The origins of the World War: 1 Before Sarajevo: underlying causes of the War
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Macmillan
1928
|
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
Beschreibung: | XVII, 551 S. Ill. |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
VOLUME I
PAOS
Preface
.................
v
List op Abbreviations
............. xi
CHAPTER
I. Introduction
:
Immediate and Underlying Causes
. . 1
The Discussion of Responsibility,
1914-1919 .... 3
The Discussion of Responsibility, after
1919 .... 8
(a) New Documents on Immediate Causes
..... 8
(b) Memoirs and Recollections
........ 15
The Underlying Causes of the War
....... 32
(a) The System of Secret Alliances
....... 34
(b) Militarism
............. 38
(c) Nationalism
............. 44
(d) Economic Imperialism
......... 44
(e) The Newspaper Press
.......... 47
II. The System op Secret Alliances,
1871-1890:
Domination
op the Eastern Empires
.......... 50
Consequences of the Franco-Prussian War
...... 50
The League of Three Emperors,
1872-1878...... 53
The Near Eastern Crisis,
1875-1878....... 59
The Austro-German Alliance of
1879....... 68
The Alliance of the Three Emperors,
1881-1887 .... 71
The Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty,
1887-1890 . . 77
The Triple Alliance of
1882.......... 80
The Rumanian Alliance of
1883......... 88
The Breakdown of the Wire to Russia in
1890 .... 90
Franco-German Relations,
1871-1890 ....... 96
III.
Тни
System op Secret Alliances,
1890-1907:
Formation
of
тни
Triple Entente
........* 105
The Franco-Russian Rapprochement,
1887-1891 .... 105
The Franco-Russian Alliance of
1894....... 110
XT
xvi
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
England at the Parting of the Ways,
1890-1898 .... 124
Mr. Chamberlain s Alliance Proposals to Germany,
1898-1901 129
Italy s Dubious Loyalty to Her Allies
....... 141
The Anglo-French Entente of
1904........ 152
The Morocco Crisis of
1905.......... 168
(a) The Kaiser s
Björkö
Policy
........ 171
(b)
Bülow s
Morocco Policy
......... 177
(c) The Kaiser s Tangier Visit
........ 183
(d)
M. Delcassé s
Fall and Its Consequences
.... 187
The Anglo-French Military and Naval Conversations,
1905-1912............... 192
The Anglo-Russian Entente of
1907....... 214
IV. The System of Secret Alliances,
1907-1914:
Triple Al¬
liance and Triple Entente in Opposition
. . . . 223
German Fear of Encirclement after
1907..... 226
Anglo-German Naval Rivalry,
1904-1909...... 233
Germany s Relations with France,
1908-1911..... 246
Germany s Relations with Russia,
1908-1911..... 250
The
Agadir
Crisis,
1911........... 277
The Haldane Mission,
1912.......... 293
The Tightening of the Triple Entente,
1912..... 312
The Renewal and Weakness of the Triple Alliance,
1912 . . 342
The Effects of the Balkan Wars,
1912-1914..... 346
V. Balkan Problems,
1907-1914......... 353
The Beginnings of Austro-Serbian Antagonism
.... 354
Russia and the Straits
........... 361
The Balkan Question Put on Ice,
1897-1907..... 364
The Buchlau Bargain of September,
1908...... 368
The Bosnian Crisis of
1908-09......... 378
Germany s Solution of the Crisis
........
3S5
The Consequences of the Bosnian Crisis
...... 393
The Racconigi Bargain of October,
1909 . . ·. . . . 406
Izvolski s Effort to Open the Straits in
1911 . . . . . 413
Russia and the Balkan League
......... 426
The Balkan Danger and the Powers in
1912..... 434
The Balkan Wars of
1912-1913......... 438
Germany s Warning to Austria, July,
1913..... 447
Intrigues over Kavala in
1913......... 455
The Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia of October
18, 1913 . . 463
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
xvii
PjUìB
The Rumanian Riddle
........... 475
The
Liman
Von
Sanders Affair
......... 498
M. Sazonov s Plans for Preparedness
....... 524
Summary
............... 542
Appendix. Fifth Treaty of the Triple Alliance,
1912 . . 547
542
THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR
SUMMARY
We may now sum up very briefly the main Balkan
Problems.
The origin of the trouble lay in the progressive decay of
the Ottoman Empire, which was no longer able to maintain
control over the Christian subject nationalities. These had
become filled with a natural desire for political freedom
and national unity. But, owing to the events of past his¬
tory, considerable sections of these peoples still lived under
Turkish or Hapsburg rule, and could not fulfil their nation¬
alistic aspirations except by the further disintegration of
Turkey and the partial dismemberment of Austria. Hence
the Balkan Wars of
1876-78
and
1912-13.
Hence also the
antagonism between Austria and Serbia, which grew steadily
more acute, because each had a vital interest at stake
—
Austria to preserve her very existence as a State, Serbia
to satisfy twentieth century ideals of political liberty and
national unity.
As Turkey declined in power, Russia and Austria be¬
came increasingly jealous of each other s influence in the
Balkans, Russia wishing to achieve her historic mission,
and Austria to prevent the danger threatening to her from
too great Slav power on her southern frontier. Bismarck
and the League of the Three Emperors, and later Russia s
venture in the Far East, for many years prevented this
rivalry from disturbing the peace of Europe. But with the
ambitious aims of M. Izvolski and Count Aehrenthal the
rivalry became acute through the outcome of the Buchlau
Bargain. Aehrenthal succeeded in annexing Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while Izvolski failed to open the Straits, be¬
cause Austria had the support of Germany, but England
was unwilling to accept Izvolski s one-sided proposal to open
the Straits to Russian warships but not to those of the other
Great Powers. Though the Annexation Crisis was settled
SUMMARY
543
without war, thanks to the solution proposed by Germany,
it increased the antagonism between Austria and Serbia on
the one hand, and between Austria and Russia on the other.
Henceforth Russia encouraged Serbia to prepare for the
future, when, aided by Russia, she could achieve a Greater
Serbia at Austria s expense. Until Russia was ready, how¬
ever, Serbia was to wait.
Having made the Racconigi Bargain with Italy, and
believing that he could count on the support of the Triple
Entente, Izvolski took advantage of the Tripolitan War
to make a third diplomatic effort to open the Straits by
means of the Charykov negotiations with Turkey. But
again he failed largely on account of lack of support from
JVance and direct opposition from England. Henceforth
he came to the conclusion that his aim could be achieved
only in connection with a general European war, and used
all his efforts to strengthen and tighten the Triple Entente
for this inevitable conflict.
Meanwhile MM. Neratov,
Hartwig,
and Nekliudov had
used the unrest caused in the Balkans by the Tripolitan
War to help bring about the Balkan League, its nominal
purpose being the preservation of the status quo, but its
practical effect being an encouragement to the Balkan
States to open war on Turkey. Though the Great Powers,
especially England and Germany, managed to prevent
Europe from being involved in a general conflict, the Balkan
Wars resulted in a universal increase of suspicion, hatred,
intrigues, and uncertainty, not only among the Great
Powers who increased their armaments, but among the
Balkan States themselves, and especially in Austria and
Serbia. Serbia, greatly embittered at her exclusion by the
Powers from a political and economic outlet on the Adriatic,
had found some compensation in Macedonia. But this
involved Bulgaria s deadly hatred. Serbia therefore tight¬
ened her relations with Greece and Rumania under Russian
544
THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR
patronage, partly as a protection against Bulgarian revenge
and partly with a view to the future struggle as the Pied¬
mont of the Balkans, against the hated Hapsburg rule.
Though M. Pashitch and the Serbian civil authorities did
not want or plan war in
1914,
they tolerated an agitation
which contributed to a series of assassinations which
culminated in the tragedy of Sarajevo. Austria meanwhile
became more and more alarmed at the dangers threatening
her very existence: the Greater Serbia agitation within
and without her frontiers, the desertion of Rumania, and
the closer ties which Russia was establishing with these two
countries whose nationalist aspirations could only be satis¬
fied through the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.
Whether Austria could have averted the danger from the
Greater Serbia and Greater Rumania irredentist agita¬
tion, by giving democratic and reasonably liberal rights to
her Slav and Rumanian subjects, or by some form of
trialism, is a hypothetical question to be touched upon
later; at any rate she did not do so. Instead she chose to
see her salvation in a war in which Serbia would be reduced
in power by having to cede territory to Bulgaria, Rumania,
and Albania. Several times Austria was ready to wage such
a war on Serbia, but was held back either by Germany, as
in July,
1913,
or by concessions on the part of Serbia, as
in March,
1909,
and October,
1913.
But in July,
1914,
as
will be seen later, Austria welcomed the opportunity for a
localized war on Serbia afforded by the assassination of the
Austrian Heir to the Throne.
M. Sazonov, though caring little for the Serbs them¬
selves, and leaving them in the lurch in crucial moments,
nevertheless encouraged and supported them at other times
as an outpost of Slavdom in the Balkans and as an asset in
a future war with Austria. Desiring peace, but fearing the
power and criticism of the Russian Pan-Slavs and mili¬
tarists, M. Sazonov was anxious to fulfil Russia s historic
SUMMARY
545
mission. Observing
Izvolskľs
failures to open the Straits
by peaceful diplomatic means and his own failure to coerce
Germany into an instant modification of General Liman s
command at Constantinople, owing in each case chiefly to
Sir Edward Grey s attitude, the Russian Foreign Minister
came to the conclusion that he could succeed in his Balkan
aims only as a result of European complications. While
Izvolski had attempted the more modest task of merely
opening the Straits to Russian warships, Sazonov wanted to
achieve the wider Pan-Slav historic mission of obtaining
possession of the Straits and controlling Constantinople. It
was because the
Liman
von
Sanders Mission seemed to
lessen the likelihood of this that Sazonov was so alarmed by
it. Hence his proposal of measures of compulsion to force
Turkey to abandon it; these, however, were not put into
effect, owing to Germany s timely concessions and M.
Kokovtsev s restraining influence. Hence also Sazonov s
contemplation of a landing force to seize the Straits, which
the military experts declared was impracticable at the mo¬
ment but should be prepared for in case of European com¬
plications in the future. During the spring of
1914,
to¬
gether with M. Izvolski and President
Poincaré,
he worked
to tighten the bonds with England by negotiations for an
Anglo-Russian Naval Convention, in order that, when the
inevitable war broke out, the solidarity of the Triple
Entente should be more perfect than on former occasions.
Consequently, if a new crisis arose, Germany and Austria
would have to yield
—
or fight a war in which the superior
forces would be on the side of the Triple Entente. In July,
1914,
with the restraining hand of Kokovtsev removed,
Sazonov believed that this Entente solidarity was virtually
assured, when the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian
ultimatum caused the European complications by means
of which he calculated that Russia could finally achieve her
historic mission.
546
THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR
Turkey and the Balkan States were in unstable equilib¬
rium. An inherent opposition of interests necessarily caused
persistent enmity between Greece and Turkey, between
Turkey and Russia, and between Austria and Serbia. But
Bulgaria and Rumania were pursuing opportunist policies,
and were ready to side with whichever group of the Great
Powers seemed likely to prove the stronger and offer the
greatest gains. No Power ever wants to yield on a matter
of prestige, but this Balkan situation made an additional
reason why neither France, Russia, Germany nor Austria
was at first willing to yield in the Austro-Serbian conflict
of July,
1914—
it might have a determining effect on the
policy of Bulgaria and Rumania. For several years it had
been recognized that a strong Balkan bloc would have an
influence in a general European war almost equal to that of
a Great Power. Hence, in the spring of
1914,
Russia was
seeking to win Rumania and build up such a bloc includ¬
ing Serbia and Greece, while Austria in turn was preparing
to form a counter-bloc with Bulgaria and Turkey. Such
was the situation when the shots at Sarajevo precipitated
the Austro-Serbian conflict and caused a crisis involving
the prestige and power of the Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente.
The writer of these lines does not believe that the World
War was inevitable. But he is quite ready to admit that,
of all the major conflicts of interest which have been alleged
as making it inevitable, the Balkan problems were those
most nearly incapable of a peaceful solution.
|
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spelling | Fay, Sidney Bradshaw 1876-1967 Verfasser (DE-588)127155929 aut The origins of the World War 1 Before Sarajevo: underlying causes of the War by Sidney Bradshaw Fay New York Macmillan 1928 XVII, 551 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier (DE-604)BV013871087 1 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010432192&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010432192&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
spellingShingle | Fay, Sidney Bradshaw 1876-1967 The origins of the World War |
title | The origins of the World War |
title_auth | The origins of the World War |
title_exact_search | The origins of the World War |
title_full | The origins of the World War 1 Before Sarajevo: underlying causes of the War by Sidney Bradshaw Fay |
title_fullStr | The origins of the World War 1 Before Sarajevo: underlying causes of the War by Sidney Bradshaw Fay |
title_full_unstemmed | The origins of the World War 1 Before Sarajevo: underlying causes of the War by Sidney Bradshaw Fay |
title_short | The origins of the World War |
title_sort | the origins of the world war before sarajevo underlying causes of the war |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010432192&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010432192&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV013871087 |
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