Federal antitrust policy: the law of competition and its practice
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
St. Paul, MN
Thomson/West
2005
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| Ausgabe: | 3. ed. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Hornbook Series
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Includes index |
| Beschreibung: | XXIII, 841 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0314150463 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Summary of Contents
Page
Preface in
WESTLAW Overview v
PART I. FOUNDATIONS: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT
Chapter
1. The Basic Economics of Antitrust 2
2. History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy 48
3. Market Power and Market Definition 78
PART II. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST
4. Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly 146
5. Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and the Rule of
Reason 193
6. Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: The Basic Doctrine of Monopolization
andAttempt— 269
7. Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases 290
8. Predatory and Other Exclusionary Pricing .— 339
9. Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers 374
10. Tie Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract 396
11. Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution 446
12. Mergers of Competitors 496
13. Conglomerate Mergers — 558
14. Price Discrimination and the Robinson Patman Act 572
PART III. ANTITRUST AS A REGULATORY INSTITUTION
15. Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws ~~ 592
16. Private Enforcement 601
17. Damages — 652
18. Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government ~ 692
19. Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy — 712
20. Antitrust Federalism and the State Action Doctrine — 736
21. The Reachof the Federal Antitrust Laws— 761
appendix: westlaw — 779
Table of Cases — 793
Table of Statutes 821
Index .. _ 827
*
vii
Table of Contents
Page
Preface iii
WESTLAW Overview — v
PART I. FOUNDATIONS: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT
Chapter 1. The Basic Economics of Antitrust . 2
See.
1.1 Price Theory: Economic Behavior and Perfect Competition 2
1.1a. The Perfectly Competitive Market 3
1.1b. Behavior of the Competitive Firm 8
1.2 Monopoly 12
1.2a. Price and Output of the Protected Monopolist 12
1.2b. Monopsony; Output Effects; Policy Implications 14
1.2c. De Facto Monopolies in Real World Markets 16
1.3 Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly 17
1.3a. Monopoly as a Status; Monopolization as a Process 17
1.3b. The Deadweight Loss Caused by Monopoly 19
1.3c. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Rent Seeking 20
1.3d. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Lost Competitor Investment ~ 23
1.4 Industrial Organization Theory and Economies of Scale 26
1.4a. The General Case of Economies of Scale 27
1.4b. Persistent Scale Economies, Natural Monopoly, Franchise Bidding and Con
testability— 31
1.5 Less Than Perfect Competition 36
1.5a. Product Differentiation 37
1.5b. Price Discrimination 37
1.5c. Oligopoly 37
1.5d. Transaction Costs 38
1.5e. Less Than Perfect Competition and Second Best 38
1.6 Barriers to Entry — 39
1.7 The Troubled Life of the Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm 42
Chapter 2. History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy 48
See.
2.1 The Development of American Antitrust Policy 48
2.1a. The Goals of the Sherman Act: Efficiency and Interest Group Explanations 48
2.1b. The Common Law and the Federal Antitrust Laws — 52
2.1c. A Thumbnail History of Federal Antitrust Policy — 56
2.2 On the Role of Economics in Antitrust 59
2.2a. Antitrust and Economics Before 1960 ~. 59
2.2b. The Chicago School and its Aftermath — 61
2.2c. Skepticism; Competitor v. Consumer Suits; Private v. Public Suits ~ 64
ix
Page
See.
2.2d. Politics and Democratic Policy 68
2.2e. Antitrust Policy in the Wake of the Chicago School 69
2.3 On the Need for Economics in Antitrust 71
2.3a. The Domain of Antitrust Economics 71
2.3b. The Substance of Antitrust Economics 73
2.3c. The Meaning of Efficiency and Consumer Weifare in Antitrust Econom¬
ics 74
Chapter 3. Market Power and Market Definition 78
See.
3.1 Introduction 79
3.1a. Market Power Technically Defined 80
3.1b. Market Share as a Surrogate for Market Power . — 81
3.1c. Market Share as More Than a Surrogate; Independent Relevance of Market
Share 82
3.1d. The Relevant Antitrust Market 83
3.2 Estimating the Relevant Market 83
3.2a. Size of Hypothesized Price Increase 85
3.2b. The Profit Maximizing Increase 86
3.2c. Broader and Narrower Markets; General Irrelevance of Submarkets 87
3.3 The Product Market; General Considerations 90
3.3a. Markets and Brands; Lock in 93
3.3al. Single Brand Ordinarily Not a Relevant Market; Kodak 93
3.3a2. Lower Court Decisions Limiting Kodak 98
3.3a3. Contract Lock in; Franchisor Brand as Market 99
3.3b. Substitutes v. Complements; Cluster Markets — 100
3.3bl. Relevant Market Consists of Substitutes — — 100
3.3b2. The Limited Rationale for Finding Cluster Markets — 101
3.4 Cross Elasticity of Demand: The Cellophane Fallacy and Its Consequences 103
3.4a. Cross Price Elasticities and Their Meaning 103
3.4b. Cross Elasticity of Demand in the du Pont (Cellophane) Case 104
3.4c. Correcting for the Cellophane Fallacy 106
3.5 Supply Elasticities; Foreign Imports .. 108
3.5a. Foreign Imports and the Alcoa Case 108
3.5b. Other Decisions Addressing (or Failing to Address) Supply Issues 111
3.5c. Accounting for Elasticity of Supply: Market Inclusion or Low Barriers to
Entry? 112
3.6 The Geographie Market 113
3.6a. Shipped Goods; Minimum Geographie Market 114
3.6b. Stationary Goods and Services 115
3.6c. Price Movements and Shipping Patterns 117
3.6cl. Price Movements Generally; Asymmetry 117
3.6c2. The Elzinga Hogarty Test 118
3.6d. TradeArea; Non competition Covenants 119
3.6e. Price Discrimination— 121 ;
3.7 Computation and Interpretation of Market Shares 122
3.7a. Revenue v. Units 122
3.7b. Output v. Capacity 124
3.7c. Product Durability and Power _ 125
3.7d. Interpreting Market Share Data; Questions of Fact or Law 126
1 :
Page
See.
3.8 Market Definition in the Justice Department Merger Guidelines . . 129
3.8a. Product Market Delineation in the Guidelines 129
3.8b. Geographie Markets Under the Guidelines 130
3.8c. Significance of Price Discrimination 131
3.8d. Calculation of Market Shares 132
3.8e. The Cellophane Fallacy in the Merger Guidelines 132
3.8f. Conclusion; The Guidelines as a Policy Statement 134
3.9 Alternative Methods of Establishing Market Power 134
3.9a. Measuring Residual Demand Directly 134
3.9b. Persistent Price Discrimination 136
3.9bl. Price Discrimination and Intellectual Property 138
3.9b2. Price Discrimination and Market Definition 139
3.9c. Persistent Monopoly Profits— 139
3.9cl. Monopoly Profits v. Accounting Profits ~~ 139
3.9c2. Absence of High Accounting Profits 140
3.9c3. The Problem of Rents 141
3.9d. Market Power and Intellectual Property ~~ 142
PART II. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST
Chapter 4. Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly 146
See.
4.1 Introduction: The Basic Economics of Price Fixing ~ 146
4.1a. The (Virtual) Universality of Cartel Cheating — 149
4.1al. Divergence Between Cartel and Single Firm Profit Maximization — 149
4.1a2. Cartel Cheating Strategies — — 150
4.1a3. Detectingand Punishing Cheating 151
4.1b. Competitive Fringe Firms — 155
4.1c. Internal Efficiencies of the Cartel ~ — 156
4.1d. CartelsofBuyers 158
4.2 Oligopoly, Cooperative and Non cooperative 159
4.2a. Non cooperative Cournot Oligopoly 159
4.2b. Cooperative v. Non cooperative Oligopoly Strategies 162
4.3 The Social Cost of Collusion 165
4.4 Antitrust Policy Toward Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion — 166
4.4a. Attacking Oligopoly; The Turner Posner Debate 167
4.4b. Identifying Tacit Collusion and Facilitators; Policy Options 169
4.5 Proving a Price or Output Agreement From Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence 173
4.6 Reaching Oligopoly Behavior on Weaker Agreement Evidence — — 177
4.6a. Introduction; Incomplete Agreements 178
4.6b. Challenging Facilitators Established by Agreement 180
4.6c. Unilateral Facilitators; Basing Point Pricing Schemes 181
4.6d. Other Facilitators; § 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act 185
4.6e. Conclusion: Summary Judgment in Conspiracy Cases 189
4.7 Intraenterprise Conspiracy — 189
Chapter 5. Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licens
ing, and the Rule of Reason 193
See.
5.1 Introduction: Naked and Ancillary Agreements Among Competitors 194
Page
See.
5.1a. Distinguishing Naked From Ancillary Restraints; Question of Law 195
5.1b. Why Multilateral Activity Deserves Closer Antitrust Scrutiny 197
5.1c. Partial Condemnation; Less Restrictive Alternatives 199
5.2 Joint Ventures as Market Facilitators 200
5.2a. Joint Ventures: An Overview 201
5.2al. Potential Harms and Benefits 201
5.2a2. The Two Sides of the Exclusivity Problem 203
5.2b. Ventures Facilitating R D, Advertising and Promotion; Ancillary Market
Divisions 205
5.2bl. Joint Ventures and Free Rider Problems 205
5.2b2. National Cooperative Research Act 205
5.2b3. Ancillary and Naked Agreements Pertaining to Advertising 206
5.2b4. Ancillary Market Divisions and Noncompetition Agreements 207
5.2c. Transactional Efficiencies Justifying Joint Venture Price Setting 211
5.2d. The Relation Between Joint Venture Analysis and Merger Analysis 214
5.3 Competitor Exchanges of Price or Output Information; Posting Agreements .— 215
5.3a. Industry Wide Dissemination of Price and Output Information 216
5.3b. Direct Competitor Exchange of Price Information 218
5.3c. Agreements to Post, or to Post and Adhere 219
5.4 Concerted Refusals to Deal— — 220
5.4a. Harms and Benefits; Appropriate Antitrust Standard 220
5.4al. A Rule of Reason, With a Few Exceptions — 220
5.4a2. Special Treatment for the Learned Professions? 225
5.4b. Efficient Joint Ventures and Refusals to Deal 226
5.4bl. Closed Membership and Other Traditional Joint Ventures 226
5.4b2. Open Membership Ventures; Positive Network Externalities 227
5.4c. Standard Setting and Rule Enforcement in Private Entrepreneurial and
Professional Associations .. 233
5.4d. Agreements Involving Non Competitors ... 239
5.4e. Expressive and Noncommercial Boycotts . 240
5.5 Agreements Governing the Licensing and Use of Patents and Other Intellectual
Property 241
5.5a. Introduction; Basic Issues 241
5.5b. The Scope of the Patent Misuse Doctrine 242
5.5c. Patent Licensing __ __ 245
5.5cl. Price Fixing; Output Restrictions; Royalty Rates; Exclusivity 245
5.5c2. Horizontal Territorial and Other Market Division Agreements 248
5.5c3. Package Licenses 250
5.5c4. Patent Pools 250
5.5c5. Grantbacks 251
5.5d. Agreements Concerning Intellectual Property Other Than Patents — 252
5.6 Characterization and Evaluation: The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason 253
5.6a. The Supreme Court and the Per Se Rule 253
5.6b. The Exaggerated Distinction Between Rule of Reason and Per Se Treatment 255
5.6c. Identifying Anticompetitive Conduct: A Tentative Road Map— 259
5.6d. The Truncated Rule of Reason _ 265
5.6e. The Bürden ofProof. 267 )
Page
Chapter 6. Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: The Basic Doctrine
of Monopolization and Attempt — 269
See.
6.1 The Monopolization Offense 269
6.2 Monopoly Power and Illegal Monopolization 271
6.2a. Monopolization s Market Power Requirement 272
6.2b. The Relation Between Market Power and Market Share 273
6.3 Conduct Requirements—Is Bad Conduct Necessary? .— 275
6.4 Identifying Monopolizing Conduct 276
6.4a. Exclusionary Conduct Defined — — — 277
6.4b. Private and Government Suits Distinguished 280
6.4c. Intent .— 280
6.5 The Offense of Attempt to Monopolize — — — 281
6.5a. The Attempt Law s Specific Intent Requirement — 282
6.5b. Dangerous Probability of Success — — 285
6.5bl. The Dangerous Probability Requirement as a Screening Device — 285
6.5b2. Dangerous Probability and Market Power . — 287
6.6 Conspiracy to Monopolize — — — 288
Chapter 7. Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases 290
See.
7.1 Introduction 291
7.2 Merger and Monopoly — 292
7.3 Output Expansion; Strategie Capacity Construction.. — 293
7.4 Price Discrimination; Leasing Practices — — 293
7.5 Unilateral Refusals to Deal I: General Doctrine— 295
7.5a. Refusals Directed at Competitors — 295
7.5b. Scope of Duty to Deal — 299
7.6 Unilateral Refusal to Deal II: Vertical Integration, Price Squeezes, Tying and
Exclusive Dealing— — — 300
7.6a. Kodak and Its Aftermath 300
7.6al. Lock in Requires Initial Purchase and Subsequent Change of
Policy — 302
7.6a2. Average Customer Must Be Poorly Informed; or Price Discrimina¬
tion Must Be Possible— — 302
7.6a3. Summary: Taking Advantage of Market Imperfections Not Within
.2 s Purview — 303
7.6b. The Price or Supply Squeeze; Vertical Integration — 304
7.6c. Tying and Exclusive Dealing—Technical Requirements Not Met 306
7.6d. Use of Vertical Refusals by Private Antitrust Plaintiffs 307
7.6e. Legitimate Business Purpose 308
7.6f. Unilateral Refusal by Nonmonopolist 309
7.7 Refusal to Deal III: The Essential Facility Doctrine — 309
7.7a. What Is a Qualifying Essential Facility ? — 310
7.7b. The Extent of the Duty to Deal 311
7.7c. Reasonableness of Refusal to Deal 312
7.7d. Essential Facility Doctrine Inconsistent With General Antitrust Goals 313
7.7dl. Forced Sharing Requires Price Administration 313
7.7d2. Forced Sharing Undercuts Incentives to Develop Alternative
Sources of Supply 313
Page
7.8 Predatory Product Design and Development; Failure to Predisclose; Altered
Complementary Products 314
7.8a. Predatory Product or Process Innovation 314
7.8b. Failure to Predisclose New Technology 316
7.8c. Microsoft: Unnecessarily Harmful Redesigns and Licensing Requirements .. 317
7.8d. Strategie Entry Deterrence; Predatory Advertising, Excessive Product Differ¬
entiation 319
7 9 The Troublesome Leverage Theory; Nonmonopolistic Advantage in Second Mar¬
ket 321
7.10 Raising Rivals Costs (RRC) — 322
7.10a. The Pedigree and Judicial Development of RRC 323
7.10b. Pre emption of Markets or Customers as RRC 325
7.11 Abuse of Patents or Other Intellectual Property 327
7.11a. Walker Process: Obtaining Patent by Fraud 328
7.11b. Enforcement of Patent Known to Be Invalid or Unenforceable; Noerr Issues 329
7.11c. Accumulation; Nonuse 332
7.11d. Refusal to License, Simple and Conditional 333
7.11dl. Absolute Refusal to License 333
7.11d2. Conditional Refusals to License 335
7.12 Abuse of Government Process 335
7.13 Business Torts as Antitrust Violations 336
7.14 Conduct Requirements in Attempt Cases 337
Chapter 8. Predatory and Other Exclusionary Pricing 339
See.
8.1 Introduction 339
8.2 When Is a Price Predatory? The Areeda Turner Test — 341
8.3 Predatory Pricing: Application and Criticism of the Areeda Turner Test 342
8.3a. The Average Variable Cost (AVC) Surrogate — — — 343
8.3b. The Problem of Long Run, Strategie Behavior; Predatory Prices Above
Cost; Multiple Benefit Predation 344
8.3bl. Limit Pricing and Strategie Entry Deterrence 344
8.3b2. Multiple Benefit Predation — 347
8.3c. AVC Measured as Average Avoidable Cost; Opportunity Cost 348
8.4 Structural Issues: When Is Predatory Pricing Plausible? — 350
8.4a. The Predator s Market Position 350
8.4b. Barriers to Entry ._ 353
8.4c. Excess Capacity 354
8.4d. Disposition of Productive Assets 355
8.4e. Should Competitor Predatory Pricing Suits Be Abolished?.. 356
8.5 Judicial Adaption of the Areeda Turner Test: Price/Cost Relationships and Intent — 357
8.5a. Price/Cost Relationships _ 357
8.5b. Intent _ 358
8.6 Judicial Adaption of Areeda Turner: Identifying Relevant Costs; Multi product
Firms; Customer Specific Pricing _ _. 359 :
8.7 Judicial Adaption of Areeda Turner: Structural Issues _ 362 I
8.8 Predatory Pricing and the Robinson Patman Act _ 364
8.9 Miscellaneous Exclusionary Pricing Problems 370
8.9a. Package Pricing _ _ _ 370
8.9b. Quantity and Market Share Discounts, Bundled and Unbundled 370
Page
See.
8.9c. Slotting Allowances and Related Pricing Incentives Paid to Retailers 372
8.9d. Predatory Buying: Price Protection Provisions as Exclusionary Devices 373
Chapter 9. Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers 374
See.
9.1 Introduction 374
9.2 The Economics of Vertical Integration 375
9.2a. The Implications of Coase s Work — 375
9.2b. Cost Savings, Technological and Transactional 377
9.2c. Efficient Vertical Integration and the Monopolist; Eliminating Double Mar
ginalization 380
9.3 Plausible Anticompetitive Consequences of Vertical Integration 382
9.3a. Strategie Control of Inputs — — 383
9.3b. Price Discrimination.— ~ 384
9.3c. Foreclosure and Entry Barriers — — 385
9.3d. Vertical Integration by Price Regulated Firms — — 385
9.3e. Vertical Integration and Cartels — — 386
9.4 Vertical Mergers and Antitrust Law — — 386
9.5 Vertical Mergers and the Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines ~ 392
9.5a. Increased Barriers to Entry — — ~ — 393
9.5b. Vertical Mergers That Facilitate Collusion 394
9.5c. Avoidance of Rate Regulation. — ~ 394
Chapter 10. Tie Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract 396
See.
10.1 Introduction: The Judicial Test for Tie Ins — — — — 397
10.2 Tying Arrangements and Consumer Weifare — — 399
10.3 Market Power and Per Se Unlawful Ties; Sherman v. Clayton Act Tests — 399
10.3a. The Rationale and Development of Tying s Market Power Requirement 400
10.3b. Tying Arrangements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets; Locked In Cus
tomers — — — ~ 402
10.3c. Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Market Power — 405
10.3d. Uniqueness and Ubiquity as Market Power — 406
10.3e. Separate Sherman and Clayton Act Tests? Federal Trade Commission Act —. 407
10.3f. The Rationale for Per Se Illegal Tie Ins — 408
10.4 When Are Products Tied Together? 410
10.4a. Coercion by Contract, Condition, or Understanding — — 410
10.4b. Proof of a Relevant Tying Agreement; Uncommunicated Conditions 412
10.4c. Package Discounts — 413
10.4d. Coercion by Package Design; Technological Ties — 413
10.5 The Requirement of Separate Tying and Tied Products. — 415
10.5a. Introduction; Basic Competitive Market Test 415
10.5b. New Products — 416
10.5c. Complete and Partial Substitutes as Separate Products 417
10.5d. Intellectual Property and Labor as Separate Products 418
10.5e. Efficiency— Economies of Joint Provision — — 419
10.6 Competitive Effects 420
10.6a. The Leverage Theory: Using Tie Ins to Turn One Monopoly Into Two;
Tipping 420
10.6b. Entry Barriers, Foreclosure, and Collusion 423
Page
See.
10.6bl. Entry Barriers and Tying Arrangements — 423
10.6b2. Foreclosure; Market Share— 424
10.6b3. Tie Ins and Collusion 425
10.6c. Evasion of Rate Regulation — — 425
10.6d. Predatory Pricing and Other Attempts to Monopolize 427
10.6e. Tie Ins as Price Discrimination and Metering Devices; Franchise Agree¬
ments — 428
10.7 Tie ins and Efficiency: Toward a General Rule of Reason — — 431
10.7a. Efficiencies and Tying Law s Idiosyncratic Per Se Rule 431
10.7b. Distribution Economies; Full Line Forcing and Unwanted Tied Products;
Lack of Consumer Injury 431
10.7c. Conclusion: Moving Tying Law Toward a Rule of Reason — 432
10.8 Reciprocity — — 433
10.9 Exclusive Dealing — — 436
10.9a. Anticompetitive Foreclosure and Its Variations 436
10.9al. The Foreclosure Theory of Exclusive Dealing — 436
10.9a2. Raising Rivals Costs — : — 436
10.9a3. Defining Markets to Measure Vertical Foreclosure 437
10.9b. Exclusive Dealing as a Cartel Facilitator 437
10.9c. The Difference Between Exclusive Dealing and Tying 438
10.9d. Efficiency Explanations and Defenses for Exclusive Dealing 439
10.9e. The Legal Standard for Exclusive Dealing Contracts 441
Chapter 11. Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution 446
11.1 Introduction 447
11.2 Perceived Competitive Threats of Minimum RPM and Vertical Territorial Restraints 448
11.2a. Introduction 448
11.2b. Vertical Restraints as Collusion Facilitators; Powerful Individual Dealers 449
11.2bl. Dealer Power; Policy Implications 451
11.2b2. Manufacturer Collusion and Vertical Restraints —. 453
11.2c. Foreclosure Effects 454
11.2d. Price Discrimination _. 454
11.2e. Other Theories 455
11.3 Vertical Restraints and Efficiency 456
11.3a. The Free Rider Problem — —_ 456
11.3al. The Economies of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free Riding — 457
11.3a2. The Domain and Efficiency of Vertical Restraints to Combat Free
Riding ._ 458
11.3b. Variations on the Free Rider Problem and Alternative Explanations 459
11.3bl. Purchase of Preferred Distribution Services; Shelf Space; Quality
Certification _ ____ _... 459
11.3b2. Facilitating Resale Density 460
11.3b3. Facilitating Supplier Entry 460
11.3b4. Protection of Dealer Margins; Enforcement of Distribution Con |
tracts 461
11.3c. Vertical Restraints and Efficiency Reconsidered 462
11.4 The Agreement Requirement in Vertical Restraints Cases 464
11.4a. Agreements—Horizontal and Vertical, Price and Nonprice 464
11.4b. The Colgate Doctrine 465 i
Page
See.
11.4c. The Rehabilitation of Colgate; Dealer Terminations 466
11.4d. The Agreement Requirement and Antitrust Policy Respecting Vertical Re
straints; Restraints Initiated by Powerful Dealers 471
11.5 Resale Price Maintenance in the Courts: The Per Se Rule and Its Exceptions 471
11.5a. The Common Law and the Rule in Dr. Miles 471
11.5b. The Meaning of Resale —Consignment Exception 473
11.5c. Maximum RPM 476
11.5d. The Difference Between Price and Non Price Agreements 479
11.5e. Per Se Rule Against RPM; Summary 481
11.6 Vertical Nonprice Restraints and the Rule of Reason 482
11.6a. Balancing Intrabrand and Interbrand Competition 483
11.6b. Sylvania s Impact in the Lower Courts 486
11.6c. Boycott Claims 488
11. 6d. Exclusive Dealerships, Sole Outlets, and Refusals to Deal 489
11.6e. Dual Distribution 490
11.7 Conclusion: A Rule of Reason for Distribution Restraints 491
11.7a. General Policy Concerns 491
11.7b. General Efficiency of Vertical Integration Not Decisive —. 492
11.7c. Rejected Approaches 492
11.7d. Rule of Reason Inquiry Summarized ~ 493
Chapter 12. Mergers of Competitors 496
See.
12.1 Introduction: Federal Merger Policy and the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 497
12.1a. The Continuing Importance of Market Structure to Merger Analysis 499
12.1b. The Basic Concerns of Merger Policy: Collusion, Oligopoly and Offsetting
Efficiencies 500
12.1c. Mergers and Exclusionary Practices; Predatory Pricing; Private Challenges .. 502
12.2 Efficiency and Merger Policy 505
12.2a. The Dubious Legacy of the Warren Era 505
12.2b. Assessing the Efficiency Effects of Horizontal Mergers 506
12.2bl. The Weifare Tradeoff Model 506
12.2b2. Must Efficiencies be Passed On ? —. 508
12.2b3. Efficiencies Must be Merger Specific and Extraordinary 508
12.2b4. Problems of Identification and Measurement 509
12.2b5. Benefit and Threat in Different Markets — —. 511
12.3 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences I: Mergers Facilitating Unilateral Price
Increases 511
12.3a. Introduction 511
12.3b. Merger to Monopoly — 511
12.3c. Dominant Firm s Acquisition of Nascent Rival 512
12.3d. Unilateral Effects in Product Differentiated Markets —. 512
12.4 Estimating Anticompetitive Consequences II: Mergers Facilitating Coordinated In
teraction—. 516
12.4a. Measuring Market Concentration: The CR4 and the Herfindahl 516
12.4al. The Four Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) — — 517
12.4a2. The Herfmdahl Hirschman Index (HHI) — 518
12.4b. Market Share Thresholds Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines; Actual
Government Practice — 523
Page
See.
12.4c. Factors Affecting the Significance of Concentration and Market Share Mea
sures 524
12.4d. How Should Concentration Count? Philadelphia Bank 525
12.5 The Significance of Product Differentiation 527
12.5a. Product Differentiation as Undermining Collusion 527
12.5b. Product Differentiation: When Is a Merger Horizontal? 528
12.6 Barriers to Entry in Merger Cases 530
12.6a. The Appropriate Definition of Entry Barriers for Merger Policy— 530
12.6b. What Constitutes an Entry Barrier?— 534
12.6bl. Economies of Scale 534
12.6b2. Risk and Size of Investment; Sunk Costs 534
12.6b3. Advertising, Promotion, and Customer Loyalty 536
12.6b4. Product Differentiation 537
12.6b5. Government Entry Restrictions 537
12.6c. Evidence Required to Prove Entry Barriers or Their Absence 538
12.6d. Entry Barrier Analysis Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 541
12.7 Other Factors Affecting the Competitive Consequences of Mergers 543
12.7a. Sophistication and Power of Trading Partners 543
12.7b. Adequacy of Irreplaceable Raw Materials 545
12.7c. Excess Capacity 546
12.7d. Marketing and Sales Methods 547
12.7e. History of Collusion or Facilitating Practices 547
12.7f. Trends Towards Concentration 548
12.7g. Aggressiveness of Acquired Firm 549
12.8 Observed Anticompetitive Behavior 549
12.9 The Failing Company Defense and Related Factors Affecting Firm Viability 551
12.10 Partial Acquisitions and Acquisitions Solely for Investment 555
12.11 Interlocking Corporate Directors or Officers .. 557
Chapter 13. Conglomerate Mergers 558
See.
13.1 Introduction: Competition and Conglomerate Mergers 558
13.2 Conglomerate Mergers and Efficiency 559
13.3 Perceived Dangers to Competition 561
13.3a. Reciprocity 561
13.3b. Leverage and Tie Ins —.. 563
13.3c. Strategie Pricing and Entry Deterrence ._ ._ 564
13.4 Mergers of Potential Competitors — 565
13.4a. The Perceived Potential Entrant Doctrine — — 566
13.4b. Actual Potential Entrant Doctrine 569
13.5 Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Division Guidelines 570
Chapter 14. Price Discrimination and the Robinson Patman Act— — 572
See.
14.1 Introduction: Price Discrimination .— 572
14.2 Price Discrimination and Competition ._. 573
14.3 Price Discrimination and the Monopolist: Perfect Price Discrimination 574
14.4 Imperfect Price Discrimination _ 575
14.5 Price Discrimination and Antitrust Policy 576
14.5a. The Social Cost of Price Discrimination 576
14.5b. The Social Cost of Preventing Price Discrimination in Concentrated Markets 578
Page
See.
14.6 The Robinson Patman Act and Price Discrimination 578
14.6a. General Interpretation ~. 578
14.6al. Legislative History and Effectiveness in Achieving Goals. 578
14.6a2. The Robinson Patman Act s Theory of Competitive Injury 580
14.6b. The Meaning of Price Discrimination Under the Act — 581
14.6c. Primary and Secondary Line Violations 581
14.6d. Technical Requirements ~ 582
14.6e. Violations by Buyers — 585
14.6f. Affirmative Defenses — — — 586
14.6fl. Cost Justification Defense — — 586
14.6f2. Meeting Competition Defense — — 587
PART III. ANTITRUST AS A REGULATORY INSTITUTION
Chapter 15. Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws ~ 592
See.
15.1 Public Enforcement Generally; The Antitrust Division — .— 592
15.1a. Criminal Enforcement — — 593
15.1b. Civil Enforcement — — — — — — — 594
15.2 The Federal Trade Commission — — — — — 595
15.3 The Process of Premerger Notification — — .. 598
15.4 Quasi Public Enforcement: The States Attorneys General 598
Chapter 16. Private Enforcement — 601
See.
16.1 Introduction: § 4 of the Clayton Act — 602
16.2 Permissible Plaintiffs—Who Should Enforce the Antitrust Laws? —~ 603
16.3 Antitrust s Special Requirement of Competitive Injury 604
16.3a. Antitrust Injury ; Private Merger Challenges — 604
16.3al. Mergers Alleged to Facilitate Exclusionary Practices 604
16.3a2. Takeover Targets as Antitrust Plaintiffs.— 606
16.3a3. Consumer Plaintiffs — 607
16.3b. Antitrust Injury Beyond 7; Per Se Violations 607
16.3c. Causation, Injury in fact, Antitrust Injury Distinguished 609
16.3d. Antitrust Injury and Damages Claims 610
16.3e. Injunctive Relief —~ 611
16.3f. Plaintiffs Unaffected by Injury to Competition; Pleading Requirements 612
16.4 Statutory and Judicial Rules Limiting Antitrust Standing. ~~ 613
16.4a. Business or Property 613
16.4b. Market Relationships; Direct Injury and Target Area Tests — 614
16.4bl. Direct Injury 614
16.4b2. Target Area 615
16.4b3. Supreme Court Attempts at a More Useful Alternative 615
16.4c. The Preferred Position of Consumers and Competitors — 617
16.5 Special Problems of Antitrust Standing 618
16.5a. The Unestablished Business as Antitrust Plaintiff. 618
16.5b. Employees 619
16.5c. Derivative Injuries and Duplicative Recovery 621
16.5d. Second Best Plaintiffs 623
16.5e. Pari Delicto; Declaratory Judgment Actions — 623
Page
See.
16.6 The Indirect Purchaser Rule 624
16.6a. Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick 624
16.6b. Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Rule 626
16.6bl. Pre existing Contracts 626
16.6b2. Injunction Suits 628
16.6b3. Cases Involving Vertical Agreements or Control 628
16.6c. Monopsony; Buyers Cartels 629
16.6d. Policy Implications of the Indirect Purchaser Rule; State Indirect Purchaser
Statutes 630
16.6e. The Umbrella Plaintiff 632
16.7 The Antitrust Statute of Limitation 633
16.8 Disposition of Issues; Summary Judgment; Expert Testimony; Tagalong Suits 636
16.8a. JuryTrial — 636
16.8b. Summary Judgment 636
16.8c. Judicial Control of Expert Testimony 642
16.8d. Tagalong Suits; Offensive Collateral Estoppel 648
16.9 Equitable Relief 649
16.10 Compulsory Arbitration 650
Chapter 17. Damages 652
See.
17.1 Antitrust Damages Actions and Social Weifare 652
17.1a. Introduction: The Role of Efficiency in Damages Theory 652
17.1b. Deterrence and Damages 653
17. lc. Using Damages to Minimize the Social Cost of Antitrust Violations 655
17.2 The Optimal Deterrence Model for Antitrust Damages 657
17.2a. Victim s Losses v. Violator s Gains .. 657
17.2b. Optimal Damages for Overcharge Injuries 657
17.2c. Optimal Damages for Exclusionary Practices 661
17.2d. The Optimal Deterrence Model in Litigation 663
17.3 The Rationale for Treble Damages — 666
17.4 How Accurately Must Damages Be Measured? 668
17.5 Measuring Damages for Overcharge Injuries 670
17.5a. Introduction; Basic Conceptual Problems 670
17.5b. Methods of Measurement: Yardstick and Before and After — 672
17.5bl. Yardstick Method — — 673
17.5b2. Before and After Method 673
17.6 Damages for Exclusionary Practices 678
17.6a. When Are Damages Due? _ 678
17.6b. Damages for Lost Sales and Market Share — 679
17.6bl. Before and After Method _ 680
17.6b2. Yardstick Method „. 682
17.6b3. Lost Market Share— _ _ 683 j
17.6c. Damages and Disaggregation 685
17.6d. Terminated Dealers and Firms Driven From Business 686
17.6e. Damages for Precluded Entry 688
17.7 Contribution; Joint and Several Liability 689
1
Page
Chapter 18. Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government 692
See.
18.1 Regulation, Rent Seeking and Antitrust Immunity 692
18.1a. Introduction 692
18.1b. Regulatory Intervention and the Right to Seek It 694
18.1c. The General Irrelevance of Regulatory Capture 694
18.Id. Noerr Protects the Process, not the Result ~. 695
18.2 The Scope of Antitrust s Petitioning Immunity 696
18.2a. Petitions for Legislative or Executive Action Generally 696
18.2b. Petitions to Governments Acting as Market Participants 696
18.2c. Petitions for Adjudicative Action 700
18.3 The Sham Exception in Legislative and Adjudicative Contexts 701
18.3a. Use of Abusive Methods; False Information — 702
18.3b. Baselessness in the Adjudicative Setting; Successful Claims 704
18.3c. Single or Repetitive Claims — — — 707
18.3d. Threat to Sue; Ex Parte Statements — — — 708
18.3e. Petitions for Invalid Legislation and Administrative Rules ~~ — 709
18.4 The Relation Between Unprotected Petitioning and the Substantive Offense 710
18.5 Corruption of Private Decision Making Bodies — 710
Chapter 19. Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy — — — 712
See.
19.1 Antitrust and Regulation in a Federal System — 712
19.2 Regulation, Deregulation and Antitrust Policy — 713
19.2a. The Scope of Regulation and the Domain of Antitrust 713
19.2b. The Rationales for Deregulation — — — — 713
19.2bl. Expanded Confidence in Competition and Markets — 713
19.2b2. Public Choice: Decreased Confidence in the Regulatory Process 715
19.3 The Role of Antitrust in the Regulated Market — 716
19.3a. Express or Implied Repeal — 716
19.3b. The Relation Between Federal Regulation and Antitrust Jurisdiction: Two
Views — . 717
19.3c. Requisite Regulatory Oversight; State Action Compared — 719
19.4 Procedure in Areas of Divided Authority; Primary Jurisdiction 720
19.5 Market Power Offenses in Regulated Markets ~ — 722
19.6 Antitrust Damages Actions and Regulated Rates: The Keogh Doctrine — 724
19.7 Particular Exemptions 725
19.7a. Miscellaneous Express Exemptions — — 726
19.7b. Antitrust and Federal Labor Policy 727
19.7c. The McCarran Ferguson Act and the Insurance Exemption — 729
19.7cl. Business of Insurance 730
19.7c2. Regulated by State Law — 732
19.7c3. Acts of Boycott, Coercion or Intimidation — 732
19.7c4. Continuing Vitality of McCarran Ferguson — — 734
Chapter 20. Antitrust Federalism and the State Action Doctrine 736
See.
20.1 Introduction; Preemption — 736
20.2 Federalism and the Policy of the State Action Doctrine — 739
20.2a. The Historical Basis of the State Action Doctrine 739
20.2b. Conflicts Between Federal Antitrust and State Regulation; Alternative Solu¬
tions 740
Page
See.
20.3 Basic Qualifications for Exemption— 742
20.4 Authorization 744
20.5 Active Supervision 747
20.5a. When Is Supervision Required? — 748
20.5b. What Kind of Supervision Is Required? 749
20.5c. Who Must Supervise? 752
20.6 The Special Problem of Municipal Antitrust Liability 752
20.7 The Relationship Between Petitions to the Government and the State Action
Doctrine — 755
20.8 The Relation Between State and Federal Antitrust Law 757
Chapter 21. The Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws 761
See.
21.1 Local Activities: Federal Antitrust and Interstate Commerce 761
21.1a. The Sherman Act s Jurisdictional Reach 761
21.1b. Jurisdictional Reach of Other Antitrust Provisions 765
21.2 Antitrust s Global Reach 766
21.2a. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: Basic Doctrine 767
21.2b. Prudential Constraints on Extraterritorial Reach 770
21.2c. The Act of State Doctrine — — 773
21.2d. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion; Petitions to Foreign Governments 774
21.2e. Foreign Sovereign Immunity .— 775
21.3 Judicial Jurisdiction and Antitrust ~ .. 776
Appendix: Westlaw — 779
Table of Cases . __ _. 793
Table of Statutes 821
Index _ _ 827
|
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| spelling | Hovenkamp, Herbert 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)132809168 aut Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice by Herbert Hovenkamp 3. ed. St. Paul, MN Thomson/West 2005 XXIII, 841 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hornbook Series Includes index Antitrustwetgeving gtt Mededingingsrecht gtt Antitrust law Economic aspects United States Antitrust law United States Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd rswk-swf Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 s DE-604 Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 s 1\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=013165119&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hovenkamp, Herbert 1948- Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice Antitrustwetgeving gtt Mededingingsrecht gtt Antitrust law Economic aspects United States Antitrust law United States Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4121924-7 (DE-588)4140732-5 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_auth | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_exact_search | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_full | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice by Herbert Hovenkamp |
| title_fullStr | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice by Herbert Hovenkamp |
| title_full_unstemmed | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice by Herbert Hovenkamp |
| title_short | Federal antitrust policy |
| title_sort | federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_sub | the law of competition and its practice |
| topic | Antitrustwetgeving gtt Mededingingsrecht gtt Antitrust law Economic aspects United States Antitrust law United States Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Antitrustwetgeving Mededingingsrecht Antitrust law Economic aspects United States Antitrust law United States Wettbewerbsrecht Antitrustrecht USA |
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