$ 100 bills on the sidewalk: suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans
It is typically difficult to determine whether households save optimally. But in some cases, savings incentives are strong enough to imply sharp normative restrictions. We consider employees who receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) plan and are allowed to make discretionary, penal...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11554 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | It is typically difficult to determine whether households save optimally. But in some cases, savings incentives are strong enough to imply sharp normative restrictions. We consider employees who receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) plan and are allowed to make discretionary, penalty-free, in-service withdrawals. For these employees, contributing below the match threshold is a dominated action. Nevertheless, half of employees with these clear-cut incentives do contribute below the match threshold, foregoing matching contributions that average 1.3% of their annual pay. Providing these "undersavers" with specific information about the free lunch they are giving up fails to raise their contribution rates. |
| Beschreibung: | 39 S. graph. Darst. |
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T13:52:01Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:35:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 39 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
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| spelling | Choi, James J. Verfasser (DE-588)128782218 aut $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans James J. Choi ; David Laibson ; Brigitte C. Madrian Dollar 100 bills on the sidewalk Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 39 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11554 It is typically difficult to determine whether households save optimally. But in some cases, savings incentives are strong enough to imply sharp normative restrictions. We consider employees who receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) plan and are allowed to make discretionary, penalty-free, in-service withdrawals. For these employees, contributing below the match threshold is a dominated action. Nevertheless, half of employees with these clear-cut incentives do contribute below the match threshold, foregoing matching contributions that average 1.3% of their annual pay. Providing these "undersavers" with specific information about the free lunch they are giving up fails to raise their contribution rates. Betriebliche Altersversorgung / Sparen / USA Laibson, David I. 1966- Verfasser (DE-588)128782226 aut Madrian, Brigitte C. 19XX- Verfasser (DE-588)128782234 aut Erscheint auch als Internetausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11554 (DE-604)BV002801238 11554 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11554.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Choi, James J. Laibson, David I. 1966- Madrian, Brigitte C. 19XX- $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Betriebliche Altersversorgung / Sparen / USA |
| title | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans |
| title_alt | Dollar 100 bills on the sidewalk |
| title_auth | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans |
| title_exact_search | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans |
| title_exact_search_txtP | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans |
| title_full | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans James J. Choi ; David Laibson ; Brigitte C. Madrian |
| title_fullStr | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans James J. Choi ; David Laibson ; Brigitte C. Madrian |
| title_full_unstemmed | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans James J. Choi ; David Laibson ; Brigitte C. Madrian |
| title_short | $ 100 bills on the sidewalk |
| title_sort | 100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401 k plans |
| title_sub | suboptimal saving in 401 (k) plans |
| topic | Betriebliche Altersversorgung / Sparen / USA |
| topic_facet | Betriebliche Altersversorgung / Sparen / USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11554.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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