Moral skepticisms:
"All contentious moral issues - from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action - raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and th...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford Univ. Press
2006
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "All contentious moral issues - from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action - raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees - e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral - can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how?" "These profound questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism - the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory, - "moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism" - which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs."--BOOK JACKET. |
| Beschreibung: | XIII, 271 S. |
| ISBN: | 0195187725 9780195187724 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "All contentious moral issues - from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action - raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees - e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral - can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how?" "These profound questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism - the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory, - "moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism" - which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs."--BOOK JACKET. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text |
CONTENTS PART I: ISSUES CHAPTER 1. WHAT IS MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY? 5 1.1.
MORAL THEORY 5 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY APPLIED TO MORALITY 7 1.3. VARIETIES OF
MORAL SKEPTICISM 9 1.4. PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST MORAL SKEPTICISM 13 CHAPTER
2. ARE MORAL BELIEFS TRUTH-APT? 16 2.1. DOES KNOWLEDGE REQUIRE TRUE
BELIEF? 16 2.2. EXPRESSIVISM 17 CHAPTER 3. ARE ANY MORAL BELIEFS TRUE?
32 3.1. ERROR THEORIES 32 3. 2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MORAL FACTS 37 33 IS
MORAL NIHILISM COHERENT? 53 3+ SO FAR 58 CHAPTER 4- ARE ANY MORAL
BELIEFS JUSTIFIED? 60 4.1. DOES KNOWLEDGE REQUIRE JUSTIFIED BELIEF? 60
4-2. WAYS TO BE JUSTIFIED 63 43- ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUSTIFIED MORAL
BELIEF 73 CHAPTER 5. IN CONTRAST WITH WHAT? 83 5.1. CONTRAST CLASSES IN
EPISTEMOLOGY 84 5-2. UNQUALIFIED EPISTEMIC JUDGMENTS 90 XII CONTENTS
5.3. PROBLEMS FOR RELEVANCE 97 5+ CLASSY PYRRHONISM 10 3 5.5. OBJECTIONS
10 7 CHAPTER 6. CLASSY MORAL PYRRHONISM 112 6.1. MORAL CONTRAST CLASSES
112 6.2. UNQUALIFIED JUDGMENTS IN MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 117 6+ RELATIVIZED
MORAL SKEPTICISMS 119 6+ ACADEMIC MORAL SKEPTICISM 121 6.5. 1S MORAL
NIHILISM RELEVANT? 122 6.6. MORE PROBLE~S FOR RELEVANCE 127 6.7.
MODERATE MORAL PYRRHONISM 130 PART II: THEORLES CHAPTER 7. NATURALISM
135 7.1. THE ORIGINAL HUMEAN DOCTRINE 135 7.2. NECESSARY MORAL TRUTHS
136 7.3. LOGICAL TRICKS 140 7+ APPEALS TO AUTHORITY 142 7.5. OTHER
NATURALISMS 151 CHAPTER 8. NORMATIVISM 153 8.1. MORAL EXPLANATIONS 153
8.2. CONTRACTARIANISM AND CONTRACTUALISM 167 CHAPTER 9. LNTUITIONISM 18
4 9.1. WHAT 1S MORAL 1NTUITIONISM? 184 9.2. WHICH CONTRAST CLASS? 191 9+
WHEN DO BELIEFS NEED CONFINNATION? 192 9+ DO MORAL BELIEFS NEED
CONFINNATION? 195 9.5. OBJECTIONS 210 9.6. QUALIFICATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS 218 CHAPTER 10. COHERENTISM 220 10.1. WHAT 1S COHERENCE? 221
10.2. FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE 226 10.3. SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE 230 10+
WIDER COHERENCE 233 10.5. WHICH CONTRAST CLASS? 235 10.6. OBJECTIONS 237
107 CONCLUSIONS 250 REFERENCES 253 INDEX 263 |
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS PART I: ISSUES CHAPTER 1. WHAT IS MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY? 5 1.1.
MORAL THEORY 5 1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY APPLIED TO MORALITY 7 1.3. VARIETIES OF
MORAL SKEPTICISM 9 1.4. PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST MORAL SKEPTICISM 13 CHAPTER
2. ARE MORAL BELIEFS TRUTH-APT? 16 2.1. DOES KNOWLEDGE REQUIRE TRUE
BELIEF? 16 2.2. EXPRESSIVISM 17 CHAPTER 3. ARE ANY MORAL BELIEFS TRUE?
32 3.1. ERROR THEORIES 32 3. 2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MORAL FACTS 37 33 IS
MORAL NIHILISM COHERENT? 53 3+ SO FAR 58 CHAPTER 4- ARE ANY MORAL
BELIEFS JUSTIFIED? 60 4.1. DOES KNOWLEDGE REQUIRE JUSTIFIED BELIEF? 60
4-2. WAYS TO BE JUSTIFIED 63 43- ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUSTIFIED MORAL
BELIEF 73 CHAPTER 5. IN CONTRAST WITH WHAT? 83 5.1. CONTRAST CLASSES IN
EPISTEMOLOGY 84 5-2. UNQUALIFIED EPISTEMIC JUDGMENTS 90 XII CONTENTS
5.3. PROBLEMS FOR RELEVANCE 97 5+ CLASSY PYRRHONISM 10 3 5.5. OBJECTIONS
10 7 CHAPTER 6. CLASSY MORAL PYRRHONISM 112 6.1. MORAL CONTRAST CLASSES
112 6.2. UNQUALIFIED JUDGMENTS IN MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 117 6+ RELATIVIZED
MORAL SKEPTICISMS 119 6+ ACADEMIC MORAL SKEPTICISM 121 6.5. 1S MORAL
NIHILISM RELEVANT? 122 6.6. MORE PROBLE~S FOR RELEVANCE 127 6.7.
MODERATE MORAL PYRRHONISM 130 PART II: THEORLES CHAPTER 7. NATURALISM
135 7.1. THE ORIGINAL HUMEAN DOCTRINE 135 7.2. NECESSARY MORAL TRUTHS
136 7.3. LOGICAL TRICKS 140 7+ APPEALS TO AUTHORITY 142 7.5. OTHER
NATURALISMS 151 CHAPTER 8. NORMATIVISM 153 8.1. MORAL EXPLANATIONS 153
8.2. CONTRACTARIANISM AND CONTRACTUALISM 167 CHAPTER 9. LNTUITIONISM 18
4 9.1. WHAT 1S MORAL 1NTUITIONISM? 184 9.2. WHICH CONTRAST CLASS? 191 9+
WHEN DO BELIEFS NEED CONFINNATION? 192 9+ DO MORAL BELIEFS NEED
CONFINNATION? 195 9.5. OBJECTIONS 210 9.6. QUALIFICATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS 218 CHAPTER 10. COHERENTISM 220 10.1. WHAT 1S COHERENCE? 221
10.2. FIRST-ORDER COHERENCE 226 10.3. SECOND-ORDER COHERENCE 230 10+
WIDER COHERENCE 233 10.5. WHICH CONTRAST CLASS? 235 10.6. OBJECTIONS 237
107 CONCLUSIONS 250 REFERENCES 253 INDEX 263 |
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| spelling | Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)131962485 aut Moral skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Oxford Oxford Univ. Press 2006 XIII, 271 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "All contentious moral issues - from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action - raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees - e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral - can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how?" "These profound questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism - the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory, - "moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism" - which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs."--BOOK JACKET. Ethics Skepticism Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 s DE-604 Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 s V:DE-604 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014592113&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter 1955- Moral skepticisms Ethics Skepticism Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4055222-6 (DE-588)4015602-3 (DE-588)4055225-1 |
| title | Moral skepticisms |
| title_auth | Moral skepticisms |
| title_exact_search | Moral skepticisms |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Moral skepticisms |
| title_full | Moral skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
| title_fullStr | Moral skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
| title_short | Moral skepticisms |
| title_sort | moral skepticisms |
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