The political economy of antitrust:
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam u.a.
Elsevier
2007
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. ed. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Contributions to economic analysis
282 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 489 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780444530936 0444530932 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The political economy of antitrust |c ed. by Vivek Ghosal ; John Stennek |
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| adam_text | Titel: The political economy of antitrust
Autor: Ghosal, Vivek
Jahr: 2007
Contents
Introduction to the Series v
Acknowledgements vii
List of Contributors xv
Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement I
Vivek Ghosal, Joseph E. Harrington and Johan Stennek
1.1. Shifting winds in antitrust 2
1.2. Enforcement of cartels 3
1.3. Merger control 9
1.4. Non-merger enforcement 16
1.5. Systemic issues 20
Acknowledgements 21
References 21
Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the
Development of Industrial Economics 25
Stephen Martin
2.1. Introduction 25
2.2. Early development 27
2.3. The First Chicago School 32
2.4. The Second Chicago School 34
2.5. Confronting the oligopoly problem 37
2.6. Chicago transformed 44
2.7. Final thoughts 45
Acknowledgements 47
Appendix 47
References 2
Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel
Formation and the Cartel Price Path 59
Joe Chen and Joseph E. Harrington
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Model 61
3.3. Optimal symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium 66
3.4. Numerical analysis
3.5. Summary
Acknowledgements
References 80
x Contents
Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price
Fixers still Go to Prison? 81
Paolo Buccimssi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
4.1. Introduction 82
4.2. Fines without leniency 85
4.3. Leniency, whistleblowers, and optimal antitrust fines 100
4.4. Implementing the optimal fine efficiently 109
4.5. Conclusion 118
Acknowledgements 119
References 120
Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests 123
Cecile Aubert
5.1. Introduction 123
5.2. The various instruments used for cartel deterrence in major O.E.C.D.
countries 128
5.3. May we expect freely provided information on collusive practices? 131
5.4. Managerial incentive contracts and collusion 135
5.5. Managers incentives with antitrust intervention 141
5.6. Conclusion 145
Acknowledgements 146
References 146
Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel 149
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx and
Matthew E. Raiff
6.1. Introduction 149
6.2. Literature 153
6.3. Coordinated effects analysis 153
6.4. Data from the vitamins industry 155
6.5. Analysis 162
6.6. Conclusion 174
Acknowledgements 174
Appendix. Review of a simple model 174
References 175
Chapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International
Cartels 177
John M. Connor
7.1. Introduction 177
7.2. Background on the issues 180
7.3. Literature review 186
7.4. Description of the sample 187
7.5. Measures of effectiveness 190
7.6. Conclusions 204
Acknowledgements 206
Appendix table: Sample 207
References 213
Contents xi
Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger
Control 217
Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and
Jean Tirole
8.1. Introduction 217
8.2. The economics of tacit collusion 218
8.3. Relevant factors for collusion 219
8.4. A mathematical illustration 228
8.5. Collusion in other dimensions than prices 233
8.6. Implications for merger control 235
References 237
Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforce¬
ment: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger 241
Jay Pil Choi
9.1. Introduction 241
9.2. A brief history of the GE/Honeywell merger case 243
9.3. Economic theory behind the EC s decision 245
9.4. The American criticism and politicization of the case 249
9.5. Looking forward with a silver lining 252
9.6. Concluding remarks 256
Acknowledgements 257
References 257
Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large
Member States 259
Henrik Horn and Johan Stennek
10.1. Introduction 259
10.2. The asymmetric treatment of small and large countries 261
10.3. Proposal 1: Reduce market segmentation 263
10.4. Proposal 2: Change geographical market delineations 265
10.5. Proposal 3: Change the objective of EU merger control 266
10.6. Proposals 4-5: Take alternative mergers and location into account 269
10.7. Summary and concluding discussion 281
Acknowledgements 284
References 284
Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control 287
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson
11.1. Introduction 287
11.2. Related literature 291
11.3. A simple model 293
11.4. A consumer surplus defense 2 -
11.5. Underlying market interactions 298
11.6. Concluding remarks 30°
Acknowledgements
References 301
xii Contents
Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment 303
Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler and Burcin Yurtoglu
12.1. Introduction 303
12.2. The evidence on merger remedies 306
12.3. Institutional background 312
12.4. Merger remedies 315
12.5. Approach and hypotheses 319
12.6. The data, the estimated abnormal returns, and mergers taxonomy 326
12.7. Results and discussion 334
12.8. Conclusions 344
Acknowledgements 345
References 346
Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in
the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice 349
Jerome Foncel, Marc Ivaldi and Valerie Rabassa
13.1. Introduction 349
13.2. The EC merger regulation 350
13.3. The role of the empirical analysis 355
13.4. An empirical illustration: The Lagardere/Editis case 358
13.5. Conclusion 366
References 366
Chapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal
Mergers 369
Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz and Gregory J. Werden
14.1. Introduction 369
14.2. Game I: Transparent retail sector 371
14.3. Game II: Opaque retail sector 373
14.4. Game III: Double marginalization 374
14.5. An illustrative example 376
14.6. Conclusions 379
References 380
Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator 383
Antoine Faure-Grimaud and David Martimort
15.1. Introduction 383
15.2. The model 387
15.3. Affiliated regulators 393
15.4. Stabilization with an independent regulator 395
15.5. Comparative statics 398
15.6. Constitutional design 400
15.7. Endogenous political uncertainty 404
15.8. Concluding remarks 406
Acknowledgements 407
Appendix A15 407
References 415
Contents xiii
Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Refraining U.S. Monopolization Law 417
Timothy J. Brennan
16.1. Section 2 s unfortunate distinctiveness 417
16.2. The fallacious syllogism 421
16.3. Spurious screen #1: Dominance in primary market 424
16.4. Spurious screen #2: Profit sacrifice 428
16.5. The complement market monopolization alternative 431
16.6. CMM applications 435
16.7. Game theoretic monopolization 442
16.8. The fix: Delete or maintain from Section 2 practice 446
16.9. Summary 447
Acknowledgements 448
References 448
Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompeti¬
tive? 453
R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon and Sue H. Mialon
17.1. Introduction 453
17.2. Theory 456
17.3. Conclusion 461
Acknowledgements 462
References 462
Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies 463
Joseph Francois and Henrik Horn
18.1. Introduction 463
18.2. The model 465
18.3. Antitrust in a trade-only equilibrium 468
18.4. Antitrust with both trade and FDI 476
18.5. Summary 480
Annex: Derivation of Equation (18.11) 482
References 482
Subject Index 485
|
| adam_txt |
Titel: The political economy of antitrust
Autor: Ghosal, Vivek
Jahr: 2007
Contents
Introduction to the Series v
Acknowledgements vii
List of Contributors xv
Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement I
Vivek Ghosal, Joseph E. Harrington and Johan Stennek
1.1. Shifting winds in antitrust 2
1.2. Enforcement of cartels 3
1.3. Merger control 9
1.4. Non-merger enforcement 16
1.5. Systemic issues 20
Acknowledgements 21
References 21
Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the
Development of Industrial Economics 25
Stephen Martin
2.1. Introduction 25
2.2. Early development 27
2.3. The First Chicago School 32
2.4. The Second Chicago School 34
2.5. Confronting the oligopoly problem 37
2.6. Chicago transformed 44
2.7. Final thoughts 45
Acknowledgements 47
Appendix 47
References '2
Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel
Formation and the Cartel Price Path 59
Joe Chen and Joseph E. Harrington
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Model 61
3.3. Optimal symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium 66
3.4. Numerical analysis
3.5. Summary
Acknowledgements
References 80
x Contents
Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price
Fixers still Go to Prison? 81
Paolo Buccimssi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
4.1. Introduction 82
4.2. Fines without leniency 85
4.3. Leniency, whistleblowers, and optimal antitrust fines 100
4.4. Implementing the optimal fine efficiently 109
4.5. Conclusion 118
Acknowledgements 119
References 120
Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests 123
Cecile Aubert
5.1. Introduction 123
5.2. The various instruments used for cartel deterrence in major O.E.C.D.
countries 128
5.3. May we expect freely provided information on collusive practices? 131
5.4. Managerial incentive contracts and collusion 135
5.5. Managers'incentives with antitrust intervention 141
5.6. Conclusion 145
Acknowledgements 146
References 146
Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel 149
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx and
Matthew E. Raiff
6.1. Introduction 149
6.2. Literature 153
6.3. Coordinated effects analysis 153
6.4. Data from the vitamins industry 155
6.5. Analysis 162
6.6. Conclusion 174
Acknowledgements 174
Appendix. Review of a simple model 174
References 175
Chapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International
Cartels 177
John M. Connor
7.1. Introduction 177
7.2. Background on the issues 180
7.3. Literature review 186
7.4. Description of the sample 187
7.5. Measures of effectiveness 190
7.6. Conclusions 204
Acknowledgements 206
Appendix table: Sample 207
References 213
Contents xi
Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger
Control 217
Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and
Jean Tirole
8.1. Introduction 217
8.2. The economics of tacit collusion 218
8.3. Relevant factors for collusion 219
8.4. A mathematical illustration 228
8.5. Collusion in other dimensions than prices 233
8.6. Implications for merger control 235
References 237
Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforce¬
ment: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger 241
Jay Pil Choi
9.1. Introduction 241
9.2. A brief history of the GE/Honeywell merger case 243
9.3. Economic theory behind the EC's decision 245
9.4. The American criticism and "politicization" of the case 249
9.5. Looking forward with a silver lining 252
9.6. Concluding remarks 256
Acknowledgements 257
References 257
Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large
Member States 259
Henrik Horn and Johan Stennek
10.1. Introduction 259
10.2. The asymmetric treatment of small and large countries 261
10.3. Proposal 1: Reduce market segmentation 263
10.4. Proposal 2: Change geographical market delineations 265
10.5. Proposal 3: Change the objective of EU merger control 266
10.6. Proposals 4-5: Take alternative mergers and location into account 269
10.7. Summary and concluding discussion 281
Acknowledgements 284
References 284
Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control 287
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson
11.1. Introduction 287
11.2. Related literature 291
11.3. A simple model 293
11.4. A consumer surplus defense 2"-
11.5. Underlying market interactions 298
11.6. Concluding remarks 30°
Acknowledgements
References 301
xii Contents
Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment 303
Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler and Burcin Yurtoglu
12.1. Introduction 303
12.2. The evidence on merger remedies 306
12.3. Institutional background 312
12.4. Merger remedies 315
12.5. Approach and hypotheses 319
12.6. The data, the estimated abnormal returns, and mergers taxonomy 326
12.7. Results and discussion 334
12.8. Conclusions 344
Acknowledgements 345
References 346
Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in
the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice 349
Jerome Foncel, Marc Ivaldi and Valerie Rabassa
13.1. Introduction 349
13.2. The EC merger regulation 350
13.3. The role of the empirical analysis 355
13.4. An empirical illustration: The Lagardere/Editis case 358
13.5. Conclusion 366
References 366
Chapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal
Mergers 369
Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz and Gregory J. Werden
14.1. Introduction 369
14.2. Game I: Transparent retail sector 371
14.3. Game II: Opaque retail sector 373
14.4. Game III: Double marginalization 374
14.5. An illustrative example 376
14.6. Conclusions 379
References 380
Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator 383
Antoine Faure-Grimaud and David Martimort
15.1. Introduction 383
15.2. The model 387
15.3. Affiliated regulators 393
15.4. Stabilization with an independent regulator 395
15.5. Comparative statics 398
15.6. Constitutional design 400
15.7. Endogenous political uncertainty 404
15.8. Concluding remarks 406
Acknowledgements 407
Appendix A15 407
References 415
Contents xiii
Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Refraining U.S. Monopolization Law 417
Timothy J. Brennan
16.1. Section 2's unfortunate distinctiveness 417
16.2. The fallacious syllogism 421
16.3. Spurious screen #1: Dominance in primary market 424
16.4. Spurious screen #2: Profit sacrifice 428
16.5. The "complement market monopolization" alternative 431
16.6. CMM applications 435
16.7. Game theoretic monopolization 442
16.8. The fix: Delete "or maintain" from Section 2 practice 446
16.9. Summary 447
Acknowledgements 448
References 448
Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompeti¬
tive? 453
R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon and Sue H. Mialon
17.1. Introduction 453
17.2. Theory 456
17.3. Conclusion 461
Acknowledgements 462
References 462
Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies 463
Joseph Francois and Henrik Horn
18.1. Introduction 463
18.2. The model 465
18.3. Antitrust in a trade-only equilibrium 468
18.4. Antitrust with both trade and FDI 476
18.5. Summary 480
Annex: Derivation of Equation (18.11) 482
References 482
Subject Index 485 |
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| series | Contributions to economic analysis |
| series2 | Contributions to economic analysis |
| spelling | The political economy of antitrust ed. by Vivek Ghosal ; John Stennek 1. ed. Amsterdam u.a. Elsevier 2007 XVI, 489 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Contributions to economic analysis 282 Kartellrecht / Kartellverfahren / Konzentrationspolitik / Wettbewerbspolitik / Industrieökonomik Sammelwerk / Collection of articles of several authors - 39 Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Aufsatzsammlung - Wettbewerbspolitik Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 s DE-604 Ghosal, Vivek 1960- Sonstige (DE-588)170665135 oth Stennek, Johan Sonstige (DE-588)171276590 oth Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-84950-866-7 Contributions to economic analysis 282 (DE-604)BV000001445 282 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014584309&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | The political economy of antitrust Contributions to economic analysis Kartellrecht / Kartellverfahren / Konzentrationspolitik / Wettbewerbspolitik / Industrieökonomik Sammelwerk / Collection of articles of several authors - 39 Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4065839-9 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | The political economy of antitrust |
| title_auth | The political economy of antitrust |
| title_exact_search | The political economy of antitrust |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The political economy of antitrust |
| title_full | The political economy of antitrust ed. by Vivek Ghosal ; John Stennek |
| title_fullStr | The political economy of antitrust ed. by Vivek Ghosal ; John Stennek |
| title_full_unstemmed | The political economy of antitrust ed. by Vivek Ghosal ; John Stennek |
| title_short | The political economy of antitrust |
| title_sort | the political economy of antitrust |
| topic | Kartellrecht / Kartellverfahren / Konzentrationspolitik / Wettbewerbspolitik / Industrieökonomik Sammelwerk / Collection of articles of several authors - 39 Wettbewerbspolitik (DE-588)4065839-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Kartellrecht / Kartellverfahren / Konzentrationspolitik / Wettbewerbspolitik / Industrieökonomik Sammelwerk / Collection of articles of several authors - 39 Wettbewerbspolitik Aufsatzsammlung Aufsatzsammlung - Wettbewerbspolitik |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014584309&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV000001445 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ghosalvivek thepoliticaleconomyofantitrust AT stennekjohan thepoliticaleconomyofantitrust |