING VESSELS AND THE NVOC REGIME 190 2.5.2.2
EXCLUSION OF TRAMP AND CABOTAGE SERVICES: THE POSITION OF NEO-BULK
TRANSPORT 192 2.5.2.3 CARGO CONFERENCES AND PASSENGER CONFERENCES 193
2.5.3 GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF CONFERENCES; SUPERCONFERENCES; VARIOUS
CONFERENCES IN ONE TRADE 194 2.5.4 ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LINER
CONFERENCES 198 2.6 REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 AND AGREEMENTS AUTHORISED
BY IT: THE SCOPE OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION 200 2.6.1 BASIC SCOPE OF THE
BLOCK EXEMPTION: ARTICLE 3 AS A CATCH-ALL EXEMPTION 200 2.6.2 AGREEMENTS
AUTHORISED AS PREREQUISITES FOR EXEMPTION 201 2.6.2.1 FIXING OF FREIGHT
RATES AS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT OF THE EXEMPTION 201 2.6.2.2 NEED
FOR OTHER RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS TO OBTAIN THE EXEMPTION 202 2.6.3
CERTAIN PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE FIXING OF FREIGHT TARIFFS FOR LINER
CONFERENCES 205 2.6.3.1 EXISTENCE OF MALPRACTICES WITHIN CONFERENCES AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES 205 2.6.3.2 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PRODUCTS IN
CONFERENCE TARIFFS 207 2.6.4 AGREEMENTS EXPRESSLY AUTHORISED BY THE
EXEMPTION 209 2.6.4.1 RATIONALISATION AGREEMENTS: AGREEMENTS CONCERNING
THE SUPPLY OF LINER SHIPPING SERVICES 209 2.6.4.2 POOL AGREEMENTS 213
2.6.5 UNSPECIFIED AGREEMENTS ANCILLARY TO THE BASIC CONFERENCE
AGREEMENTS 214 2.6.5.1 RULES CONCERNING PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES:
RULES OF ENTRY AND WITHDRAWAL (OPEN AND CLOSED CONFERENCES; GIVING
NOTICE) 216 2.6.5.2 INTERNAL REGULATIONS: ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING;
SELF-POLICING 222 2.6.5.3 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MACHINERY 226 2.6.5.4
AGREEMENTS ON DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING OF SERVICES (AGENTS AND FREIGHT
FORWARDERS) 227 2.6.6 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF SEVERAL CONFERENCES
233 2.7 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND THEIR INDEPENDENT COMPETITORS
AND THE LIMITS OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 OF
REGULATION 4056/86 235 2.8 NON-AUTHORISED CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS:
APPLICABILITY OF THE EXEMPTION, PARTIAL NULLITY AND SEVERABILITY OF
AGREEMENTS 238 2.9 CONDITIONS AND OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON LINER
CONFERENCES 244 2.10 CONDITION OF NON-DISCRIMINATION CONTAINED IN
ARTICLE 4 OF REGULATION 4056/86 245 CONTENTS XI 2.10.1 DISCRIMINATION
BETWEEN PORTS AND COUNTRIES AND COMMUNITY LINER CONFERENCES 246 2.10.2
CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH OF THE CONDITION: NULLITY AND SEVERABILITY OF
DISCRIMINATORY AGREEMENTS 250 2.11 OBLIGATIONS ATTACHED TO THE EXEMPTION
FOR LINER CONFERENCES: ARTICLE 5 OF REGULATION 4056/86 252 2.11.1
CONSULTATIONS WITH SHIPPERS AND SELF-REGULATION IN MARITIME TRANSPORT
253 2.11.2 REGULATION OF LOYALTY ARRANGEMENTS 255 2.11.3 SERVICES NOT
COVERED BY FREIGHT RATES 262 2.11.4 OBLIGATION TO PUBLISH TARIFFS 264
2.11.5 OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY CONCILIATORS' RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ARBITRATION AWARDS 266 2.11.6 CONSEQUENCES OF BREACH OF THE OBLIGATIONS
268 2.12 EXEMPTION FOR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND USERS, AND
BETWEEN USERS 269 2.13 MONITORING OF EXEMPTED AGREEMENTS AND CONFERENCE
PRACTICES: WITHDRAWAL OF THE BENEFIT OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES 7 AND 8 OF REGULATION 4056/86 272 2.13.1 BREACH
OF AN OBLIGATION 273 2.13.2 BREACH OF THE BASIC EXEMPTION CONDITIONS:
EFFECTS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE EC TREATY 273 2.13.3
WITHDRAWAL OF THE EXEMPTION FOR ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION: ARTICLE 8
OF THE REGULATION AS A PROCEDURAL PROVISION 279 2.14 RULES IN CONFLICTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES, PARTICIPATION OF SHIPPERS
AND INDISPENSABILITY OF LINER CONFERENCES 287 3.1 GENERAL QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81(3) TO LINER CONFERENCES 287 3.2
FIRST CONDITION FOR OBTAINING AN EXEMPTION: THE ECONOMIC OR TECHNICAL
'ADVANTAGES' OF CERTAIN RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR
AUTHORISATION IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW 294 3.3 ADVANTAGES OF LINER
CONFERENCES 299 3.4 THEORETICAL REASONS FOR THE ADVANTAGES OF
CONFERENCES 302 3.4.1 MARKET EFFICIENCY AS OPPOSED TO TECHNICAL
EFFICIENCY 302 3.4.2 DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION AND INSTABILITY IN THE
LINER MARKET: THE EMPTY CORE THEORY 304 3.5 THE STABILITY ARGUMENT: A
CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF FREIGHT RATE
FIXING IN SCHEDULED MARITIME TRANSPORT 312 3.5.1 MEANING OF (AN
ADVANTAGE CALLED) STABILITY 312 3.5.2 GENERALLY ILLEGAL NATURE OF
PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW AND EXCEPTIONS TO
THIS RULE 315 3.5.3 ADVANTAGE OF PRICE FIXING UNDER REGULATION 4056/86
320 3.5.4 DUBIOUS ADVANTAGES OF FREIGHT RATE STABILITY 323 3.5.5
CONFERENCES' LACK OF STABILISING EFFECTS 325 XII CONTENTS 3.5.5.1
FREQUENCY OF GENERAL INCREASES IN FREIGHT RATES 326 3.5.5.2 COMPETITION
AS REGARDS THE QUALITY OF SERVICES AS A DESTABILISING FACTOR 327 3.5.5.3
DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS ACCORDING TO PRODUCTS IMPOSED BY CONFERENCES 329
3.5.5.4 MALPRACTICES WITHIN CONFERENCES 330 3.5.5.5 ROLE OF CONFERENCES
IN PRICE WARS 333 3.5.5.6 IMPOSITION OF SURCHARGES 334 3.5.6 CONCLUSIONS
REGARDING STABILITY 335 3.6 ADEQUACY AND EFFICIENCY OF SERVICES 336
3.6.1 CONCEPTS OF ADEQUACY AND EFFICIENCY 336 3.6.2 RATIONALISATION OF
SERVICES AS AN ALLEGED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF INEFFICIENCY IN THE
LINER MARKET 338 3.6.3 A CRITIQUE OF THE EFFICIENCY, ADEQUACY AND
RATIONALISATION OF CONFERENCES 340 3.6.3.1 LINER SHIPPING AND
MONOPOLISATION 340 3.6.3.2 ACHIEVEMENTS OF CONFERENCES AS REGARDS
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 344 3.6.3.3 LINER CONFERENCES AND RATIONALISATION
345 3.6.3.4 RATIONALISING CAPACITY OF OTHER TYPES OF AGREEMENTS AND OF
INDEPENDENTS COMPARED TO THAT OF CONFERENCES 348 3.6.4 CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING THE EFFICIENCY AND ADEQUACY THAT CONFERENCES PROVIDE 350 3.7
CONCLUSIONS ON THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF CONFERENCES 352 3.8 A FAIR
SHARE FOR CONSUMERS OF THE BENEFIT RESULTING FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF
LINER CONFERENCES: SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS 352 3.9 TRADITIONAL THEORY
CONCERNING THE RESULTING BENEFITS OF CONFERENCES FOR CONSUMERS AND
REGULATION 4056/86 358 3.10 SURVIVAL OF THE TRADITIONAL BENEFITS OF
CONFERENCES AND THEIR PERCEPTION BY USERS 360 3.11 ON BALANCE, DO LINER
CONFERENCES HAVE POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE EFFECTS? 366 3.12
INDISPENSABLE NATURE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION AGREED BY
CONFERENCE MEMBERS: GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE THIRD CONDITION OF
ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE EC TREATY 372 3.13 DUBIOUSLY INDISPENSABLE NATURE
OF FIXING FREIGHT RATES: LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES 376 3.13.1 ACTS
OF CONFERENCES THEMSELVES AS PROOF OF THE 'SUBJECTIVE DISPENSABILITY' OF
FREIGHT RATE FIXING 376 3.13.1.1 CONTINGENT NATURE OF BELONGING TO LINER
CONFERENCES FOR SHIPOWNERS 376 3.13.1.2 BREACH OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS
BY THEIR MEMBERS: MALPRACTICE REVISITED 378 3.13.2 EXISTENCE OF LESS
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PRICE STABILITY:
NON-DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS AND LONG-TERM SERVICE CONTRACTS 379 3.13.2.1
'OBJECTIVE DISPENSABILITY' OF DISCRIMINATION ACCORDING TO TYPE OF CARGO
IN CONFERENCE TARIFFS 380 3.13.2.2 SERVICE CONTRACTS AS AN HISTORICAL
ALTERNATIVE TO PRICE FIXING IN SCHEDULED MARITIME TRANSPORT: COMMON
CARRIAGE AND CONTRACT CARRIAGE 380 CONTENTS XIII 3.13.2.3 REVIVAL OF
LONG-TERM CONTRACTS IN THE USA AND RETURN TO THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN SERVICE CONTRACTS AND FREIGHT RATES 382 3.13.2.4 EXPANSION OF
CONTRACT CARRIAGE AND THE END OF INSTABILITY THROUGH ADEQUATE AND
EFFICIENT MEANS 384 3.13.2.5 SERVICE CONTRACTS IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION
LAW 387 3.14 INDISPENSABILITY OF MARKET-SHARING AND RATIONALISATION
AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO WITHIN LINER CONFERENCES AND THE CONTROL OF
SUPPLY BY PART OF THEIR MEMBERS 396 3.15 OPEN OR CLOSED CONFERENCES IN
THE LIGHT OF THE THIRD CONDITION FOR THE EXEMPTION 399 3.16
INDISPENSABLE NATURE OF OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION AUTHORISED BY
LINER CONFERENCE MEMBERS: AGREEMENTS RESULTING FROM CONSULTATIONS
BETWEEN SHIPPERS AND CONFERENCES AND LOYALTY AGREEMENTS 401 3.17
UNLIMITED DURATION OF EXEMPTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE THIRD CONDITION OF
ARTICLE 81 (3) OF THE EC TREATY AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY 404 4 THE MARKET POWER OF LINER CONFERENCES 407 4.1
INTRODUCTION 407 4.2 ECONOMIC POWER UNDER ARTICLE 81(3)(B) OF THE EC
TREATY: THE CONDITION OF NOT ELIMINATING COMPETITION IN RESPECT OF A
SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MARKET 407 4.2.1 GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE
FOURTH CONDITION FOR THE EXEMPTION 407 4.2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ARTICLES 81(3) AND 82 OF THE EC TREATY 412 4.2.3 THEORIES CONCERNING THE
RELATION BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF DOMINANT POSITION AND ELIMINATION OF
COMPETITION IN RESPECT OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MARKET 416 4.2.4
TOTAL INCOMPATIBILITY OF DOMINANT POSITIONS RESULTING FROM A RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENT WITH ARTICLE 81 (3) (B) OF THE EC TREATY 421 4.2.4.1
COLLECTIVE DOMINANT POSITIONS IN GENERAL 421 4.2.4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE
COLLECTIVE POSITION AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 422 4.2.4.3
COLLECTIVE (DOMINANT) POSITIONS RESULTING FROM RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS
428 4.2 A A ANALYSIS OF MARKET POWER IN SITUATIONS WHERE A COLLECTIVE
DOMINANT POSITION EXISTS 431 4.3 DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET IN
LINER SHIPPING: ANALYSIS OF LINER MARKETS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 432
4.3.1 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCT MARKET 433 4.3.2 GEOGRAPHICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCT MARKET 441 4.3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
MARKET 442 4.4 'COLLECTIVE POSITION' OF LINER CONFERENCES: THE PROBLEM
OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 443 4.4.1 UNEQUIVOCAL 'COLLECTIVE POSITION' OF
CONFERENCES 444 4.4.2 PROBLEM OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 448 4.5 DOMINANT
POSITION OF CONFERENCES 452 4.5.1 STRUCTURE OF SUPPLY 455 4.5.1.1
INTRODUCTION 455 XIV CONTENTS 4.5.1.2 ABSOLUTE MARKET SHARES: STABILITY,
DURABILITY AND IMPORTANCE; THE NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF CONFERENCES 456
4.5.1.3 RELATIVE MARKET SHARES: QUALITY OF SERVICES AND QUALITY OF
COMPETITION FROM THE INDEPENDENTS; THEIR ROLE ON LINER MARKETS 463
4.5.1.4 COMPETITION FROM NON-VESSEL OPERATORS 470 4.5.1.5 DEGREE OF
MARKET CONCENTRATION 473 4.5.2 POTENTIAL COMPETITION 476 4.5.2.1
'TRADITIONAL' POTENTIAL COMPETITION 477 4.5.2.2 THEORY OF CONTESTABLE
MARKETS 482 4.5.3 STRUCTURE OF DEMAND AND THE COUNTERVAILING POWER OF
USERS 486 4.5.4 OTHER ANCILLARY CRITERIA OF A STRUCTURAL NATURE 501
4.5.5 ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOUR: THE MARKET POWER OF CONFERENCES IN THE
LIGHT OF THEIR PRACTICES 501 4.5.5.1 ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION IN
GENERAL: CONCEPTS AND EXAMPLES 502 4.5.5.2 ABUSES COMMITTED BY LINER
CONFERENCES IN COMMUNITY DECISIONS 503 4.5.5.3 PRACTICES CAPABLE OF
BEING CONSIDERED ABUSIVE AUTHORISED BY REGULATION 4056/86: INCREASE OF
FREIGHT RATES, IMPOSITION OF SURCHARGES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
DIFFERENT TYPES OF CARGO AND LOYALTY ARRANGEMENTS 505 4.6 CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF NON-ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION AND THE
MARKET POWER OF LINER CONFERENCES 520 5 THE FUTURE OF LINER CONFERENCES
523 5.1 ATYPICAL ORIGIN OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION FOR LINER CONFERENCES 523
5.2 THE DUBIOUS MERITS OF LINER CONFERENCES 526 5.2.1 THE PARADOX OF
STABILITY 528 5.2.2 SHIPPERS AND PATERNALISM 531 5.2.3 WEIGHING UP THE
PROS AND CONS 533 5.2.4 DISPENSING WITH INDISPENSABILITY 533 5.2.5
MARKET POWER OF LINER CONFERENCES 535 5.3 STABILITY AND EFFECTIVE
COMPETITION 536 5.4 REGULATION 4056/86 AS AN EXAMPLE OF ABUSE OF THE
BLOCK EXEMPTION SYSTEM 542 5.4.1 ACCEPTABLE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION
IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW 542 5.4.2 CONFERENCES AND THE LIMITS OF
SELF-REGULATION IN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW 545 5.4.3 MANIPULATION OF
ARTICLE 81(3) FOR MARITIME POLICY ENDS 548 5.5 LINER CONFERENCES AT THE
COMMUNITY CROSS-ROADS 552 5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 552 5.5.2 APPLICATION OF
THE COMPETITION RULES TO MARITIME TRANSPORT AND ITS RISKS 553 5.5.2.1 AN
EXAMPLE OF A STEP BACKWARDS: THE US POLICY TOWARDS LINER CONFERENCES 555
5.5.2.2 CONTROL POLICIES IN THE USA AND EUROPE AFTER 1984 559 5.5.2.3
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE AUTHORISATION OF CONFERENCES IN
THE USA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 561 5.5.2.4 NEW CONTENT FOR US COMITY 562
CONTENTS XV 5.5.3 THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UN CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE
OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN MARITIME TRANSPORT 564 5.5.3.1 THE
UNCTAD CODE AND EC LAW 565 5.5.3.2 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT 567 5.6 BUILDING A NEW
MODEL: THE REVIEW OF REGULATION 4056/86 AND THE END OF LINER CONFERENCES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 568 5.6.1 ORIGIN AND SURVIVAL OF MARITIME
CONFERENCES IN THE WORLD: IDEOLOGICAL MARKETING AND SHIPOWNERS' PRESSURE
GROUPS 571 5.6.2 END OF THE SPECIFICITY OF LINER SHIPPING 574 5.6.3 THE
EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES 578 5.7 THE FUTURE OF THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY
580 5.7.1 INTRODUCTION 580 5.7.2 A WORLD WITHOUT MARITIME CARTELS 581
5.7.2.1 THE UNLIKELY APOCALYPSE OF FREE COMPETITION 581 5.7.2.2 PRICE
FORMATION IN THE NEW WORLD OF SCHEDULED MARITIME TRANSPORT 584 5.7.3 THE
NEW ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES: OLIGOPOLISTIC CONCENTRATION
AND THE SURVIVAL OF DISCRIMINATION 586 5.7.4 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN SHIPOWNERS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONFERENCES 590 5.8 FINAL
CONSIDERATIONS 594 BIBLIOGRAPHY 603 INDEX 629 |
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| author | Ortiz Blanco, Luis |
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| bvnumber | BV021459594 |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV021459594 |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV021459594 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:07:16Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:36:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1841135275 9781841135274 |
| language | English |
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| physical | XLIV, 654 S. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Hart |
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| spelling | Ortiz Blanco, Luis Verfasser aut Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox Luis Ortiz Blanco Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2007 XLIV, 654 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Span. Ausg. u.d.T.: Ortiz Blanco, Luis: Las conferencias maritimas frente al derecho antitrust de la Comunidad Europea. 2007 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014679593&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Ortiz Blanco, Luis Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox |
| title | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox |
| title_auth | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox |
| title_exact_search | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox |
| title_full | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox Luis Ortiz Blanco |
| title_fullStr | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox Luis Ortiz Blanco |
| title_full_unstemmed | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox Luis Ortiz Blanco |
| title_short | Shipping conferences under EC antitrust law |
| title_sort | shipping conferences under ec antitrust law criticism of a legal paradox |
| title_sub | criticism of a legal paradox |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014679593&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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