Air power as a coercive instrument:
Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica
RAND
1999
|
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater. |
Beschreibung: | XVIII, 174 S. |
ISBN: | 0833027433 |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Byman, Daniel |
author_facet | Byman, Daniel |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Byman, Daniel |
author_variant | d b db |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV013050667 |
callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
callnumber-label | UG633 |
callnumber-raw | UG633 |
callnumber-search | UG633 |
callnumber-sort | UG 3633 |
callnumber-subject | UG - Military Engineering and Air Forces |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)41173829 (DE-599)BVBBV013050667 |
dewey-full | 358.4/14/0973 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 358 - Air & other specialized forces |
dewey-raw | 358.4/14/0973 |
dewey-search | 358.4/14/0973 |
dewey-sort | 3358.4 214 3973 |
dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
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isbn | 0833027433 |
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physical | XVIII, 174 S. |
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spelling | Byman, Daniel Verfasser aut Air power as a coercive instrument Daniel L. Byman ; Matthew C. Waxman ; Eric Larson Santa Monica RAND 1999 XVIII, 174 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater. Air Force dtict Air power dtict Coercive force dtict Military doctrine dtict Air power Air power United States Military planning United States Militärische Intervention (DE-588)4027497-4 gnd rswk-swf Luftwaffe (DE-588)4125963-4 gnd rswk-swf Zwangsmittel (DE-588)4191195-7 gnd rswk-swf Militärische Macht (DE-588)4169950-6 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Luftwaffe (DE-588)4125963-4 s Militärische Macht (DE-588)4169950-6 s Zwangsmittel (DE-588)4191195-7 s DE-604 Militärische Intervention (DE-588)4027497-4 s 1\p DE-604 Waxman, Matthew C. Sonstige oth Larson, Eric Sonstige oth 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Byman, Daniel Air power as a coercive instrument Air Force dtict Air power dtict Coercive force dtict Military doctrine dtict Air power Air power United States Military planning United States Militärische Intervention (DE-588)4027497-4 gnd Luftwaffe (DE-588)4125963-4 gnd Zwangsmittel (DE-588)4191195-7 gnd Militärische Macht (DE-588)4169950-6 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4027497-4 (DE-588)4125963-4 (DE-588)4191195-7 (DE-588)4169950-6 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
title | Air power as a coercive instrument |
title_auth | Air power as a coercive instrument |
title_exact_search | Air power as a coercive instrument |
title_full | Air power as a coercive instrument Daniel L. Byman ; Matthew C. Waxman ; Eric Larson |
title_fullStr | Air power as a coercive instrument Daniel L. Byman ; Matthew C. Waxman ; Eric Larson |
title_full_unstemmed | Air power as a coercive instrument Daniel L. Byman ; Matthew C. Waxman ; Eric Larson |
title_short | Air power as a coercive instrument |
title_sort | air power as a coercive instrument |
topic | Air Force dtict Air power dtict Coercive force dtict Military doctrine dtict Air power Air power United States Military planning United States Militärische Intervention (DE-588)4027497-4 gnd Luftwaffe (DE-588)4125963-4 gnd Zwangsmittel (DE-588)4191195-7 gnd Militärische Macht (DE-588)4169950-6 gnd |
topic_facet | Air Force Air power Coercive force Military doctrine Air power United States Military planning United States Militärische Intervention Luftwaffe Zwangsmittel Militärische Macht USA |
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