Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value:
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| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiesbaden
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag
2005
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| Ausgabe: | 1. Aufl. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Gabler-Edition Wissenschaft : Entrepreneurship
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXIV, 445 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 3835000926 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804134541153009664 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Content Overview
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem statement 1
1.2 Definitions 3
1.3 Motivation: The special interest in liCOs 7
1.4 Kxisting KCO research 11
1.5 Objective 23
1.6 Outline 25
2 Theoretical Foundations 27
2.1 Section outline 27
2.2 Theoretical foundations of corporate finance 27
2.3 Agency theory and its implications 33
2.4 Application of agency theory to empirical corporate finance 40
2.5 A two dimensional agency framework for the analysis of KCOs 45
3 Hypothesis development 65
3.1 Section outline 65
3.2 Development of value levers 65
3.3 Lever 1: Focus and investment efficiency 72
3.4 Lever 2: Information asymmetries and disclosure 90
3.5 Lever 3: Incentive compensation 106
3.6 Lever 4: Ownership concentration 129
3.7 Summary of hypotheses 146
4 Empirical Evidence 149
4.1 Section Outline 149
4.2 Data 149
4.3 Methodology 158
4.4 Results 240
4.5 Discussion 335
5 Conclusion 361
6 References 367
IX
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem statement 1
1.2 Definitions 3
1.2.1 Group of Companies 3
1.2.2 ECO 5
1.3 Motivation: The special interest in ECOs 7
1.3.1 Dual character of ECOs as means of financing and reorganization 7
1.3.2 Empirical significance of ECOs on the German capital market 10
1.4 Existing ECO research 11
1.4.1 U.S. ECO literature 11
1.4.2 German ECO literature 16
1.4.3 Gaps in existing research 20
1.5 Objective 23
1.5.1 Core research questions 23
1.5.2 Limitations 23
1.6 Outline 25
2 Theoretical Foundations 27
2.1 Section outline 27
2.2 Theoretical foundations of corporate finance 27
2.2.1 Need fora theory of the firm 27
2.2.2 New Institutional Economics 28
2.2.2.1 Origins of New Institutional Economics 28
2.2.2.2 The contractual view of the firm 29
2.2.2.3 Subdisciplines of New Institutional Economics 30
2.2.2.4 Agency theory as foundation of corporate finance 32
2.3 Agency theory and its implications 33
2.3.1 The core question of agency theory 33
2.3.2 Development of agency theory and its subdisciplines 34
2.3.2.1 The two subdisciplines of agency theory 34
2.3.2.2 Principal agent theory 34
2.3.2.3 Positive Agency Theory 36
2.4 Application of agency theory to empirical corporate finance 40
XI
2.4.1 The classic corporate finance approach to agency theory 40
2.4.2 Critique 42
2.5 A two dimensional agency framework for the analysis of ECOs 45
2.5.1 Efficiency criterion and framework dimensions 45
2.5.2 First dimension: determinants of agency costs 46
2.5.2.1 Determinants of agency costs in Positive Agency Theory 46
2.5.2.2 Determinants of agency costs in Principal Agent Theory 50
2.5.2.3 Synthesis 52
2.5.3 Second dimension: agency relationships affected by ECOs 57
2.5.3.1 Organizational hierarchies as cascades of agency relationships 57
2.5.3.2 Groups of companies as two layer agency structures 58
2.5.3.3 ECOs as special case of two layer agency structures 62
2.5.4 Two dimensional agency framework for the analysis ECOs 64
3 Hypothesis development 65
3.1 Section outline 65
3.2 Development of value levers 65
3.2.1 Potentia effects of ECOs on agency costs 65
3.2.2 Aggregation of framework compartments into four value levers 69
3.3 Lever 1: Focus and investment efficiency 72
3.3.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 72
3.3.2 Focus and corporate valuation 73
3.3.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 73
3.3.2.2 Empirical evidence 75
3.3.3 Inefficient investment and agency costs 78
3.3.3.1 Forms of inefficient investment in diversified firms 78
3.3.3.2 Inefficient across firm allocations 79
3.3.3.3 Inefficient within firm allocations on internal capital markets 82
3.3.4 Focus, investment efficiency, and ECOs 86
3.4 Lever 2: Information asymmetries and disclosure 90
3.4.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 90
3.4.2 Information asymmetries and corporate valuation 91
3.4.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 91
3.4.2.2 1 Empirical evidence 93
3.4.3 Disclosure and agency costs 95
XII
3.4.3.1 Role and types of disclosure 95
3.4.3.2 Mandatory disclosure and the institutional environment 97
3.4.3.3 Voluntary disclosure and managerial incentives 98
3.4.4 Information asymmetries, disclosure, and ECOs 101
3.5 Lever 3: Incentive compensation 106
3.5.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 106
3.5.2 Incentive compensation and corporate valuation 106
3.5.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 106
3.5.2.2 Empirical evidence 110
3.5.3 Incentive compensation and agency costs 115
3.5.3.1 Determinants of optimal incentive compensation 115
3.5.3.2 Stock and options as alternative forms of
incentive compensation 119
3.5.3.3 Compensation of division managers 122
3.5.4 Incentive compensation and ECOs 125
3.6 Lever 4: Ownership concentration 129
3.6.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 129
3.6.2 Ownership concentration and corporate valuation 130
3.6.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 130
3.6.2.2 Empirical evidence 132
3.6.3 Blockholders and agency costs 135
3.6.3.1 Benefits of blockholders 135
3.6.3.2 Costs of blockholders 136
3.6.3.3 Role of the institutional environment 138
3.6.3.4 Empirical evidence on the agency costs of blockholders 139
3.6.4 Ownership concentration and ECOs 143
3.7 Summary of hypotheses 146
4 Empirical Evidence 149
4.1 Section Outline 149
4.2 Data 149
4.2.1 Sample collection procedure and data sources 149
4.2.2 Sample descriptive statistics 151
4.3 Methodology 158
4.3.1 Overarching empirical design 158
XIII
4.3.1.1 Operationalization of efficiency criterion 158
4.3.1.2 Methods used in the ECO literature and their imitations 162
4.3.2 Measurement of short term abnormal returns: event study 166
4.3.2.1 Concept and relevance of event studies 166
4.3.2.2 Definition of event and event period 167
4.3.2.3 Estimation of expected return 169
4.3.2.4 Abnormal return calculation and tests for significance 172
4.3.2.4.1 The standard model and extensions 172
4.3.2.4.2 Seemingly unrelated regression 177
4.3.2.4.3 GARCH 182
4.3.2.4.4 Nonparametric tests and bootstrap 185
4.3.2.5 Summary of empirical design 189
4.3.3 Measurement of long term abnormal returns 190
4.3.3.1 Concept and relevance of long term returns analysis 190
4.3.3.2 Calculation of long term returns 193
4.3.3.3 Estimation of expected return 199
4.3.3.4 Tests for significance 205
4.3.3.5 Summary of empirical design 208
4.3.4 Hypothesis tests: cross sectional regression 209
4.3.4.1 Concept and relevance of cross sectional regression analysis 209
4.3.4.2 Regression assumptions and diagnostic tests 210
4.3.4.3 Model specification 216
4.3.4.4 Explanatory variable definitions 220
4.3.4.4.1 Summary of explanatory variables 220
4.3.4.4.2 Variables relating to focus and investment efficiency 220
4.3.4.4.3 Variables relating to information asymmetries and disclosure . 226
4.3.4.4.4 Variables relating to incentive compensation 230
4.3.4.4.5 Variables relating to ownership concentration 232
4.3.4.4.6 Control variables: Operating ratios and market timing 233
4.3.4.5 Dependent variable definitions 236
4.3.4.6 Expected signs of explanatory variables 237
4.3.4.7 Summary of empirical design 239
4.4 Results 240
4.4.1 Abnormal returns 240
4.4.1.1 Short term abnormal returns 240
XIV
4.4.1.1.1 Results for the full sample 240
4.4.1.1.2 Results for the two subsamples 251
4.4.1.2 Long term abnormal returns 256
4.4.1.2.1 Results for the full sample 256
4.4.1.2.2 Results for the two subsamples 270
4.4.2 Cross sectional regression 281
4.4.2.1 Explanatory variable descriptive statistics 281
4.4.2.2 Short term abnormal returns regressions 287
4.4.2.2.1 Results for the full model 287
4.4.2.2.2 Results for the reduced models 296
4.4.2.2.3 Robustness checks 298
4.4.2.3 Long term abnormal returns regressions 319
4.4.2.3.1 Results for the full and reduced models 319
4.4.2.3.2 Robustness checks 324
4.5 Discussion 335
4.5.1 The impact of ECOs on firm value 335
4.5.1.1 Short term impact 335
4.5.1.2 Long term impact 337
4.5.1.3 Overall impact and implications 339
4.5.2 The determinants of the impact of ECOs on firm value 341
4.5.2.1 Agency costs and the capital market reaction 341
4.5.2.2 Comparison to previous ECO literature 350
4.5.2.3 Relative importance of the four value levers 354
4.5.3 Implications for research and practice 355
4.5.3.1 Research implications 355
4.5.3.2 Practical implications 359
5 Conclusion 361
6 References 367
XV
List of Tables
Table 1: Stylized facts on U.S. ECOs 16
Table 2: Stylized facts on German ECOs 19
Table 3: Comparison of Positive Agency Theory and Principal Agent Theory 53
Table 4: Summary of sample size 150
Table 5: Summary of data sources 151
Table 6: Frequency and volume of ECOs and IPOs 152
Table 7: Characteristics of ECOs 154
Table 8: Sample industry distribution 155
Table 9: ECO operating ratios 157
Table 10: Methodological approaches in the ECO literature 164
Table 11: Abilities of different event study methods
to handle econometric issues 178
Table 12: Summary of empirical design of short term event study 190
Table 13: Methodological recommendations in the long term returns literature 194
Table 14: Summary of empirical design of long term returns analysis 209
Table 15: Summary of explanatory variable definitions 222
Table 16: Control variables 236
Table 17: Expected signs of explanatory variables 238
Table 18: Summary of empirical design of cross sectional regression 239
Table 19: Short term abnormal returns, standard market model 242
Table 20: Short term abnormal returns, Scholcs VC illiams market model 244
Table 21: Short term abnormal returns, Dimson market model 246
Table 22: Market model regression parameters 250
Table 23: Short term abnormal returns, SUR 252
Table 24: Short term abnormal returns, GARCII 252
XVII
Table 25: Short term abnormal returns, standard market model,
subsample analysis 254
Table 26 : Long term abnormal returns, value weighted
reference portfolio adjusted 258
Table 27: Long term abnormal returns, equal weighted
reference portfolio adjusted 260
Table 28: Long term abnormal returns, matching firm adjusted 262
Table 29: Long term abnormal returns, index adjusted 264
Table 30: Long term abnormal returns, value weighted
reference portfolio adjusted, subsample 1984 1997 272
Table 31: Long term abnormal returns, value weighted
reference portfolio adjusted, subsample 1998 2001 274
Table 32: Long term abnormal returns, matching firm adjusted,
subsample 1984 1997 276
Table 33: Ixing tcrm abnormal returns, matching firm adjusted,
subsample 1998 2001 278
Table 34: Explanatory variable descriptive statistics 282
Fable 35: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 284
Table 36: Short term cross sectional regression, full model 288
lable 37: Short term cross sectional regression, reduced models 292
lable 38: Short term cross sectional regression, alternative standard errors 300
Table 39: Short term cross sectional regression,
bootstrapped confidence intervals 301
lable 40: Short term cross sectional regression, with thin trading adjustments 311
Table 41: Short term cross sectional regression, CARs as dependent variable 312
I able 42: Short term cross sectional regressions, alternative event periods 314
lable 43: Short term cross sectional regression, alternative specifications 316
lable 44: Long term cross sectional regression 321
XVIII
Table 45: Long term cross sectional regression,
bootstrapped confidence intervals 326
Table 46: Long term cross sectional regression, BHARs as dependent variable 328
Table 47: Long term abnormal returns regressions, alternative specifications 330
Table 48: Literature on short term capital market reaction 336
Table 49: Literature on long term capital market reaction 338
Table 50: Summary of hypotheses and results 343
Table 51: Literature on determinants of capital market reaction 352
XIX
List of Figures
Figure 1: Dual character of ECOs 9
Figure 2: Frequency of KCOs 11
Figure 3: Abnormal stock returns surrounding ECO announcements 18
Figure 4: Potential patterns of stock market reaction to ECOs 22
Figure 5: Subdisciplines of New Institutional Economics 31
Figure 6: Firm value and private benefits in the absence of monitoring 47
Figure 7: Firm value and private benefits under monitoring 48
Figure 8: Groups of companies as cascades of agency relationships 59
Figure 9: Types of agency relationships in groups of companies 61
Figure 10: Changes to agency relationships in groups of companies
related to ECOs 63
Figure 11: Two dimensional agency framework for the analysis of ECOs 64
Figure 12: Potential reduction of agency costs due to ECOs 66
Figure 13: Potential increase in agency costs due to ECOs 67
Figure 14: Value levers in the two dimensional agency framework 70
Figure 15: F ocus and investment efficiency hypotheses
in the two dimensional framework 89
Figure 16: Information asymmetries and disclosure hypotheses
in the two dimensional framework 105
Figure 17: Incentive compensation hypotheses in the
two dimensional framework 128
Figure 18: Ownership concentration hypotheses and
the two dimensional framework 147
Figure 19: Summary of hypotheses within the two dimensional framework 148
Figure 20: Comparison of BHAR and CTAR methods 198
Figure 21: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding
ECO announcement, full sample 248
XXI
Figure 22: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding
ECO announcement, subsamples 257
Figure 23: Parent long term BHARs, full sample 269
Figure 24: Subsidiary long term BHARs, full sample 269
Figure 25: Parent/subsidiary portfolio long term BHARs, full sample 270
Figure 26: Parent long term BHARs, subsamples 280
Figure 27: Subsidiary long term BHARs, subsamples 280
Figure 28: Parent/subsidiary portfolio long term BHARs, subsamples 281
Figure 29: CUSUM graph, Model (1) 290
Figure 30: Relative importance of the four value levers 355
XXII
|
| adam_txt |
Content Overview
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem statement 1
1.2 Definitions 3
1.3 Motivation: The special interest in liCOs 7
1.4 Kxisting KCO research 11
1.5 Objective 23
1.6 Outline 25
2 Theoretical Foundations 27
2.1 Section outline 27
2.2 Theoretical foundations of corporate finance 27
2.3 Agency theory and its implications 33
2.4 Application of agency theory to empirical corporate finance 40
2.5 A two dimensional agency framework for the analysis of KCOs 45
3 Hypothesis development 65
3.1 Section outline 65
3.2 Development of value levers 65
3.3 Lever 1: Focus and investment efficiency 72
3.4 Lever 2: Information asymmetries and disclosure 90
3.5 Lever 3: Incentive compensation 106
3.6 Lever 4: Ownership concentration 129
3.7 Summary of hypotheses 146
4 Empirical Evidence 149
4.1 Section Outline 149
4.2 Data 149
4.3 Methodology 158
4.4 Results 240
4.5 Discussion 335
5 Conclusion 361
6 References 367
IX
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem statement 1
1.2 Definitions 3
1.2.1 Group of Companies 3
1.2.2 ECO 5
1.3 Motivation: The special interest in ECOs 7
1.3.1 Dual character of ECOs as means of financing and reorganization 7
1.3.2 Empirical significance of ECOs on the German capital market 10
1.4 Existing ECO research 11
1.4.1 U.S. ECO literature 11
1.4.2 German ECO literature 16
1.4.3 Gaps in existing research 20
1.5 Objective 23
1.5.1 Core research questions 23
1.5.2 Limitations 23
1.6 Outline 25
2 Theoretical Foundations 27
2.1 Section outline 27
2.2 Theoretical foundations of corporate finance 27
2.2.1 Need fora theory of the firm 27
2.2.2 New Institutional Economics 28
2.2.2.1 Origins of New Institutional Economics 28
2.2.2.2 The contractual view of the firm 29
2.2.2.3 Subdisciplines of New Institutional Economics 30
2.2.2.4 Agency theory as foundation of corporate finance 32
2.3 Agency theory and its implications 33
2.3.1 The core question of agency theory 33
2.3.2 Development of agency theory and its subdisciplines 34
2.3.2.1 The two subdisciplines of agency theory 34
2.3.2.2 Principal agent theory 34
2.3.2.3 Positive Agency Theory 36
2.4 Application of agency theory to empirical corporate finance 40
XI
2.4.1 The classic corporate finance approach to agency theory 40
2.4.2 Critique 42
2.5 A two dimensional agency framework for the analysis of ECOs 45
2.5.1 Efficiency criterion and framework dimensions 45
2.5.2 First dimension: determinants of agency costs 46
2.5.2.1 Determinants of agency costs in Positive Agency Theory 46
2.5.2.2 Determinants of agency costs in Principal Agent Theory 50
2.5.2.3 Synthesis 52
2.5.3 Second dimension: agency relationships affected by ECOs 57
2.5.3.1 Organizational hierarchies as cascades of agency relationships 57
2.5.3.2 Groups of companies as two layer agency structures 58
2.5.3.3 ECOs as special case of two layer agency structures 62
2.5.4 Two dimensional agency framework for the analysis ECOs 64
3 Hypothesis development 65
3.1 Section outline 65
3.2 Development of value levers 65
3.2.1 Potentia' effects of ECOs on agency costs 65
3.2.2 Aggregation of framework compartments into four value levers 69
3.3 Lever 1: Focus and investment efficiency 72
3.3.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 72
3.3.2 Focus and corporate valuation 73
3.3.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 73
3.3.2.2 Empirical evidence 75
3.3.3 Inefficient investment and agency costs 78
3.3.3.1 Forms of inefficient investment in diversified firms 78
3.3.3.2 Inefficient across firm allocations 79
3.3.3.3 Inefficient within firm allocations on internal capital markets 82
3.3.4 Focus, investment efficiency, and ECOs 86
3.4 Lever 2: Information asymmetries and disclosure 90
3.4.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 90
3.4.2 Information asymmetries and corporate valuation 91
3.4.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 91
3.4.2.2 1 Empirical evidence 93
3.4.3 Disclosure and agency costs 95
XII
3.4.3.1 Role and types of disclosure 95
3.4.3.2 Mandatory disclosure and the institutional environment 97
3.4.3.3 Voluntary disclosure and managerial incentives 98
3.4.4 Information asymmetries, disclosure, and ECOs 101
3.5 Lever 3: Incentive compensation 106
3.5.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 106
3.5.2 Incentive compensation and corporate valuation 106
3.5.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 106
3.5.2.2 Empirical evidence 110
3.5.3 Incentive compensation and agency costs 115
3.5.3.1 Determinants of optimal incentive compensation 115
3.5.3.2 Stock and options as alternative forms of
incentive compensation 119
3.5.3.3 Compensation of division managers 122
3.5.4 Incentive compensation and ECOs 125
3.6 Lever 4: Ownership concentration 129
3.6.1 Treatment in the ECO literature 129
3.6.2 Ownership concentration and corporate valuation 130
3.6.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 130
3.6.2.2 Empirical evidence 132
3.6.3 Blockholders and agency costs 135
3.6.3.1 Benefits of blockholders 135
3.6.3.2 Costs of blockholders 136
3.6.3.3 Role of the institutional environment 138
3.6.3.4 Empirical evidence on the agency costs of blockholders 139
3.6.4 Ownership concentration and ECOs 143
3.7 Summary of hypotheses 146
4 Empirical Evidence 149
4.1 Section Outline 149
4.2 Data 149
4.2.1 Sample collection procedure and data sources 149
4.2.2 Sample descriptive statistics 151
4.3 Methodology 158
4.3.1 Overarching empirical design 158
XIII
4.3.1.1 Operationalization of efficiency criterion 158
4.3.1.2 Methods used in the ECO literature and their imitations 162
4.3.2 Measurement of short term abnormal returns: event study 166
4.3.2.1 Concept and relevance of event studies 166
4.3.2.2 Definition of event and event period 167
4.3.2.3 Estimation of expected return 169
4.3.2.4 Abnormal return calculation and tests for significance 172
4.3.2.4.1 The standard model and extensions 172
4.3.2.4.2 Seemingly unrelated regression 177
4.3.2.4.3 GARCH 182
4.3.2.4.4 Nonparametric tests and bootstrap 185
4.3.2.5 Summary of empirical design 189
4.3.3 Measurement of long term abnormal returns 190
4.3.3.1 Concept and relevance of long term returns analysis 190
4.3.3.2 Calculation of long term returns 193
4.3.3.3 Estimation of expected return 199
4.3.3.4 Tests for significance 205
4.3.3.5 Summary of empirical design 208
4.3.4 Hypothesis tests: cross sectional regression 209
4.3.4.1 Concept and relevance of cross sectional regression analysis 209
4.3.4.2 Regression assumptions and diagnostic tests 210
4.3.4.3 Model specification 216
4.3.4.4 Explanatory variable definitions 220
4.3.4.4.1 Summary of explanatory variables 220
4.3.4.4.2 Variables relating to focus and investment efficiency 220
4.3.4.4.3 Variables relating to information asymmetries and disclosure . 226
4.3.4.4.4 Variables relating to incentive compensation 230
4.3.4.4.5 Variables relating to ownership concentration 232
4.3.4.4.6 Control variables: Operating ratios and market timing 233
4.3.4.5 Dependent variable definitions 236
4.3.4.6 Expected signs of explanatory variables 237
4.3.4.7 Summary of empirical design 239
4.4 Results 240
4.4.1 Abnormal returns 240
4.4.1.1 Short term abnormal returns 240
XIV
4.4.1.1.1 Results for the full sample 240
4.4.1.1.2 Results for the two subsamples 251
4.4.1.2 Long term abnormal returns 256
4.4.1.2.1 Results for the full sample 256
4.4.1.2.2 Results for the two subsamples 270
4.4.2 Cross sectional regression 281
4.4.2.1 Explanatory variable descriptive statistics 281
4.4.2.2 Short term abnormal returns regressions 287
4.4.2.2.1 Results for the full model 287
4.4.2.2.2 Results for the reduced models 296
4.4.2.2.3 Robustness checks 298
4.4.2.3 Long term abnormal returns regressions 319
4.4.2.3.1 Results for the full and reduced models 319
4.4.2.3.2 Robustness checks 324
4.5 Discussion 335
4.5.1 The impact of ECOs on firm value 335
4.5.1.1 Short term impact 335
4.5.1.2 Long term impact 337
4.5.1.3 Overall impact and implications 339
4.5.2 The determinants of the impact of ECOs on firm value 341
4.5.2.1 Agency costs and the capital market reaction 341
4.5.2.2 Comparison to previous ECO literature 350
4.5.2.3 Relative importance of the four value levers 354
4.5.3 Implications for research and practice 355
4.5.3.1 Research implications 355
4.5.3.2 Practical implications 359
5 Conclusion 361
6 References 367
XV
List of Tables
Table 1: Stylized facts on U.S. ECOs 16
Table 2: Stylized facts on German ECOs 19
Table 3: Comparison of Positive Agency Theory and Principal Agent Theory 53
Table 4: Summary of sample size 150
Table 5: Summary of data sources 151
Table 6: Frequency and volume of ECOs and IPOs 152
Table 7: Characteristics of ECOs 154
Table 8: Sample industry distribution 155
Table 9: ECO operating ratios 157
Table 10: Methodological approaches in the ECO literature 164
Table 11: Abilities of different event study methods
to handle econometric issues 178
Table 12: Summary of empirical design of short term event study 190
Table 13: Methodological recommendations in the long term returns literature 194
Table 14: Summary of empirical design of long term returns analysis 209
Table 15: Summary of explanatory variable definitions 222
Table 16: Control variables 236
Table 17: Expected signs of explanatory variables 238
Table 18: Summary of empirical design of cross sectional regression 239
Table 19: Short term abnormal returns, standard market model 242
'Table 20: Short term abnormal returns, Scholcs VC'illiams market model 244
Table 21: Short term abnormal returns, Dimson market model 246
Table 22: Market model regression parameters 250
Table 23: Short term abnormal returns, SUR 252
Table 24: Short term abnormal returns, GARCII 252
XVII
Table 25: Short term abnormal returns, standard market model,
subsample analysis 254
Table 26 : Long term abnormal returns, value weighted
reference portfolio adjusted 258
Table 27: Long term abnormal returns, equal weighted
reference portfolio adjusted 260
Table 28: Long term abnormal returns, matching firm adjusted 262
Table 29: Long term abnormal returns, index adjusted 264
Table 30: Long term abnormal returns, value weighted
reference portfolio adjusted, subsample 1984 1997 272
Table 31: Long term abnormal returns, value weighted
reference portfolio adjusted, subsample 1998 2001 274
Table 32: Long term abnormal returns, matching firm adjusted,
subsample 1984 1997 276
Table 33: Ixing tcrm abnormal returns, matching firm adjusted,
subsample 1998 2001 278
Table 34: Explanatory variable descriptive statistics 282
Fable 35: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 284
Table 36: Short term cross sectional regression, full model 288
lable 37: Short term cross sectional regression, reduced models 292
lable 38: Short term cross sectional regression, alternative standard errors 300
Table 39: Short term cross sectional regression,
bootstrapped confidence intervals 301
lable 40: Short term cross sectional regression, with thin trading adjustments 311
Table 41: Short term cross sectional regression, CARs as dependent variable 312
I able 42: Short term cross sectional regressions, alternative event periods 314
lable 43: Short term cross sectional regression, alternative specifications 316
lable 44: Long term cross sectional regression 321
XVIII
Table 45: Long term cross sectional regression,
bootstrapped confidence intervals 326
Table 46: Long term cross sectional regression, BHARs as dependent variable 328
Table 47: Long term abnormal returns regressions, alternative specifications 330
Table 48: Literature on short term capital market reaction 336
Table 49: Literature on long term capital market reaction 338
Table 50: Summary of hypotheses and results 343
Table 51: Literature on determinants of capital market reaction 352
XIX
List of Figures
Figure 1: Dual character of ECOs 9
Figure 2: Frequency of KCOs 11
Figure 3: Abnormal stock returns surrounding ECO announcements 18
Figure 4: Potential patterns of stock market reaction to ECOs 22
Figure 5: Subdisciplines of New Institutional Economics 31
Figure 6: Firm value and private benefits in the absence of monitoring 47
Figure 7: Firm value and private benefits under monitoring 48
Figure 8: Groups of companies as cascades of agency relationships 59
Figure 9: Types of agency relationships in groups of companies 61
Figure 10: Changes to agency relationships in groups of companies
related to ECOs 63
Figure 11: Two dimensional agency framework for the analysis of ECOs 64
Figure 12: Potential reduction of agency costs due to ECOs 66
Figure 13: Potential increase in agency costs due to ECOs 67
Figure 14: Value levers in the two dimensional agency framework 70
Figure 15: F'ocus and investment efficiency hypotheses
in the two dimensional framework 89
Figure 16: Information asymmetries and disclosure hypotheses
in the two dimensional framework 105
Figure 17: Incentive compensation hypotheses in the
two dimensional framework 128
Figure 18: Ownership concentration hypotheses and
the two dimensional framework 147
Figure 19: Summary of hypotheses within the two dimensional framework 148
Figure 20: Comparison of BHAR and CTAR methods 198
Figure 21: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding
ECO announcement, full sample 248
XXI
Figure 22: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding
ECO announcement, subsamples 257
Figure 23: Parent long term BHARs, full sample 269
Figure 24: Subsidiary long term BHARs, full sample 269
Figure 25: Parent/subsidiary portfolio long term BHARs, full sample 270
Figure 26: Parent long term BHARs, subsamples 280
Figure 27: Subsidiary long term BHARs, subsamples 280
Figure 28: Parent/subsidiary portfolio long term BHARs, subsamples 281
Figure 29: CUSUM graph, Model (1) 290
Figure 30: Relative importance of the four value levers 355
XXII |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Junker, Lukas |
| author_facet | Junker, Lukas |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Junker, Lukas |
| author_variant | l j lj |
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| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330 |
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| dewey-sort | 3330 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. Aufl. |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV020836229 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T13:15:01Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:26:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 3835000926 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014158176 |
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| publishDate | 2005 |
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| publisher | Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag |
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| series2 | Gabler-Edition Wissenschaft : Entrepreneurship |
| spelling | Junker, Lukas Verfasser aut Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value Lukas Junker 1. Aufl. Wiesbaden Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 2005 XXIV, 445 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Gabler-Edition Wissenschaft : Entrepreneurship Zugl.: Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2005 Desinvestition (DE-588)4011517-3 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Equity Carve-out (DE-588)4874711-7 gnd rswk-swf Restrukturierung (DE-588)4335640-0 gnd rswk-swf Shareholder-Value-Analyse (DE-588)4353913-0 gnd rswk-swf Konzern (DE-588)4032356-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Konzern (DE-588)4032356-0 s Restrukturierung (DE-588)4335640-0 s Desinvestition (DE-588)4011517-3 s Equity Carve-out (DE-588)4874711-7 s Shareholder-Value-Analyse (DE-588)4353913-0 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014158176&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Junker, Lukas Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value Desinvestition (DE-588)4011517-3 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Equity Carve-out (DE-588)4874711-7 gnd Restrukturierung (DE-588)4335640-0 gnd Shareholder-Value-Analyse (DE-588)4353913-0 gnd Konzern (DE-588)4032356-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4011517-3 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4874711-7 (DE-588)4335640-0 (DE-588)4353913-0 (DE-588)4032356-0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value |
| title_auth | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value |
| title_exact_search | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value |
| title_full | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value Lukas Junker |
| title_fullStr | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value Lukas Junker |
| title_full_unstemmed | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value Lukas Junker |
| title_short | Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value |
| title_sort | equity carveouts agency costs and firm value |
| topic | Desinvestition (DE-588)4011517-3 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Equity Carve-out (DE-588)4874711-7 gnd Restrukturierung (DE-588)4335640-0 gnd Shareholder-Value-Analyse (DE-588)4353913-0 gnd Konzern (DE-588)4032356-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Desinvestition Agency-Theorie Equity Carve-out Restrukturierung Shareholder-Value-Analyse Konzern Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014158176&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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