The theory of incentives: the principal agent model
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ [u.a.]
Princeton Univ. Press
2002
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Literaturverz. S. [399]-412 |
| Beschreibung: | XII, 421 Seite Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780691091846 0691091846 0691091838 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text |
Contents
xi
Foreword
1
Introduction
7 1
Incentives in Economic Thought
8 1.1
Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
11 1.2
Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
14 1.3
Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem
15 1.4
Borda,
Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
18 1.5
Léon
Walras
and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
18 1.6
Knight, Arrow,
Pauly:
Incentives in Insurance
20 1.7
Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and
Incentives
22 1.8
Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
23 1.9
Incentives in Planned Economies
25 1.10
Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
27 1.11
Auctions
28
L
The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
32 2.1
The Basic Model
33 2.2
The Complete Information Optimal Contract
36 2.3
Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
39 2.4
Information Rents
40 2.5
The Optimization Program of the Principal
41 2.6
The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
46 2.7
The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
48 2.8
Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
48 2.9
The Revelation Principle
51 2.10
A More General Utility Function for the Agent
57 2.11
Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
63 2.12
Commitment
65 2.13
Stochastic Mechanisms
•
68 2.14
Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
•
72 2.15
Contract Theory at Work
81
Appendix
82 5
Incentive and Participation Constraints with
Adverse Selection
•
86 3.1
More than Two Types
93 3.2
Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
101 3.3
Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
115 3.4
Random Participation Constraint
118 3.5
Limited Liability
121 3.6
Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
130 3.7 Redistributive
Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity
Trade-Off
134
Appendices
145
T1
Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
148 4.1
The Model
153 4.2
Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
4.3
The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent
Extraction and Efficiency
4.4
The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency
4.5
More than Two Levels of Performance
4.6
Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
4.7
Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm
4.8
Contract Theory at Work
4.9
Commitment Under Moral Hazard
•
Appendices
J
Incentive and Participation Constraints with
Moral Hazard
•
5.1
More than Two Levels of Effort
5.2
The Multitask Incentive Problem
5.3
Nonseparability of the Utility Function
5.4
Redistribution and Moral Hazard
Appendices
Ό
Nonverifiability
6.1
No Contract at Date
0
and Ex Post Bargaining
6.2
Incentive Compatible Contract
6.3
Nash Implementation
6.4
Subgame-Perfect Implementation
*
6.5
Risk Aversion
•
6.6
Concluding Remarks
/
Mixed Models
•
7.1
Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard
7.2
Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection
7.3
Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability
303
ö Dynamics
under Full Commitment
307 8.1
Repeated Adverse Selection
319 8.2
Repeated Moral Hazard
342 8.3
Constraints on Transfers: The Role of Implicit
Incentives
347
V Limits and Extensions
351 9.1
Informed Principal
•
360 9.2
Limits to Enforcement
364 9.3
Dynamics and Limited Commitment
370 9.4
The Hold-Up Problem
375 9.5
Limits to the Complexity of Contracts
*
387 9.6
Limits in the Action Space
•
391 9.7
Limits to Rational Behavior
395 9.8
Endogenous Information Structures
•
399
References
413
Author Index
417
Subject Index
Economies
has much to do with incentives-
—
not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products,
to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years
ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place
the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the
most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question
as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way
in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design
institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents.
This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates
a task to a single agent through a contract
—
the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner
or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical
overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, ti\e authors
devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three
types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented
look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to
become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might fmd themselves pondering what
contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
"This book will surely be the standard technical reference in an important field for a number of years
—
possibly for many if the field ceases to develop so rapidly. It is indeed a fine contribution to the economics
literature."
—
Sir James Mirrlees, University of Cambridge,
1996
Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences
"Incentive theory is at the very core of economics. This text is a masterly exposition of the modern theory
by one of the pioneers of the field, Jean-Jacques Laffont, together with one of its rising stars, David
Martimort."
—
Eric
Maskin,
Institute for Advanced Study
"The most important development in economics in the last forty years has been the study of incentives to
achieve potential
îmitual
gains when the parties have different degrees of knowledge. The time is ripe for
a synthesis and systematization. Jean-Jacques Laffont has been one of the most important contributors to
the field over the years, and David Martimort has shown his capacity for highly original work. This book,
dealing with the basic models of the field, combines clarity, thoroughness, and great respect for historical
development."
—
Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University,
1972
Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
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| spelling | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 Verfasser (DE-588)11006061X aut The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort Princeton, NJ [u.a.] Princeton Univ. Press 2002 XII, 421 Seite Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Literaturverz. S. [399]-412 Wirtschaft Economics Incentives in industry Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 s DE-604 Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 s DE-188 Martimort, David 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)123364469 aut Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009787230&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009787230&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 Martimort, David 1967- The theory of incentives the principal agent model Wirtschaft Economics Incentives in industry Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4133767-0 (DE-588)4079351-5 (DE-588)4126353-4 |
| title | The theory of incentives the principal agent model |
| title_auth | The theory of incentives the principal agent model |
| title_exact_search | The theory of incentives the principal agent model |
| title_full | The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort |
| title_fullStr | The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort |
| title_full_unstemmed | The theory of incentives the principal agent model Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort |
| title_short | The theory of incentives |
| title_sort | the theory of incentives the principal agent model |
| title_sub | the principal agent model |
| topic | Wirtschaft Economics Incentives in industry Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wirtschaft Economics Incentives in industry Anreiz Wirtschaftstheorie Agency-Theorie |
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