The economics of business enterprise: an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cheltenham [u.a.]
Elgar
2002
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| Ausgabe: | 3. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXV, 590 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 1840645245 1840649054 1843764202 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The economics of business enterprise |b an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |c Martin Ricketts |
| 250 | |a 3. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cheltenham [u.a.] |b Elgar |c 2002 | |
| 300 | |a XXV, 590 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1820240332246220800 |
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| adam_text |
Contents
Figures xiv
Tables xvi
Preface xvii
Preface to the first edition xix
Preface to the second edition xxiii
Acknowledgement xxv
PART 1 BASIC CONCEPTS
1. The gains from the trade 3
1. Production and the firm 3
2. Scarcity 4
3. The allocation problem 6
4. Recontracting and the allocation problem 11
5. Tatonnement 12
6. The equilibrium method 15
7. Institutions and information 16
8. Institutions and contract enforcement 18
8.1 The exchange game 18
8.2 Conventions and norms 20
8.3 Reputation 23
8.4 Monitoring and penalties 23
8.5 Moral leadership 24
9. Conclusion 25
2. Transactions costs 27
1. The process of exchange 27
2. Contracts and information 30
2.1 Adverse selection or 'hidden information' 30
2.2 Moral hazard or 'hidden action' 34
2.3 Bounded rationality 35
2.4 Asset specificity and 'hold up' 36
3. Institutional responses to transactions costs 38
3.1 Money 39
3.2 Political institutions 42
3.3 The firm as a nexus of contracts 43
v
4. Conclusion 49
Appendix 51
3. The entrepreneur 53
1. Introduction 53
2. Contrasting views of the entrepreneur 54
2.1 The classical tradition 54
2.2 Knight 55
2.3 Kirzner 58
2.4 Schumpeter 65
2.5 Shackle 69
2.6 Casson 71
3. The entrepreneur and the firm 76
3.1 The small entrepreneurial firm 77
3.2 The firm as a coalition of entrepreneurs 80
Appendix 84
4. Property rights 86
1. Introduction 86
2. Types of property rights 88
2.1 Private rights 88
2.2 Communal rights 89
2.3 Collective rights 89
2.4 Exchangeable rights 90
2.5 Alienable and inalienable rights 92
2.6 Exclusion 92
3. The development of property rights 92
4. Team production and the classical capitalist firm 98
5. Alternative structures of property rights 101
5.1 The single proprietor 102
5.2 The partnership 104
5.3 The joint stock company 108
6. Property rights and managerial theories of the firm 111
7. Property rights and transactions cost approaches to the firm 113
7.1 'Ownership'of the firm 113
7.2 Hansmann and the costs of ownership 115
7.3 Grossman, Hart and the property rights theory of the
firm 118
8. Entrepreneurship and property rights 122
8.1 'Ownership'and the entrepreneur 122
8.2 The property rights approach to the finance of the
entrepreneur 124
9. Conclusion 125
Appendix: The assignment of residual control rights 131
5. Principal and agent 136
1. Introduction 136
2. Observability and the sharecropper 137
3. Risk sharing 141
4. Effort incentives 146
5. Information 150
6. Examples of incentive contracts 154
6.1 Health and motor insurance 155
6.2 Law enforcement 155
6.3 Employment contracts 156
7. Monitoring the effort of team members 158
8. Incentive contracts and the firm 162
9. Conclusion 165
Appendix: The Von Neumann Morgenstern axioms of choice
under uncertainty 167
PART 2 THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS
6. Hierarchies 171
1. Introduction 171
2. Piece rates and time rates 173
2.1 Payment schedules, moral hazard and effort 173
2.2 Payment schedules, adverse selection and worker
sorting 177
3. The role of the monitor 179
3.1 Monitoring and moral hazard 179
3.2 Monitoring and adverse selection 180
4. Contracts and adverse selection: the screening
mechanism 182
5. Moral hazard, penalties and wage payments 184
5.1 The efficiency wage 185
5.2 Deferred compensation and'bond posting'. 187
6. The rank order tournament 189
6.1 Incentives and the structure of a tournament 189
6.2 Further problems with high powered incentives 195
7. Idiosyncratic exchange 197
8. Rent seeking, entrepreneurship and opportunism 199
9. The firm as a governance structure 203
9.1 The internal labour market 203
9.2 Specific human capital 204
9.3 Behavioural norms and perceptions of fairness 207
9.4 Company unions and disputes procedures 208
10. The Japanese firm 208
11. Conclusion 210
Appendix 214
7. Integration and the visible hand 217
1. The variety of business enterprise 217
1.1 Vertical integration 217
1.2 Conglomerate diversification 218
1.3 International integration 219
2. Strategy and structure 220
3. Visible and invisible hands 226
3.1 The boundary of the firm 226
3.2 Arm's length and obligational transactional relations 227
3.3 The franchise chain 229
3.4 Quasi vertical integration 230
4. Integration, complexity and environmental uncertainty 232
4.1 Integration, coordination and complexity 232
4.2 Integration, coordination and uncertainty 235
5. Integration, internalisation and market failure 238
5.1 Monitoring input quality 239
5.2 Internalisation and the multinational firm 241
5.3 Integration and market power 242
5.4 Transaction specific investments and opportunistic
recontracting 246
5.5 Enforcing intertemporal commitments 250
6. Integration and innovation 251
6.1 Research and development 252
6.2 Schumpeter's entrepreneur 255
7. Conclusion 258
1. Corporate governance 1: managerial incentives 261
1. Who controls the joint stock firm? 261
2. Four views of corporate control 262
2.1 Control and the shareholder: the traditional view 262
2.2 The managerial interest and the Berle Means critique 264
2.3 Entrepreneurship and the neo Austrian critique 265
2.4 Contractual incompleteness, dependency and control 267
3. Corporate governance as a principal agent problem 269
4. Managerial incentive contracts 271
4.1 Managerial incentives and the theory of principal and
agent 271
4.2 Some early studies of managerial contracts 273
4.3 Interpretative problems and more recent studies 275
5. Monitoring managers 282
5.1 Do shareholders monitor managers? 282
5.2 The costs of monitoring 283
5.3 The degree of shareholder control 284
6. The managerial labour market 290
7. The product market 293
8. Conclusion 297
9. Corporate governance 2: the takeover and capital structure 301
1. The entrepreneur and the takeover 301
2. The takeover and the free rider problem 302
3. Minority shareholders and the takeover 303
4. Hold up, breach of faith and the takeover 305
5. Adverse selection, short termism and the takeover 306
6. Moral hazard, monitoring costs and the takeover 309
7. The takeover and capital market efficiency 310
8. Defences against hostile takeovers 313
8.1 Supermajority amendments 313
8.2 Dual class recapitalisations 314
8.3 Poison pills 314
8.4 Greenmail 315
8.5 Golden parachutes 316
9. Do takeovers improve economic efficiency? 316
9.1 The takeover wave of the 1980s 316
9.2 Moral hazard and the free cash flow theory 317
9.3 The role of the'junk bond' 318
9.4 Gains to target and bidding companies 319
10. Capital structure and corporate governance 321
10.1 The Modigliani Miller theorem 321
10.2 The agency costs theory of financial structure 323
10.3 Agency problems, debt and the Hart Moore theory
of financial structure 326
10.4 Bounded rationality and financial structure 331
11. Corporate governance bank versus market systems 332
11.1 The United Kingdom and the United States 332
11.2 Japan and Germany 333
j 11.3 Differences in capital structures 335
i 12. Conclusion 337
I
10. Profit sharing, cooperative and mutual enterprise 341
1. Residual claims and enterprise governance 341
2. Principal Agent theory and profit sharing 344
2.1 Type of firm classified by distribution of residual
claims 344
2.2 Monitoring effort and the profit sharing firm 348
3. Profit sharing and contractual incompleteness 350
3.1 Debt finance 350
3.2 Hold up 351
3.3 Bargaining within the firm 352
4. The problem of investment decisions 353
5. The size of the team 355
5.1 Employment in the labour managed firm 356
5.2 Employment and profit sharing 360
6. The labour capital partnership 361
7. The role of peer pressure 364
7.1 Internal pressure 364
7.2 External pressure 365
8. The retail cooperative 368
8.1 Transactions costs and the retail cooperative 368
8.2 Role of retail cooperatives in nineteenth century
England 369
9. Marketing and supply cooperatives 371
9.1 Marketing and distribution 371
9.2 Supply cooperatives and the utilities 373
10. Mutual enterprise 374
11. Stakeholding 377
12. Conclusion 379
11. Non profit and charitable enterprise 383
1. The non profit enterprise 383
2. Governance problems and the non profit
enterprise 384
3. The rationale of the non profit enterprise 387
3.1 Contract failure 387
3.2 Government failure 389
3.3 Tax advantages 390
4. Examples of non profit enterprise 391
4.1 Hospitals 391
4.2 The university 394
4.3 The arts 395
4.4 The club 397
5. Bureaucracy 400
6. Conclusion 403
12. Evolution and economic organisation 406
1. The variety of theoretical approaches 406
1.1 Neoclassical analysis of organisations 407
1.2 Radical approaches to organisations 408
2. The resources of the firm 409
3. Evolution in economics 411
3.1 Biological Analogies 411
3.2 The evolution of the firm 412
3.3 Market relationships and evolution 413
3.4 An ecology of institutions 415
4. Evolution and efficiency 416
5. Conclusion 418
PART 3 PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION
13. Economic organisation and the role of the state 423
1. Introduction 423
2. The neoclassical tradition 424
3. The new institutional economics and public policy 425
3.1 Establishing external institutions 426
3.2 The normative Hobbes and Coase theorems 427
4. The public interest approach 433
5. Criticisms of the public interest approach to policy 436
5.1 The Austrian critique 437
5.2 The 'public choice' critique 443
5.3 Contracting and the property rights critique 445
6. Conclusion 451
14. Private and public enterprise: the ownership of business 453
1. Introduction 453
2. Some historical background 453
2.1 The growth of public enterprise in the UK to 1980 453
2.2 Public enterprise in other mixed economies 454
2.3 Reform after 1980 455
3. Public versus private enterprise 455
3.1 Empirical studies in the 1970s 455
3.2 Reform of public enterprise 457
3.3 The forces of competition 462
4. The process of privatisation in the 'mixed economies' 466
4.1 Stock market flotation 466
4.2 The employee buy out 467
4.3 The private sale 468
4.4 Voucher privatisation 468
5. Privatisation policy dilemmas 469
5.1 The Austrian view 469
5.2 The public choice view 469
5.3 Privatisation and the normative Hobbes and Coase
theorems 471
6. Mass privatisation 472
6.1 The political economy of mass privatisation 473
6.2 Vouchers and privatisation 475
6.3 The governance of enterprise after mass privatisation 477
7. The effects of privatisation 478
7.1 Comparisons between firms of differing ownership
types 478
7.2 Case studies of firms' performance before and after
privatisation 479
7.3 Econometric studies of the effects of changes in
governance 480
7.4 Use of multinational data 482
8. Conclusion 482
15. Economic regulation and the structure of business 485
1. Introduction 485
2. The 'natural' monopoly problem 486
2.1 Definition of 'natural' monopoly 486
2.2 Contestability 487
2.3 Sustainability 490
2.4 Intertemporal unsustainability 493
3. Organisational structure and competition 498
3.1 Vertical disintegration in the public utilities 498
3.2 Competition policy 500
4. Regulating utilities 509
4.1 Regulation as a contract 509
4.2 Regulation as rent seeking 512
4.3 Rate of return regulation 514
4.4 RPI minus X 516
4.5 Sliding scale profits tax 519
5. Franchising 522
5.1 Auctioning the right to serve the market 522
5.2 The Chadwick Demsetz auction 523
6. Control of natural monopoly networks a summary of
organisational models 525
6.1 Government ownership and operation of the network 525
6.2 Government ownership with assets leased to a private
operator 526
6.3 Network assets owned and operated by a franchisee 526
6.4 Network assets owned and operated by a regulated
public company 527
6.5 Network assets owned by a network user but leased to
a separate company 527
6.6 Network assets owned and operated by an
unregulated public company 528
7. Deregulation 529
7.1 Production and supply in the public utilities 529
7.2 Deregulation outside the public utilities 531
8. Conclusion 532
Bibliography 537
Figures
1.1 Production possibilities in a four person community 6
1.2 Person C and person D together can produce 4 units of x
and 4 units of y 9
1.3 How person A gains from specialisation and exchange 13
2.1 A central contractual agent economises on contractual links 44
2.2 Probability distribution of quality 52
3.1 Casson's theory of entrepreneurship 74
4.1 External effects result in overfishing 97
4.2 The team with a single monitor 104
4.3 The team with two monitors 105
4.4 Two'managerial'models of the firm 112
5.1 State contingent claims: a line of constant expected outcome 142
5.2 Risk averse people have convex indifference curves 143
5.3 Optimal risk sharing but with a risk neutral party. The
risk averse person takes no risk 145
5.4 Contracts on rr' will just induce effort level e 147
5.5 All contracts in set xwy will induce effort level e and are
Pareto preferred to a contract at 6 148
5.6 With a risk neutral agent, a 'first best' outcome is achievable
atcp 150
5.7 With an informative signal, costless monitoring can save on
risk bearing costs 154
5.8 Effort costs, risk bearing costs and monitoring gambles 161
6.1 Alternative contractual arrangements 174
6.2 Time rates and piece rates 175
6.3 Adverse selection in recruitment 181
6.4 Education as a screening device 183
6.5 The tournament 192
6.6 Distribution of observational errors 215
6.7 Cumulative distribution function of 6k 6j 216
7.1 The unitary form 221
7.2 The multidivisional structure 222
7.3 A hybrid form 223
7.4 Price discrimination is required if a monopoly supplier is to
prevent substitution away from input m by downstream buyers 245
xiv
8.1 Shareholder and manager as principal and agent 272
8.2 Management shareholdings and firm size 277
8.3 Managerial incentives: the case of the stable bonus 289
8.4 Leibenstein's X efBciency theory of costs 294
9.1 The agency cost of outside equity 324
9.2 Financial structure: the agency cost approach 326
10.1 Firm type and the distributable surplus 345
10.2 Investor ownership with profit related pay 347
10.3 Worker ownership with debt and outside equity 347
10.4 The size of the labour managed firm 359
10.5 Mutual monitoring in a partnership 366
11.1 Newhouse's model of the non profit hospital 392
11.2 Donation as a method of voluntary price discrimination 396
11.3 The optimal club: Buchanan's analysis 398
11.4 Niskanen's model of the budget maximising bureau 401
11.5 Migue and Belanger's bureaucrat discretion model 402
13.1 The Coase theorem 429
13.2 Economies of scale and marginal cost pricing 435
14.1 An optimal contract for public enterprise managers 461
15.1 Intertemporal unsustainability 495
15.2 Government contracting: fixed price versus cost plus 515
15.3 A profit sharing regulatory contract 521
Tables
1.1 Consumption levels with no trade 7
1.2 A possible allocation that is outside the 'core' 8
1.3 Joint payoff to every possible coalition 10
1.4 An allocation of consumption that is in the 'core' 10
1.5 A second allocation of consumption that is in the'core' 10
1.6 The structure of payoffs in a game of exchange 19
1.7 Expected payoffs in the exchange game when the probability
of repetition is 3/4 21
3.1 The gains to entrepreneurial activity 60
4.1 The fishery an illustrative table 93
4.2 The Hawk Dove game 95
15.1 The present value of the cost of satisfying the demands of
each possible 'coalition' 496
xvi |
| adam_txt |
Contents
Figures xiv
Tables xvi
Preface xvii
Preface to the first edition xix
Preface to the second edition xxiii
Acknowledgement xxv
PART 1 BASIC CONCEPTS
1. The gains from the trade 3
1. Production and the firm 3
2. Scarcity 4
3. The allocation problem 6
4. Recontracting and the allocation problem 11
5. Tatonnement 12
6. The equilibrium method 15
7. Institutions and information 16
8. Institutions and contract enforcement 18
8.1 The exchange game 18
8.2 Conventions and norms 20
8.3 Reputation 23
8.4 Monitoring and penalties 23
8.5 Moral leadership 24
9. Conclusion 25
2. Transactions costs 27
1. The process of exchange 27
2. Contracts and information 30
2.1 Adverse selection or 'hidden information' 30
2.2 Moral hazard or 'hidden action' 34
2.3 Bounded rationality 35
2.4 Asset specificity and 'hold up' 36
3. Institutional responses to transactions costs 38
3.1 Money 39
3.2 Political institutions 42
3.3 The firm as a nexus of contracts 43
v
4. Conclusion 49
Appendix 51
3. The entrepreneur 53
1. Introduction 53
2. Contrasting views of the entrepreneur 54
2.1 The classical tradition 54
2.2 Knight 55
2.3 Kirzner 58
2.4 Schumpeter 65
2.5 Shackle 69
2.6 Casson 71
3. The entrepreneur and the firm 76
3.1 The small entrepreneurial firm 77
3.2 The firm as a coalition of entrepreneurs 80
Appendix 84
4. Property rights 86
1. Introduction 86
2. Types of property rights 88
2.1 Private rights 88
2.2 Communal rights 89
2.3 Collective rights 89
2.4 Exchangeable rights 90
2.5 Alienable and inalienable rights 92
2.6 Exclusion 92
3. The development of property rights 92
4. Team production and the classical capitalist firm 98
5. Alternative structures of property rights 101
5.1 The single proprietor 102
5.2 The partnership 104
5.3 The joint stock company 108
6. Property rights and managerial theories of the firm 111
7. Property rights and transactions cost approaches to the firm 113
7.1 'Ownership'of the firm 113
7.2 Hansmann and the costs of ownership 115
7.3 Grossman, Hart and the property rights theory of the
firm 118
8. Entrepreneurship and property rights 122
8.1 'Ownership'and the entrepreneur 122
8.2 The property rights approach to the finance of the
entrepreneur 124
9. Conclusion 125
Appendix: The assignment of residual control rights 131
5. Principal and agent 136
1. Introduction 136
2. Observability and the sharecropper 137
3. Risk sharing 141
4. Effort incentives 146
5. Information 150
6. Examples of incentive contracts 154
6.1 Health and motor insurance 155
6.2 Law enforcement 155
6.3 Employment contracts 156
7. Monitoring the effort of team members 158
8. Incentive contracts and the firm 162
9. Conclusion 165
Appendix: The Von Neumann Morgenstern axioms of choice
under uncertainty 167
PART 2 THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS
6. Hierarchies 171
1. Introduction 171
2. Piece rates and time rates 173
2.1 Payment schedules, moral hazard and effort 173
2.2 Payment schedules, adverse selection and worker
sorting 177
3. The role of the monitor 179
3.1 Monitoring and moral hazard 179
3.2 Monitoring and adverse selection 180
4. Contracts and adverse selection: the screening
mechanism 182
5. Moral hazard, penalties and wage payments 184
5.1 The efficiency wage 185
5.2 Deferred compensation and'bond posting'. 187
6. The rank order tournament 189
6.1 Incentives and the structure of a tournament 189
6.2 Further problems with high powered incentives 195
7. Idiosyncratic exchange 197
8. Rent seeking, entrepreneurship and opportunism 199
9. The firm as a governance structure 203
9.1 The internal labour market 203
9.2 Specific human capital 204
9.3 Behavioural norms and perceptions of fairness 207
9.4 Company unions and disputes procedures 208
10. The Japanese firm 208
11. Conclusion 210
Appendix 214
7. Integration and the visible hand 217
1. The variety of business enterprise 217
1.1 Vertical integration 217
1.2 Conglomerate diversification 218
1.3 International integration 219
2. Strategy and structure 220
3. Visible and invisible hands 226
3.1 The boundary of the firm 226
3.2 Arm's length and obligational transactional relations 227
3.3 The franchise chain 229
3.4 Quasi vertical integration 230
4. Integration, complexity and environmental uncertainty 232
4.1 Integration, coordination and complexity 232
4.2 Integration, coordination and uncertainty 235
5. Integration, internalisation and market failure 238
5.1 Monitoring input quality 239
5.2 Internalisation and the multinational firm 241
5.3 Integration and market power 242
5.4 Transaction specific investments and opportunistic
recontracting 246
5.5 Enforcing intertemporal commitments 250
6. Integration and innovation 251
6.1 Research and development 252
6.2 Schumpeter's entrepreneur 255
7. Conclusion 258
1. Corporate governance 1: managerial incentives 261
1. Who controls the joint stock firm? 261
2. Four views of corporate control 262
2.1 Control and the shareholder: the traditional view 262
2.2 The managerial interest and the Berle Means critique 264
2.3 Entrepreneurship and the neo Austrian critique 265
2.4 Contractual incompleteness, dependency and control 267
3. Corporate governance as a principal agent problem 269
4. Managerial incentive contracts 271
4.1 Managerial incentives and the theory of principal and
agent 271
4.2 Some early studies of managerial contracts 273
4.3 Interpretative problems and more recent studies 275
5. Monitoring managers 282
5.1 Do shareholders monitor managers? 282
5.2 The costs of monitoring 283
5.3 The degree of shareholder control 284
6. The managerial labour market 290
7. The product market 293
8. Conclusion 297
9. Corporate governance 2: the takeover and capital structure 301
1. The entrepreneur and the takeover 301
2. The takeover and the free rider problem 302
3. Minority shareholders and the takeover 303
4. Hold up, breach of faith and the takeover 305
5. Adverse selection, short termism and the takeover 306
6. Moral hazard, monitoring costs and the takeover 309
7. The takeover and capital market efficiency 310
8. Defences against hostile takeovers 313
8.1 Supermajority amendments 313
8.2 Dual class recapitalisations 314
8.3 Poison pills 314
8.4 Greenmail 315
8.5 Golden parachutes 316
9. Do takeovers improve economic efficiency? 316
9.1 The takeover wave of the 1980s 316
9.2 Moral hazard and the free cash flow theory 317
9.3 The role of the'junk bond' 318
9.4 Gains to target and bidding companies 319
10. Capital structure and corporate governance 321
10.1 The Modigliani Miller theorem 321
10.2 The agency costs theory of financial structure 323
10.3 Agency problems, debt and the Hart Moore theory
of financial structure 326
10.4 Bounded rationality and financial structure 331
11. Corporate governance bank versus market systems 332
11.1 The United Kingdom and the United States 332
11.2 Japan and Germany 333
j 11.3 Differences in capital structures 335
i 12. Conclusion 337
I
10. Profit sharing, cooperative and mutual enterprise 341
1. Residual claims and enterprise governance 341
2. Principal Agent theory and profit sharing 344
2.1 Type of firm classified by distribution of residual
claims 344
2.2 Monitoring effort and the profit sharing firm 348
3. Profit sharing and contractual incompleteness 350
3.1 Debt finance 350
3.2 Hold up 351
3.3 Bargaining within the firm 352
4. The problem of investment decisions 353
5. The size of the team 355
5.1 Employment in the labour managed firm 356
5.2 Employment and profit sharing 360
6. The labour capital partnership 361
7. The role of peer pressure 364
7.1 Internal pressure 364
7.2 External pressure 365
8. The retail cooperative 368
8.1 Transactions costs and the retail cooperative 368
8.2 Role of retail cooperatives in nineteenth century
England 369
9. Marketing and supply cooperatives 371
9.1 Marketing and distribution 371
9.2 Supply cooperatives and the utilities 373
10. Mutual enterprise 374
11. Stakeholding 377
12. Conclusion 379
11. Non profit and charitable enterprise 383
1. The non profit enterprise 383
2. Governance problems and the non profit
enterprise 384
3. The rationale of the non profit enterprise 387
3.1 Contract failure 387
3.2 Government failure 389
3.3 Tax advantages 390
4. Examples of non profit enterprise 391
4.1 Hospitals 391
4.2 The university 394
4.3 The arts 395
4.4 The club 397
5. Bureaucracy 400
6. Conclusion 403
12. Evolution and economic organisation 406
1. The variety of theoretical approaches 406
1.1 Neoclassical analysis of organisations 407
1.2 Radical approaches to organisations 408
2. The resources of the firm 409
3. Evolution in economics 411
3.1 Biological Analogies 411
3.2 The evolution of the firm 412
3.3 Market relationships and evolution 413
3.4 An ecology of institutions 415
4. Evolution and efficiency 416
5. Conclusion 418
PART 3 PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION
13. Economic organisation and the role of the state 423
1. Introduction 423
2. The neoclassical tradition 424
3. The new institutional economics and public policy 425
3.1 Establishing external institutions 426
3.2 The normative Hobbes and Coase theorems 427
4. The public interest approach 433
5. Criticisms of the public interest approach to policy 436
5.1 The Austrian critique 437
5.2 The 'public choice' critique 443
5.3 Contracting and the property rights critique 445
6. Conclusion 451
14. Private and public enterprise: the ownership of business 453
1. Introduction 453
2. Some historical background 453
2.1 The growth of public enterprise in the UK to 1980 453
2.2 Public enterprise in other mixed economies 454
2.3 Reform after 1980 455
3. Public versus private enterprise 455
3.1 Empirical studies in the 1970s 455
3.2 Reform of public enterprise 457
3.3 The forces of competition 462
4. The process of privatisation in the 'mixed economies' 466
4.1 Stock market flotation 466
4.2 The employee buy out 467
4.3 The private sale 468
4.4 Voucher privatisation 468
5. Privatisation policy dilemmas 469
5.1 The Austrian view 469
5.2 The public choice view 469
5.3 Privatisation and the normative Hobbes and Coase
theorems 471
6. Mass privatisation 472
6.1 The political economy of mass privatisation 473
6.2 Vouchers and privatisation 475
6.3 The governance of enterprise after mass privatisation 477
7. The effects of privatisation 478
7.1 Comparisons between firms of differing ownership
types 478
7.2 Case studies of firms' performance before and after
privatisation 479
7.3 Econometric studies of the effects of changes in
governance 480
7.4 Use of multinational data 482
8. Conclusion 482
15. Economic regulation and the structure of business 485
1. Introduction 485
2. The 'natural' monopoly problem 486
2.1 Definition of 'natural' monopoly 486
2.2 Contestability 487
2.3 Sustainability 490
2.4 Intertemporal unsustainability 493
3. Organisational structure and competition 498
3.1 Vertical disintegration in the public utilities 498
3.2 Competition policy 500
4. Regulating utilities 509
4.1 Regulation as a contract 509
4.2 Regulation as rent seeking 512
4.3 Rate of return regulation 514
4.4 RPI minus X 516
4.5 Sliding scale profits tax 519
5. Franchising 522
5.1 Auctioning the right to serve the market 522
5.2 The Chadwick Demsetz auction 523
6. Control of natural monopoly networks a summary of
organisational models 525
6.1 Government ownership and operation of the network 525
6.2 Government ownership with assets leased to a private
operator 526
6.3 Network assets owned and operated by a franchisee 526
6.4 Network assets owned and operated by a regulated
public company 527
6.5 Network assets owned by a network user but leased to
a separate company 527
6.6 Network assets owned and operated by an
unregulated public company 528
7. Deregulation 529
7.1 Production and supply in the public utilities 529
7.2 Deregulation outside the public utilities 531
8. Conclusion 532
Bibliography 537
Figures
1.1 Production possibilities in a four person community 6
1.2 Person C and person D together can produce 4 units of x
and 4 units of y 9
1.3 How person A gains from specialisation and exchange 13
2.1 A central contractual agent economises on contractual links 44
2.2 Probability distribution of quality 52
3.1 Casson's theory of entrepreneurship 74
4.1 External effects result in overfishing 97
4.2 The team with a single monitor 104
4.3 The team with two monitors 105
4.4 Two'managerial'models of the firm 112
5.1 State contingent claims: a line of constant expected outcome 142
5.2 Risk averse people have convex indifference curves 143
5.3 Optimal risk sharing but with a risk neutral party. The
risk averse person takes no risk 145
5.4 Contracts on rr' will just induce effort level e 147
5.5 All contracts in set xwy will induce effort level e and are
Pareto preferred to a contract at 6 148
5.6 With a risk neutral agent, a 'first best' outcome is achievable
atcp 150
5.7 With an informative signal, costless monitoring can save on
risk bearing costs 154
5.8 Effort costs, risk bearing costs and monitoring gambles 161
6.1 Alternative contractual arrangements 174
6.2 Time rates and piece rates 175
6.3 Adverse selection in recruitment 181
6.4 Education as a screening device 183
6.5 The tournament 192
6.6 Distribution of observational errors 215
6.7 Cumulative distribution function of 6k 6j 216
7.1 The unitary form 221
7.2 The multidivisional structure 222
7.3 A hybrid form 223
7.4 Price discrimination is required if a monopoly supplier is to
prevent substitution away from input m by downstream buyers 245
xiv
8.1 Shareholder and manager as principal and agent 272
8.2 Management shareholdings and firm size 277
8.3 Managerial incentives: the case of the stable bonus 289
8.4 Leibenstein's X efBciency theory of costs 294
9.1 The agency cost of outside equity 324
9.2 Financial structure: the agency cost approach 326
10.1 Firm type and the distributable surplus 345
10.2 Investor ownership with profit related pay 347
10.3 Worker ownership with debt and outside equity 347
10.4 The size of the labour managed firm 359
10.5 Mutual monitoring in a partnership 366
11.1 Newhouse's model of the non profit hospital 392
11.2 Donation as a method of voluntary price discrimination 396
11.3 The optimal club: Buchanan's analysis 398
11.4 Niskanen's model of the budget maximising bureau 401
11.5 Migue and Belanger's bureaucrat discretion model 402
13.1 The Coase theorem 429
13.2 Economies of scale and marginal cost pricing 435
14.1 An optimal contract for public enterprise managers 461
15.1 Intertemporal unsustainability 495
15.2 Government contracting: fixed price versus cost plus 515
15.3 A profit sharing regulatory contract 521
Tables
1.1 Consumption levels with no trade 7
1.2 A possible allocation that is outside the 'core' 8
1.3 Joint payoff to every possible coalition 10
1.4 An allocation of consumption that is in the 'core' 10
1.5 A second allocation of consumption that is in the'core' 10
1.6 The structure of payoffs in a game of exchange 19
1.7 Expected payoffs in the exchange game when the probability
of repetition is 3/4 21
3.1 The gains to entrepreneurial activity 60
4.1 The fishery an illustrative table 93
4.2 The Hawk Dove game 95
15.1 The present value of the cost of satisfying the demands of
each possible 'coalition' 496
xvi |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:06:02Z |
| indexdate | 2025-01-03T15:00:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Ricketts, Martin 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)170238873 aut The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm Martin Ricketts 3. ed. Cheltenham [u.a.] Elgar 2002 XXV, 590 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 s 1\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014675034&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Ricketts, Martin 1948- The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4078614-6 |
| title | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |
| title_auth | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |
| title_exact_search | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |
| title_full | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm Martin Ricketts |
| title_fullStr | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm Martin Ricketts |
| title_full_unstemmed | The economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm Martin Ricketts |
| title_short | The economics of business enterprise |
| title_sort | the economics of business enterprise an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |
| title_sub | an introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm |
| topic | Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Unternehmenstheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014675034&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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