Logical pluralism:

"In this book J. C. Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what they call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic,...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Beall, Jeffrey C. 1966- (VerfasserIn), Restall, Greg (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Oxford [u.a.] Clarendon Press 2006
Ausgabe:1. publ.
Schlagworte:
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Klappentext
Zusammenfassung:"In this book J. C. Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what they call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers."--BOOK JACKET.
Beschreibung:Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
Beschreibung:VIII, 143 S.
ISBN:9780199288403
9780199288410
0199288402
0199288410

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