Banking supervision in integrated financial markets: implications for the EU

I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be important...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Stolz, Stéphanie Marie 1974- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Munich CES 2002
Munich Ifo
Schriftenreihe:CESifo working papers 812 : Monetary policy and international finance
Schlagworte:
Zusammenfassung:I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be important in the EU because national banking problems could easily spread via the highly integrated interbank market. I show that if benevolent supervisors are accountable only to their own jurisdiction, they will not take cross-border contagion effects into account. Supervisors with such a national mandate fail to implement the optimum from a supranational perspective. In consequence, the probability of a bank failure will be inefficiently high. Against the background of this result, I argue in favor of institutionalizing an EU "Supervisory Coordination Authority" to which national supervisors are accountable.
Beschreibung:Auch im Internet unter der Adresse www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar
Beschreibung:19 S. 21 cm

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