Lobbies and technology diffusion:
"Do lobbies affect technology diffusion and growth? A number of authors have identified the importance of vested interests as a deterrent to technology diffusion and the relevance that this may have for growth. however, the evidence that exists about this mechanism is just anecdotal. In this pa...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
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Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11022 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | "Do lobbies affect technology diffusion and growth? A number of authors have identified the importance of vested interests as a deterrent to technology diffusion and the relevance that this may have for growth. however, the evidence that exists about this mechanism is just anecdotal. In this paper we build a model of lobbying and technology diffusion where the speed of diffusion of new technologies depends on some dimensions of the political regime and on the whether there is an old technology that may be substituted by the new technology. This differential effect of institutions on the diffusion of technologies with a predecessor constitutes the central element of our identification strategy. To implement this test we use technology diffusion data from Comin and Hobijn [2004]. We find that the relevant institutional variables have a differential effect on the diffusion of technologies with a predecessor technology as predicted by the theory. We show that this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, or reverse causality"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
Beschreibung: | 26, [2] S. |
Internformat
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490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11022 | |
520 | 3 | |a "Do lobbies affect technology diffusion and growth? A number of authors have identified the importance of vested interests as a deterrent to technology diffusion and the relevance that this may have for growth. however, the evidence that exists about this mechanism is just anecdotal. In this paper we build a model of lobbying and technology diffusion where the speed of diffusion of new technologies depends on some dimensions of the political regime and on the whether there is an old technology that may be substituted by the new technology. This differential effect of institutions on the diffusion of technologies with a predecessor constitutes the central element of our identification strategy. To implement this test we use technology diffusion data from Comin and Hobijn [2004]. We find that the relevant institutional variables have a differential effect on the diffusion of technologies with a predecessor technology as predicted by the theory. We show that this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, or reverse causality"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
650 | 4 | |a Diffusion of innovations |x Political aspects | |
650 | 4 | |a Lobbying |x Economic aspects | |
650 | 4 | |a Technological innovations |x Political aspects | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Comin, Diego 1973- Hobijn, Bart 1970- |
author_GND | (DE-588)128833270 (DE-588)129560995 |
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classification_rvk | QB 910 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)58732814 (DE-599)BVBBV019884243 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV019884243 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:08:21Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013208337 |
oclc_num | 58732814 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-703 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
owner_facet | DE-703 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
physical | 26, [2] S. |
publishDate | 2005 |
publishDateSearch | 2005 |
publishDateSort | 2005 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Comin, Diego 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)128833270 aut Lobbies and technology diffusion Diego Comin ; Bart Hobijn Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 26, [2] S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11022 "Do lobbies affect technology diffusion and growth? A number of authors have identified the importance of vested interests as a deterrent to technology diffusion and the relevance that this may have for growth. however, the evidence that exists about this mechanism is just anecdotal. In this paper we build a model of lobbying and technology diffusion where the speed of diffusion of new technologies depends on some dimensions of the political regime and on the whether there is an old technology that may be substituted by the new technology. This differential effect of institutions on the diffusion of technologies with a predecessor constitutes the central element of our identification strategy. To implement this test we use technology diffusion data from Comin and Hobijn [2004]. We find that the relevant institutional variables have a differential effect on the diffusion of technologies with a predecessor technology as predicted by the theory. We show that this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, or reverse causality"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Politik Diffusion of innovations Political aspects Lobbying Economic aspects Technological innovations Political aspects Hobijn, Bart 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)129560995 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11022 (DE-604)BV002801238 11022 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11022.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Comin, Diego 1973- Hobijn, Bart 1970- Lobbies and technology diffusion National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Politik Diffusion of innovations Political aspects Lobbying Economic aspects Technological innovations Political aspects |
title | Lobbies and technology diffusion |
title_auth | Lobbies and technology diffusion |
title_exact_search | Lobbies and technology diffusion |
title_full | Lobbies and technology diffusion Diego Comin ; Bart Hobijn |
title_fullStr | Lobbies and technology diffusion Diego Comin ; Bart Hobijn |
title_full_unstemmed | Lobbies and technology diffusion Diego Comin ; Bart Hobijn |
title_short | Lobbies and technology diffusion |
title_sort | lobbies and technology diffusion |
topic | Politik Diffusion of innovations Political aspects Lobbying Economic aspects Technological innovations Political aspects |
topic_facet | Politik Diffusion of innovations Political aspects Lobbying Economic aspects Technological innovations Political aspects |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11022.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT comindiego lobbiesandtechnologydiffusion AT hobijnbart lobbiesandtechnologydiffusion |