Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets:
"We analyze the democratic politics of a rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows the government to issue debt to finance capital items only. Many national governments followed this rule in the 18th and 19th centuries and most U.S. states do today. This simple 1800s f...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11030 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We analyze the democratic politics of a rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows the government to issue debt to finance capital items only. Many national governments followed this rule in the 18th and 19th centuries and most U.S. states do today. This simple 1800s financing rule sometimes provides excellent incentives for majorities to choose an efficient mix of public goods in an economy with a growing population of overlapping generations of long-lived but mortal agents. In a special limiting case with demographics that make Ricardian equivalence prevail, the 1800s rule does nothing to promote efficiency. But when the demographics imply even a moderate departure from Ricardian equivalence, imposing the rule substantially improves the efficiency of democratically chosen allocations. We calibrate some examples to U.S. demographic data. We speculate why in the twentieth century most national governments abandoned the 1800s rule while U.S. state governments have retained it"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 44 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11030 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "We analyze the democratic politics of a rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows the government to issue debt to finance capital items only. Many national governments followed this rule in the 18th and 19th centuries and most U.S. states do today. This simple 1800s financing rule sometimes provides excellent incentives for majorities to choose an efficient mix of public goods in an economy with a growing population of overlapping generations of long-lived but mortal agents. In a special limiting case with demographics that make Ricardian equivalence prevail, the 1800s rule does nothing to promote efficiency. But when the demographics imply even a moderate departure from Ricardian equivalence, imposing the rule substantially improves the efficiency of democratically chosen allocations. We calibrate some examples to U.S. demographic data. We speculate why in the twentieth century most national governments abandoned the 1800s rule while U.S. state governments have retained it"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV019884454 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:08:22Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013208546 |
| oclc_num | 57569739 |
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| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 44 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Bassetto, Marco Verfasser (DE-588)129752533 aut Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 44 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11030 "We analyze the democratic politics of a rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows the government to issue debt to finance capital items only. Many national governments followed this rule in the 18th and 19th centuries and most U.S. states do today. This simple 1800s financing rule sometimes provides excellent incentives for majorities to choose an efficient mix of public goods in an economy with a growing population of overlapping generations of long-lived but mortal agents. In a special limiting case with demographics that make Ricardian equivalence prevail, the 1800s rule does nothing to promote efficiency. But when the demographics imply even a moderate departure from Ricardian equivalence, imposing the rule substantially improves the efficiency of democratically chosen allocations. We calibrate some examples to U.S. demographic data. We speculate why in the twentieth century most national governments abandoned the 1800s rule while U.S. state governments have retained it"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Finanzwirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Finance, Public United States Econometric models USA Sargent, Thomas J. 1943- Sonstige (DE-588)118751298 oth National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11030 (DE-604)BV002801238 11030 |
| spellingShingle | Bassetto, Marco Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Finanzwirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Finance, Public United States Econometric models |
| title | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets |
| title_auth | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets |
| title_exact_search | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets |
| title_full | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent |
| title_fullStr | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent |
| title_full_unstemmed | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent |
| title_short | Politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets |
| title_sort | politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets |
| topic | Finanzwirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Finance, Public United States Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Finanzwirtschaft Ökonometrisches Modell Finance, Public United States Econometric models USA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bassettomarco politicsandefficiencyofseparatingcapitalandordinarygovernmentbudgets AT sargentthomasj politicsandefficiencyofseparatingcapitalandordinarygovernmentbudgets |