Public choice III:
"This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous...
Gespeichert in:
| Vorheriger Titel: | Mueller, Dennis C. Public choice II |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2003
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Sample text Publisher description Table of contents Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock." |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 768 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0521894751 0521815460 9780521815468 9780521894753 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents
Preface
1 introduction
Part I Origins of the state
2 The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency
2.1 Public goods and prisoners dilemmas
2.2 Coordination games
2.3 Public goods and chickens
2.4* Voluntary provision of public goods with constant returns to scale
2.5* Voluntary provision of public goods with varying supply technologies
2.6 Externalities
2.7 The Coase theorem
2.8 Coase and the core
2.9 A generalization of the Coase theorem
2.10 Does the Coase theorem hold without predefined property rights?
2.11 Externalities with large numbers of individuals
2.12 Externalities with large numbers of individuals - a second time
2.13 Experimental results in the voluntary provision of public goods
3 The reason for collective choice ֊ redistribution
3.1 Redistribution as insurance
3.2 Redistribution as a public good
3-3 Redistribution to satisfy fairness norms
3.4 Redistribution to improve allocative efficiency
3.5 Redistribution as taking
3.6 Income transfers in the United States
3.7 Redistribution and the distribution of income
3.8 Redistribution to special interests
Part II Public choice in a direct democracy
4 The choice of voting rule
4.1 The unanimity rule
4.2 Criticisms of the unanimity rule
4.3 The optimal majority
4.4 A simple majority as the optimal majority
page xvii
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Contents
viii
5 Majority rule ֊ positive properties 79
5.1 Majority rule and redistribution 79
5.2 Cycling 84
5.3* The median voter theorem - one-dimensional issues 85
5.4 Majority rule and multidimensional issues 87
5.5* Proof of the median voter theorem - multidimensional case 92
5.6 Majority rule equilibria when preferences are not defined in
spatial terms 94
5.7* Proof of extremal restriction - majority rule theorem 95
5.8 Restrictions on preferences, on the nature and number of issues, and
on the choice of voting rule that can induce equilibria 97
5.8.1 Preference homogeneity 97
5.8.2 Homogeneous preferences and qualified majority rules 99
5.8.3 The relationship between numbers of issues and alternatives
and the required majority 103
5.9 Logrolling 104
5.10* Logrolling and cycling 108
5 Л1 Testing for logrolling 109
5.12 Agenda manipulation 112
5.12.1 Agenda control in a spatial environment 112
5.12.2 Agenda control in a divide-the-cake game 113
5.13 Why so much stability? 114
5.13.1 Issues axe indeed of one dimension 115
5.13.2 Voting one dimension at a time 116
5.13.3 Logrolling equilibria 118
5.13.4 Empirical evidence of cycling 120
5.13.5 Experimental evidence of cycling 123
6 Majority rule — normative properties 128
6.1 Condorcet’s jury theorem 128
6.2 May’s theorem on majority rule 133
6.3* Proof of May’s theorem on majority rule 135
6.4 The Rae֊Taylor theorem on majority rule 136
6.5 Assumptions underlying the unanimity rule 137
6.6 Assumptions underlying the two rules contrasted 138
6.7 The consequences of applying the rules to the “wrong” issues 140
6*7Л Deciding improvements in allocative efficiency via majority rule 140
6.7.2 Deciding redistribution by unanimity 143
6.8 Conclusions 144
7 Simple alternatives to majority rule 147
7.1 The alternative voting procedures defined 147
7.2 The procedures compared - Condorcet efficiency 148
7.3 The procedures compared - utilitarian efficiency 151
7.4 The Borda count $2
7.4.1 Axiomatic properties 152
7.4.2 The Borda count and the “tyranny of the majority” 154
7.4.3 The Borda count and strategic manipulation 155
7.5 Approval voting 155
7.6 Implications for electoral reform 157
Contents
ix
8 Complicateci alternatives to majonty rule 159
8.1 The demand-revealing process 160
8.1.1 The mechanics of the process 160
8.1.2 Vernon Smith’s auction mechanism 168
8.2 Point voting 169
8.3* An explication of the Hylland-Zeckhauser point-voting procedure 170
8.4 Voting by veto 174
8.5 A companson of the procedures 179
9 Exit, voice, and disloyalty 182
9.1 The theory of clubs 183
9.2 Votmg-with-the-feet 186
9.3 Global optimality via voting-with-the-feet 189
9.4* Clubs and the core 194
9.5 Voting-with-the-feet: empirical evidence 199
9.6 Voluntary association, allocational efficiency, and distributional
equity 202
9.7 The theory of revolution 204
Part III Public choice in a representative democracy
10 Federalism 209
10.1 The logic of federalism 209
10.1.1 The assignment problem 209
10.1.2 Federalism with geographic representation 212
10.2 Why the size of government may be “too large” under federalism 213
10.2.1 Logrolling 213
10.2.2 Universalism 215
10.3 Intergovernmental grants under federalism 215
10.3.1 Intergovernmental grants to achieve Pareto optimality 216
10.3.2 The empirical evidence on intergovernmental grants 221
10.4 Why the size of government may be “too large” and “too small”
under federalism 223
10.5 The problem of centralization under federalism 227
11 Two-party competition - deterministic voting 230
11.1 Outcomes under two-party democracy 231
11.2 Two-party competition in a constrained policy space 236
11.2.1 The uncovered set 236
11.2.2 The uncovered set with high valence issues 240
11.3 Relaxing the assumptions of the Downsian model 241
11.3.1 Candidates have preferences over policies 241
11.3.2 Candidates can enter and exit the contests 242
11.4 Testing the median voter hypothesis 243
11.5 Are local public expenditures public or private goods? 246
12 Two-party competition — probabilistic voting 249
12.1 Instability with deterministic voting 249
12.2 Equilibria under probabilistic voting 252
12.3 Normative characteristics of the equilibria 253
12.4 Equilibria with interest groups 255
12.5 An applicati on to taxation 257
x Contents
12.5.1 The logic 257
12.5.2 The evidence 259
12.6 Commentary 250
13 Multip arty system s 2 54
13.1 Two views of representation 264
13.2 Selecting a representative body of legislators 265
13.3 Proportional representation in practice 266
13.4 Electoral rules 266
13.4.1 The Hare, Droop, Impenali, d’Hondt, and Sainte-Lagué
formulas 267
13.4.2 The single-transferable vote (STV) 269
13.4.3 Limited voting 220
13.4.4 Single-nontransferable-vote systems (SNTV) 271
13.5 Electoral rules and the number of parties 271
13.6 Electoral rules and the degree of proportionality 27 6
13.7 The goals of parties 278
13.7.1 Coalition theories with a one-dimensional issue space 280
13.7.2 Coalition theories with two- or more-dimensional issue spaces 285
13.7.2.1 The political heart 285
13.7.2.2 The dimension-by-dimension median 286
13.8 Cabinet stability 290
13.8.1 The duration of governments 290
13.8.2 The death of governments 292
13.8.3 Summary 295
13.9 S ocial stability 295
13.10 Strategic voting 296
13.10.1 Strategic voting under the plurality rule 296
13.10.2 Strategic voting in multiparty systems 297
13.11 Commentary 298
14 The paradox of voting 303
14.1 The rational voter hypothesis 304
14.1.1 Expected utility maximization 304
14.1.2 A taste for voting 306
14 ,13 Voting as a game of cat and mouse 30 6
14.1 .4 The rational voter as minimax-regret strategist 307
14.2 The rational voter hypothesis: the evidence 308
143 The expressive voter hypothesis 320
14.4 The ethical voter hypothesis 322
14.5 Ethical preferences as selfish behavior 325
14.6 The selfish voter 326
14.7 Summary and implications 329
15 Rent seeking 333
15.1 The theory of rent seeking 333
15.1.1 The basic rent-seeking model with a fixed number of players 335
15.1.1.1 Diminishing or constant returns, r 1 336
15.1.1.2 Increasing returns with 1 r 2 335
15.1.13 Increasing returns with r 2 337
Contents xi
15.1.2 The impact of free entry 337
15 Л .3 Rent seeking with sequential investments 338
15.1.4 Relaxing the assumptions 340
15.1.4.1 Risk-neutrality 340
15.1.4.2 Rent seeking among groups 342
15.1.4.3 Rent seeking when the probability of winning is
not defined logistically 342
15.1.4.4 Designing rent-seeking contests 342
15.2 Rent seeking through regulation 343
15.3 Rent seeking and the political process 347
15.4 Rent seeking through tariffs and quotas 348
15.4.1 The economic effects of tariffs, quotas, and voluntary
export restraints 348
15.4.2 Endogenous protection models 350
15.4.3 Remaining puzzles 353
15.5 Rent seeking in other governmental activities 354
15.6 How large are the welfare losses from rent seeking? 355
16 Bureaucracy 359
16.1 Uncertainty, information, and power 360
16.2 The budget-maximizing bureaucrat 362
16.2.1 Environment and incentives 362
16.2.2 The model 363
16.3 Extensions of the model 365
16.3.1 Alternative institutional assumptions 365
16.3.2 Bargaining between sponsor and bureau 368
16.4 Alternative behavioral assumptions 368
16.4.1 The slack-maximizing bureaucrat 368
16.4.2 The risk-avoiding bureaucrat 370
16.5 Empirical tests 371
16.5.1 Power of the agenda setter 371
16.5.2 Cost differences between publicly and privately provided
services 373
16.6 The government as Leviathan 380
16.6.1 Theory 380
16.6.2 Empirical testing — government expenditures and taxes 382
16.7 Conclusions 3 84
17 Legislatures and bureaucracies 386
17.1 The Congressional-dominance model 386
17.1.1 Congressional dominance through administrative structure 386
17.1.2 Congressional dominance through administrative procedure 388
17.2 The impact of uncertainty and transaction costs 388
17.2.1 Uncertainty and the locus of responsibility 389
17.2.2 Uncertainty, transaction costs, and commitment 389
17.3 Congress and the president 391
17.3.1 The legislature controls the president 391
17.3.2 Presidential control over the legislature 393
17.3.3 The problem of deadlocks 395
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Contents
174 Congress, the president, and the judiciary
174.1 Adding the judiciary to the model
17 4.2 The goals of the judiciary
17.5 Legislative decision making in the European Union
17.6 Conclusions
Dictatorship
18.1 The origins of dictatorship
18.2 The goals of dictators
18.2.1 The consumption of the dictator
18.2.2 Power
18.2.3 Security
18.3 The functioning and survival of dictatorships
18.3.1 The utility ֊maximizing dictator
18.3.2 Tin pots and totalitarians
18.3.3 Selective strategies to survive
18.34 The dictator’s dilemma
18.3.5 The limits of totalitarianism
184 The rise and decline of dictatorships
18.5 Dictatorship and economic performance
18.5.1 The relative advantages of dictatorship and democracy
18.5.2 The relative economic performance of dictatorships
and democracies
18.5.2.1 A direct test of Wintrobe’s model of dictatorship
18.6 Conclusions
Part IV Applications and testing
Political competition and macroeconomic performance
19.1 Macroeconomic performance and political success
19.1.1 Vote and popularity functions
19.1.2 Whom do voters hold responsible?
19.2 Opportunistic politics
19.24 With myopic voters
19.2.2 With rational voters
19.3 Partisan politics
1934 Partisan politics with retrospective voters
193.2 Partisan politics with rational, forward-looking voters
19.4 The evidence
1944 Do politicians try to manipulate the macroeconomic
environment?
194.2 Are there partisan biases?
194.3 Which theories fit the data best?
1944 Additional evidence for the Alesina/Rosenthal model
194.5 Discussion
19.5 Voter behavior
19.54 Myopic, retrospective, rational
19.5.2 Sociotropic or egotropie
19.6 Politics and inflation
Contents xiii
19.6.1 Hypotheses 461
19.6.2 The facts 462
19.6.3 Central bank independence 465
19.7 Deficits 466
19.7.1 The facts 466
19.7.2 Hypotheses 466
19.7.2.1 Fiscal illusion and Keynesian delusions 466
19.7.2.2 Political business cycles 467
19.7.2.3 Partisan effects 467
19.7.2.4 Government paralysis 467
19.7.2.5 Budgetary rules 468
19.7.3 The evidence 468
19.8 Reflections 469
20 Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying 472
20.1 The logic of collective action 473
20.2 Models of interest group behavior in politics 475
20.2.1 Informative campaigning in a Downsian model 476
20.2.2 Persuasive campaigning in a Downsian model 477
20.3 Empirical studies of the causes and consequences of
campaign contributions 481
20.3.1 Votes for a candidate are a function of campaign expenditures 481
20.3.2 Determinants of campaign contributions 486
20.3.3 Determinants of representative voting behavior ֊ campaign
contributions 489
20.3.4 Determinants of representative voting behavior ֊ ideology or
pure survival 489
20.3.5 Evaluation 493
20.4 Lobbying 496
20.5 The welfare effects of interest group activities 497
21 The size of government 501
21.1 The facts 501
2L2 Explanations for the size and growth of government 506
21.2.1 The government as provider of public goods and eliminator
of externalities 506
21.2. L1 “Taste variables” 507
21.2A .2 Income 509
21.2.1.3 The Baumol effect 510
21.2.2 The government as redistributor of income and wealth 511
21.2.2.1 The Meltzer and Richard model 512
21.2.2.2 Additional redistribution—growth֊oTgovemment hypotheses 514
21.2.2.3 Some logical/empirical difficulties with the redistnbutiom-
growth-of-govemment hypothesis 515
21.2.2.4 Direct empirical tests of the redistribution-government֊size
hypothesis 516
21.2.3 Interest groups and the growth of government 519
21.2.4 Bureaucracy and the growth of government 523
XXV
Contents
21.2.5 Fiscal illusion 527
21.2.6 Tax elasticity 529
213 Conclusions 530
22 Government size and economic performance 535
22.1 The welfare losses from taxation 536
22.2 Government size and black market activity 539
22.3 Government size and corruption 544
22.4 Government size and economic productivity 545
22.5 Government size and economic growth 548
22.5.1 Methodological issues 548
22.5.2 The evidence 551
22.6 Government activity and the economic decline of nations 554
22.6.1 The logic 554
22.6.2 Empirical evidence 556
22.7 Conclusions 559
Part V Normative public choice
23 Social welfare functions 563
23 T The Bergson-Samuel son social welfare function 563
23.2 Axiomatic social welfare functions 568
23.2.1 Fleming’s social welfare function 568
23.2.2 Harsanyi’s social welfare function 569
23.23 Two criticisms of Harsanyi’s social welfare function 571
23.23.1 Should individual attitudes toward risk count? 571
23.23.2 Can individuals agree on a value for W1 572
23.2.4 Ng’s social welfare function 575
23.2.5 Nash’s and other multiplicative social welfare functions 576
233 What form of social welfare function is best? 578
24 The impossibility of a social ordering 582
24.1 Logic of the proof 583
24.2 Relaxing the postulates 585
24.2.1 Transitivity 586
24.2.2 Unrestricted domain 589
24.23 independence of irrelevant alternatives 590
243 Strategy-proof social welfare functions 592
24 4 Implications for public choice 595
25 A just social contract 597
25.1 The social contract 598
25.2 The two principles of justice 599
253 Extensions of the theory to other political stages 602
25.4 Critique of the Rawlsian social contract 603
25.4.1 The social contract 603
25.4.2 The two principles of justice 607
25.43 Experimental evidence 609
25.5 Two utilitarian defenses of the maximin principle 609
25,5T Maximm as a means to obtain compliance 609
25.5.2 Maximin as a redistribution principle 611
25.6 The social contract as a constitution 612
XV
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Contents
The constitution as a utilitarian contract
26.1 The constitutional context
26.2 The two-action case
26.3 The constitutional contract
26.3.1 Optimal collective action with only identity uncertainty
26.3.2 Optimal collective action with identity and numbers uncertainty
26.3.3 Optimal collective action with identity, numbers, and
payoff uncertainty
26.4 Symmetric and asymmetric bans and obligations
26.5 Continuous actions with interdependent utilities
26.6 Decision-making costs
26.6.1 Prisoners’ dilemmas
26.6.2 Direct conflicts
26.7 Rights and obligations
26.8 Constitutions: contracts or conventions?
26.8.1 Constitutions as contracts
26.8.2 Constitutions as conventions
26.8.3 Discussion
26.9 Conclusions regarding two-stage theories of social choice
26.10 From the normative, two-stage theory of constitutions to
hypothesis testing
Liberal rights and social choices
27.1 The theorem
27.2 Resolving the paradox
27.2.1 Rights over Pareto
27.2.2 Pareto trades of actions
27.2.3 Pareto trades of rights
27.3 Rights over social states versus rights over actions
27.4 Liberal rights and obligations
27.5 Constitutional rights and liberal rights
Part VI What have we learned?
Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?
28.1 The failures of rational actor models of politics
28 .2 The rational choice approach to modeling
28.3 The prediction of cycling
28.4 The predictions of spatial models
28.5 Predicting voting and ffee-nding
28֊6 Can public choice contribute to the positive study of
political institutions?
28.7 Has public choice contributed anything to the normative study
of political institutions?
28.8 Conclusions
Allocation, redistribution, and public choice
References
Name index
Subject index
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Mueller, Dennis C. 1940- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)108471322 |
| author_facet | Mueller, Dennis C. 1940- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Mueller, Dennis C. 1940- |
| author_variant | d c m dc dcm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV014110881 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JF1001 |
| callnumber-raw | JF1001.M78 2003 |
| callnumber-search | JF1001.M78 2003 |
| callnumber-sort | JF 41001 M78 42003 |
| callnumber-subject | JF - Public Administration |
| classification_rvk | MF 4000 QC 160 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)237794371 (DE-599)BVBBV014110881 |
| dewey-full | 320 32021 324 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) 324 - The political process |
| dewey-raw | 320 320 21 324 |
| dewey-search | 320 320 21 324 |
| dewey-sort | 3320 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV014110881 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:57:50Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521894751 0521815460 9780521815468 9780521894753 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-009667985 |
| oclc_num | 237794371 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-824 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-N2 DE-20 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-703 DE-706 DE-945 DE-521 DE-11 DE-188 DE-83 DE-384 DE-634 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
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| physical | XIX, 768 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateSearch | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Mueller, Dennis C. 1940- Verfasser (DE-588)108471322 aut Public choice III Dennis C. Mueller Public choice three Public choice 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2003 XIX, 768 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke "This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock." Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd rswk-swf Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd rswk-swf Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd rswk-swf Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd rswk-swf Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd rswk-swf Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s DE-604 Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 s Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 s Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 s DE-188 Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 s Früher u.d.T. Mueller, Dennis C. Public choice II http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/2002022287.html Sample text http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam022/2002022287.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/2002022287.html Table of contents Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009667985&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Mueller, Dennis C. 1940- Public choice III Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4064286-0 (DE-588)4233109-2 (DE-588)4043214-2 (DE-588)4011413-2 (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4079009-5 |
| title | Public choice III |
| title_alt | Public choice three Public choice |
| title_auth | Public choice III |
| title_exact_search | Public choice III |
| title_full | Public choice III Dennis C. Mueller |
| title_fullStr | Public choice III Dennis C. Mueller |
| title_full_unstemmed | Public choice III Dennis C. Mueller |
| title_old | Mueller, Dennis C. Public choice II |
| title_short | Public choice III |
| title_sort | public choice iii |
| topic | Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Kollektiventscheidung Wahl Public-Choice-Theorie Ökonomische Theorie der Politik Demokratie Theorie Wahlverhalten |
| url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/2002022287.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam022/2002022287.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/2002022287.html http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009667985&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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