Emotional reason: deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value

"How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understan...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Helm, Bennett W. ca. 20. bis 21. Jahrhundert (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2001
Ausgabe:1. publ.
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in philosophy
Schlagworte:
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Zusammenfassung:"How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons."--BOOK JACKET.
Beschreibung:Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
Beschreibung:X, 261 S.
ISBN:0521801109
0521039118
9780521801102
9780521039116

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