Global differences in corporate governance systems: theory and implications for reforms
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiesbaden
Dt. Univ.-Verl.
2002
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. Aufl. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Gabler Edition Wissenschaft : Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVIII, 143 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 3824476940 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Global differences in corporate governance systems |b theory and implications for reforms |c Markus Berndt |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Table of Contents
Foreword V
Preface VII
List of Tables XIII
List of Figures XV
List of Variables XVII
1. Introduction 1
2. Differences in Corporate Governance Systems 4
2.1 Componentsof a Corporate Governance System Scope of the Analysis 4
2.2 Empirical Evidence 5
2.2.1 Concentration of Control 5
2.2.2 Ownership 9
2.2.3 Capital Markets 10
2.2.4 Legislation 11
2.2.5 Summary Stylized Facts 13
2.2.6 Recent Developments 13
2.3 Explanations for the Evolution of Different Systems 14
2.3.1 Potential Influences on Corporate Governance 14
2.3.2 Technology 15
2.3.3 Financial Institutions 15
2.3.4 Legal Tradition 16
2.3.5 Labor Relations 18
1 2.3.6 Property Rights and Interventionism 18
2.4 Explanations for the Persistence of Different Systems 19
2.4.1 Remaining Questions 19
2.4.2 Political Economy 19
2.4.3 Network Effects 20
3. Analytical Framework 22
3.1 Purpose of Corporate Governance 22
3.1.1 Shared Purpose 22
3.1.2 Main Agency Problems of the Different Corporate Governance
Strategies 24
3.2 The Role of Institutions and Law 28
3.2.1 Market Response 28
3.2.2 Potential Market Failures 29
3.2.3 Legislative Intervention 30
4. Dispersed Control the Outsider System 32
4.1 Takeover Market and the Agency Costs of Dispersed Control 32
4.2 Institutional Innovation 34
IX
4.3 A Case for Mandatory Disclosure 36
4.3.1 Benefits and Costs of Disclosure 36
4.3.2 Model 39
4.3.3 Implications 41
5. Concentrated Control the Insider System 44
5.1 Differences with Dispersed Control 44
5.2 Modeling the Reputation Mechanism of Concentrated Control 44
5.2.1 Setup 44
5.2.2 Sequential Equilibrium 48
5.2.3 Sketch of Proof 49
5.2.4 Properties of the Sequential Equilibrium 58
5.3 Implications 58
5.3.1 Corporate Governance without Control 58
5.3.2 Consequences for the Institutional Design 60
5.4 Legislative Intervention 62
5.4.1 Need for Legislative Intervention? 62
5.4.2 Preemptive Rights and Shareholder Approval to Authorized Capital
Increases 63
6. Network Effects via Capital Markets 68
6.1 Influence of Corporate Governance on Capital Market Liquidity 68
6.2 The Influence of Capital Market Liquidity on Corporate Governance 69
6.2.1 The Effects on the Costs of Capital of Dispersed Control 69
6.2.2 The Effects on the Costs of Capital of Concentrated Control 69
6.3 Resulting Network Effects 72
7. Evolutionary Model 76
7.1 Intention and Structure 76
7.2 Setup 76
7.2.1 Players 76
7.2.2 Strategies of Corporate Control 76
7.2.3 Capital Markets 77
7.2.4 Legislative Strategies 77
7.2.5 Structure of the Model 78
7.3 Control Strategy 79
7.3.1 Firms Payoffs 79
7.3.2 Decision Process 80
7.3.3 Cost of Capital 81
7.3.4 Strategy Choice 82
7.3.5 Equilibria 84
7.4 Legislation and Financial System 86
7.4.1 The Legislator s Payoffs 86
7.4.2 Strategy Choice 86
7.4.3 Financial System 89
X
8. Implications for Corporate Governance Reforms 93
8.1 Sequencing of Reforms 93
8.1.1 Influence of the Overall Quality of Law on the Autonomous Costs of
Capital 93
8.1.2 Influence of the Overall Quality of Law on the Corporate Governance
System 93
8.1.3 Introduction of Mandatory One Share One Vote Provisions 94
8.1.4 Proposed Sequencing of Reforms 95
8.2 Hysteresis of Inefficient Systems 96
8.2.1 Social Welfare 96
8.2.2 Inherent Coordination Problems 97
8.3 Effect of Capital Market Integration 98
8.3.1 Scope of the Analysis 98
8.3.2 Modeling Capital Market Integration 99
8.3.3 Implications 100
8.4 An Outlook on Privatization Strategies 103
8.4.1 Basic Idea 103
8.4.2 Auction to One Investor 104
8.4.3 Mass Privatization 104
8.4.4 Detrimental Minority Control Privatization 105
9. The Influence of Coordination Benefits on Corporate Governance and
Accounting Standards 106
9.1 Objective of this Chapter 106
9.1.1 Intention of the Chapter 106
9.1.2 Remaining Puzzles 106
9.1.3 Why a new Model? 108
9.2 Setup 109
9.2.1 One Country 109
9.2.2 Two Countries 111
9.3 Equilibria 116
9.4 Social Welfare 119
9.5 Implications of the Coordination Model 122
9.5.1 Sticky Variety 122
9.5.2 Standardization with the Wrong Standard 123
10. Conclusion 127
Appendix: Difference between Entry Inducement and Entry Deterrence
A Theoretical Note 131
References 137
XI
List of Tables
Table 1 Crossholdings in Some Major Economies, 1994 8
Table 2 Comparison of Ownership Concentration in Some Major Economies 9
Table 3 Different Identities of Controllers, 1995 10
Table 4 Capital Markets in Some Major Economies, 1995 11
Table 5 Legal Differences in Some Countries 12
Table 6 Two Types of Financial Systems Stylized Facts 13
Table 7 The LLSV Antidirector Index 17
Table 8 Possible Values for the Dummy Variable Preemptive Rights 17
Table 9 An Alternative Minority Protection Index 18
Table 10 Agency Problems resulting from Information Asymmetries and their
Relevance in Corporate Finance 23
Table 11 Strategies of the Outsider and the Greedy Insider in Equilibrium 49
Table 12 Possible Interpretation of the Legislative Strategy Set L 78
Table 13 Potential Stable Equilibria 117
Table 14 Sequential Equilibria in the two Different Games 132
XIII
List of Figures
Figure 1 Disperse Formal Control Rights (Strategy D) 6
Figure 2 Simple Example of a Pyramidal Corporate Structure 7
Figure 3 Concentrate Formal Control Rights (Strategy C) 8
Figure 4 Exogenous Influences on Corporate Governance 14
Figure 5 The Influence of Politics, Roe (1994) 16
Figure 6 The Influence of Legal Tradition, LLSV (1997, 1998), LLS (1999) 16
Figure 7 Persistence due to Political Rent Seeking, Roe and Bebchuk (1999) 20
Figure 8 Network Effects in a Financial System 21
Figure 9 Asymmetric Information as a Source of Principal Agent Problems 22
Figure 10 Variety of Agency Problems in a Firm 25
Figure 11 Main Agency Problems of Dispersed Control (Strategy D) 26
Figure 12 Main Weakness of Concentrated Control (Strategy D) 27
Figure 13 Legal Influences on Corporate Governance 30
Figure 14 The Costs of a Takeover Determining the Agency Costs of Dispersed
Control 33
Figure 15 Privately vs. Socially Optimal Levels of Disclosure 40
Figure 16 The Prisoners Dilemma of Disclosure 41
Figure 17 Insider Corporate Governance Game 45
Figure 18 One Stage of the Sequential Insider Corporate Governance Game with
Incomplete Information 46
Figure 19 Sequence of Events in one Stage 48
Figure 20 Total Expected Payoffs at n=n*+ 57
Figure 21 Influence of the Insider s Length of Commitment jV on the Required
Probability p of the Insider Being Honest 59
Figure 22 Influence of the Greedy Insider s Exploitation Possibilities a on the
Required Probability^ of the Insider Being Honest 60
Figure 23 Network Effects of Corporate Governance via Capital Markets
(An Overall Aggravating Effect of Increased Liquidity on the Costs of
Capital of Concentrated Control Assumed) 73
Figure 24 Network Effects of Corporate Governance via Capital Markets
(An Overall Mitigating Effect of Increased Liquidity on the Costs of Capital
of Concentrated Control Assumed) 74
Figure 25 Structure of the Basic Model 79
Figure 26 Costs of Capital under Different Legal Regimes 83
Figure 27 The Efficacy of Legal Intervention Depending on Firms Corporate
Governance 87
XV
Figure 28 The Evolution of Financial Systems 90
Figure 29 The Influence of the Quality of Law on the Autonomous Costs of Capital 93
Figure 30 The Influence of a weak Overall Quality of Law on the Financial System 94
Figure 31 The Influence of Mandatory One Share On Vote 95
Figure 32 The Effect of an Increase in the Overall Quality of Law on the Financial
System 96
Figure 33 Social Welfare Functions 97
Figure 34 The Effects of Capital Market Integration on Developed Countries 99
Figure 35 Possible Harmful Effects of Capital Market Integration on Countries with
Low Overall Quality of Law 102
Figure 36 Market Standardization of Accounting practices in One Country 110
Figure 37 Simplifying Assumption Regarding the Behavior of the Firms in the two
Countries 113
Figure 38 Market Standardization of Accounting practices in two Disintegrated
Countries 114
Figure 39 Market Standardization of Accounting practices in two Completely
Integrated Countries 115
Figure 40 Critical Experience Benefits in the Bigger Country for the Occurrence of
Wrong Standardization by Market Forces. 125
Figure 41 The Entry Deterrence Game by Kreps and Wilson (1982) 131
Figure 42 Temporal Evolution of the Entry Inducement Endgame 134
Figure 43 Temporal Evolution of the Entry Deterrence Endgame 135
XVI
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| indexdate | 2024-07-09T19:03:43Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 3824476940 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Berndt, Markus Verfasser aut Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms Markus Berndt 1. Aufl. Wiesbaden Dt. Univ.-Verl. 2002 XVIII, 143 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Gabler Edition Wissenschaft : Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts Zugl.: Hamburg, Univ., Diss., 2002 Mathematisches Modell Capital market Corporate governance Mathematical models Evolutionary economics Mathematical models Stock ownership Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 gnd rswk-swf Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Kapitalstruktur (DE-588)4125993-2 gnd rswk-swf Systemvergleich (DE-588)4058813-0 gnd rswk-swf Globalisierung (DE-588)4557997-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Globalisierung (DE-588)4557997-0 s Kapitalstruktur (DE-588)4125993-2 s Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 s DE-188 Systemvergleich (DE-588)4058813-0 s HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009906581&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Berndt, Markus Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms Mathematisches Modell Capital market Corporate governance Mathematical models Evolutionary economics Mathematical models Stock ownership Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Kapitalstruktur (DE-588)4125993-2 gnd Systemvergleich (DE-588)4058813-0 gnd Globalisierung (DE-588)4557997-0 gnd |
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| title | Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms |
| title_auth | Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms |
| title_exact_search | Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms |
| title_full | Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms Markus Berndt |
| title_fullStr | Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms Markus Berndt |
| title_full_unstemmed | Global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms Markus Berndt |
| title_short | Global differences in corporate governance systems |
| title_sort | global differences in corporate governance systems theory and implications for reforms |
| title_sub | theory and implications for reforms |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Capital market Corporate governance Mathematical models Evolutionary economics Mathematical models Stock ownership Organisationsökologie (DE-588)4388755-7 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Kapitalstruktur (DE-588)4125993-2 gnd Systemvergleich (DE-588)4058813-0 gnd Globalisierung (DE-588)4557997-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Capital market Corporate governance Mathematical models Evolutionary economics Mathematical models Stock ownership Organisationsökologie Corporate Governance Kapitalstruktur Systemvergleich Globalisierung Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009906581&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT berndtmarkus globaldifferencesincorporategovernancesystemstheoryandimplicationsforreforms |