China's troubled bank loans: workout and prevention
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
London [u.a.]
Kluwer Law Internat.
2001
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | International banking, finance and economic law
22 |
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXII, 427 S. |
| ISBN: | 9041198393 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Lou, Jianbo |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a China's troubled bank loans |b workout and prevention |c by Jianbo Lou |
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| 264 | 1 | |a London [u.a.] |b Kluwer Law Internat. |c 2001 | |
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| 490 | 1 | |a International banking, finance and economic law |v 22 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Bank | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Bank loans |z China | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Banks and banking |z China | |
| 830 | 0 | |a International banking, finance and economic law |v 22 |w (DE-604)BV009685504 |9 22 | |
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| _version_ | 1804128930864562176 |
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| adam_text | CHINA S TROUBLED BANK LOANS: WORKOUT AND PREVENTION BY JIANBO LOU KLUWER
LAW INTERNATIONAL LONDON - THE HAGUE - BOSTON TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE
XIX LIST OFABBREVIATIONS XXI PARTI BACKGROUND INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND:
THE PROBLEM STATED 3 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 6 METHODOLOGIES 11
GENERALIZATION VERSUS SPECIALIZATION 11 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VERSUS LEGAL
ANALYSIS 11 1. CHINA S BANK NON-PERFORMING LOAN PROBLEM: SERIOUSNESS,
CAUSES AND SOLUTION 13 1.1 INTRODUCTION 13 1.2 THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE
BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 14 1.2.1 THE SERIOUSNESS: THE LARGE AMOUNT OF
EXISTING NPLS AND INCREASING NEW NPLS 14 1.2.2 NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF STATE
BANK NPLS 16 1.2.2.1 NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON STATE BANKS 16 1.2.2.2 NEGATIVE
EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE GROWTH OF REAL ECONOMY 18 1.2.3
SUMMARY 21 1.3 CAUSES OF BANK NPLS*THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 21 1.3.1
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 22 1.3.1.1 THE CONCEPT OF SOFT BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS AND ITS APPLICATION 22 1.3.1.2 CONSEQUENCES OF SOFT BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS 23 1.3.1.3 SOURCES OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 23 1.3.2
MARKET DISCIPLINE*A MECHANISM TO CURB SOFT CREDIT 24 1.3.2.1 GENERAL
INTRODUCTION*THE THEORY OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 24 1.3.2.2 MARKET
DISCIPLINE AS A MECHANISM TO CURB UNSUSTAINABLE BORROWING AND ITS
CONDITIONS 25 VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.3.3 FAILURE OF MARKET
DISCIPLINE*THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF THE BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 27 1.4
CAUSES OF BANK NPLS*EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 28 1.4.1 THE BANK-CENTRIC AND
STATE-BANK-DOMINATED FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 28 1.4.1.1 BANK-CENTRIC
FINANCE IN CHINA 28 1.4.1.2 THE DOMINATION OF STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 31
1.4.2 SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ON SOES IN THE FORM OF POLICY LOANS 33
1.4.2.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 33 1.4.2.2 POLICY LOANS FOR DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES 34 1.4.2.3 POLICY LOANS TO SUBSIDIZE LOSS-MAKING SOES 37
1.4.2.4 FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE DUE TO POLICY LOANS 39 1.4.3
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 39 1.4.3.1
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS AS INSTRUMENTS TO
IMPLEMENT MONETARY POLICY 39 1.4.3.2 THE CREDIT PLAN 40 1.4.3.3 INTEREST
RATE CONTROLS 42 1.4.3.4 DIVISION OF BUSINESS SCOPE AMONG STATE
SPECIALIZED BANKS 44 1.4.4 WEAK INFERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS WITHIN STATE
COMMERCIAL BANKS 46 1.4.5 INAPPROPRIATE BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION 47 1.4.6 SUMMARY 48 1.5 THREE BASIC STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH
THE BANK NPL PROBLEM 48 1.5.1 LARGE SCALE BANK CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION
49 1.5.2 REGULATORY FORBEARANCE 51 1.5.2.1 REGULATORY FORBEARANCE IN
GENERAL 51 1.5.2.2 THE FAILURE OF REGULATORY FORBEARANCE SOLUTION TO THE
THRIFT CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 52 1.5.2.3 THE FAILURE OF JAPAN S
REGULATORY FORBEARANCE POLICY AND THE SUBSEQUENT U-TURN 56 1.5.2.4
REGULATORY FORBEARANCE IN CHINA: A FAILED POLICY 59 1.5.3 BANK
RESTRUCTURING 60 1.5.3.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR BANK RESTRUCTURING 60 1.5.3.2
TEN CRITICAL POINTS IN MANAGING AND RESOLVING A SYSTEMIC BANK CRISIS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 61 1.5.4 SUMMARY 63 1.6 CONCLUSION 63 1.6.1
A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM 63 1.6.2 A COMPREHENSIVE BANK RESTRUCTURING IS NEEDED
IN CHINA 64 1.6.2.1 THE NPL PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED IMMEDIATELY 64
1.6.2.2 ENTERPRISE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 64 1.6.2.3 THE CREATION OF NEW
NPLS MUST BE PREVENTED 65 TABLE OF CONTENTS IX 1.6.2.4 AVOIDING SHOCKS
FROM THE NPL PROBLEM 65 1.6.2.5 ENHANCING MARKET DISCIPLINE SHOULD BE
THE MAIN THEME IN NPL WORKOUT AND PREVENTION 65 PART II NON-PERFORMING
LOAN WORKOUT 2. BANK RECAPITALIZATION AND AMC PROGRAM 69 2.1
INTRODUCTION 69 2.2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RESTRUCTURING 69
2.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ASIAN CRISIS COUNTRIES 70 2.2.1.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
UNDER FIRREA IN THE UNITED STATES 70 2.2.1.2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN
ASIAN CRISIS COUNTRIES 70 2.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANK
RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA 71 2.2.2.1 THERE IS NO NEED FOR NEW INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK IN CHINA 71 2.2.2.2 WHO SHOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BANK
AND ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA? 72 2.3 RECAPITALIZING THE BIG
FOUR 73 2.3.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT RECAPITALIZATION OF THE BIG
FOUR 74 2.3.1.1 THE STATE OWNERSHIP OF THE BIG FOUR 74 2.3.1.2 THE LOW
PROFITABILITY OF THE BIG FOUR DENOTES THAT THEY CANNOT GROW OUT OF THE
PROBLEM THEMSELVES 74 2.3.1.3 THE DIFFICULTY OF RAISING CAPITAL IN OTHER
WAYS 75 2.3.2 OPTIONS FOR RECAPITALIZATION*THEORETICAL ANALYSES 76
2.3.2.1 CAPITAL INJECTION VERSUS LIQUIDITY PROVISION 77 2.3.2.2 ASSET
SIDE VERSUS LIABILITY SIDE 78 2.3.3 HOW SHOULD THE BIG FOUR BE
RECAPITALIZED? 79 2.3.3.1 CENTRAL BANK VERSUS TREASURY 79 2.3.3.2 CASH
INJECTION VERSUS BOND-BAD DEBT SWAP 80 2.3.3.3 EX-ANTE RECAPITALIZATION
VERSUS EX-POST RECAPITALIZATION 82 2.3.4 COMMENTS ON CHINA S BANK
RECAPITALIZATION PRACTICES 83 2.3.4.1 SPECIAL TREASURY BONDS IN CHINA TO
RECAPITALIZE BANKS 83 2.3.4.2 BOND-BAD DEBT SWAPS 85 2.3.5 THE CONFLICTS
BETWEEN RECAPITALIZATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 86 2.3.5.1 METHODS TO
ENHANCE MARKET DISCIPLINE: ASIAN EXPERIENCES 86 2.3.5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHINA 88 2.4 CHINA S AMC PRACTICES 90 2.4.1 WHY ASSET MANAGEMENT
COMPANIES IN CHINA? 90 X TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.4.1.1 POLISH EXPERIENCE:
LEAVING THE NPLS INSIDE THE BANKS 90 2.4.1.2 ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCY SOLUTION: EXPERIENCE OF ASIAN
CRISIS COUNTRIES 92 2.4.1.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 95 2.4.2 CHINA S USE
OF AMCS 95 2.4.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA S AMCS 97 2.4.3.1.
BANK-SPECIFIC AMCS 97 2.4.3.2. STATE OWNERSHIP AND HEAVY ADMINISTRATIVE
COLOUR 99 2.4.3.3 WIDE BUSINESS SCOPE AND POWERS 100 2.4.4 PROBLEMS WITH
AMC PRACTICES IN CHINA AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 100 2.4.4.1 THE DILEMMA
FACED BY CHINESE AMCS 100 2.4.4.2 THE DEPENDENCE OF AMCS ON THEIR BANKS
102 2.4.4.3 THE FUNDING PROBLEM 103 2.4.4.4 THE LACK OF EXPERTISE AND
EXPERIENCE 104 2.4.4.5 DIFFICULTIES IN EVALUATING ASSETS 105 2.4.5
IMMEDIATE LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO AMC PRACTICES IN CHINA 106 2.4.5.1 THE
NOTIFICATION OBLIGATION UNDER CONTRACT LAW 106 2.4.5.2 ACCOMPLISHING
LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY INTERESTS 107 2.4.5.3
AMCS LIABILITIES TO DEBTORS 107 2.5 SUMMARY 108 3. NON-PERFORMING LOAN
DISPOSAL AND DEBT RESTRUCTURING 111 3.1 INTRODUCTION 111 3.2 TWO
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARDS NPLS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 112
3.2.1 TWO MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARDS NPLS 112 3.2.2 CHOOSING THE
RIGHT STRATEGY: THE EXPERIENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SOUTH KOREA 113 3.2.3
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 114 3.3 NPL DISPOSAL 115 3.3.1 SELLING COLLATERAL
UNDERLYING LOANS 115 3.3.2 LOAN COLLECTION 117 3.3.3 SELLING OFF NPLS
DIRECTLY 118 3.3.4 SECURITIZING NPLS 118 3.3.4.1 SECURITIZATION: GENERAL
118 3.3.4.2 SECURITIZATION IN CHINA 119 3.3.4.3 A PROPER LEGAL
INFRASTRUCTURE MUST BE DEVELOPED TO PROMOTE SECURITIZATION IN CHINA 120
3.3.4.4 PROSPECTS 123 3.3.5 THE UNITED STATES RTCS PRACTICE IN QUICK
DISPOSAL OF ASSETS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 124 3.3.5.1 THE RTC
PRACTICE IN DISPOSING OF ASSETS 124 3.3.5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 126
TABLE OF CONTENTS XI 3.3.6 OBSTACLES TO SELLING NPLS TO FOREIGN
INVESTORS 127 3.3.7 SUMMARY 128 3.4 ENTERPRISE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 128
3.4.1 DEBT RESTRUCTURING VERSUS FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING 128 3.4.2 WHY
DEBT RESTRUCTURING? 129 3.4.3 A THEME FOR SOE DEBT
RESTRUCTURING*REDUCING THEIR EXCESSIVE DEBT-ASSET RATIO 130 3.4.3.1 THE
EXCESSIVE DEBT-ASSET RATIO OF SOES IN CHINA*AN EXPLANATION OF SOES
DETERIORATING PROFITABILITY 130 3.4.3.2 NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF EXCESSIVE
DEBT-ASSET RATIO 131 3.4.3.3 KOREAN EXPERIENCES 133 3.4.3.4 CONCLUSION
134 3.4.4 THE DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME 134 3.4.4.1. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS:
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 134 3.4.4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEBT-EQUITY
SWAP IN CHINA 135 3.4.4.3 POLICIES BEHIND THE SETC DEBT-EQUITY SWAP
SCHEME 137 3.4.4.4 PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME AND
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 141 3.4.4.5 AMCS EXIT PROBLEM 145 3.4.4.6 SUMMARY
148 3.4.5 PROBLEMS WITH DEBT RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA 149 3.5 A PROPER
LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEBT DISPOSAL AND RESTRUCTURING 149 3.5.1
CREDITOR PASSIVITY OF BANKS IN CHINA: THE LACK OF AN EFFICIENT LOAN
COLLECTING MECHANISM IN CHINA 150 3.5.1.1 THE PHENOMENON 150 3.5.1.2 THE
CAUSES 151 3.5.1.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATION 157 3.5.2 THE LACK OF
APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN CREDITORS AND
DEBTORS 157 3.5.2.1 COMPARATIVE STUDIES: MODELS AND PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 157 3.5.2.2 DESIGNING A STRUCTURE FITTING
THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF CHINA 168 3.5.2.3 COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN
DEBT RESTRUCTURING 174 3.5.2.4 PRO-CLAIM DEBTS 175 3.6 CONCLUSION 177
PART III NON-PERFORMING LOAN PREVENTION 4. ENHANCING PRUDENTIAL BANKING
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 181 4.1 INTRODUCTION 181 4.2 THE EVOLUTION OF
THE PBOC AS BANK REGULATOR AND SUPERVISOR IN CHINA 182 XII TABLE OF
CONTENTS 4.2.1 THE PBOC BEFORE 1984 182 4.2.1.1 1949-1952: THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PBOC 182 4.2.1.2 1953-1978: THE MONO-BANK PERIOD
183 4.2.1.3 1979-1984: THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKING BUSINESS
FROM THE PBOC 184 4.2.2 THE PBOC AFTER 1984 184 4.2.2.1 1984-JULY 1993
184 4.2.2.2 JULY 1993-JUNE 1996: THE PBOC AS BOTH FINANCIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND FINANCIAL POLICE 186 4.2.2.3 JUNE
1995-PRESENT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN CHINA 187
4.2.3 THE PBOC DEVELOPS INTO AN EXCLUSIVE BANKING REGULATOR AND
SUPERVISOR 188 4.3 ENHANCING THE PBOC S INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY,
RESTRUCTURING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PBOC AND THE DIVISION
OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY DUTIES BETWEEN THE PBOC HEADQUARTERS AND
BRANCHES 190 4.3.1 ENHANCING THE PBOC S INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY 190
4.3.1.1 WHY A MORE INDEPENDENT PBOC? 190 4.3.1.2 A HISTORIE REVIEW OF
THE PBOC S INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY BEFORE THE 1995 CENTRAL BANKING LAW
191 4.3.1.3 AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK UNDER THE CENTRAL BANKING LAW?
192 4.3.2 THE PBOC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE RESTRUCTURING 197 4.3.2.1
STREAMLINING THE PBOC HEADQUARTERS 197 4.3.2.2 RESHUFFLING THE PBOC
BRANCHES 198 4.3.3 THE PBOC REGULATIONS ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY
RESPONSIBILITIES 201 4.3.3.1 THE DIVISION OF SUPERVISORY DUTIES BETWEEN
THE PBOC HEADQUARTERS AND ITS BRANCHES AT VARIOUS LEVELS 201 4.3.3.2 THE
ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING OF THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISORS AT VARIOUS LEVELS
202 4.3.4 SUMMARY 203 4.4 REMOVING UNNECESSARY ADMINISTRATION
RESTRICTIONS ON STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 203 4.4.1 INDIRECT MONETARY
POLICY INSTRUMENTS VERSUS DIRECT MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS 204 4.4.2
CREDIT GUIDANCE VERSUS CREDIT PLAN 204 4.4.2.1 THE REMOVAL OF CREDIT
PLAN 204 4.4.2.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF CREDIT GUIDANCE 206 4.4.2.3 THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFORM 207 4.4.3 DECONTROL OF INTEREST RATES 207
4.4.3.1 CHINA S CURRENT RMB INTEREST RATE ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM UNDER
THE 1999 INTEREST RATE ADMINISTRATION PROVISIONS 207 4.4.3.2 EFFORTS
TOWARDS THE LIBERALIZATION OF INTEREST RATES 208 TABLE OF CONTENTS XIII
4.4.3.3 PROSPECTS OF INTEREST RATE LIBERALIZATION IN CHINA 211 4.5
CURRENT BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN CHINA: COMPARED TO THE
BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 212 4.5.1
LICENSING PROCESS AND APPROVAL FOR CHANGES IN STRUCTURE 213 4.5.1.1 THE
CORE PRINCIPLES REQUIREMENTS 213 4.5.1.2 LICENSING AND STRUCTURE CHANGE
APPROVAL IN CHINA 213 4.5.1.3. ARE CHINA S REQUIREMENTS IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE BASLE CORE PRINCIPLE? 215 4.5.2 ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONGOING
BANKING SUPERVISION 216 4.5.2.1 PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
216 4.5.2.2 METHODS OF ONGOING BANKING SUPERVISION 219 4.5.3
SANCTIONING: FORMAL POWERS OF SUPERVISORS 227 4.5.3.1 CHINA HAS
DEVELOPED A SET OF SUPERVISORY MEASURES TO BRING ABOUT PROMPT CORRECTIVE
ACTION (PCA) 227 4.5.3.2 PROBLEMS WITH CHINA S PCAS AND IMPROVEMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS 228 4.6 SUMMARY 230 5. PROMOTING BANK INTERNAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS 234 5.1 INTRODUCTION 234 5.2 THE BASLE COMMITTEE S FRAMEWORK FOR
INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 234 5.3 DEVELOPMENT OF
BANK INTERNAL CONTROLS IN CHINA 235 5.3.1 BANK INTERNAL CONTROLS BEFORE
THE ISSUANCE OF PBOC GUIDELINES FOR ENHANCING INTERNAL CONTROLS IN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 235 5.3.2 THE 1997 PBOC GUIDELINES FOR ENHANCING
INTERNAL CONTROLS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: IN COMPARISON WITH THE
BASLE COMMITTEE INTERNAL CONTROL PAPER 236 5.3.2.1 DEFINITION AND
OBJECTIVES OF INTERNAL CONTROLS 236 5.3.2.2 PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL
CONTROLS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 237 5.3.2.3 EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS BY SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 245 5.4 PROBLEMS WITH INTERNAL
CONTROLS OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS 245 5.4.1 THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 245 5.4.1.1 THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 245 5.4.1.2 DIVERSIFYING THE
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE BIG FOUR: A SOLUTION TO THEIR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PROBLEM? 248 5.4.2 THE INFORMATION PROBLEM 251 XIV TABLE OF
CONTENTS 5.4.2.1 EFFORTS OF THE PBOC TO HELP COMMERCIAL BANKS OBTAIN
EXTERNAL INFORMATION 251 5.4.2.2 FURTHER ISSUES 253 5.4.3 PROSPECTS 253
5.5 THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW LOAN CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 253 5.5.1 BASLE
COMMITTEE S SOUND PRACTICES FOR LOAN ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE 253 5.5.2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA S LOAN CLASSIFICATION AND PROVISIONING SYSTEM
254 5.5.2.1 CHINA S FORMER LOAN CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS AND THEIR
PROBLEMS 254 5.5.2.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF THE FIVE-LEVEL CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM INTO CHINA 257 5.5.2.3 THE NEW LOAN CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM*
GUIDELINES FOR LOAN CLASSIFICATION 258 5.5.2.4 THE PBOC GUIDELINES
VERSUS BASLE COMMITTEE SOUND PRACTICES FOR LOAN ACCOUNTING AND
DISCLOSURE 264 5.5.3 LOAN PROVISIONING 267 5.5.3.1 THE INSUFFICIENT LOAN
PROVISIONING OF CHINA S COMMERCIAL BANKS 267 5.5.3.2 GENERAL PROVISIONS
VERSUS SPECIAL PROVISIONS 268 5.5.3.3 BANKS DISCRETION TO MAKE
PROVISION FOR AND TO WRITE OFF LOAN LOSS 271 5.5.3.4 TAXATION AND LOAN
LOSS PROVISIONING 272 5.6 SUMMARY 272 6. BANKING SAFETY NET: MECHANISMS
FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT 275 6.1 INTRODUCTION*DESIGNING A BANK SAFETY NET
275 6.2 CENTRAL BANK S ROLE AS LENDER-OF-LAST-RESORT 276 6.2.1 A GENERAL
INTRODUCTION 276 6.2.1.1 UNDERSTANDING LOLR PROPERLY 276 6.2.1.2 THE
HISTORY AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF LOLR 277 6.2.1.3 DEFINING LOLR IN
PRACTICE 277 6.2.1.4 RATIONALE FOR LOLR* LOLR VERSUS MARKET DISCIPLINE
279 6.2.2 DEFINING THE PBOC S LOLR ROLE 280 6.2.2.1 THE LOLR ROLE OF THE
PBOC IS NOT WELL DEFINED IN CHINA 280 6.2.2.2 LEGAL DEFINITION OF LOLR:
THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN MODELS 282 6.2.2.3
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 284 6.3 INTRODUCING A DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM
INTO CHINA 285 6.3.1 WHY DEPOSIT INSURANCE? 285 6.3.1.1 A BRIEF SURVEY
OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE 285 6.3.1.2 PROS AND CONS OF
DEPOSIT INSURANCE 286 6.3.1.3 DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 288 TABLE OF
CONTENTS XV 6.3.1.4 REPLACING THE IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE IN CHINA
WITH EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE 289 6.3.2 ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED AND
PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED IN DESIGNING CHINA S DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM
291 6.3.2.1 ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED 291 6.3.2.2 PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING
A DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 292 6.3.3 DESIGNING CHINA S DEPOSIT INSURANCE
SYSTEM 294 6.3.3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, COVERAGE AND FUNDING OF THE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 294 6.3.3.2 DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUM 297
6.3.3.3 MEMBERSHIP OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 298 6.3.3.4 SUMMARY
299 6.3.4 TIMING THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 300 6.4
INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION 300 6.4.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 300 6.4.2 CLOSURE
AND LIQUIDATION (DEPOSIT PAYOFF) 301 6.4.2.1. OUT OF COURT LIQUIDATION:
VOLUNTARY CLOSURE VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE 302 6.4.2.2 BANKRUPTCY
306 6.4.3 MERGER OR TAKEOVER (PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION) 311 6.4.3.1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 311 6.4.3.2 THE PRACTICE IN CHINA 312 6.4.4 RESCUE
PACKAGE OR OPEN BANK ASSISTANCE 313 6.4.4.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 313
6.4.4.2 APPLICATION IN CHINA 314 6.4.5 MANAGEMENT TAKEOVER (A VARIATION
OF BRIDGE BANK) 315 6.4.5.1 BRIDGE BANK PRACTICES 315 6.4.5.2 MANAGEMENT
TAKEOVER IN CHINA 315 6.4.6 PROBLEMS WITH CHINA S BANK INSOLVENCY
RESOLUTION 316 6.4.6.1 UNCERTAINTY IN TREATING FOREIGN CREDITORS 317
6.4.6.2 THE PBOC S AUTONOMY IN DEALING WITH PROBLEM INSTITUTIONS 318
6.4.6.3 INADEQUATE TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 318 6.4.7 BUILDING UP A
SOLID LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION 319 6.4.7.1 GENERAL
CONSIDERATION: SHALL CHINA HAVE SPECIAL LEGISLATION ON BANK INSOLVENCY
RESOLUTION? 319 6.4.7.2 ISSUES NEED TO BE CLARIFIED FOR BANK
INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION IN CHINA 321 6.5 CONCLUSION 322 PART IV CONCLUDING
OBSERVATIONS 7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
RESTORING MARKET DISCIPLINE IN CHINA 327 7.1 INTRODUCTION 327 XVI TABLE
OF CONTENTS 7.2 THE FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE*THE ULTIMATE ROOT OF
THE STATE COMMERCIAL BANK NPL PROBLEM 327 7.2.1 THE CAPTIVE FINANCIAL
MARKETS 328 7.2.2 THE INFORMATION PROBLEM 328 7.2.3 THE BAILOUT
EXPECTATION 329 7.2.4 THE LACK OF RESPONSE TO MARKET SIGNALS BY
BORROWERS 329 7.3 SYSTEMATIC BANKING AND SOE RESTRUCTURING*STRATEGIES
TOWARDS THE BANK NPL PROBLEM IN CHINA 330 7.3.1 THE NEED FOR
COMPREHENSIVE BANK AND SOE RESTRUCTURING 330 7.3.2 KEY STEPS FOR BANK
AND SOE RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA 331 7.4 RESOLVING THE STOCK OF NPL: BANK
RECAPITALIZATION AND NPL MANAGEMENT 331 7.4.1 RECAPITALIZATION OF STATE
COMMERCIAL BANKS VERSUS MARKET DISCIPLINE 331 7.4.1.1 NEW INSTITUTIONS
TO LEAD BANK RESTRUCTURING 332 7.4.1.2 EX-ANTE RECAPITALIZATION VERSUS
EX-POST RECAPITALIZATION 332 7.4.1.3 PRIVATE SECTOR-BASED SOLUTIONS AND
CONDITIONING PUBLIC SUPPORT 333 7.4.2 AMC PRACTICES IN CHINA: CAN AMC
IMPOSE MARKET DISCIPLINE ON SOES? 334 7.4.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF AMCS IN
CHINA 334 7.4.2.2 THE DEBT-EQUITY SWAP SCHEME IN CHINA 335 7.4.2.3
PROBLEMS WITH CHINA S AMC PRACTICES 335 7.4.2.4 A NECESSARY LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR NPL MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 338 7.4.2.5 CONCLUSION 340 7.5 NPL
PREVENTION: DEVELOPING A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKING
REGULATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 340 7.5.1 WHY A PARTNERSHIP
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKING REGULATION AND MARKET DISCIPLINE? 340
7.5.1.1 RATIONALE FOR REGULATION, RATIONALE FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE 340
7.5.1.2 THE LIMITATION OF REGULATION 341 7.5.1.3 CONCLUSION 342 7.5.2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUDENTIAL BANKING REGULATION IN CHINA AND ITS
COMPATIBILITY WITH MARKET DISCIPLINE 343 7.5.2.1 FOSTERING COMPETITION
SHOULD BE ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES FOR BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
IN CHINA 343 7.5.2.2 REMOVING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON BANKS
COMPLETELY 343 7.5.2.3 PROMOTING DISCLOSURE STANDARDS AND ACCOUNTING
PRACTICES 344 7.6 DESIGNING AN APPROPRIATE BANKING SAFETY NET TO ENHANCE
MARKET DISCIPLINE AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN CHINA 345 7.6.1 THE
OVERALL CONSISTENCY BETWEEN BANK SAFETY NETS AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 345
TABLE OF CONTENTS XVII 7.6.1.1 THE INHERENT MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM 345
7.6.1.2 UNDERSTAND SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS PROPERLY 346 7.6.1.3 BANK SAFETY
NET MUST BE WELL-DESIGNED AND OPERATED 346 7.6.2 THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN BANK SAFETY NET AND BANKING PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 348 7.7
CONCLUDING REMARKS 348 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPH}/ 351 INDEX 405
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
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| dewey-search | 332.17530951 |
| dewey-sort | 3332.17530951 |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV014068563 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:57:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9041198393 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-009635174 |
| oclc_num | 48628501 |
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| owner_facet | DE-739 DE-11 |
| physical | XXII, 427 S. |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateSearch | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| publisher | Kluwer Law Internat. |
| record_format | marc |
| series | International banking, finance and economic law |
| series2 | International banking, finance and economic law |
| spelling | Lou, Jianbo Verfasser aut China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention by Jianbo Lou 1. publ. London [u.a.] Kluwer Law Internat. 2001 XXII, 427 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier International banking, finance and economic law 22 Bank Bank loans China Banks and banking China International banking, finance and economic law 22 (DE-604)BV009685504 22 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009635174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Lou, Jianbo China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention International banking, finance and economic law Bank Bank loans China Banks and banking China |
| title | China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention |
| title_auth | China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention |
| title_exact_search | China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention |
| title_full | China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention by Jianbo Lou |
| title_fullStr | China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention by Jianbo Lou |
| title_full_unstemmed | China's troubled bank loans workout and prevention by Jianbo Lou |
| title_short | China's troubled bank loans |
| title_sort | china s troubled bank loans workout and prevention |
| title_sub | workout and prevention |
| topic | Bank Bank loans China Banks and banking China |
| topic_facet | Bank Bank loans China Banks and banking China |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009635174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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