Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Ukrainian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Kyiv
Nacionalʹna Akad. Nauk Ukraïny, Inst. Ukrainsʹkoj Archeohrafii ta Džereloznavstva im. M. S. Hruševsʹkoho [u.a.]
2005
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | PST: Muskovite expansion and Pereiaslav Rada 1654. - In kyrill. Schr., ukrain. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 367 S. |
| ISBN: | 9660234201 |
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Зміст
Передмова
. 7
Частина
1
Феномен московської експансії
XIV -
першої половини
XVII
ст.
Розділ
1.
Конвой східноєвропейських аналогів
. 15
Розділ
2.
Від удільного князівства до Московського царства
. 51
Розділ
3.
Донське, волзьке та яїцьке козацтва в експансіоністських
концепціях Московії
. 87
Розділ
4.
Цивілізаційна інтервенція, що не відбулася: Річ Посполита
і козацький пояс Дон-Яїк-Терек
.121
Частина
2
На шляху до свого Переяслава
1654
року
Розділ
1.
Московія й українські козаки в
XVI -
першій половині
XVII
ст
.139
Розділ
2.
Український
1648
рік очима Московії
.187
Розділ
3.
Між "вічним миром"
1634
р. і територіальними спокусами
.237
Розділ
4.
Московська концепція Переяслава
1654
p.:
невизначеність
до останнього
.285
Післямова
.-,.315
Бібліографія
.322
Індекс
.341
SUMMARY
Muscovy was predetermined to meet the middle of the seventeenth cen¬
tury, the time period, for which the historical destiny has prepared great up¬
heavals and trials for the Eastern Europe in fact, at the crossroads. By that time
Muscovy had a really vast experience of conquests and integrations of ethni¬
cally and even civilizationally foreign communities. During almost three centu¬
ries of expansion Moscow was able to subdue to its rule huge territories in all
directions from its historical core, and at the same time it solved a number of
geopolitical tasks. The Muscovite grand princes have conquered a number of
neighboring states sometimes much more developed applying dreadful cruelty
without any hesitation, which literally horrified Europe. First being a principal¬
ity lost in the woods, the rulers of which kissed the grounds to Mongolian khans,
Muscovy turned into a threat not only for Asian steppe element, but also for the
integrity of the Eastern fragment of European civilization.
Among the state formations, which immanently belonged to European world,
the first victims of Muscovite expansion became Tver, Novgorod, Pskov, as well
as Siver Smolensk lands, so-called Verkhivsky lands, which were cut off from
the
Ruthenian
world in various ways and integrated into political body of Mus¬
covy. This success has inflamed the territorial claims of Moscow in the Western
direction. At the same time in the East the Muscovite grand princes almost op¬
timally used the destructive processes that took part in the Golden Horde. The
middle of the sixteenth century became the epoch of great territorial repartition.
Kazan and Astrakhan khanates capitulated to Muscovite troops; Nogai lost a
part of its sovereignty; Muscovy started to penetrate Ciscaucasia, and since the
eighties of the seventeenth century
-
Siberia. Muskovy with all its might wedged
itself in no man's Steppe, desperately trying to obtain even the forest-steppe
Left-Bank Dnieper, which was territorially remote, but very important strategi¬
cally due to confrontation with Poland and the Crimea. Finally the Don, the
Volga, the Yaik, and the Terek Cossack enclaves became the object of Muscovy's
persistent infringements. Although it did not succeed in absorbing Cossack en¬
claves by the middle of the seventeenth century, but it was able to draw them
into the sphere of its influence. Taking into account the unconcerned indiffer-
Summary
359
enee
of Vilnius and Warsaw to the Eastern fragment of the Steppe and to the
Cossack band the Don
-
the Volga
-
the Yaik, the Moslem neighbors remained
the only serious opponents of Muscovy in competitions for domination in this
region. However, the tendency directed to continuous narrowing of military
and political potentials of the Crimea andNogai hordes finally consolidated by
the middle of the seventeenth century. The conversion of Muscovy to offensive
tactics regarding the Crimean Khanate on the eve of Ukrainian National libera¬
tion war became an indicative confirmation
ofthat.
The Crimean Khanate still
continued to play a vital part in the Eastern European politics, it was still able to
organize powerful invasions to Muscovy, but establishing an anti-Muscovite front
with participation of all Nogai hordes was beyond its power. Despite all the ef¬
forts Islam-Hirey III failed to start realizing his superidea
-
winning back Kazan
and Astrakhan from Muscovy in the middle of the seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, despite obvious success on the way of its expansive plans real¬
ization Muscovy was neither politically nor militarily ready for further open
competitions for
Ruthenian
lands in the middle of the seventeenth century. And
without possession of these lands one could not expect a geopolitical domina¬
tion in the Eastern Europe. The Smolensk war has finally testified Muskovy's
disability both to conquer the Commonwealth militarily, and to get its own way
by means of provoking the off-center Muskovy-centrist tendencies in Ukraine
and Byelorussia. Ruthenian nobility as a representation camp "responsible" for
political destiny of these lands remained an ungrateful material for Muscovite
tsars. The factor of the East European expanse confessionalization although raised
the problem of Orthodox solidarity, but did not shake the gentry orientation to
the Commonwealth world. Still considering itself an organic constituent of the
Commonwealth "political nation", and gradually but stably being polonized, the
Ruthenian nobility mentally could not imagine its existence outside its social
and political system. Furthermore, the process of splitting
Ruthenia
as a solid
Ukrainian-Byelorussian array has started in the imagination of Ruthenian elite.
The Ukrainian nobility started to realize the political expanse
"Ruthenia"
only
as "the tenitory of southern ("Ukrainian") principalities ofKyivan Rm' epoch".
That is why one could yield the Ruthenian elite to swear to Muscovite tsar only
by conquering the respective territories.
Confessionalization aroused a sincere interest to Muscovy only of Ukrai¬
nian high-level Orthodox clergy and just because the Eastern patriarchs did not
have a real power to head the Orthodox bloc in the actualized on confessionalized
basis confrontation with the Catholic camp. Muscovite tsar remained the only
Orthodox monarch, the sovereign of "a great state", that's why he was naturally
considered to be the last hope for the Orthodox believers. Moscow correspond¬
ingly turned to a center of attraction of the Orthodox world including the East¬
ern patriarchs, to the core of an imaginary Orthodox bloc. And as a result, ap-
360
Summary
pearance of the Muskovy-centrist statements from the side of Ukrainian Ortho¬
dox clergy had the same nature at its heart as appeals to Moscow (sometimes no
less panegyrical) of representatives of other fragments of the Orthodox world.
Namely the acuteness of the Orthodox problem in the Commonwealth, but not
realization the necessity of joining the Poland's and Lithuania's
Ruthenian
lands
to Muscovy encouraged Ukrainian ecclesiastics to Orthodox rhetoric. This is
confirmed both by the tendencies characteristic for Ukrainian Orthodoxy in P.
Mohyla's time, and reaction of Muskovy itself to Muskovy-centrist appeals of
clergy in
1620 -
beginning of
1630,
as well as by attitude of Ukrainian clergy to
Pereiaslav
Rada
(Council) of
1654
with its threats of Kyivan Metropolitanate
subjection to Muscovite Patriarchy. Ukrainian Orthodox circles clearly distin¬
guished the
Ruthenian
world from the Muscovite one. They have proposed a
Ruthenian identity model, where they have found a place to Cossacks as new
defenders of Orthodoxy, but
Ruthenia
territorially did not cover the Muscovite
lands, being limited to Ukrainian
-
Byelorussian territory. Recollecting com¬
mon ethnic roots, belonging of Ruthenian and Muscovite lands to political ex¬
panse of Kyivan
Rus',
statements on desirability of renewing the common politi¬
cal roof
-
all that in the part meant for Muscovite ears, in fact, was called to
make Muscovy mainly a factor of competitions for the rights of Orthodox be¬
lievers in the Commonwealth. Clergy desired to threaten Warsaw by its
coreligionism with the Muscovites in order to press stronger on the Catholic
camp and finally reach "soothing the ancient Greek religion" and "improvement of
liberties and freedom of Ruthenian people'
.
Ukrainian Cossacks were not in a hurry to come over under Muscovite gon¬
falons either. During the confessionalization process the Cossacks turned into a
protector of national interests of the Ukrainian world, and claimed its preten¬
sions to occupy the highest level of social rank. The Cossacks' reaction to
Smolensk war became a cold bath for Muscovy, which was lulled by pro-Musco¬
vite rhetoric coming from time to time out of Cossack circle, as well as by pas¬
sionate assurances of Y. Boretskyi—I. Kopyskyi regarding Cossack intentions as
if to come over under the "high tsar hand'. A decade after this war cleared up the
situation completely. The Cossacks saw the future of their state solely with re¬
forming of the Commonwealth. Also, by the beginning of National liberation
war the Cossacks have not become a legitimate "political nation", that's why it
could not be (in Moscow's eyes) a subject of relations regarding political future
of Ukrainian lands. According to the contemporary political and legal views the
Cossacks could play only a subsidiary role.
This factor-in combination with the fact that by the end of forties of the
seventeenth century the pro-Muscovite moods were not a business card of the
Ukrainian elite established the fundamentals of the position with which Mus¬
covy started its relations with
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi
and his circle in
1648.
Summary
361
Though Muscovy had a good chance to rely on relations with the Ukrainian
world intensified during the sixteenth
-
first half of the seventeenth centuries,
but in the key issue
-
spread of its superiority over him
-
there was no other
solution for it except for a power one; for this one, I reiterate, it did not feel
ready. Squeezed by the defeat in Smolensk war, Muscovy could not allow itself
measuring swords with Warsaw alone, and nothing, in fact, notified of better
times approaching. War for Ukrainian
-
Byelorussian lands was evidently not
in the agenda for Muscovite diplomacy. In Muscovy's actions we cannot see any
signs of preparation for a storm of the Ukrainian stronghold. On the contrary,
one can feel a lack of views regarding the prospects of advancement of their ex¬
pansionist interests. This is witnessed by its diplomatic relations with the Com¬
monwealth at the beginning of National liberation war in Ukraine. Perhaps, the
most striking confirmation of this is the fact that Muscovy did not employ the
social explosion that took place in Ukraine in
1648
as a means of pressure during
the negotiations on delimitation of the last segment (Northern-Nevel) of its
boundary with the Commonwealth according to the terms of Polianiv armi¬
stice. Despite reasonability of the opportunity the Muscovite diplomats did not
leave the position agreed in
1644
and initialed by the Commonwealth embassy
of A. Kysil in
1647
during his visit to Moscow. Impetuous processes that took
place then on the highest level of the Ukrainian social rank, creation of the Cos¬
sack state, reshaping the traditional position of powers in the East European
international relations
-
all that posed to Muscovy totally different problems in
the Ukrainian direction than those it had been used to before.
Hence, there are no reasons to consider the Muscovite conception of
1654
Pereiaslav as a display of its plans that were crystallized in Muscovy in the first
half of the seventeenth century, or even earlier. Actually, only Muscovy's politi¬
cal claims to Ukrainian lands had an old tradition; whereas the strategies di¬
rected to realization of this intention changed with time, and the version that
ripened on the eve of Pereiaslav
Rada
1654
and was realized during and after it
in principle could not be developed before the beginning of the Ukrainian Na¬
tional liberation war. Pereiaslav
1654
that was a "turning point in the history of
three
countrìes:
Poland, Russia and Ukraine", in fact, was an impromptu for Mus¬
covy in an ideological sense, and not a deeply thought over, adjusted action.
During the first five years of the Ukrainian National liberation war Mus¬
covy was at the crossroads. Not without political dividends balancing between
the problem of maintaining "the eternal peace"
1634
and its old territorial appe¬
tites regarding the
Ruthenian
lands of the Commonwealth, the tsar's court did
not have the courage to cross the epochal (as it would be ascertained later) path
in the Ukrainian issue. In order to push off Moscow from the position of an
interested observer, B. Khmelnytskyi had to create a stalemate political situa¬
tion for it, skilfully giving check by the ghost of Turkish protectorate over the
362
Summary
Cossack state and by his dynastic plans in Moldova. Realization of hetman's
both foreign-policy projects would say good-bye for a long time to the Musco¬
vite plans to annex Ukraine to "tsarpatrimony". After September
1653
Zemskyi
Sobor
(Assembly of the Land) the Posol's'kyi
Prikaz
(Foreign Office) worked
immediately "from the wheels", consequently the ideological lining of the Mus¬
covite position given publicity in Pereiaslav was changed repeatedly. Besides,
the final version was based on recommendations of the Ukrainian party. Since the
second half of the fifteenth century dreaming of concentration of all the
Ruthenian
lands of the Commonwealth in their hands, the Muscovite dynasts did not dem¬
onstrate an integral conception for substantiation the legality of their claims for
unconditional annexation of exactly Hetmanate to "tsarpatrimony" by the time
of making a decision on leaving the system of "the eternal peace".
Such an inconsistency between almost bicentenary preparation of Muscovy
for getting control over "Kyiv heritage" and the real unpreparedness of the tsar
government for ideological substantiation of the process of its strategic goal re¬
alization in the middle of the seventeenth century was determined by much deeper
circumstances than concrete peculiarities of military and political situation in
the region. The root of the problem consisted in the following: regarding the
political future of Ukrainian lands (at least Hetmanate) Muskovy had to deal
not with the traditional, and so, legitimate elite, but with the camp, which pressed
the gentry from its place under the sun, and demanded its legalization as a new
"political nation". In the system of political and legal coordinates inherent to the
Christian world in early-modern times the obtrusion of legitimate Christian state
to contractual relations with the state
-
new-formation meant an official recog¬
nition of the latter with all the subsequent ideological and political consequences.
Muskovy found itself in such a situation for the first time during more than
two hundred years of its expansionist practices. A complicated situation formed
on the highest level of social rank was waiting for it in Ukraine. Having ab¬
sorbed a minor part of nobility, the Cossacks de-facto became a "political nation"
on the under-authority territory and determined their
fate. De
jure the nobility
continued to be a "political nation", their main array remained faithful to the
political system of the Commonwealth and persistently struggled with the Cos¬
sacks; that became a great tragedy of the Ukrainian world. Moreover, far from all
the ethnic Ukrainian lands were under the
hetman
power, though Hetmanate's
elite, keeping to the church model of
"Ruthenian
people", which meant that
Ruthenia
covered the territory of Kyiv Metropolitanate, practiced the idea of
hetman's power spread not only on the Ukrainian lands, but also on Byelorussian
ones. In Byelorussia, on the part of Podillya, in Halychyna and Volyn'
-
the terri¬
tories to which Moscow also had claims
-
the nobility has kept its positions.
As it was quickly clarified, the Muscovite elite turned out to be not ready
ideologically to the rash of Cossacks to the highest level of social rank. No con-
Summary
363
ception that could take into account the probability of such a scenario in Ukraine
was developed in Moscow by the middle of the seventeenth century. The Cos¬
sacks' competitions for the right to belong to
"Ruthenian
people" in the
ñrst
half
of the seventeenth century did not wake a subject interest of the Muscovite elite
and did not affect its political conceptions regarding Ukrainian Cossacks.
Muskovy continued to stake only on tactful relations with the Cossacks. It could
not quickly rebuild on new rails to the accompaniment of Ukrainian National
liberation war. Burden of traditional views of the "correct" organization of the
society and power was an extraordinary strong obstacle to recognize Cossack
enclaves to be a "political nation" at the expense of legitimate elite
-
Ukrainian
nobility. Namely this burden has created an ideological ground both for
Muskovy's manipulation with the Ukrainian factor in relations with the Com¬
monwealth during the second half of the seventeenth century, and for casting
doubt later on belonging the Cossacks to the closed club of social elites.
Muscovy's general lack of confidence in viability of the project "Zaporozhian
Host" extremely overburdened the situation as all the previous Cossack rebel¬
lions ended in defeat. Even more oppressive were the system of values demon¬
strated by the Cossacks since P. Sagaidachnyi times (especially the cult of the
king's son (later the king) Vladyslav in the Cossack environment), as well as the
Cossacks' political position during Smolensk war. The Cossacks connected the
future of their camp solely with reforming of the Commonwealth's political sys¬
tem, but not with the change of a monarch, even in favor of an Orthodox tsar.
Hence there is that deep warning constantly emanating from the
Posol's'Iîyiprykaz
when responding to information on readiness of the Cossacks for a subjection to
the Muscovite tsar. In general Muscovy did not trust the Cossacks, and being
taught by the bitter experience of the first half of the seventeenth century con¬
stantly doubted the sincerity of their intentions. Probably, the best evidence of
Moscow's uncertainty is its constant expectation of a common Cossack-Tatar
campaign to the Don and directly to Muscovite lands. Also, tsar was probably
irritated by rather numerous reports that the Cossacks did not consider Mus¬
covy to be an alternative-free direction of a possible migration in case of a final
defeat, instead they considered a Crimean variant as well.
But the greatest concern was caused by the fact that at the beginning of
1649
B. Khmelnytskyi drew a parallel between the Kyivan
Rus'
and the Cos¬
sack state, expressively reminded that Kyiv was primacy in comparison with
Moscow and reminded of much shorter very Muscovite state tradition. In
1651
hetman
finally showed his cards and set out his vision of Hetmanate's "subjec¬
tion" to the tsar, which was unfavorable for the latter. Ukrainian-Muscovite
relations had to be built on a contractual basis ("on articles"). At that Chyhyryn
did not agree on a deeper political relations with Muscovy than the one that had
existed between it and the Don Host. That meant that Hetmanate would re-
364
Summary
main a full-fledged state organism, a subject of international relations, it would
not have common power bodies with Muscovy and would maintain relations
with it through ambassador missions. The only uniting link would be the tsar-
protector and defender. The fact that the statement on the limits of intensifica¬
tion of political relations between the Cossack state and Muscovy was made
after Berestechko catastrophe added a special clarity to the strategies of B.
Khmelnytskyi. After all, relations of Chyhyryn with the Crimea,
Porta
and
Moldavia, especially the idea of Turkish protectorate and Moldavian project
poured oil on the flames.
As a result, Muskovy did not have any other way out than to wait, even if it
was not formally bound up by Polyaniv peace treaty, would got rid of a psycho¬
logical pressure of defeat in Smolensk war and felt ready militarily. Not to risk,
find out the state of affairs in Ukraine in details, console itself by weakening the
Ukrainian and the Polish parties
-
a better alternative to such a course for Mos¬
cow did not exist.
During the first half a year of the Ukrainian National liberation war Mus¬
covy perceived it as a usual Cossack uprising. Before the turn of
1648-1649
the
tsar government did not show its strategic interest beyond the usual limits it
reached during Cossack wars of the first half of the seventeenth century. The
tsar's official documents and orders to the frontier voevodes (governors of prov¬
inces) did not contain any signs of Moscow's interest to the internal life of Cos¬
sack world, to the processes of forming the Cossack state and its elite. Muscovy
assessed Ukrainian events as a permanent steam emitting in the lingering Cos¬
sack-Polish confrontation and did not look at them through the prism of its
expansionist plans. Possibility of the Commonwealth disintegration as a result
of processes launched in spring
1648
in Ukraine was not assumed. B.
Khmelnytskyi's calls concerning the war with Warsaw, his appeals to Orthodox
solidarity and proposals to nominate Oleksiy Mykhailovych for a king's election
did not give rise to Moscow's real interest. Moreover, the Muscovy was filled
with the probability of Cossack-Tatar intrusion and on this ground maintained
active contacts with Adam Kysil and Yarema Vyshnevetskyi. The possibility of
crossing the Ukrainian border by the Muscovite troops was probable, and the
Polish party actively called upon to it. Only at the end of the year Muscovy
gradually started to change its attitude to the Ukrainian events under the influ¬
ence of success of the Cossack arms and active diplomacy of B. Khmelnytskyi. It
finally rejected the possibility of fulfillment its duties ensued from the anti-Tatar
agreement
1646,
imposes direct diplomatic contacts with Chyhyryn, and by
spring develops its first conception regarding Ukrainian National liberation war.
That was a conception of delay the prospect of war with the Commonwealth
for an uncertain time. Muscovy made a conclusion on advisability of interfer¬
ence into the Ukrainian events, but exceptionally by means of political instru-
Summary
365
ments
staking first of all on a detailed wangling the degree of sympathies for
'itself from the side of the Cossacks and, obviously, on weakening the parties.
The highest limit of Muscovite highest ranks' desires did not go further than
strategically exceptionally profitable role of a mediator between the rebels and
Warsaw and support the candidature of Oleksiy Mykhailovych in case election
did not take place.
Initially these would be the frames for describing the Muscovite position
regarding the Ukrainian issue till, actually, autumn
1653.
Namely the idea of
mediation in various variants would remain a comer stone of Ukrainian policy
of Muscovy, despite seemingly radicalism of resolutions of
1651
Zemskyi
Sobor.
Tsar and his circle protracted declaration of war to the Commonwealth as long
as possible trying to catch hold of any chance (even an illusive one) in order to
delay the time of crossing its Rubicon. The most notorious examples are confir¬
mation of "the eternal peace" by Moscow in
1650,
as well as the behavior of the
embassy of B. Repnin in
1653
in conditions of a diplomatic time trouble, which
was arranged by B. Khmelnytskyi in Moscow by means of an inspired raffling of
a Turkish card. In the latter case the tsar messenger had an order (and, to all
appearances, he was fulfilling it) to show a remarkable pliability; its final point
could become (and it did become) an attempt to change the refusal of Muscovy
of a complex of previous pretensions and its obligations to slow down B.
Khmelnytskyi's appetites for the guarantees of Yan Kazymyr to ensure the effi¬
cacy of religious items of the Polish-Cossack
Zbořiv
agreement.
All the diplomatic games carried out by Moscow with Warsaw and
Chyhyryn during
1649-1652
were directed not in the least to preparation of a
ground for recognition of the Cossacks as a representative of the Orthodox popu¬
lation of the Commonwealth, and on this basis to accept the Cossack state under
its domination and unleash a war with the Crown for the final consolidation of
the new repartition of the Ukrainian ethnic territory. The superidea of the Mus¬
covite highest ranks consisted in achievement of a Poland's voluntary renuncia¬
tion of
Ruthenian
lands, and, above all, Smolensk.
The platform for this goal realization had to be made, according to the plan,
by strengthening the role of Moscow as a mediator in Ukrainian affairs. The first
attempt to become firmly established in such a status was made in
1650,
when the
mithion of the Pushkin brothers presented in Warsaw a modified variant of the
Ukrainian politics conception developed at the beginning of
1649;
this time it was
highlighted by a decisiveness to squeeze out political and territorial concessions
(Smolensk, Sivershchyna). Such an aggravation of Muscovite position was deter¬
mined by the consequences of
Zbořiv-Zbarazh
campaign of
1649,
especially by an
actual recognition of the Cossack state legitimacy from the King's party. In the
context of the initial version of his conception Oleksiy Mykhailovych did not have
even an intention to quarrel with Yan Kazymyr; now Muscovite ambassadors
366
Summary
started to talk about the wish of the tsar to "reconcile" the king with the Cossacks,
and blackmailed the latter by the fact of availability of legitimate reasons for leav¬
ing "the eternal peace'
,
especially by the fact that B. Khmelnytskyi inventively
strived for signing a military and political union with the Orthodox tsar.
In April
1651
the Muscovite diplomacy succeeded to provoke a consent
from, the party of the Commonwealth ambassadors S. Vitovskyi and K. Obukho-
vych. Although they come to their senses and made a reverse motion, but an
important pretext has been made. Henceforth Muscovy unsuccessfully tried to
develop the success applying various diplomatic instruments and toughening its
position as Ukrainian National liberation war dragged on. However it purpose¬
fully avoided to cross the path that separated the offensiveness of diplomacy
from military opposition. Decisions of Zemskyi
Sobor
1651
urged to witness
B. Khmelnytskyi the strategic intentions of the state and by that to keep him
from the further rapprochement with Turkey.
In fact, during
1648—1653
hetman
and his circle permanently fulfilled the
function of Muscovy's intellectual donor, a supplier of ideas for it directed to
intensification the Muscovite- Cossack relations and to aggravation of relations
with Warsaw. The Posol's'kyjprykaz nourished by the results of work of hetman's
chancellery using it for development of its Ukrainian and Polish politics con¬
ception. Muscovy's diplomatic game in Polish direction was worked into a stiff
mixture by arguments of Ukrainian origin. Chronologically the key constitu¬
ents of official Muscovite position appeared in the conception only after the re¬
spective suggestions from the Ukrainian side. Namely
hetman
was the first to
hoist a flag of Orthodox solidarity and election the Orthodox tsar to a King's
throne. Namely Chyhyryn tirelessly supplied arguments regarding the legiti¬
macy of Muscovy's leaving the "the etemalpeace" system in
1634.
Namely
hetman
raised a question of Muscovy's mediation in Cossack-Polish confrontation and
directed it to the course of connecting Hetmanate with Kyivan
Rus'.
Application of Ukrainian origin argumentation by Muscovite ambassadors
in Pereiaslav that was based on Kyiv-centrist conception of Little and Great
Rus'
in fact meant recognition of Cossack state by a representatives of all the
Little
Rus'.
That put an end to the problem of legitimation of Hetmanate,
Hetman
power and the Cossacks as a "political nation" in the yeas of Christian world.
Moscow agreed to place the Cossacks over the
Ruthenian
nobility and to treat
them as a representative of the Ukrainian world; that laid the foundation for
legitimacy of B. Khmelnytskyi's claims to concentration of all the ethnic Ukrai¬
nian lands as well as the territory of Byelorussia under his power. So, the compe¬
tition for Byelorussia that flares up between Muscovy and Hetmanate in
1654
would have a perfectly legitimate basis for the Ukrainian party.
The process of forming the Muscovy's Ukrainian politics in
1648-1653,
es¬
pecially the specific character of development the decision to accept the Cos-
Summary
367
sack state "under the high tsar hand" and evolution of Muscovite ambassadors'
argumentation utilized at Pereiaslav
Rada
1654
puts an end to a complex of
evidences on the fact that the contemporary Ukrainians and Muscovites clearly
realized the difference between their worlds. Muscovite diplomacy did not im¬
pose on theses regarding the ethnic proximity of Ukrainians and Muscovites the
notions of "a angle people', "a angle
Oríhodoxrusáan
people"
,
as they started to
talk in Russian historiography again on the turn of the twentieth—twenty first
centuries.
In exactly the same way the position of Chyhyryn shows that the Cossacks
realizing themselves within the limits of a church model of
Ruthenian
identity
definitely dissociate themselves from the Muscovite world. Muscovy was con¬
sidered only as a very important player in the system of regional international
relations, as a possible ally and
-
the most important
-
legalizer of Hetmanate
existence, its protector (evidently, till the end of competition for the final part¬
ing with Poland). Hetman's appeals to unity of the Orthodox world were of
solely tactical nature and were determined by the fact that in the confessionalized
expanse namely religious slogans were both a natural phenomenon, and a factor
that could rouse the greatest resonance. B. Khmelnytskyi widely used the flag of
struggle for the Orthodox belief in the internal policy and in diplomatic actions
in various directions
-
from Moldova and Transylvania to Lithuania and Swe¬
den. Appeals that sounded to the Muscovy side regarding Orthodox solidarity
did not contain an ethnic component and did not touch the problem of integra¬
tion the Ukrainian and Muscovite worlds.
Hetman
chancellery periodically gave
Muscovy quite clear signals regarding Chyhyryn's vision of the limits of the
sought protectorate of the Muscovite tsar over the Cossack state. This protec¬
torate should not reach further than a nominal supremacy resembling the rela¬
tion of Muscovy to Don Host. |
| adam_txt |
Зміст
Передмова
. 7
Частина
1
Феномен московської експансії
XIV -
першої половини
XVII
ст.
Розділ
1.
Конвой східноєвропейських аналогів
. 15
Розділ
2.
Від удільного князівства до Московського царства
. 51
Розділ
3.
Донське, волзьке та яїцьке козацтва в експансіоністських
концепціях Московії
. 87
Розділ
4.
Цивілізаційна інтервенція, що не відбулася: Річ Посполита
і козацький пояс Дон-Яїк-Терек
.121
Частина
2
На шляху до свого Переяслава
1654
року
Розділ
1.
Московія й українські козаки в
XVI -
першій половині
XVII
ст
.139
Розділ
2.
Український
1648
рік очима Московії
.187
Розділ
3.
Між "вічним миром"
1634
р. і територіальними спокусами
.237
Розділ
4.
Московська концепція Переяслава
1654
p.:
невизначеність
до останнього
.285
Післямова
.-,.315
Бібліографія
.322
Індекс
.341
SUMMARY
Muscovy was predetermined to meet the middle of the seventeenth cen¬
tury, the time period, for which the historical destiny has prepared great up¬
heavals and trials for the Eastern Europe in fact, at the crossroads. By that time
Muscovy had a really vast experience of conquests and integrations of ethni¬
cally and even civilizationally foreign communities. During almost three centu¬
ries of expansion Moscow was able to subdue to its rule huge territories in all
directions from its historical core, and at the same time it solved a number of
geopolitical tasks. The Muscovite grand princes have conquered a number of
neighboring states sometimes much more developed applying dreadful cruelty
without any hesitation, which literally horrified Europe. First being a principal¬
ity lost in the woods, the rulers of which kissed the grounds to Mongolian khans,
Muscovy turned into a threat not only for Asian steppe element, but also for the
integrity of the Eastern fragment of European civilization.
Among the state formations, which immanently belonged to European world,
the first victims of Muscovite expansion became Tver, Novgorod, Pskov, as well
as Siver Smolensk lands, so-called Verkhivsky lands, which were cut off from
the
Ruthenian
world in various ways and integrated into political body of Mus¬
covy. This success has inflamed the territorial claims of Moscow in the Western
direction. At the same time in the East the Muscovite grand princes almost op¬
timally used the destructive processes that took part in the Golden Horde. The
middle of the sixteenth century became the epoch of great territorial repartition.
Kazan and Astrakhan khanates capitulated to Muscovite troops; Nogai lost a
part of its sovereignty; Muscovy started to penetrate Ciscaucasia, and since the
eighties of the seventeenth century
-
Siberia. Muskovy with all its might wedged
itself in no man's Steppe, desperately trying to obtain even the forest-steppe
Left-Bank Dnieper, which was territorially remote, but very important strategi¬
cally due to confrontation with Poland and the Crimea. Finally the Don, the
Volga, the Yaik, and the Terek Cossack enclaves became the object of Muscovy's
persistent infringements. Although it did not succeed in absorbing Cossack en¬
claves by the middle of the seventeenth century, but it was able to draw them
into the sphere of its influence. Taking into account the unconcerned indiffer-
Summary
359
enee
of Vilnius and Warsaw to the Eastern fragment of the Steppe and to the
Cossack band the Don
-
the Volga
-
the Yaik, the Moslem neighbors remained
the only serious opponents of Muscovy in competitions for domination in this
region. However, the tendency directed to continuous narrowing of military
and political potentials of the Crimea andNogai hordes finally consolidated by
the middle of the seventeenth century. The conversion of Muscovy to offensive
tactics regarding the Crimean Khanate on the eve of Ukrainian National libera¬
tion war became an indicative confirmation
ofthat.
The Crimean Khanate still
continued to play a vital part in the Eastern European politics, it was still able to
organize powerful invasions to Muscovy, but establishing an anti-Muscovite front
with participation of all Nogai hordes was beyond its power. Despite all the ef¬
forts Islam-Hirey III failed to start realizing his superidea
-
winning back Kazan
and Astrakhan from Muscovy in the middle of the seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, despite obvious success on the way of its expansive plans real¬
ization Muscovy was neither politically nor militarily ready for further open
competitions for
Ruthenian
lands in the middle of the seventeenth century. And
without possession of these lands one could not expect a geopolitical domina¬
tion in the Eastern Europe. The Smolensk war has finally testified Muskovy's
disability both to conquer the Commonwealth militarily, and to get its own way
by means of provoking the off-center Muskovy-centrist tendencies in Ukraine
and Byelorussia. Ruthenian nobility as a representation camp "responsible" for
political destiny of these lands remained an ungrateful material for Muscovite
tsars. The factor of the East European expanse confessionalization although raised
the problem of Orthodox solidarity, but did not shake the gentry orientation to
the Commonwealth world. Still considering itself an organic constituent of the
Commonwealth "political nation", and gradually but stably being polonized, the
Ruthenian nobility mentally could not imagine its existence outside its social
and political system. Furthermore, the process of splitting
Ruthenia
as a solid
Ukrainian-Byelorussian array has started in the imagination of Ruthenian elite.
The Ukrainian nobility started to realize the political expanse
"Ruthenia"
only
as "the tenitory of southern ("Ukrainian") principalities ofKyivan Rm' epoch".
That is why one could yield the Ruthenian elite to swear to Muscovite tsar only
by conquering the respective territories.
Confessionalization aroused a sincere interest to Muscovy only of Ukrai¬
nian high-level Orthodox clergy and just because the Eastern patriarchs did not
have a real power to head the Orthodox bloc in the actualized on confessionalized
basis confrontation with the Catholic camp. Muscovite tsar remained the only
Orthodox monarch, the sovereign of "a great state", that's why he was naturally
considered to be the last hope for the Orthodox believers. Moscow correspond¬
ingly turned to a center of attraction of the Orthodox world including the East¬
ern patriarchs, to the core of an imaginary Orthodox bloc. And as a result, ap-
360
Summary
pearance of the Muskovy-centrist statements from the side of Ukrainian Ortho¬
dox clergy had the same nature at its heart as appeals to Moscow (sometimes no
less panegyrical) of representatives of other fragments of the Orthodox world.
Namely the acuteness of the Orthodox problem in the Commonwealth, but not
realization the necessity of joining the Poland's and Lithuania's
Ruthenian
lands
to Muscovy encouraged Ukrainian ecclesiastics to Orthodox rhetoric. This is
confirmed both by the tendencies characteristic for Ukrainian Orthodoxy in P.
Mohyla's time, and reaction of Muskovy itself to Muskovy-centrist appeals of
clergy in
1620 -
beginning of
1630,
as well as by attitude of Ukrainian clergy to
Pereiaslav
Rada
(Council) of
1654
with its threats of Kyivan Metropolitanate
subjection to Muscovite Patriarchy. Ukrainian Orthodox circles clearly distin¬
guished the
Ruthenian
world from the Muscovite one. They have proposed a
Ruthenian identity model, where they have found a place to Cossacks as new
defenders of Orthodoxy, but
Ruthenia
territorially did not cover the Muscovite
lands, being limited to Ukrainian
-
Byelorussian territory. Recollecting com¬
mon ethnic roots, belonging of Ruthenian and Muscovite lands to political ex¬
panse of Kyivan
Rus',
statements on desirability of renewing the common politi¬
cal roof
-
all that in the part meant for Muscovite ears, in fact, was called to
make Muscovy mainly a factor of competitions for the rights of Orthodox be¬
lievers in the Commonwealth. Clergy desired to threaten Warsaw by its
coreligionism with the Muscovites in order to press stronger on the Catholic
camp and finally reach "soothing the ancient Greek religion" and "improvement of
liberties and freedom of Ruthenian people'
.
Ukrainian Cossacks were not in a hurry to come over under Muscovite gon¬
falons either. During the confessionalization process the Cossacks turned into a
protector of national interests of the Ukrainian world, and claimed its preten¬
sions to occupy the highest level of social rank. The Cossacks' reaction to
Smolensk war became a cold bath for Muscovy, which was lulled by pro-Musco¬
vite rhetoric coming from time to time out of Cossack circle, as well as by pas¬
sionate assurances of Y. Boretskyi—I. Kopyskyi regarding Cossack intentions as
if to come over under the "high tsar hand'. A decade after this war cleared up the
situation completely. The Cossacks saw the future of their state solely with re¬
forming of the Commonwealth. Also, by the beginning of National liberation
war the Cossacks have not become a legitimate "political nation", that's why it
could not be (in Moscow's eyes) a subject of relations regarding political future
of Ukrainian lands. According to the contemporary political and legal views the
Cossacks could play only a subsidiary role.
This factor-in combination with the fact that by the end of forties of the
seventeenth century the pro-Muscovite moods were not a business card of the
Ukrainian elite established the fundamentals of the position with which Mus¬
covy started its relations with
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi
and his circle in
1648.
Summary
361
Though Muscovy had a good chance to rely on relations with the Ukrainian
world intensified during the sixteenth
-
first half of the seventeenth centuries,
but in the key issue
-
spread of its superiority over him
-
there was no other
solution for it except for a power one; for this one, I reiterate, it did not feel
ready. Squeezed by the defeat in Smolensk war, Muscovy could not allow itself
measuring swords with Warsaw alone, and nothing, in fact, notified of better
times approaching. War for Ukrainian
-
Byelorussian lands was evidently not
in the agenda for Muscovite diplomacy. In Muscovy's actions we cannot see any
signs of preparation for a storm of the Ukrainian stronghold. On the contrary,
one can feel a lack of views regarding the prospects of advancement of their ex¬
pansionist interests. This is witnessed by its diplomatic relations with the Com¬
monwealth at the beginning of National liberation war in Ukraine. Perhaps, the
most striking confirmation of this is the fact that Muscovy did not employ the
social explosion that took place in Ukraine in
1648
as a means of pressure during
the negotiations on delimitation of the last segment (Northern-Nevel) of its
boundary with the Commonwealth according to the terms of Polianiv armi¬
stice. Despite reasonability of the opportunity the Muscovite diplomats did not
leave the position agreed in
1644
and initialed by the Commonwealth embassy
of A. Kysil in
1647
during his visit to Moscow. Impetuous processes that took
place then on the highest level of the Ukrainian social rank, creation of the Cos¬
sack state, reshaping the traditional position of powers in the East European
international relations
-
all that posed to Muscovy totally different problems in
the Ukrainian direction than those it had been used to before.
Hence, there are no reasons to consider the Muscovite conception of
1654
Pereiaslav as a display of its plans that were crystallized in Muscovy in the first
half of the seventeenth century, or even earlier. Actually, only Muscovy's politi¬
cal claims to Ukrainian lands had an old tradition; whereas the strategies di¬
rected to realization of this intention changed with time, and the version that
ripened on the eve of Pereiaslav
Rada
1654
and was realized during and after it
in principle could not be developed before the beginning of the Ukrainian Na¬
tional liberation war. Pereiaslav
1654
that was a "turning point in the history of
three
countrìes:
Poland, Russia and Ukraine", in fact, was an impromptu for Mus¬
covy in an ideological sense, and not a deeply thought over, adjusted action.
During the first five years of the Ukrainian National liberation war Mus¬
covy was at the crossroads. Not without political dividends balancing between
the problem of maintaining "the eternal peace"
1634
and its old territorial appe¬
tites regarding the
Ruthenian
lands of the Commonwealth, the tsar's court did
not have the courage to cross the epochal (as it would be ascertained later) path
in the Ukrainian issue. In order to push off Moscow from the position of an
interested observer, B. Khmelnytskyi had to create a stalemate political situa¬
tion for it, skilfully giving check by the ghost of Turkish protectorate over the
362
Summary
Cossack state and by his dynastic plans in Moldova. Realization of hetman's
both foreign-policy projects would say good-bye for a long time to the Musco¬
vite plans to annex Ukraine to "tsarpatrimony". After September
1653
Zemskyi
Sobor
(Assembly of the Land) the Posol's'kyi
Prikaz
(Foreign Office) worked
immediately "from the wheels", consequently the ideological lining of the Mus¬
covite position given publicity in Pereiaslav was changed repeatedly. Besides,
the final version was based on recommendations of the Ukrainian party. Since the
second half of the fifteenth century dreaming of concentration of all the
Ruthenian
lands of the Commonwealth in their hands, the Muscovite dynasts did not dem¬
onstrate an integral conception for substantiation the legality of their claims for
unconditional annexation of exactly Hetmanate to "tsarpatrimony" by the time
of making a decision on leaving the system of "the eternal peace".
Such an inconsistency between almost bicentenary preparation of Muscovy
for getting control over "Kyiv heritage" and the real unpreparedness of the tsar
government for ideological substantiation of the process of its strategic goal re¬
alization in the middle of the seventeenth century was determined by much deeper
circumstances than concrete peculiarities of military and political situation in
the region. The root of the problem consisted in the following: regarding the
political future of Ukrainian lands (at least Hetmanate) Muskovy had to deal
not with the traditional, and so, legitimate elite, but with the camp, which pressed
the gentry from its place under the sun, and demanded its legalization as a new
"political nation". In the system of political and legal coordinates inherent to the
Christian world in early-modern times the obtrusion of legitimate Christian state
to contractual relations with the state
-
new-formation meant an official recog¬
nition of the latter with all the subsequent ideological and political consequences.
Muskovy found itself in such a situation for the first time during more than
two hundred years of its expansionist practices. A complicated situation formed
on the highest level of social rank was waiting for it in Ukraine. Having ab¬
sorbed a minor part of nobility, the Cossacks de-facto became a "political nation"
on the under-authority territory and determined their
fate. De
jure the nobility
continued to be a "political nation", their main array remained faithful to the
political system of the Commonwealth and persistently struggled with the Cos¬
sacks; that became a great tragedy of the Ukrainian world. Moreover, far from all
the ethnic Ukrainian lands were under the
hetman
power, though Hetmanate's
elite, keeping to the church model of
"Ruthenian
people", which meant that
Ruthenia
covered the territory of Kyiv Metropolitanate, practiced the idea of
hetman's power spread not only on the Ukrainian lands, but also on Byelorussian
ones. In Byelorussia, on the part of Podillya, in Halychyna and Volyn'
-
the terri¬
tories to which Moscow also had claims
-
the nobility has kept its positions.
As it was quickly clarified, the Muscovite elite turned out to be not ready
ideologically to the rash of Cossacks to the highest level of social rank. No con-
Summary
363
ception that could take into account the probability of such a scenario in Ukraine
was developed in Moscow by the middle of the seventeenth century. The Cos¬
sacks' competitions for the right to belong to
"Ruthenian
people" in the
ñrst
half
of the seventeenth century did not wake a subject interest of the Muscovite elite
and did not affect its political conceptions regarding Ukrainian Cossacks.
Muskovy continued to stake only on tactful relations with the Cossacks. It could
not quickly rebuild on new rails to the accompaniment of Ukrainian National
liberation war. Burden of traditional views of the "correct" organization of the
society and power was an extraordinary strong obstacle to recognize Cossack
enclaves to be a "political nation" at the expense of legitimate elite
-
Ukrainian
nobility. Namely this burden has created an ideological ground both for
Muskovy's manipulation with the Ukrainian factor in relations with the Com¬
monwealth during the second half of the seventeenth century, and for casting
doubt later on belonging the Cossacks to the closed club of social elites.
Muscovy's general lack of confidence in viability of the project "Zaporozhian
Host" extremely overburdened the situation as all the previous Cossack rebel¬
lions ended in defeat. Even more oppressive were the system of values demon¬
strated by the Cossacks since P. Sagaidachnyi times (especially the cult of the
king's son (later the king) Vladyslav in the Cossack environment), as well as the
Cossacks' political position during Smolensk war. The Cossacks connected the
future of their camp solely with reforming of the Commonwealth's political sys¬
tem, but not with the change of a monarch, even in favor of an Orthodox tsar.
Hence there is that deep warning constantly emanating from the
Posol's'Iîyiprykaz
when responding to information on readiness of the Cossacks for a subjection to
the Muscovite tsar. In general Muscovy did not trust the Cossacks, and being
taught by the bitter experience of the first half of the seventeenth century con¬
stantly doubted the sincerity of their intentions. Probably, the best evidence of
Moscow's uncertainty is its constant expectation of a common Cossack-Tatar
campaign to the Don and directly to Muscovite lands. Also, tsar was probably
irritated by rather numerous reports that the Cossacks did not consider Mus¬
covy to be an alternative-free direction of a possible migration in case of a final
defeat, instead they considered a Crimean variant as well.
But the greatest concern was caused by the fact that at the beginning of
1649
B. Khmelnytskyi drew a parallel between the Kyivan
Rus'
and the Cos¬
sack state, expressively reminded that Kyiv was primacy in comparison with
Moscow and reminded of much shorter very Muscovite state tradition. In
1651
hetman
finally showed his cards and set out his vision of Hetmanate's "subjec¬
tion" to the tsar, which was unfavorable for the latter. Ukrainian-Muscovite
relations had to be built on a contractual basis ("on articles"). At that Chyhyryn
did not agree on a deeper political relations with Muscovy than the one that had
existed between it and the Don Host. That meant that Hetmanate would re-
364
Summary
main a full-fledged state organism, a subject of international relations, it would
not have common power bodies with Muscovy and would maintain relations
with it through ambassador missions. The only uniting link would be the tsar-
protector and defender. The fact that the statement on the limits of intensifica¬
tion of political relations between the Cossack state and Muscovy was made
after Berestechko catastrophe added a special clarity to the strategies of B.
Khmelnytskyi. After all, relations of Chyhyryn with the Crimea,
Porta
and
Moldavia, especially the idea of Turkish protectorate and Moldavian project
poured oil on the flames.
As a result, Muskovy did not have any other way out than to wait, even if it
was not formally bound up by Polyaniv peace treaty, would got rid of a psycho¬
logical pressure of defeat in Smolensk war and felt ready militarily. Not to risk,
find out the state of affairs in Ukraine in details, console itself by weakening the
Ukrainian and the Polish parties
-
a better alternative to such a course for Mos¬
cow did not exist.
During the first half a year of the Ukrainian National liberation war Mus¬
covy perceived it as a usual Cossack uprising. Before the turn of
1648-1649
the
tsar government did not show its strategic interest beyond the usual limits it
reached during Cossack wars of the first half of the seventeenth century. The
tsar's official documents and orders to the frontier voevodes (governors of prov¬
inces) did not contain any signs of Moscow's interest to the internal life of Cos¬
sack world, to the processes of forming the Cossack state and its elite. Muscovy
assessed Ukrainian events as a permanent steam emitting in the lingering Cos¬
sack-Polish confrontation and did not look at them through the prism of its
expansionist plans. Possibility of the Commonwealth disintegration as a result
of processes launched in spring
1648
in Ukraine was not assumed. B.
Khmelnytskyi's calls concerning the war with Warsaw, his appeals to Orthodox
solidarity and proposals to nominate Oleksiy Mykhailovych for a king's election
did not give rise to Moscow's real interest. Moreover, the Muscovy was filled
with the probability of Cossack-Tatar intrusion and on this ground maintained
active contacts with Adam Kysil and Yarema Vyshnevetskyi. The possibility of
crossing the Ukrainian border by the Muscovite troops was probable, and the
Polish party actively called upon to it. Only at the end of the year Muscovy
gradually started to change its attitude to the Ukrainian events under the influ¬
ence of success of the Cossack arms and active diplomacy of B. Khmelnytskyi. It
finally rejected the possibility of fulfillment its duties ensued from the anti-Tatar
agreement
1646,
imposes direct diplomatic contacts with Chyhyryn, and by
spring develops its first conception regarding Ukrainian National liberation war.
That was a conception of delay the prospect of war with the Commonwealth
for an uncertain time. Muscovy made a conclusion on advisability of interfer¬
ence into the Ukrainian events, but exceptionally by means of political instru-
Summary
365
ments
staking first of all on a detailed wangling the degree of sympathies for
'itself from the side of the Cossacks and, obviously, on weakening the parties.
The highest limit of Muscovite highest ranks' desires did not go further than
strategically exceptionally profitable role of a mediator between the rebels and
Warsaw and support the candidature of Oleksiy Mykhailovych in case election
did not take place.
Initially these would be the frames for describing the Muscovite position
regarding the Ukrainian issue till, actually, autumn
1653.
Namely the idea of
mediation in various variants would remain a comer stone of Ukrainian policy
of Muscovy, despite seemingly radicalism of resolutions of
1651
Zemskyi
Sobor.
Tsar and his circle protracted declaration of war to the Commonwealth as long
as possible trying to catch hold of any chance (even an illusive one) in order to
delay the time of crossing its Rubicon. The most notorious examples are confir¬
mation of "the eternal peace" by Moscow in
1650,
as well as the behavior of the
embassy of B. Repnin in
1653
in conditions of a diplomatic time trouble, which
was arranged by B. Khmelnytskyi in Moscow by means of an inspired raffling of
a Turkish card. In the latter case the tsar messenger had an order (and, to all
appearances, he was fulfilling it) to show a remarkable pliability; its final point
could become (and it did become) an attempt to change the refusal of Muscovy
of a complex of previous pretensions and its obligations to slow down B.
Khmelnytskyi's appetites for the guarantees of Yan Kazymyr to ensure the effi¬
cacy of religious items of the Polish-Cossack
Zbořiv
agreement.
All the diplomatic games carried out by Moscow with Warsaw and
Chyhyryn during
1649-1652
were directed not in the least to preparation of a
ground for recognition of the Cossacks as a representative of the Orthodox popu¬
lation of the Commonwealth, and on this basis to accept the Cossack state under
its domination and unleash a war with the Crown for the final consolidation of
the new repartition of the Ukrainian ethnic territory. The superidea of the Mus¬
covite highest ranks consisted in achievement of a Poland's voluntary renuncia¬
tion of
Ruthenian
lands, and, above all, Smolensk.
The platform for this goal realization had to be made, according to the plan,
by strengthening the role of Moscow as a mediator in Ukrainian affairs. The first
attempt to become firmly established in such a status was made in
1650,
when the
mithion of the Pushkin brothers presented in Warsaw a modified variant of the
Ukrainian politics conception developed at the beginning of
1649;
this time it was
highlighted by a decisiveness to squeeze out political and territorial concessions
(Smolensk, Sivershchyna). Such an aggravation of Muscovite position was deter¬
mined by the consequences of
Zbořiv-Zbarazh
campaign of
1649,
especially by an
actual recognition of the Cossack state legitimacy from the King's party. In the
context of the initial version of his conception Oleksiy Mykhailovych did not have
even an intention to quarrel with Yan Kazymyr; now Muscovite ambassadors
366
Summary
started to talk about the wish of the tsar to "reconcile" the king with the Cossacks,
and blackmailed the latter by the fact of availability of legitimate reasons for leav¬
ing "the eternal peace'
,
especially by the fact that B. Khmelnytskyi inventively
strived for signing a military and political union with the Orthodox tsar.
In April
1651
the Muscovite diplomacy succeeded to provoke a consent
from, the party of the Commonwealth ambassadors S. Vitovskyi and K. Obukho-
vych. Although they come to their senses and made a reverse motion, but an
important pretext has been made. Henceforth Muscovy unsuccessfully tried to
develop the success applying various diplomatic instruments and toughening its
position as Ukrainian National liberation war dragged on. However it purpose¬
fully avoided to cross the path that separated the offensiveness of diplomacy
from military opposition. Decisions of Zemskyi
Sobor
1651
urged to witness
B. Khmelnytskyi the strategic intentions of the state and by that to keep him
from the further rapprochement with Turkey.
In fact, during
1648—1653
hetman
and his circle permanently fulfilled the
function of Muscovy's intellectual donor, a supplier of ideas for it directed to
intensification the Muscovite- Cossack relations and to aggravation of relations
with Warsaw. The Posol's'kyjprykaz nourished by the results of work of hetman's
chancellery using it for development of its Ukrainian and Polish politics con¬
ception. Muscovy's diplomatic game in Polish direction was worked into a stiff
mixture by arguments of Ukrainian origin. Chronologically the key constitu¬
ents of official Muscovite position appeared in the conception only after the re¬
spective suggestions from the Ukrainian side. Namely
hetman
was the first to
hoist a flag of Orthodox solidarity and election the Orthodox tsar to a King's
throne. Namely Chyhyryn tirelessly supplied arguments regarding the legiti¬
macy of Muscovy's leaving the "the etemalpeace" system in
1634.
Namely
hetman
raised a question of Muscovy's mediation in Cossack-Polish confrontation and
directed it to the course of connecting Hetmanate with Kyivan
Rus'.
Application of Ukrainian origin argumentation by Muscovite ambassadors
in Pereiaslav that was based on Kyiv-centrist conception of Little and Great
Rus'
in fact meant recognition of Cossack state by a representatives of all the
Little
Rus'.
That put an end to the problem of legitimation of Hetmanate,
Hetman
power and the Cossacks as a "political nation" in the yeas of Christian world.
Moscow agreed to place the Cossacks over the
Ruthenian
nobility and to treat
them as a representative of the Ukrainian world; that laid the foundation for
legitimacy of B. Khmelnytskyi's claims to concentration of all the ethnic Ukrai¬
nian lands as well as the territory of Byelorussia under his power. So, the compe¬
tition for Byelorussia that flares up between Muscovy and Hetmanate in
1654
would have a perfectly legitimate basis for the Ukrainian party.
The process of forming the Muscovy's Ukrainian politics in
1648-1653,
es¬
pecially the specific character of development the decision to accept the Cos-
Summary
367
sack state "under the high tsar hand" and evolution of Muscovite ambassadors'
argumentation utilized at Pereiaslav
Rada
1654
puts an end to a complex of
evidences on the fact that the contemporary Ukrainians and Muscovites clearly
realized the difference between their worlds. Muscovite diplomacy did not im¬
pose on theses regarding the ethnic proximity of Ukrainians and Muscovites the
notions of "a angle people', "a angle
Oríhodoxrusáan
people"
,
as they started to
talk in Russian historiography again on the turn of the twentieth—twenty first
centuries.
In exactly the same way the position of Chyhyryn shows that the Cossacks
realizing themselves within the limits of a church model of
Ruthenian
identity
definitely dissociate themselves from the Muscovite world. Muscovy was con¬
sidered only as a very important player in the system of regional international
relations, as a possible ally and
-
the most important
-
legalizer of Hetmanate
existence, its protector (evidently, till the end of competition for the final part¬
ing with Poland). Hetman's appeals to unity of the Orthodox world were of
solely tactical nature and were determined by the fact that in the confessionalized
expanse namely religious slogans were both a natural phenomenon, and a factor
that could rouse the greatest resonance. B. Khmelnytskyi widely used the flag of
struggle for the Orthodox belief in the internal policy and in diplomatic actions
in various directions
-
from Moldova and Transylvania to Lithuania and Swe¬
den. Appeals that sounded to the Muscovy side regarding Orthodox solidarity
did not contain an ethnic component and did not touch the problem of integra¬
tion the Ukrainian and Muscovite worlds.
Hetman
chancellery periodically gave
Muscovy quite clear signals regarding Chyhyryn's vision of the limits of the
sought protectorate of the Muscovite tsar over the Cossack state. This protec¬
torate should not reach further than a nominal supremacy resembling the rela¬
tion of Muscovy to Don Host. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Brechunenko, Viktor Anatolijovyč 1965- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1025869486 |
| author_facet | Brechunenko, Viktor Anatolijovyč 1965- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Brechunenko, Viktor Anatolijovyč 1965- |
| author_variant | v a b va vab |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021273661 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)238758119 (DE-599)BVBBV021273661 |
| era | Geschichte 1300-1650 gnd Geschichte 1500-1654 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1300-1650 Geschichte 1500-1654 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Ukraine (DE-588)4061496-7 gnd Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Ukraine Russland |
| id | DE-604.BV021273661 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T13:45:18Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-22T00:33:56Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9660234201 |
| language | Ukrainian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014594749 |
| oclc_num | 238758119 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 367 S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Nacionalʹna Akad. Nauk Ukraïny, Inst. Ukrainsʹkoj Archeohrafii ta Džereloznavstva im. M. S. Hruševsʹkoho [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Brechunenko, Viktor Anatolijovyč 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)1025869486 aut Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku Viktor Brechunenko Kyiv Nacionalʹna Akad. Nauk Ukraïny, Inst. Ukrainsʹkoj Archeohrafii ta Džereloznavstva im. M. S. Hruševsʹkoho [u.a.] 2005 367 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier PST: Muskovite expansion and Pereiaslav Rada 1654. - In kyrill. Schr., ukrain. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1300-1650 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1500-1654 gnd rswk-swf Kosaken (DE-588)4032542-8 gnd rswk-swf Perejaslaw-Chmelnizki Vertrag 1654 (DE-588)4045152-5 gnd rswk-swf Expansionspolitik (DE-588)4015995-4 gnd rswk-swf Ukraine (DE-588)4061496-7 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Perejaslaw-Chmelnizki Vertrag 1654 (DE-588)4045152-5 s DE-604 Ukraine (DE-588)4061496-7 g Kosaken (DE-588)4032542-8 s Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Geschichte 1500-1654 z Expansionspolitik (DE-588)4015995-4 s Geschichte 1300-1650 z Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014594749&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014594749&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Brechunenko, Viktor Anatolijovyč 1965- Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku Kosaken (DE-588)4032542-8 gnd Perejaslaw-Chmelnizki Vertrag 1654 (DE-588)4045152-5 gnd Expansionspolitik (DE-588)4015995-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4032542-8 (DE-588)4045152-5 (DE-588)4015995-4 (DE-588)4061496-7 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku |
| title_auth | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku |
| title_exact_search | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku |
| title_full | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku Viktor Brechunenko |
| title_fullStr | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku Viktor Brechunenko |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku Viktor Brechunenko |
| title_short | Moskovsʹka ekspansija i Perejaslavsʹka Rada 1654 roku |
| title_sort | moskovsʹka ekspansija i perejaslavsʹka rada 1654 roku |
| topic | Kosaken (DE-588)4032542-8 gnd Perejaslaw-Chmelnizki Vertrag 1654 (DE-588)4045152-5 gnd Expansionspolitik (DE-588)4015995-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Kosaken Perejaslaw-Chmelnizki Vertrag 1654 Expansionspolitik Ukraine Russland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014594749&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014594749&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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