Banking supervision in integrated financial markets: implications for the EU
I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be important...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
CES
2002
Munich Ifo |
Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working papers
812 : Monetary policy and international finance |
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be important in the EU because national banking problems could easily spread via the highly integrated interbank market. I show that if benevolent supervisors are accountable only to their own jurisdiction, they will not take cross-border contagion effects into account. Supervisors with such a national mandate fail to implement the optimum from a supranational perspective. In consequence, the probability of a bank failure will be inefficiently high. Against the background of this result, I argue in favor of institutionalizing an EU "Supervisory Coordination Authority" to which national supervisors are accountable. |
Beschreibung: | Auch im Internet unter der Adresse www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar |
Beschreibung: | 19 S. 21 cm |
Internformat
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520 | 8 | |a I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be important in the EU because national banking problems could easily spread via the highly integrated interbank market. I show that if benevolent supervisors are accountable only to their own jurisdiction, they will not take cross-border contagion effects into account. Supervisors with such a national mandate fail to implement the optimum from a supranational perspective. In consequence, the probability of a bank failure will be inefficiently high. Against the background of this result, I argue in favor of institutionalizing an EU "Supervisory Coordination Authority" to which national supervisors are accountable. | |
650 | 4 | |a Bankenaufsicht / Internationale Kreditvergabe / Kreditrisiko / Internationaler Finanzmarkt / Bankenkrise / Theorie / EU-Staaten | |
650 | 4 | |a contagion | |
830 | 0 | |a CESifo working papers |v 812 : Monetary policy and international finance |w (DE-604)BV013978326 |9 812 | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-010202420 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Stolz, Stéphanie Marie 1974- |
author_GND | (DE-588)123297036 |
author_facet | Stolz, Stéphanie Marie 1974- |
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author_sort | Stolz, Stéphanie Marie 1974- |
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building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV016507675 |
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ctrlnum | (OCoLC)248823605 (DE-599)BVBBV016507675 |
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id | DE-604.BV016507675 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T19:11:19Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-010202420 |
oclc_num | 248823605 |
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physical | 19 S. 21 cm |
publishDate | 2002 |
publishDateSearch | 2002 |
publishDateSort | 2002 |
publisher | CES Ifo |
record_format | marc |
series | CESifo working papers |
series2 | CESifo working papers |
spelling | Stolz, Stéphanie Marie 1974- Verfasser (DE-588)123297036 aut Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU Stéphanie Stolz. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research Munich CES 2002 Munich Ifo 19 S. 21 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 812 : Monetary policy and international finance Auch im Internet unter der Adresse www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be important in the EU because national banking problems could easily spread via the highly integrated interbank market. I show that if benevolent supervisors are accountable only to their own jurisdiction, they will not take cross-border contagion effects into account. Supervisors with such a national mandate fail to implement the optimum from a supranational perspective. In consequence, the probability of a bank failure will be inefficiently high. Against the background of this result, I argue in favor of institutionalizing an EU "Supervisory Coordination Authority" to which national supervisors are accountable. Bankenaufsicht / Internationale Kreditvergabe / Kreditrisiko / Internationaler Finanzmarkt / Bankenkrise / Theorie / EU-Staaten contagion CESifo working papers 812 : Monetary policy and international finance (DE-604)BV013978326 812 |
spellingShingle | Stolz, Stéphanie Marie 1974- Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU CESifo working papers Bankenaufsicht / Internationale Kreditvergabe / Kreditrisiko / Internationaler Finanzmarkt / Bankenkrise / Theorie / EU-Staaten contagion |
title | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU |
title_auth | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU |
title_exact_search | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU |
title_full | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU Stéphanie Stolz. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
title_fullStr | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU Stéphanie Stolz. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
title_full_unstemmed | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the EU Stéphanie Stolz. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
title_short | Banking supervision in integrated financial markets |
title_sort | banking supervision in integrated financial markets implications for the eu |
title_sub | implications for the EU |
topic | Bankenaufsicht / Internationale Kreditvergabe / Kreditrisiko / Internationaler Finanzmarkt / Bankenkrise / Theorie / EU-Staaten contagion |
topic_facet | Bankenaufsicht / Internationale Kreditvergabe / Kreditrisiko / Internationaler Finanzmarkt / Bankenkrise / Theorie / EU-Staaten contagion |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT stolzstephaniemarie bankingsupervisioninintegratedfinancialmarketsimplicationsfortheeu |