Pork for policy: Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil
"The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lu...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11273 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | "The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
Beschreibung: | 58 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV020045374 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 20100303 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 050927s2005 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)60314995 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV020045374 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
049 | |a DE-703 |a DE-521 |a DE-19 | ||
050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
084 | |a QB 910 |0 (DE-625)141231: |2 rvk | ||
100 | 1 | |a Alston, Lee J. |d 1951- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130488038 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Pork for policy |b Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil |c Lee J. Alston ; Bernardo Mueller |
264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2005 | |
300 | |a 58 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11273 | |
520 | 3 | |a "The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
650 | 4 | |a Executive-legislative relations |z Brazil |x Econometric models | |
650 | 4 | |a Government spending policy |z Brazil |x Econometric models | |
651 | 4 | |a Brasilien | |
700 | 1 | |a Mueller, Bernardo |d 1963- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130507598 |4 aut | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11273 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 11273 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11273.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013366385 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804133619383402496 |
---|---|
any_adam_object | |
author | Alston, Lee J. 1951- Mueller, Bernardo 1963- |
author_GND | (DE-588)130488038 (DE-588)130507598 |
author_facet | Alston, Lee J. 1951- Mueller, Bernardo 1963- |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Alston, Lee J. 1951- |
author_variant | l j a lj lja b m bm |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV020045374 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HB1 |
callnumber-raw | HB1 |
callnumber-search | HB1 |
callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
classification_rvk | QB 910 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)60314995 (DE-599)BVBBV020045374 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02513nam a2200397 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV020045374</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20100303 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">050927s2005 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)60314995</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV020045374</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QB 910</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141231:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Alston, Lee J.</subfield><subfield code="d">1951-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130488038</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Pork for policy</subfield><subfield code="b">Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil</subfield><subfield code="c">Lee J. Alston ; Bernardo Mueller</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">58 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">11273</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ökonometrisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Executive-legislative relations</subfield><subfield code="z">Brazil</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Government spending policy</subfield><subfield code="z">Brazil</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Brasilien</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mueller, Bernardo</subfield><subfield code="d">1963-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130507598</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">11273</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">11273</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11273.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013366385</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
geographic | Brasilien |
geographic_facet | Brasilien |
id | DE-604.BV020045374 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:11:36Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013366385 |
oclc_num | 60314995 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-703 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
owner_facet | DE-703 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
physical | 58 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2005 |
publishDateSearch | 2005 |
publishDateSort | 2005 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Alston, Lee J. 1951- Verfasser (DE-588)130488038 aut Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil Lee J. Alston ; Bernardo Mueller Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 58 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11273 "The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Executive-legislative relations Brazil Econometric models Government spending policy Brazil Econometric models Brasilien Mueller, Bernardo 1963- Verfasser (DE-588)130507598 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11273 (DE-604)BV002801238 11273 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11273.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Alston, Lee J. 1951- Mueller, Bernardo 1963- Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Executive-legislative relations Brazil Econometric models Government spending policy Brazil Econometric models |
title | Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil |
title_auth | Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil |
title_exact_search | Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil |
title_full | Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil Lee J. Alston ; Bernardo Mueller |
title_fullStr | Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil Lee J. Alston ; Bernardo Mueller |
title_full_unstemmed | Pork for policy Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil Lee J. Alston ; Bernardo Mueller |
title_short | Pork for policy |
title_sort | pork for policy executive and legislative exchange in brazil |
title_sub | Executive and Legislative exchange in Brazil |
topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Executive-legislative relations Brazil Econometric models Government spending policy Brazil Econometric models |
topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Executive-legislative relations Brazil Econometric models Government spending policy Brazil Econometric models Brasilien |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11273.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT alstonleej porkforpolicyexecutiveandlegislativeexchangeinbrazil AT muellerbernardo porkforpolicyexecutiveandlegislativeexchangeinbrazil |