Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets:
"Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g. the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firms will not shroud information in equilibrium. However, shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such shrouding...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11755 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g. the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firms will not shroud information in equilibrium. However, shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such shrouding creates an inefficiency, which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors' customers. However, if add-ons have close substitutes, a "curse of debiasing" arises, and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add-ons. In equilibrium, two kinds of exploitation coexist. Optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons. In turn, sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes. It is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates. It is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to non-exploitative firms. We show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets, even in markets with costless advertising, and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 36 S. |
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| spelling | Gabaix, Xavier Verfasser (DE-588)131457594 aut Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets Xavier Gabaix ; David Laibson Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 36 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11755 "Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g. the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firms will not shroud information in equilibrium. However, shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such shrouding creates an inefficiency, which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors' customers. However, if add-ons have close substitutes, a "curse of debiasing" arises, and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add-ons. In equilibrium, two kinds of exploitation coexist. Optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons. In turn, sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes. It is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates. It is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to non-exploitative firms. We show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets, even in markets with costless advertising, and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Consumer behavior Econometric models Marketing Laibson, David I. 1966- Verfasser (DE-588)128782226 aut Erscheint auch als Internetausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11755 (DE-604)BV002801238 11755 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11755.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Gabaix, Xavier Laibson, David I. 1966- Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Consumer behavior Econometric models Marketing |
| title | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets |
| title_auth | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets |
| title_exact_search | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets |
| title_full | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets Xavier Gabaix ; David Laibson |
| title_fullStr | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets Xavier Gabaix ; David Laibson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets Xavier Gabaix ; David Laibson |
| title_short | Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets |
| title_sort | shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Consumer behavior Econometric models Marketing |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Consumer behavior Econometric models Marketing |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11755.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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