Incentives and political economy:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
2000
|
Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
Schriftenreihe: | Clarendon lectures in economics
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
Beschreibung: | XII, 257 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 0198294247 9780199248681 |
Internformat
MARC
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100 | 1 | |a Laffont, Jean-Jacques |d 1947-2004 |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)11006061X |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Incentives and political economy |c Jean-Jacques Laffont |
250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 2000 | |
300 | |a XII, 257 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 0 | |a Clarendon lectures in economics | |
500 | |a Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke | ||
650 | 7 | |a economia politica - modello matematico |2 tessin-TR | |
650 | 4 | |a Wirtschaftspolitik | |
650 | 4 | |a Economic policy | |
650 | 4 | |a Industrial policy | |
650 | 4 | |a Commercial policy | |
650 | 4 | |a Industrial promotion | |
650 | 4 | |a Incentives in industry | |
650 | 4 | |a Subsidies | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Koalition |0 (DE-588)4135668-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Politische Ökonomie |0 (DE-588)4115586-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Anreiz |0 (DE-588)4133767-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Interessenverband |0 (DE-588)4027286-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Unsicherheit |0 (DE-588)4186957-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Kontrakttheorie |0 (DE-588)4128260-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
689 | 1 | 0 | |a Politische Ökonomie |0 (DE-588)4115586-5 |D s |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804127608779046912 |
---|---|
adam_text | Contents
Preface
v
Acknowledgements
vii
1.
Introduction
1
1.1
Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch
1
1.2
The Design of Democratic Institutions
3
2.3
Political
Economi/ in
Democratic Countries
5
2.4
The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics
6
1.5
The Complete Contracting Approach
10
1.6
The Incomplete Contracting Approach
11
1.7
Adding Asymmetric Information
13
1.8
Endogenous Coalition Formation
13
I Politicians as Informed Supervisors
15
2.
The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional
Design
17
2.2
Introduction
17
2.2
A Simple Supervision Model
22
2.2.2
The Optimal Constitution Without Supervision
23
2.2.2
The Supervision Technology
27
2.3
Optimal Incentives for the Politician
31
2.3.2
Optimal Collusion-proof Constitution
31
2.3.2
Equilibrium Collusion
35
2.4
Conclusion
39
Appendix
2 40
3.
An Incentive Theory
oř
the Separation of Powers
46
3.2
Introduction
46
3.2
Separation af Powers and Yardstick Competition
48
3.3
A Model with Three Types
52
3.4
Single Non-benewlent Politician
57
3.5
Separation of Politicians
60
3.5.1
Collusion-proof Constraints
60
3.5.2
Opí/mař
Constitution under
Sqtarãtíon
61
Comparative Statics: Rent and Welfare
63
x
Contents
3.6
Generalization of the Results
65
3.6.1
Prudent Behavior and Various Preferences
65
3.6.2
Discriminatory Side-contracting Offers
67
3.6.3
Collusion Between the Politicians
68
3.7
Conclusion
69
Appendix
3 71
4.
Checks and Balances
73
4.1
Introduction
73
4.2
The Model
76
4.3
Optimal Symmetric
Constitution
79
4.4
Supervision and Division of Tasks
83
4.5
Multidimensional Collusion Activities
86
4.6
A Model with Three Politicians
90
4.7
Optimal Supervisory Structures
91
Ł8
Conclusion
94
Appendix
4 95
Π
Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design
99
5.
Political Economy and Industrial Policy
101
5.1
Introduction
101
5.2
Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off
104
5.3
Ownership Matters
ÏÛ7
5.4
Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule
№
5.5
Political Price Discrimination Versus Uniform Pricing
112
5.6
Information Asymmetries, Costly Redistribution
and the Cost of Democracy
116
5.7
Conclusion
118
Appendix
5 118
6.
Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing
Controversy
129
6.1
Introduction
129
6.2
The Marginal Cost Pricing Rule
134
63
Frisch s Comment
13°
6.4
Smith, Edgeworth, HotelUng i3S
б
J
Project Selection and Pricing Rules 147
6.6
Conclusion
149
Appendix
6 150
Contents xi
7.
Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of
Environmental Incentive Regulation
154
7.1
Introduction
154
7.2
The Basic Model
157
7.3
Controlling the
Discriminator}/
Power of
Politicians through Constraints on the Choice of
Instruments
159
7.4
Delegating
Discriminatori/
Power to the
Politicians
166
7.5
Multiple Privately Informed Interest Groups
168
7.6
Conclusion
173
Appendix
7 175
III Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design
179
8.
Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition
Formation
181
8.1
Introduction
181
8.2
The Model
184
8.3
Modeling Collusion
188
8.4
Collusion under Complete Information
190
8.5
Collusion under Complete Information with
Extended Mechanisms
194
8.6
Collusion under Incomplete Information
195
8.7
Conclusion
201
Appendix
8
203
9.
Collusion and Decentralization
207
9.1
Introduction
207
9.2
The Independent Case
208
9.2.1
The Optimal Centralized Constitution
208
9.2.2
Optimal Delegation
210
9.3
The Independent Case with Limits on
Communication
213
9.4
Risk Aversion
216
9.4.1
The Benchmark Model
217
9.4.2
Collusion with Complete Information
218
9.4.3
Collusion under Incomplete Information
219
9.5
Conclusion
223
xii Contents
10.
Concluding Remarks
225
Appendix. Translations of Passages Quoted in French
228
References
231
Index
243
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 |
author_GND | (DE-588)11006061X |
author_facet | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 |
author_variant | j j l jjl |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV012920466 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HD87 |
callnumber-raw | HD87.L34 2000 |
callnumber-search | HD87.L34 2000 |
callnumber-sort | HD 287 L34 42000 |
callnumber-subject | HD - Industries, Land Use, Labor |
classification_rvk | QC 100 QC 220 QD 050 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)260100017 (DE-599)BVBBV012920466 |
dewey-full | 338.921 338.9 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
dewey-raw | 338.9 21 338.9 |
dewey-search | 338.9 21 338.9 |
dewey-sort | 3338.9 221 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
edition | 1. publ. |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV012920466 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:36:03Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0198294247 9780199248681 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008795499 |
oclc_num | 260100017 |
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owner | DE-20 DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-384 DE-12 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-N2 DE-521 DE-11 DE-188 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
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physical | XII, 257 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2000 |
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publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
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series2 | Clarendon lectures in economics |
spelling | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 Verfasser (DE-588)11006061X aut Incentives and political economy Jean-Jacques Laffont 1. publ. Oxford [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 2000 XII, 257 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Clarendon lectures in economics Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke economia politica - modello matematico tessin-TR Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Industrial policy Commercial policy Industrial promotion Incentives in industry Subsidies Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 gnd rswk-swf Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd rswk-swf Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd rswk-swf Interessenverband (DE-588)4027286-2 gnd rswk-swf Unsicherheit (DE-588)4186957-6 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 s Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 s Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s DE-604 Unsicherheit (DE-588)4186957-6 s Interessenverband (DE-588)4027286-2 s Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 s DE-188 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008795499&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 Incentives and political economy economia politica - modello matematico tessin-TR Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Industrial policy Commercial policy Industrial promotion Incentives in industry Subsidies Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 gnd Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Interessenverband (DE-588)4027286-2 gnd Unsicherheit (DE-588)4186957-6 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4135668-8 (DE-588)4115586-5 (DE-588)4133767-0 (DE-588)4027286-2 (DE-588)4186957-6 (DE-588)4128260-7 |
title | Incentives and political economy |
title_auth | Incentives and political economy |
title_exact_search | Incentives and political economy |
title_full | Incentives and political economy Jean-Jacques Laffont |
title_fullStr | Incentives and political economy Jean-Jacques Laffont |
title_full_unstemmed | Incentives and political economy Jean-Jacques Laffont |
title_short | Incentives and political economy |
title_sort | incentives and political economy |
topic | economia politica - modello matematico tessin-TR Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Industrial policy Commercial policy Industrial promotion Incentives in industry Subsidies Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 gnd Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Interessenverband (DE-588)4027286-2 gnd Unsicherheit (DE-588)4186957-6 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
topic_facet | economia politica - modello matematico Wirtschaftspolitik Economic policy Industrial policy Commercial policy Industrial promotion Incentives in industry Subsidies Koalition Politische Ökonomie Anreiz Interessenverband Unsicherheit Kontrakttheorie |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008795499&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT laffontjeanjacques incentivesandpoliticaleconomy |