Revisiting the stability and growth pact: grand design or internal adjustment?
The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Problems have appeared in sticking to the rules. Proposals to reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. But is the Pact a flawed fiscal rule? Against established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, its design and compliance mechanisms fare reasonably...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Brussels
European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
2003
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Schriftenreihe: | Economic papers
180 |
Schlagworte: |
Commission of the European Communities.
> Proposal for a council regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure
|
Zusammenfassung: | The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Problems have appeared in sticking to the rules. Proposals to reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. But is the Pact a flawed fiscal rule? Against established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, its design and compliance mechanisms fare reasonably well. Where weaknesses are found, they tend to reflect trade-offs typical of supra-national arrangements. In the end, only a higher degree of fiscal integration would remove the inflexibility inherent in the recourse to predefined budgetary rules. This does not mean that the EU fiscal rules cannot be improved. However, given the existing degree of political integration in EMU, internal adjustment rather than attempting to re-design the rules from scratch appears a more suitable way to bring about progress. Redefining the medium term budgetary target, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan application of the rules and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility. |
Beschreibung: | 33 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 9289449179 |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Problems have appeared in sticking to the rules. Proposals to reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. But is the Pact a flawed fiscal rule? Against established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, its design and compliance mechanisms fare reasonably well. Where weaknesses are found, they tend to reflect trade-offs typical of supra-national arrangements. In the end, only a higher degree of fiscal integration would remove the inflexibility inherent in the recourse to predefined budgetary rules. This does not mean that the EU fiscal rules cannot be improved. However, given the existing degree of political integration in EMU, internal adjustment rather than attempting to re-design the rules from scratch appears a more suitable way to bring about progress. Redefining the medium term budgetary target, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan application of the rules and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Buti, Marco 1957- Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. 1953- Franco, Daniele 1953- |
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author_sort | Buti, Marco 1957- |
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id | DE-604.BV016544635 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T19:11:47Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9289449179 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-010224062 |
oclc_num | 52157907 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | 33 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2003 |
publishDateSearch | 2003 |
publishDateSort | 2003 |
publisher | European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs |
record_format | marc |
series | Economic papers |
series2 | Economic papers |
spelling | Buti, Marco 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)12169769X aut Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? by Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger and Daniele Franco Brussels European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2003 33 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Economic papers 180 The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Problems have appeared in sticking to the rules. Proposals to reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. But is the Pact a flawed fiscal rule? Against established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, its design and compliance mechanisms fare reasonably well. Where weaknesses are found, they tend to reflect trade-offs typical of supra-national arrangements. In the end, only a higher degree of fiscal integration would remove the inflexibility inherent in the recourse to predefined budgetary rules. This does not mean that the EU fiscal rules cannot be improved. However, given the existing degree of political integration in EMU, internal adjustment rather than attempting to re-design the rules from scratch appears a more suitable way to bring about progress. Redefining the medium term budgetary target, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan application of the rules and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility. Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance and co-ordination of budgetary positions Europäische Union Stabilitätspakt (DE-588)4596397-6 gnd rswk-swf Belastingpolitiek gtt EMU gtt Europäische Union Stabilitätspakt (DE-588)4596397-6 u DE-604 Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)124950957 aut Franco, Daniele 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)12169772X aut Economic papers 180 (DE-604)BV000617403 180 |
spellingShingle | Buti, Marco 1957- Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. 1953- Franco, Daniele 1953- Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? Economic papers Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance and co-ordination of budgetary positions Europäische Union Stabilitätspakt (DE-588)4596397-6 gnd Belastingpolitiek gtt EMU gtt |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4596397-6 |
title | Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? |
title_auth | Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? |
title_exact_search | Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? |
title_full | Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? by Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger and Daniele Franco |
title_fullStr | Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? by Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger and Daniele Franco |
title_full_unstemmed | Revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment? by Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger and Daniele Franco |
title_short | Revisiting the stability and growth pact |
title_sort | revisiting the stability and growth pact grand design or internal adjustment |
title_sub | grand design or internal adjustment? |
topic | Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance and co-ordination of budgetary positions Europäische Union Stabilitätspakt (DE-588)4596397-6 gnd Belastingpolitiek gtt EMU gtt |
topic_facet | Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a council regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance and co-ordination of budgetary positions Europäische Union Stabilitätspakt Belastingpolitiek EMU |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV000617403 |
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