The conflict over Kosovo: why Milosevic decided to settle when he did
"Why did Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decide on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo? Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly inte...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
Rand
2001
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Project Air Force
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Why did Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decide on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo? Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, this book examines (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative."--BOOK JACKET. |
| Beschreibung: | XXXI, 155 S. |
| ISBN: | 0833030035 |
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| 520 | 1 | |a "Why did Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decide on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo? Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, this book examines (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative."--BOOK JACKET. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | A 350044 THE CONFLICT OVER KOSOVO WHY MILOSEVIC TO SETTLE WHEN HE DID
STEPHEN T. HOSMER PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RAND APPROVED
FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED CONTENTS PREFACE III FIGURE
XI SUMMARY XIII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XXIX ACRONYMS XXXI CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 1 PARTI WHY MILOSEVIC DIDN T SETTLE EARLIER CHAPTER TWO HE
ASSUMED ACCEPTING RAMBOUILLET TERMS WOULD ENDANGER HIS RULE 7 MILOSEVIC
HAD MAJOR STAKES IN KOSOVO 8 SOME RAMBOUILLET TERMS WOULD HAVE BEEN
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SERB PUBLIC 12 ACCEPTING RAMBOUILLET WOULD HAVE BEEN
DANGEROUS FOR MILOSEVIC 16 CHAPTER THREE HE ASSUMED HE COULD FORCE NATO
TO OFFER BETTER TERMS 19 MILOSEVIC HAD REASON TO EXPECT THE BOMBING TO
BE LIMITED * -.-- 19 VIII THE CONFLICT OVER KOSOVO: WHY MILOSEVIC
DECIDED TO SETTLE WHEN HE DID MILOSEVIC BELIEVED HE COULD FORCE A HALT
TO THE BOMBING AND GARNER BETTER TERMS 22 PART II WHY MILOSEVIC DECIDED
TO SETTLE ON JUNE 3 CHAPTER FOUR HE REALIZED THAT HIS HOPED-FOR LEVERAGE
ON NATO HAD EVAPORATED 37 ETHNIC CLEANSING DID NOT PRODUCE THE LEVERAGE
EXPECTED 37 NATO REMAINED UNITED AND RESOLUTE 40 RUSSIA S SUPPORT FOR
THE FRY DISSOLVED 42 CHAPTER FIVE BOMBING PRODUCED A POPULAR CLIMATE
CONDUCIVE TO CONCESSIONS 49 THE INITIAL PUBLIC REACTION TO THE BOMBING
WAS SURPRISE AND ANGRY DEFIANCE 50 AFTER A MONTH OF BOMBING, PUBLIC
ATTITUDES BEGAN TO CHANGE 52 CONCERNS ABOUT CASUALTIES PROVOKED ANTIWAR
DEMONSTRATIONS IN MILOSEVIC S HEARTLAND 57 BOMBING PROMPTED CALLS FROM
PARTY LEADERS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 60 THE
FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS MET WITH RELIEF 63 BOMBING MADE CONCESSIONS
POLITICALLY FEASIBLE 64 CHAPTER SIX DAMAGE TO DUAL-USE INFRASTRUCTURE
GENERATED GROWING PRESSURE 65 THE DAMAGE TO SERBIA S INFRASTRUCTURE AND
ECONOMY WAS BECOMING SEVERE 66 ATTACKS WERE PERCEIVED AS AIMED AT
WEAKENING MILOSEVIC S CONTROL MECHANISMS 71 THE BOMBING IMPOSED STRESS,
HARDSHIPS, AND COSTS ON THE RULING ELITE 73 CHAPTER SEVEN DAMAGE TO
MILITARY FORCES AND KLA RESURGENCE GENERATED LITTLE PRESSURE 77 NATO S
OBJECTIVES IN ATTACKING MILITARY TARGETS 77 CONTENTS IX MUCH
ABOVE-GROUND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE WAS DESTROYED 79 THE SERBS ADOPTED
COUNTERMEASURES TO REDUCE DAMAGE TO THEIR MILITARY STRUCTURE 80 VJ
ARMOR, ARTILLERY, AND TROOPS SURVIVED THE WAR LARGELY INTACT 82 SERB
FORCES IN KOSOVO WERE ABLE TO CARRY OUT MOST OF THEIR MISSIONS 85 THE
BOTTOM LINE CONCERNING ATTACKS ON PURELY MILITARY TARGETS 89 CHAPTER
EIGHT HE EXPECTED UNCONSTRAINED BOMBING IF NATO S TERMS WERE REJECTED 91
NATO S TERMS WERE SEEN AS A RUSSIAN-BACKED ULTIMATUM 91 WHY SERBIA S
LEADERSHIP FOUND THE THREAT OF UNCONSTRAINED BOMBING CREDIBLE 97
MILOSEVIC FEARED UNCONSTRAINED BOMBING MIGHT ENDANGER HIS RULE 103
CHAPTER NINE HE PROBABLY ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THREAT OF FUTURE INVASION
109 INVASION APPEARED A MORE DISTANT THREAT 110 INDICATIONS THAT GROUND
ATTACK WAS BEING CONTEMPLATED PROBABLY WORRIED BELGRADE LEADERS 112 SERB
LEADERS MAY HAVE REALIZED THAT INVASION WOULD BE PRECEDED BY INTENSIFIED
BOMBING 113 CHAPTER TEN HE BELIEVED NATO S TERMS PROVIDED HIM WITH SOME
POLITICAL COVER 115 RAMBOUILLET COMPARED TO THE JUNE 10 AGREEMENT 116
MILOSEVIC PROCLAIMED VICTORY 118 PART III CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
CHAPTER ELEVEN CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 123 AIR POWER S CONTRIBUTIONS
WERE CRUCIAL 123 X THE CONFLICT OVER KOSOVO: WHY MILOSEVIC DECIDED TO
SETTLE WHEN HE DID THE CONDITIONS PROMPTING THE SERBS TO SETTLE WERE
ALSO EVIDENT IN OTHER CONFLICTS 126 MILOSEVIC S DECISION TO YIELD
DEPENDED ON DEVELOPMENTS THAT TOOK TIME TO MATURE 127 NATO AND SERB
LEADERS PERCEIVED STRATEGIC BOMBING DIFFERENTLY 130 MAINTAINING
CAPABILITIES TO COERCE FUTURE ADVERSARY LEADERS 132 BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Hosmer, Stephen T. |
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| era | Geschichte gnd |
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| geographic | Kosovo (Republic) History Civil War, 1998-1999 |
| geographic_facet | Kosovo (Republic) History Civil War, 1998-1999 |
| id | DE-604.BV014100410 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:57:37Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0833030035 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-009658630 |
| oclc_num | 46976540 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | XXXI, 155 S. |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateSearch | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| publisher | Rand |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Project Air Force |
| spelling | Hosmer, Stephen T. Verfasser aut The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer Santa Monica, Calif. Rand 2001 XXXI, 155 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Project Air Force "Why did Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decide on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo? Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, this book examines (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative."--BOOK JACKET. Milosevic, Slobodan <1941-....> ram Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> ram Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 gnd rswk-swf Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord ram Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) ram Geschichte Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 gnd rswk-swf Kosovo (Republic) History Civil War, 1998-1999 Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 p Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 s Geschichte z DE-604 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009658630&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Hosmer, Stephen T. The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Milosevic, Slobodan <1941-....> ram Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> ram Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 gnd Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord ram Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) ram Geschichte Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)119112108 (DE-588)4547508-8 |
| title | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_auth | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_exact_search | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_full | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer |
| title_fullStr | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer |
| title_full_unstemmed | The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did Stephen T. Hosmer |
| title_short | The conflict over Kosovo |
| title_sort | the conflict over kosovo why milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| title_sub | why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| topic | Milosevic, Slobodan <1941-....> ram Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> ram Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 (DE-588)119112108 gnd Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord ram Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) ram Geschichte Kosovo-Krieg (DE-588)4547508-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Milosevic, Slobodan <1941-....> Milošević, Slobodan <1941-2006> Milošević, Slobodan 1941-2006 Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999) Geschichte Kosovo-Krieg Kosovo (Republic) History Civil War, 1998-1999 |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009658630&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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