The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | German |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
Sonderforschungsbereich 373
1999
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper
1999,66 |
| Beschreibung: | 27 S. |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given |c Dirk Engelmann ; Martin Strobel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
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| 490 | 1 | |a Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper |v 1999,66 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Strobel, Martin |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV012899534 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:35:41Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | German |
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| physical | 27 S. |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publishDateSearch | 1999 |
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| publisher | Sonderforschungsbereich 373 |
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| series | Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper |
| series2 | Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper |
| spelling | Engelmann, Dirk 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)122057945 aut The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given Dirk Engelmann ; Martin Strobel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Berlin Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1999 27 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper 1999,66 Strobel, Martin Verfasser aut Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper 1999,66 (DE-604)BV012925295 1999,66 |
| spellingShingle | Engelmann, Dirk 1970- Strobel, Martin The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse <Berlin>: Discussion paper |
| title | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given |
| title_auth | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given |
| title_exact_search | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given |
| title_full | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given Dirk Engelmann ; Martin Strobel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
| title_fullStr | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given Dirk Engelmann ; Martin Strobel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
| title_full_unstemmed | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given Dirk Engelmann ; Martin Strobel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
| title_short | The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given |
| title_sort | the false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV012925295 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT engelmanndirk thefalseconsensuseffectdisappearsifrepresentativeinformationandmonetaryincentivesaregiven AT strobelmartin thefalseconsensuseffectdisappearsifrepresentativeinformationandmonetaryincentivesaregiven |