Elected versus appointed regulators: theory and evidence
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
2000
|
Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
7579 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Beschreibung: | 41 S. graph. Darst. |
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geographic | USA |
geographic_facet | USA |
id | DE-604.BV013115019 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:39:19Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008935303 |
oclc_num | 43729636 |
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owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
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physical | 41 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2000 |
publishDateSearch | 2000 |
publishDateSort | 2000 |
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series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Besley, Timothy 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128383178 aut Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence Timothy Besley ; Stephen Coate Cambridge, Mass. 2000 41 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 7579 Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Administrative agencies States Officials and employees Selection and appointment United States Econometric models Consumer protection Political aspects United States States Econometric models Industrial policy United States States Citizen participation Econometric models Political participation Economic aspects United States States Econometric models Trade regulation United States States Citizen participation Econometric models USA Coate, Stephen Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 7579 (DE-604)BV002801238 7579 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7579.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Besley, Timothy 1960- Coate, Stephen Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Administrative agencies States Officials and employees Selection and appointment United States Econometric models Consumer protection Political aspects United States States Econometric models Industrial policy United States States Citizen participation Econometric models Political participation Economic aspects United States States Econometric models Trade regulation United States States Citizen participation Econometric models |
title | Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence |
title_auth | Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence |
title_exact_search | Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence |
title_full | Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence Timothy Besley ; Stephen Coate |
title_fullStr | Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence Timothy Besley ; Stephen Coate |
title_full_unstemmed | Elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence Timothy Besley ; Stephen Coate |
title_short | Elected versus appointed regulators |
title_sort | elected versus appointed regulators theory and evidence |
title_sub | theory and evidence |
topic | Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Administrative agencies States Officials and employees Selection and appointment United States Econometric models Consumer protection Political aspects United States States Econometric models Industrial policy United States States Citizen participation Econometric models Political participation Economic aspects United States States Econometric models Trade regulation United States States Citizen participation Econometric models |
topic_facet | Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Administrative agencies States Officials and employees Selection and appointment United States Econometric models Consumer protection Political aspects United States States Econometric models Industrial policy United States States Citizen participation Econometric models Political participation Economic aspects United States States Econometric models Trade regulation United States States Citizen participation Econometric models USA |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7579.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT besleytimothy electedversusappointedregulatorstheoryandevidence AT coatestephen electedversusappointedregulatorstheoryandevidence |