Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Beograd
JP Službeni List SCG
2004
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | In kyrill. Schr., serb. |
| Beschreibung: | 497 S. |
| ISBN: | 8674190642 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | САДРЖАЈ
Страна
ПРЕДГОВОР
УВОДНА
ПРВИ ДЕО
ИЗБОРНИ СИСТЕМИ И ПОСЛЕДИЦЕ ИЗБОРНОГ ПРАВА
ПРВА ГЛАВА
ЕЛЕМЕНТИ ИЗБОРНОГ СИСТЕМА
1.
2.
3.
ДРУГА ГЛАВА
ТИПОВИ
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ДРУГИ ДЕО
ИЗБОРНИ СИСТЕМИ ПОСТКОМУНИСТИЧКИХ ДРЖАВА
ТРЕЋА
ГЕНЕЗА ИЗБОРНИХ СИСТЕМА ПОСТКОМУНИСТИЧКИХ ДРЖАВА
ЧЕТВРТА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Страна
10.
П. Заюьучак
ПЕТА ГЛАВА
ЧЕШКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
.
СЛОВАЧКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
СЕДМА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ОСМА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
Страна
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ДЕВЕТА
РЕПУБЛИКА БУГАРСКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ДЕСЕТА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ЈЕДАНАЕСТА
РУСКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Страна
ДВАНАЕСТА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ТРИНАЕСТА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА ХРВАТСКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ЧЕТРНАЕСТА ГЛАВА
РЕПУБЛИКА
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ТРЕЋИ
УПОРЕДНА АНАЛИЗА ИЗБОРНИХ СИСТЕМА ПОСТКОМУНИСТИЧКИХ
ДРЖАВА
ПЕТНАЕСТА ГЛАВА
ЗАКЉУЧНА РАЗМАТРАЊА
1.
Страна
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
CONCLUSIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
CONCLUSIONS
The electoral legislation of the post-Communist states examined in this
study is the subject of continuous reforming. Nevertheless, such a statement
cannot be generally applied to the all electoral systems under our review. In
this context the most obvious example is Hungary, then goes the Czech Re¬
public and the Slovak Republic
changed their electoral systems since the beginning of the transitional peri¬
od, or (as in the case of the latter two states) have introduced minor changes
which were insignificant and affected only some fragments of the electoral
system but not the very type of it, that is their majority or representative for¬
mulas. Three states mentioned above are a typical example of ununified
electoral legislation to the extent which hampers the observation of electoral
procedures and makes electoral technique difficult to apply. As a result, un¬
unified electoral legislation brings in contradictory decisions, conflicts and
infringes the ability of election participants to exercise their rights in the
electoral process.
Among
Slovenia
Constitution. All of these three states have a bicameral parliamentary struc¬
ture, but their constitutions do not assign the proclaimed type of electoral
system to the both chambers of parliament. Thus, the Czech Republic stated
in its constitution the proportional electoral system only for the lower, repre¬
sentative chamber and a majority system
of Poland and Slovenia defined the proportional electoral system for the
lower chamber and left the arrangement of the type of electoral system for
the members of the upper chamber to the mercy of law.
469
Table
Poland
Seim
The Senate
460
100
Czech Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
200
81
Slovak Republic
National Council
150
Hungary
National Assembly
386
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
327 -
140 -
Bulgaria
National Assembly
240
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
101
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
450
360
Slovenia
National Assembly
The State Council
90
40
Croatia
Assembly
100-160
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly (Sobranie)
120
Mostly in all of the states which electoral systems is the subject of this
study the type of electoral system is determined by the electoral law. Only
two states
by a specified majority of votes. In Hungary, for example, the electoral law
is adopted by two-thirds of legislative vote. Romania has an organic legisla¬
tion which implies the majority of votes in both chambers of Parliament.
However, the qualified majority in case of Romania is completely derogated
by the right of the government to change organic laws and thus the electoral
legislation by issuing so called urgent decrees which have the power of
law. The adoption of electoral laws in other states under review envisages a
regular parliamentary procedure where the qualified majority is not a must.
But this does not mean that the electoral legislation becomes automatically
vulnerable to the correlation of forces in Parliament that is the correlation of
parties and their interests. On the contrary, the process of institutional engi¬
neering in the political system and especially in the electoral system is under
constant monitoring and influence of the international organizations and in
such an environment the reforms of electoral legislation are more or less
stimulated, directed or, if necessary, even stopped in accordance with their
recommendations
In the post-Communist states considered in our study the proportional
electoral system dominates and varies depending upon the number of con¬
stituencies and polling places, electoral qualification and the type of formula
used for the allocation of seats. The majority electoral system is widely used
in many post-Communist states for the election of the members of the upper
470
chamber (see, for example, Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and Slove¬
nia). The only exception is Romania which by means of law determines the
proportional system for the elections to the Senate, but even in this case
small constituencies almost turn the declared proportional system into a ma¬
jority one.
Table
Adopted system
Adopted by
Constitution
Law
Poland
Seim
The Senate
proportional
majority
Yes
No
No
Yes
Czech
Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
proportional
majority
Yes
Yes
No
No
Slovak
Republic
National Council
proportional
No
Yes
Hungary
National Assembly
mixed-compensatory
No
Yes
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
proportional
proportional
No
Yes
Yes
Bulgaria
National Assembly
proportional
No
Yes
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
proportional
No
Yes
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
mixed scheme
majority
No
No
Yes
Yes
Slovenia
National Assembly
The State Council
proportional
majority
Yes
No
No
Yes
Croatia
Assembly
proportional
No
Yes
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly (Sobranie)
proportional
No
Yes
The mentioned states generally determine the right to vote and be
elected in their constitutions. Electoral systems of these countries do not de¬
fine the right to elect as an obligatory and no sanctions are envisaged if the
residents abstain from voting. Other elements of electoral legislation are de¬
termined by electoral law, but again not all of them. Very often some aspects
of elections such as the registration of voters, organisation of constituencies
and polling places, election campaign, financing and penalties for violation
of electoral law are regulated by special laws. Some electoral systems, main¬
ly those with ununified laws, arrange election procedures for the election to
all representative bodies (national and regional Parliaments, municipal as¬
semblies of local self-governing) and even the elections of the President by a
single law. Along with the constitution, electoral law, law on mass media,
law on the formation of political parties, criminal statute and other laws, the
electoral legislature is also comprised of directives, instructions, decisions
and guiding principles of the central election bodies. As a rule, these instruc¬
tions and directives regulate technical aspects
471
tion
dures out of the premises of the ballot station
importance to the democratic character of electoral process. In this context
the electoral system of Russia differs from the electoral systems in other
states. Thus, the Central Election Committee of Russia has the right to deter¬
mine constituencies if for some reasons the Parliament fails to do it. Most of
the post-Communist states (with Slovenia as an exception) has introduced in
their constitutions the terms of mandate. In many cases there is a practice to
broad and update the conditions for pre-term termination of the mandate by
issuing regulations which have the power of law.
The term of issuing regular elections is also the subject of the constitu¬
tional provisions in the post-Communist states. Regular elections as a rule
are issued at least
the states determine a standard four-year term of service with the exception
to the representatives in upper chamber of Parliament. The elections com¬
monly must be held at least
nia, Croatia and Hungary do not follow this rule and have shorter time inter¬
vals for the issuing of the election that is
before the mandate expiration. It is almost a rule that the right to issue regu¬
lar elections belongs to the President. The exceptions are the Slovak Repub¬
lic where the right to issue elections belongs to the Chairman of the Parlia¬
ment and Romania where this right is granted to the government. Russia has
a unique solution as far as the issuing of elections is concerned. Thus, if the
President who is empowered to issue elections fails for some reasons to do
so, the Central Election Committee as a national electoral body has the legal
right to issue elections by itself.
Table
Term for issuing regular elections before the
previous mandate expires
Issuer
Poland
90
President of the Republic
Czech Republic
90
President of the Republic
Slovakia
90
Chairman of the Parliament
Hungary
75
President of the Republic
Romania
60
Chairman of the Government
Bulgaria
60
President of the Republic
Estonia
90
President of the Republic
Russia
90
President of Russia
Slovenia
75
President of the Republic
Croatia
30
President of the Republic
F.Y.R.O.M.
90
President of the Republic
472
General
tion participants, as well as secret ballot and direct franchise. Parallel to
these provisions the state constitutions confirm and the electoral laws usual¬
ly interpret the fundamental principles of protecting the right to vote before
court.
1.
The right to vote in all analyzed electoral systems is guarantied by the
constitution and as a rule interpreted by electoral law. In the framework of
analyzed electoral systems, individuals are eligible to vote once they reach
the age of majority (the age of
Republic where the residents acquire the right to vote once they reach the
age of
elected) the situation varies. Four states
Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary
(18
our study the right to be elected is acquired upon reaching the age of
years for the lower Chamber of Parliament (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic, Estonia, Bulgaria, Russia) or upon reaching the age of
(Romania). The age requirements for the Senate differ from state to state.
The highest age requirement for the Senate in the context of the right to be
elected has the Czech Republic
and Poland
The electoral systems of the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Esto¬
nia, Russia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia suspend suffrage
for reasons of conviction for a criminal offence. Among these states Hunga¬
ry has the most rigid measures
tigation, as well as a person hospitalized for a medical treatment has no right
to vote and the right to be elected. F.Y.R.O.M., on the contrary, has quite a
liberal electoral system in this sense
vote but is suspended from the right to be elected.
In all of the examined states residence in the state is required for the
exercise of the right to vote. The right to vote is also preconditioned by the
citizenship. This right can be withdrawn for reasons of legal incapacity (e.g.,
based on mental incapacity) and is limited by age requirement. These four
conditions for getting the right to vote and for exercising it are integral ele¬
ments of all post-Communist systems. Only Hungary and the Slovak Repub¬
lic do not leave their citizens who live and work abroad an opportunity to ex¬
ercise their right to suffrage by voting abroad in corresponding diplomatic
missions. The electoral systems of other states envisage that the citizens li¬
ving or temporally residing abroad should be given an opportunity to exer-
473
cise
cial registration of the mentioned category of voters, it also takes much more
time to arrange registers of voters and require a completely different type of
decisions. Electoral legislation of some states, for example, allow voters li¬
ving abroad to be registered on polling day.
Table
Suffrage
The Right to Vote
The Right to be
Elected
Poland
Seim
The Senate
00
21
30
Czech Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
18
18
21
40
Slovak Republic
National Council
21
21
Hungary
National Assembly
18
18
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
18
18
23
33
Bulgaria
National Assembly
18
21
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
18
21
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
CO CO
21
18
Slovenia
National Assembly
The State Council
18
18
oo oo
Croatia
Assembly
18
18
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly
18
18
The registration of voters differs in examined electoral systems. Most
of the states let the local self-governing organs to determine the registration
procedure in cooperation with state agencies, usually with the Ministry of
Interior or other institutions which are in charge of keeping personal data,
notary records and register books. The electoral systems of the Czech Re¬
public and the Slovak Republic are an exception of this rule as in these states
the registration of voters is determined by the Ministry of Interior in coordi¬
nation with other state bodies. Estonia has a special institution
Register of Citizens and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the
registration procedure is a sole prerogative of the Ministry of Justice. The
Hungarian electoral model also goes beyond the standard frames. Thus, re¬
gisters of voters in Hungary are compiled by local organs of self-governing
in cooperation with the network of electoral offices
administration which manages the election process. In comparison with
electoral systems of other states only Estonia prescribes the compiling of the
Central Register of Voters. The Hungarian Central Election Office also has
474
an address book of voters organized by districts, but this Office only per¬
forms the unification of local registers of voters and does not compile regis¬
ters of voters.
All examined electoral systems envisage a standard set of data for the
register of voters
of birth, home address and personal identification number. The electoral sys¬
tems of Estonia, Romania, and Russia practice a suspension of individuals
from the right to be elected or even to vote in case of criminal conviction and
they added to the register of voters a special column containing the informa¬
tion whether a voter has been convicted or serves his sentence for criminal
offence.
The electoral systems of all states under review permit absentee voting
envisaging extracts from the register of voters if on polling day the voters
undergo medical treatment in a hospital, sanatorium, rehabilitation centre or
are on a military service for a fixed period of time or are engaged in military
manoeuvres. For the mentioned categories of voters the electoral systems
provide an opportunity to vote at a specially formed polling places or at the
polling places which are the nearest to the places of their temporal resi¬
dence.
The terms for updating the record of voters differ from state to state.
The electoral systems of F.Y.R.O.M. and Russia are the most vigorous in
this case and insist on updating the record of voters twice a year. All the
states in their electoral systems also envisage an effective opportunity for an
individual to complain if he is deprived from his right to check the accuracy
of registration and timely introduce corrections in the record of voters.
Only two states
voting abroad. All other post-Communist states secure mechanisms for their
citizens to exercise the right to vote if they have residence in other country
or if on polling day they stay on business or as tourists abroad. Registration
of voters, organization and holding of elections abroad is mainly a responsi¬
bility of central election bodies and Foreign Ministry, or rather diplomatic
representatives and consulates.
Only Estonia and Romania practice the use of so called voter cards.
The voter card confirms the voter s identity and is valid if attached to the
identity document. In these states an individual is not allowed to vote with¬
out the voter card.
At the end it is important to emphasize that many states
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria and Romania
permit to include new entries in the register of voters even on polling day.
This approach is far from being consistent with standard norms of registra¬
tion which prescribe that the register of voters should be completed in a sen¬
sible period before polling day in order to exclude any possibility of mani¬
pulations and electoral fraud.
475
2.
The task of administering elections in studied electoral systems lies
with the electoral bodies. The electoral bodies are not much alike in exam¬
ined states and their differences are noticeble in the way they are formed and
organized, in legal regulations of their activities, in the extent of their au¬
thorities, in composition and structure etc. However, the basic features of
the electoral bodies in examined states should be compared for better under¬
standing of their role in the electoral process.
All electoral systems of the post-Communist states under our study
(the only exception is Romania) determine the central electoral body as a
standing state body which stands at the apex of each system. The rule is that
the central electoral body functions permanently while subordinate electoral
bodies, as a rule, are bound to a certain electoral cycle and formed after the
issuing of the elections. This is a common rule with almost all the states ex¬
cept Russia where the mandate of subordinate electoral commissions for¬
mally lasts till the formation of new electoral bodies.
There are several criteria determined for the formation of electoral
bodies. The most important criterion is who nominates the composition of
electoral bodies and who can be a member of the electoral body. In Hungary,
Russia, Slovenia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the right
to compose the Central Electoral Commission belongs to Parliament. In Po¬
land and Bulgaria, on the contrary, the central electoral body is composed by
the decisions of the executive power
Slovak Republic empowered the government to form the central electoral
body. In the Czech Republic the composition of the central electoral body al¬
so rests with executive brunch and is a responsibility of the Minister of the
Interior. The laws of Romania, Estonia, Croatia and F.Y.R.O.M. determine
the institutions which delegate members to the composition of the central
electoral body.
The composition of the central electoral bodies is related to and can be
compared by the role the political parties (both ruling and in opposition)
play. Thus, in Poland and Estonia the central electoral bodies are entirely
composed of the representatives of judicial agencies, high members of Par¬
liament or corresponding ministries. The composition of the central electoral
body in the Czech Republic is a sole prerogative of the Minister of Interior.
Only in the mentioned three states the representatives of political parties are
not included in the composition of the central electoral body. Poland, Estonia
and the Czech Republic allow political parties to participate in the work of
electoral bodies only at the level of election commissions of electoral dis¬
tricts and polling boards. Other states under study form central electoral
bodies so that, as a rule, include in their composition the representatives of
476
highest
resentatives of both parliamentary and non-parliamentary political parties.
The Slovak Republic stays apart from these two groups as forms its central
electoral body exclusively from the representatives of the authorized bearers
(political parties or coalitions) of the list of candidates. Bulgaria does not be¬
long to two main groups as well. The electoral system of Bulgaria prohibits
the participation of the Supreme Court judges in the work of electoral bodies.
Table
Name
Number and Composition
Nominator
Poland
State
Electoral
Commission
9
3
3
3
The President
Czech
Republic
State
Electoral
Commission
11
The minister of Interior and
tives from the following ministers: Finance,
Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defense, Health
and Statistics
Government
Slovak
Republic
State
Electoral
Commission
-
Every bearer of the list of candidates (party
or coalition) determines two members
Government
Hungary
National
Electoral
Committee
5
5
of Interior
each bearer of the candidates list
Parliament
Romania
State
Electoral
Commission
23
7
casting of lots)
16
didates list
The Chairman
of the
Supreme
Court
Bulgaria
State
Electoral
Commission
25
Members are chosen in consultations with
parliamentary parties and coalitions
The President
Estonia
National
Electoral
Committee
7
By one representative from the Court of
first instance, the Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court and by one representative
of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of
Finance, Office of Public Prosecutor and
Parliament
Riigikogu
(Parliament)
Russia
State
Electoral
Commission
15
5
at the suggestion of the State Duma
5
the suggestion of The Federation Council
5
dent of Russian Federation
The State
Duma
477
Name
Number and Composition
Nominator
Slovenia
The Republic
Electoral
Commission
6
The Chairman of the Republic Electoral
Commission is a judge of the Supreme
Court
2
3
proportionally
National
Assembly
Croatia
State
Electoral
Commission
11
-
- 4
stitutional Court and nominated from the
Supreme Court and prominent legal
experts
- 3
- 3
tion
Assembly
(Sabor)
F.Y.R.O.M.
State
Electoral
Commission
9
The Chairman of the State Electoral Com¬
mission is nominated by the President of
the Republic;
-
Supreme Court at the suggestion of the
ruling party and the party in opposition
(totally
-
legal experts at the suggestion of the rul¬
ing party and the party in opposition
(totally
Assembly
(Sobranie)
Mostly all analyzed electoral systems envisage strict hierarchy rela¬
tions between higher and lower electoral commissions. This practically
means that all decisions taken within the competence of the higher electoral
body is binding on all subordinate electoral bodies. The exception from this
rule makes the Slovak Republic, Hungary and the Former Yugoslav Repub¬
lic of Macedonia. The absence of the mentioned hierarchy creates a problem
in exercising and interpreting of electoral legislation and put the participants
of electoral race in unequal positions, brings in electoral conflicts and thus
affects the legitimacy of elections.
The central electoral bodies of states under review has almost the same
competence with smaller differences which are the result of different types
of electoral systems, traditions, organization of state administration, admin¬
istrative division of the state etc. In this context exceptions can not be treated
as features deserving attention as they do not affect the usual role and posi¬
tion of central electoral bodies in theory and electoral practice.
Only electoral systems of Poland and Hungary have electoral admin¬
istration. This is a sort of logistics structure which renders legal and techni¬
cal support to the electoral bodies. The State Electoral Bureau in Poland
478
and the National Electoral Office in Hungary are in charge of managing the
electoral process. These organs are under jurisdiction of the central elec¬
toral body. They do not belong to the state administration but are author¬
ized to coordinate the work of different executive segments in electoral
process. Almost the same role play Bureaus of Statistics in the electoral
systems of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic managing the
most delicate phase of the electoral process
sults and allocation of mandates. The electoral systems of other states
mainly recommend state agencies and institutions as well as local self-gov¬
ernments to deliver all possible support to the electoral bodies.
3.
Among the post-Communist countries under study only the Slovak Re¬
public has one electoral district for the elections to central representative
body. Russia uses a mixed type of electoral system according to which half
of the State Duma members are elected in one electoral district. All other
states practice in their electoral systems larger amount of electoral districts.
The number of electoral districts varies from
nia. The number of electoral districts usually has nothing to do with the in¬
fluence on election results.
If we look at the size of electoral districts which we measure by the
average number of mandates then we can notice that the practice differs.
The average size of electoral districts varies from
mandates in the Czech Republic. The average size of the electoral district
in the post-Communist states when the elections to the lower chamber are
in question remains at the level of the average electoral district which, to
some extent, keeps the proportion between votes and mandates, that is the
electoral mechanism does not produce automatically inadequate presenta¬
tion or excessive representation.
It is interesting that the electoral systems under consideration do not
pay much attention to the definition of electoral districts neither from the
standpoint of criteria nor from the standpoint of terms for introducing
changes into electoral districts. The exception is Russia, F.Y.R.O.M. and
Croatia. These states have limited by law the average deviation in number of
voters in electoral districts and fixed he terms within which it is allowed to
change the districts. Taking into account that this is the most vulnerable and
manipulative element of all electoral systems which directly affects the out¬
come of elections, that is the representation of parties in Parliament and
number of seats, we can say that the absence in almost all discussed electoral
systems (with the exception of three states mentioned above) of the legal
definition of electoral district resizing is a grave disadvantage which opens
the way to manipulations in electoral process.
479
Table 17:Number of Electoral Districts and Average Number of Mandates
Number of Electoral Districts
Average
Number of
Mandates
Poland
Seim
The Senate
41
40
11,5
2,5
Czech Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
14
81
14,3
1
Slovak Republic
National Council
1
150
Hungary
National Assembly
176 -
20 -
1
7,9
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
42
42
7,8
3,3
Bulgaria
National Assembly
31
7,7
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
12
8,4
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
225
+ 225
360
1
225
Slovenia
National Assembly
The State Council
10
22
11
1,8
Croatia
Assembly
12
11,7
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly (Sobranie)
6
20
4.
The process of nomination, registration and approval of candidates can
be comparatively analyzed through authorized nominators, through the cate¬
gories of public employment which are determined as incompatible with
candidacy and through the additional conditions for nomination which must
be met along with standard norms of the right to vote.
The political party is a subject which in all considered electoral sys¬
tems of the post-Communist states belongs to the authorized nominators of
candidates. The same right is granted to the citizens who can independently
nominate candidates for election to the upper or lower chambers of Parlia¬
ment. The exception of the rule is Russia where the citizens are not author¬
ized to nominate candidates to the deputies who are elected by the use of a
proportional formula in the Federal district. Thus, the citizens in Russia are
only entitled to nominate candidates in single member electoral districts.
The electoral systems of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic ex¬
clude their citizens from the group of authorized nominators and reserve this
right exclusively for political parties, political movements, coalitions etc.
Such a decision which favors the political parties in the nomination process
480
from one side stresses the importance of political parties in the representa¬
tive democracy and from the other pulls the citizens out of the most essential
electoral phase reducing their function to mere voting. The right of citizens
to nominate their candidates, along with political parties, shows the tenden¬
cy to decline but this right is not suspended in mostly all electoral systems of
post-Communist states. The narrowing of nomination rights to the group of
political parties can not be justified either theoretically or practically. We are
convinced that the right to nominate candidates granted to the citizens in no
way damages the democratic character of electoral system. On the contrary,
the absence of this right can breed bureaucracy and authoritarianism inside
political parties. In this case, even standard legal provisions which are
present in some of the examined electoral systems and which envisage that
the parties should nominate candidates in accordance with clearly defined
procedures and by secret voting could not be an insurmountable obstacle to
the mentioned processes.
The electoral systems of the post-Communist states do not similarly
define the nomination of candidates by electoral coalitions. In this context
Estonia, for example, has the most rigid electoral system which practically
does not accept electoral coalitions. The parties, as the Estonian law says,
must participate in election campaign only under their sole names . That
means that the nomination of a joint candidate demands the registration un¬
der a new name. No less rigid are the decisions which prescribe electoral
qualifications for electoral coalitions in Poland, Romania and especially the
Czech Republic.
Table
Poland
Seim
The Senate
Electoral Committee
Parties
Coalitions
Citizens
Czech
Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
Authorized
person
Parties, movements, coa¬
litions
Parties, coalitions, citi¬
zens
Slovak
Republic
National Council
Parties and coalitions
Hungary
National Assembly
Parties, coalitions, funds
and citizens
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
Parties, coalitions, politi¬
cal groups and citizens
Bulgaria
National Assembly
Initiating
board
Parties, coalitions, citi¬
zens
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
Parties and citizens
481
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
Authorized
person
Parties, national funds,
electoral blocks
Citizens
member electoral districts
Slovenia
National Assembly
Parties, coalitions, citi¬
zens
Croatia
Assembly
Parties, coalitions, citi¬
zens
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly (Sobranie)
Parties, coalitions, citi¬
zens
All the electoral systems under consideration condition the candidacy
by a certain number of collected signatures or by electoral deposits. Three
states
electoral deposit. All other reviewed electoral systems insist on collecting
signatures in support to the candidate. In this connection only Russia and
Romania determine the percentage of collected signatures, as it do interna¬
tional organizations which are engaged in observation of elections and elec¬
toral consulting. Hungary is a special case as its system of nominating cou¬
pons seriously complicates the nomination of candidates. Not so rare are
the decisions which oblige the so called independent candidates to collect
the required number of signatures and at the same time release the political
parties from such an obligation (in Croatia, for example). This is another
form of discrimination of the independent, non-party candidates which
could have a negative impact on voters turnover and party system. From the
other side, the electoral systems with less firm conditions for the political
parties in the phase of nominating candidates might have more chances to
face artificial growth of party system fragmentation and formation of new
parties, as well as the decline of turnover.
The electoral systems of Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and
Russia oblige to form electoral committees or determine authorized repre¬
sentatives. In both cases a collective or an individual institution is in ques¬
tion, authorized in the name of the nominator of the candidates list to com¬
municate with electoral bodies, to deliver requested documents, to introduce
changes and to participate in eventual disputes. This collective or individual
institution is responsible for the actions of the party or coalition in electoral
process, but in practice the role of this institution is mainly bounded to the
nomination, election campaign and it s financing.
All electoral systems determine the categories of public employment
which may be incompatible with candidacy. In some states (as in case of Ro¬
mania and Croatia) the list of such categories is too long and in other cases it
is restricted to the categories in the army, police and judicial brunch. All ex¬
amined electoral systems permit candidacy in this segment under condition
482
that the elected candidate must leave the post which is incompatible with a
parliamentary mandate. Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic oblige their candidates to make a statement that they
have not collaborated with secret services as it is a condition for disqualifi¬
cation. If the candidate nevertheless conceals the fact of collaboration and is
elected, the mandate of the representative body to which the candidate has
been elected could be terminated after conducted investigation.
Table
Number of Signatures
Electoral Deposit
Poland
Seim
The Senate
5.000
3.000
Czech
Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
1.000
15.000
Slovak
Republic
National Council
10.000
voters
Hungary
National Assembly
750
pons
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
0,5%
trict
Bulgaria
National Assembly
from
toral district
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
—
2
salaries per candidate
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
1 %
trict
200.000
register of voters
15%
election fund
15%
fund
Slovenia
National Assembly
The State Council
3
residents of the electoral district
Croatia
Assembly
500 -
didates
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly (Sobranie)
500 -
5.
During the comparative analysis of the post-Communist electoral sys¬
tems we have noticed differences in the approach towards the election cam¬
paign which classification includes a vast variety of criteria. We will discuss
only the key features which are standard for all systems.
483
All examined electoral systems limit the duration of an election cam¬
paign and prohibit election campaigning in the army, police, state bodies, at
the place of work, as well as through lotteries, gambling, free distribution of
goods etc. Only Romania and Hungary have not officially limited the dura¬
tion of an election campaign. All other systems limit the duration to a certain
period, but this limit mainly covers the presenting of candidates and their
programs in the media in general and the electronic media in particular. Al¬
most in all the states in question the blackout period starts
election day and lasts till the closure of polling places. Ban on making the
opinion polls concerning the elections public on the threshold the election
day has also become an integral part of many electoral systems. Many states
determined a period within which the publicizing or public announcement
of public opinion polls related to the elections is not allowed. In some states
this period coincides with the blackout period and in other states (Slovakia,
for example) it starts
come a common practice to oblige the mass media to publish along with the
results of public opinion polls the following information: who conducted the
polls, who ordered the polls, who financed the polls, the polling sample, the
polling period and possible statistical errors.
It is interesting that almost all systems precisely determine poster and
bill-board advertising as a part of election campaigning. This segment of an
election campaign is, as a rule, a responsibility of local governments which
should ensure adequate space and equal treatment to all parties, coalitions
and other nominators of the lists of candidates as well as an opportunity of
buying an additional space for placards, posters etc. The examined electoral
systems also almost unanimously prescribe for nominators to remove this
kind of agitation in a fixed period of time after the end of elections.
Many of electoral systems clearly obligate the publisher to declare who
ordered the printing of the material for the election campaign and note its
circulation, and to deliver samples of this material to electoral bodies. This is
not the censorship act but an element of electoral process which prevents
election rivals from pulling through electoral slogans which do not respect
the interests of other candidates. Besides, this is an instrument of financial
control over the expenditures for election campaigning. And the last, but not
the least: an individual who thinks that his electoral right is infringed by the
content of posters, leaflets, bill-boards etc. has an opportunity to complain
and to demand the introduction of corrections, an apology or a compensa¬
tion. The same rules are applied for the election campaign in the electronic
media.
484
Table
The duration
of an election campaign
Ban on publicizing of
opinion polls
Blackout period
Poland
87
-
24
Czech
Republic
16
3
48
Slovak
Republic
30
14
48
Hungary
-
-
24
Romania
-
-
24
Bulgaria
30
during the blackout period
24
Estonia
44
-
-
Russia
From the day of candi¬
dates nomination
5
24
Slovenia
30
7
24
Croatia
13
24
24
F.Y.R.O.M.
30
5
24
The most attention is paid to the electronic media as the strongest
means of propaganda which have a gigantic impact on the electorate and
play the leading role in forming the public opinion about the competitors in
the electoral marathon. The first pattern we have noticed is that the states
with almost unchanged electoral legislation are lagging behind this segment
and stick to the outdated decisions which leave this segment unsettled or su¬
perficially defined, and that is the case with the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic and Hungary. Other electoral systems observed in our study regu¬
lated this segment by the laws adopted in the last two years and precisely de¬
termine the rights and obligations of nominators of lists of candidates and
candidates in the electronic media.
Free and equal distribution of broadcasting time is commonly guaran¬
teed in the state media to all nominators of the lists of candidates. This is the
practice in electoral systems of Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Re¬
public, Hungary, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
Slovenia. These states do not give parliamentary parties (nominators of the
lists of candidates) an advantage in the use of the electronic media. Other
states (Romania, Bulgaria and Estonia) precondition an access to the elec¬
tronic media by the number of submitted lists of candidates, nominated can¬
didates or by the parliamentary status of the parties. The electoral systems
of Bulgaria, Estonia and Russia have no terms of electoral broadcasting for
free even in the state media. In this context the electoral system of Russia of¬
fers a specific solution
485
cal
paign. In fact this is not a free broadcasting but some sort of crediting.
The conduction of the election campaign in the private electronic me¬
dia is also regulated in a different way. Among the analyzed electoral sys¬
tems only Czech and Slovak systems clearly prohibit the conduction of elec¬
tion campaigns in the private electronic media. Other electoral systems
allow the parties to rent the terms and space in the private electronic media
without restrictions or with some limits such as the equal length and broad¬
casting time, the prices equal to those in the state media, restricted time of
electoral advertising, election-related programming and limits of a total time
of electoral advertising in certain media.
Tabela
The State Media
The Private Media
Poland
Equal conditions
lists in
Lot
Rent of broadcasting
Unlimited
Czech
Republic
Equal conditions
Free of charge
Lot
Prohibited
Slovak
Republic
Equal conditions
Free of charge
Lot
Prohibited
Hungary
Equal conditions
of charge
Lot
Renting
Unlimited
Romania
Twice much time for parliamentary parties
-condition: lists of candidates in
Lot
Non-parliamentary parties
Unlimited
Estonia
Proportionally to the number of candidates
Lot
Unlimited
Russia
Equal conditions
Lot
Rent of broadcasting
broadcasting terms
According to the rules of
state media
Slovenia
Equal conditions
Lot
Rent of broadcasting without limits
Unlimited
486
The State Media
The Private Media
Croatia
Equal conditions
Lot
Rent of broadcasting without limits
Unlimited
RY.R.O.M.
Equal conditions
Lot
Rent of broadcasting
Unlimited
Bulgaria
1/2
Lot
According to the rules of
state media
The presentation of candidates and their nominators are central events
in the electoral process. This is the most dynamic phase where the election
programs are presented, views about candidates are expressed and promises
are made. In spite of such an importance this phase still has remained ununi-
fied for more than ten years. However, we can notice some tendencies to
limit the space and time of the election campaigns in the media, to limit the
money amounts for the campaigning expenditures, to ensure absolutely fair
and equal treatment of all the parties and coalitions which nominate their
lists of candidates and to reduce the role of the media to a neutral provider of
services in the election campaigns. Another tendency is that the election
campaigning is lesser and lesser conditioned by the contracts signed by the
media, the government and the Parliament. More and more frequently this
phase is determined by electoral or special laws in order to stress its impor¬
tance, to ensure equal conditions in the electoral process and to prevent the
eventual abuse of the media in election campaigns. The appearance of senior
state officials in the media during the election campaign also has a tendency
to be regulated. Thus, the decisions which limit their election-related state¬
ments, comments or interviews become a common practice. The aim of such
a regulation is to stop the so called state marketing, or in other words the
misuse of the media and the promotion of the party interests through the
public position.
6.
Voting as the most important segment of the electoral process is deter¬
mined in detail in all electoral systems. However, almost half of electoral
systems in question give precise determination of this segment not in the
laws but in a whole series of by-laws, rules, instructions and decisions of the
central electoral bodies. It is a standard for all the systems to regulate the
formation of polling places, to prohibit the display of party symbols within
the polling places and in the immediate vicinity, to prescribe the sealing of
487
ballot boxes
should be technically ensured by voting booths or screens.
Five of the all analyzed electoral systems of the post-Communist states
(Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Russia) al¬
low the registration of voters in the register of voters on the voting day. The
rest of the examined electoral systems do not permit any of additional regis¬
trations in the register of voters. In the all electoral systems in question the
identification of voters is carried out on the basis of their identity cards or
similar documents and only the electoral system of the Former Yugoslav Re¬
public of Macedonia sets down the procedure of voters ink-marking in order
to prevent the voters to vote over and over again.
Less than a half of the post-Communist electoral systems practice the
so called voting for a person, where an individual votes for a candidate. In
other systems prevails voting for the list of candidates. Only in Hungary, Es¬
tonia and Slovenia individuals vote for a candidate, in other analyzed states
individuals vote for the list of candidates. At that only three electoral sys¬
tems give a chance to show preference for certain candidates from the list
in Poland for a one candidate, in the Czech Republic for two candidates and
in the Slovak Republic for four candidates. Almost all the electoral systems,
with the exception of Russia, do not envisage special protective measures
concerning the paper the ballots are printed on.
It is interesting to observe voting procedure from the perspective of
who is allowed to be present at the polling places during voting and counting
of votes. The electoral systems of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic
and Hungary allow only the members of the polling board to be present at
the polling place. The electoral system of Hungary is so rigid in this sense
that even forbids the international observers to visit the polling places. On
the contrary, other electoral systems allow not only the presence of domestic
and international observers, but also the presence of party and media repre¬
sentatives, and, in the case of Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, even candi¬
dates. The electoral systems which permit to observe polling operations en¬
visage the right of observers to be acquainted with the polling protocols, to
make their remarks and to inform public about their positions.
Table
Poland
Seim
The Senate
Voting for the candidate from a list of candidates
Voting for a candidate
Czech
Republic
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
Voting for a list of candidates
dates is an advantage
Voting for a candidate
Slovak
Republic
National Council
Voting for a list of candidates
dates is an advantage
488
Hungary
National Assembly
Voting for a candidate
Romania
Chamber of Deputies
The Senate
Voting for a list of candidates
Voting for a list of candidates
Bulgaria
National Assembly
Voting for a list of candidates
Estonia
Riigikogu (Parliament)
Voting for a candidate
Russia
The State Duma
The Federation Council
Voting for a candidate in a single member district
Voting for a list of candidates in the Federal District
Voting for a candidate
Slovenia
National Assembly
The State Council
Voting for a candidate
Voting for a candidate
Croatia
Assembly
Voting for a list of candidates
F.Y.R.O.M.
Assembly (Sobranie)
Voting for a list of candidates
Voting duration is usually limited by one day. However, the electoral
systems of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic extended this period
to two days and the electoral system of Estonia went even further by pro¬
longing this term up to five days. All systems envisage special voting which
is organized outside the polling place (for ill or infirm persons) or by means
of postal balloting. The voting procedure outside the polling place is more or
less the same in all the systems: two representatives of the polling board, a
sealed handheld ballot-box and ballot sealed in the envelope before it is put
in the ballot-box.
Voting on election day abroad is also an interesting characteristic of
electoral systems of the post-Communist states. Hungary and the Slovak
Republic, for example, prohibit voting abroad. All other states envisage an
opportunity to vote in their diplomatic and consular facilities abroad not
only for their citizens residing in other states but also for the citizens who are
on business or tourist tour. As to the method of the representatives of
Diaspora selected in special electoral districts, it is only practiced in the
Croatian electoral system.
7.
The allocation of mandates or seats can be compared by the formula
which the analyzed electoral systems use for the transformation of votes into
seats, as well as by an electoral qualification which must be met for the par¬
ticipation in the allocation of seats. It is difficult to draw generalizations here
as this electoral segment has a variety of nuances in the allocation of seats.
489
D Hondt
electoral systems of the Czech Republic, F.Y.R.O.M., Bulgaria and Croatia.
The electoral systems of Hungary, Russia, Romania and Estonia practice a
simple electoral qualification. The Slovak Republic and Slovenia apply
Droop s Quota. Poland is a special case as the allocation of seats for the
im
The electoral qualification quota is calculated at the national level and
it makes commonly
nia where the qualification quota is
ed by the law is exercised by the electoral systems of Poland, the Czech Re¬
public and Romania. The gradation of the qualification quota for coalitions
is designed to keep parliamentary parties from fragmentation and minor par¬
ties from artificial coalitions which could only enforce the blackmail poten¬
tial if enrolled in Parliament. No one of the analyzed electoral systems can
be characterized as a pure proportional electoral system because of the high
electoral quota fixed by the law, though there are systems with one electoral
district
Another interesting aspect is that all the states have large national mi¬
norities and for some of them, as for example for Gypsies, the high qualifi¬
cation quota fixed by the law is an insurmountable obstacle. Only Croatia,
Romania and in some aspects Slovenia envisage the so called positive dis¬
crimination of national minorities by reserving seats for the organizations
which represent the interests of national minorities and participate in the
elections.
Table
Poland
5%
8%
Czech Republic
5%
+ 5%
Slovak Republic
5%
Hungary
5%
Romania
5%
8-10%
Bulgaria
4%
Estonia
5%
Russia
7%
Slovenia
4%
Croatia
5%
F.Y.R.O.M.
Undefined
490
In the framework of determining the election results all examined elec¬
toral systems verify the authority of polling boards. We may say that the re¬
sponsibilities of polling boards are standard in almost all the systems in
question. Besides the members of the polling board, the electoral systems
authorize the representatives of candidates, parties, media, national and in¬
ternational observers to be present at polling stations. Only the electoral sys¬
tems of the Slovak Republic and Hungary set down that only the members of
the polling board can be present at polling operations of the polling board.
From the point of restrictive interpretation this practically means that the ob¬
servers of, for example,
tions, but this is not a case in practice.
Table
Poland
Observers
Czech Republic
Officers of the Statistics Bureau
Slovakia
No one but the members of the polling board
Hungary
No one but the members of the polling board
Romania
Candidates, observers, media
Bulgaria
Candidates, tellers, an observer and media
Estonia
Observers
Russia
Party representatives, candidates, media, observers
Slovenia
Party representatives, candidate representatives, observers
Croatia
Non-government organizations, international observers
RY.R.O.M.
Party representatives, candidate representatives, observers
8.
All the electoral systems under study determine, mainly in their Con¬
stitutions, the reasons for a pre-term termination of the mandate. Resigna¬
tion, death, mental incapacity imposed by express decision of a court, crimi¬
nal conviction, loss of citizenship and suffrage are common individual
reasons for a pre-term termination of the mandate in the examined electoral
systems. In addition to these reasons the electoral systems of Poland, the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic add the refusal to take an oath to
the reasons mentioned above. However, this reason can be rather interpreted
as a condition for the verification of the mandate, as if the oath is not taken
the mandate can not be verified, granted or terminated. Poland, Bulgaria and
Estonia define the concealing of the fact of collaboration with secret services
as a reason for pre-term termination of the mandate. The electoral system of
Estonia foresees the termination of mandate if the parliament member poor-
491
ly speaks the official language of the state. This provision is quite discrimi¬
nating for a large Russian minority. At last, F.Y.R.O.M. is the only post-
-Communist state where the mandate of the parliament member can be ter¬
minated pre-term if he leaves the party which nominated him or if he be¬
comes a member of another party.
The electoral systems which are the object of our study fill up the
emptied parliament seats from the list of candidates, but they use different
schemes and terms. Thus, in the electoral systems of Poland, the Czech Re¬
public, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Slovenia and F.Y.R.O.M. the emptied
seat is automatically granted to the next candidate from the list. The Hungar¬
ian electoral system has no such a definition and lets the nominator to de¬
cide. In the Slovak Republic and Croatia the parties are authorized by law to
determine the candidate from the list to whom the emptied seat will be allo¬
cated. Estonia has a special decision. After elections a list of alternative can¬
didates is formed which includes the candidates whose party got over
votes and the candidates themselves got at least
quota in the electoral district of their candidacy. The emptied seat is granted
to the candidate from the list according to the number of received votes. The
electoral systems of the Slovak Republic and Croatia practice a pending
mandate procedure. Thus, if the Member of Parliament accepts the public
office which is incompatible with the parliamentary mandate, the party de¬
termines the deputy who exercises this pending mandate as long as the in¬
compatibility lasts.
Table
Individual reasons
Approved by
Poland
-
-
-
-
-
Law
Czech
Republic
-
-
-
-
Constitution
Slovak
Republic
-
-
-
-
-
Constitution
492
Individual reasons
Approved by
Hungary
-
-
-
Constitution
Romania
-
-
-loss of citizenship
-
Constitution
Bulgaria
-
-
-
-
-
Constitution
Estonia
-
-
-
-
-
Constitution
Russia
-
-
-
Law
Slovenia
-
-
-
-
Law
Croatia
-
-
-
-
Constitution
F.Y.R.O.M.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Law
Only three electoral systems fix the deadlines for the replacement of
emptied seats in Parliament. Thus, the emptied seat can not be replaced if
less than
than a year has left before the regular elections
months have left before the regular elections
systems do not put any deadlines so the emptied seats are the responsibility
of the Parliament and can be replaced during the whole term of service.
493
9.
In this segment of the electoral system the difference between the
states which have reformed the electoral legislature by adopting new elec¬
toral laws for the last two years and the states which have kept the old elec¬
toral provisions is a manifesting one. Thus, the electoral systems from the
first group very precisely determine the financing of election campaign and
eventual subvention of the parties on the basis of election results. The elec¬
toral systems from the second group are either very unspecific about this is¬
sue or do not define this matter at all, even not in the Law on Political Par¬
ties.
All electoral systems of analyzed post-Communist states prohibit the
financing of election campaign by state agencies and bodies, foreign legal
entities and natural persons, as well as the so called anonymous donors. In
addition to these prohibitive rules the electoral system of Russia rules out the
financing of election campaigns by non-governmental organizations, hu¬
manitarian organizations, associations etc. Besides, only the Russian system
obliges the parties to return back the funds which remained unspent after
election campaign to their contributors in proportion to their contributions.
Table
Special organ
Special account
Reporting
Poland
Financial agent
Yes
3
to the State Election Commission
Czech Republic
No
No
No
Slovak
Republic
No
No
1
Finance and the Central Election Commis¬
sion
Hungary
No
No
30
for Financial Control
Romania
Financial
intermediate
Yes
No
Bulgaria
No
No
No
Estonia
No
No
Every week during the election campaign
and
Election Committee
Russia
authorized
representative
Yes
Twice during the campaign and
after elections to the Central Election
Committee
Slovenia
organizer
Yes
11
3
cil
Croatia
No
No
No
F.Y.R.O.M.
authorized
representative
Yes
3
(Sobranie)
494
The electoral systems of Poland, Romania, Estonia, Russia, and
F.Y.R.O.M. prescribe to the nominators (parties, coalitions) and independent
candidates to form special committees or to authorize financial representa¬
tives for managing the financing of election campaign. Slovenia and the
same five states mentioned above oblige the nominators of the lists of candi¬
dates to exercise financial operations related to their election campaigns
through a special bank account. Financing has been very precisely defined in
all of the mentioned electoral systems
butions, determination of expense items, control of authorized financial
agencies and ending with subventions based on election results.
Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Russia, Slovenia and F.Y.R.O.M. clearly
limit the amount of financial contributions paid by persons and organizations
to the electoral funds of parties or independent candidates. Poland, the Slo¬
vak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, Slovenia and F.Y.R.O.M. restrict
by law the spending of campaign funds to a strictly defined amount. This
amount is indicated by an appropriate quote expressed in national currency
either per voter or cumulatively. Practically in all studied states the election
contestants are obliged to report on the financing of election campaign to the
Parliament, central election bodies or corresponding auditing agencies. The
only outsider is Romania where financing of election campaign remains
veiled in obscurity.
The situation is slightly different in the sphere of governmental sub¬
ventions which are granted to the parties on the basis of election results. A
common practice is to distribute subventions in proportion to the number of
seats and number of votes. Thus, in Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and
Croatia nominators of the lists of candidates receive governmental subven¬
tions in accordance with the number of seats in Parliament and number of
votes at the national level. In Hungary and F.Y.R.O.M. the parties receive
subventions only on the basis of allocated seats and in the Slovak Republic
and Estonia
again an exception as its electoral system does not foresee financing of the
parties by none of the mentioned criteria.
Table
Poland
1
Czech Republic
unlimited
Slovak Republic
12
Hungary
1
Romania
unlimited
Bulgaria
1
2
200.000
495
Estonia
unlimited
Russia
250
6
Slovenia
60
Croatia
unlimited
RY.R.O.M.
15
Mostly all electoral systems under study ensure public funding of par¬
ties with a certain percent of votes won in the election contest. In this con¬
nection Slovenia and Poland set different percentage for parties and coali¬
tions, thus making the difference between the party alone and the party in
coalition. In other electoral systems all parties are entitled to public fund¬
ing if at the national level they win from
public to even
which is worth mentioning has the Croatian electoral system. Hence, the
parties with greater number of women elected from their lists to parliament
are entitled to additional funding.
The analyzed provisions confirm our assumption that financing has a
tendency to become one of the most precisely defined segments of many
electoral systems. More and more states regulate financing of election cam¬
paign through laws on political parties and through the electoral legislation
as well. It is a common tendency to make financing of elections absolutely
transparent. From this perspective Russia has a unique decision. Thus, the
Russian electoral system obliges the parties to publish in mass media the in¬
formation about contributions which exceed a certain amount, limits the ex¬
penses on election campaign and establishes detailed financial reporting
which is public and liable to repeated financial control. In case of
servance of mentioned provisions Russia foresees rigorous penalties inclu¬
ding a complete ban on party activities.
Table
Poland
Party with at least
Coalition with at least
Czech Republic
Party with at least
Slovak Republic
Party with at least
Hungary
In proportion to the number of seats
Romania
No subventions
Bulgaria
Party with at least
Estonia
Party with at least
496
Russia
Party with at least
Party with at least
Slovenia
Party with at least
Coalition with at least
Croatia
Party with at least
F.Y.R.O.M.
Party with at least
10.
The protection of suffrage rights is primarily regulated by laws and
less by the Constitution. The Constitution mainly guarantees protection of
suffrage rights and these are the laws which determine the procedures, au¬
thority of electoral bodies and the role of courts, including the Constitutional
Court.
Electoral bodies protect suffrage rights by applying a two-level proce¬
dure. The decisions of higher electoral bodies are final but at the same time
are subject to appeal before the court. The voters, nominators of the lists and
candidates themselves have the ability to submit complaints concerning their
suffrage rights, candidacy, voting, and determination of results and alloca¬
tion of seats. Short terms are established for the proceedings before courts in
order to avoid the breaks in dynamic electoral process and obstruction in
constituting of national representative bodies.
All electoral systems ensure the protection of suffrage before courts
and before the Constitutional Court. Elections complaints and appeals are
subjected to expedited process of consideration and decisions of the courts
are final. It is interesting that no one of the studied electoral systems envis¬
ages the participation of Parliament as a court instance in the protection of
suffrage rights.
Protection of suffrage rights is solved in a different way in the electoral
systems of post-Communist states. Dominating are the decisions according
to which eventual violations and criminal offences in the sphere of suffrage
rights are generally regulated by electoral laws and worked out in detail by
special laws
identical in all the systems but the process differs in respect to specific fea¬
tures of national judicial systems. The same
which vary from fines to imprisonments and possible disfranchisement.
prevod
497
Г
Staatsbibliothek
|
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| author | Jovanović, Milan 1958- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1269457950 |
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| bvnumber | BV019634870 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JN96 |
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| geographic_facet | Transformationsländer Osteuropa |
| id | DE-604.BV019634870 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:01:49Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 8674190642 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-012963877 |
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| physical | 497 S. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
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| publisher | JP Službeni List SCG |
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| spelling | Jovanović, Milan 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)1269457950 aut Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država Milan N. Jovanović Beograd JP Službeni List SCG 2004 497 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier In kyrill. Schr., serb. Elections Europe, Eastern Elections Europe, Eastern Case studies Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd rswk-swf Transformationsländer (DE-588)4651141-6 gnd rswk-swf Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 g Transformationsländer (DE-588)4651141-6 g Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=012963877&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=012963877&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Jovanović, Milan 1958- Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država Elections Europe, Eastern Elections Europe, Eastern Case studies Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139210-3 (DE-588)4651141-6 (DE-588)4075739-0 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država |
| title_auth | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država |
| title_exact_search | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država |
| title_full | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država Milan N. Jovanović |
| title_fullStr | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država Milan N. Jovanović |
| title_full_unstemmed | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država Milan N. Jovanović |
| title_short | Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država |
| title_sort | izborni sistemi postkomunistickih drzava |
| topic | Elections Europe, Eastern Elections Europe, Eastern Case studies Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Elections Europe, Eastern Elections Europe, Eastern Case studies Wahlsystem Transformationsländer Osteuropa Fallstudiensammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=012963877&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=012963877&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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