Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | German |
Veröffentlicht: |
Aachen
Shaker
1999
|
Ausgabe: | Als Ms. gedr. |
Schriftenreihe: | Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Zugl.: Bonn, Univ., Diss., 1999 |
Beschreibung: | 140 S. Ill. |
ISBN: | 382655874X |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Contents
1 Recent Topics in Contract Theory 5
1.1 Introduction 5
1.2 The hold up problem and private information 7
1.3 Applications of incomplete contracts 16
1 Private Information and the Hold up Problem 23
2 Simple Contracts and Renegotiation 25
2.1 Introduction 25
2.2 Model I: Voluntary bargaining under asymmetric information . 28
2.3 Model II: Private information and the hold up problem .... 35
2.4 Conclusion 41
2.5 Appendix 43
3 Cooperative Investment and Private Information 49
3.1 Introduction 49
3.2 The model 52
3.3 The basic trade off 54
3.4 The second best contract 59
3.5 Extensions 62
3.6 Discussion 65
3.7 Appendix 68
3
4 CONTENTS
4 How to Avoid Yes Men Behavior 73
4.1 Introduction 73
4.2 The model 75
4.3 The first best is achievable 77
4.4 Conclusion 82
4.5 Appendix 83
II Applications of Incomplete Contracts 89
5 Specialization and Vertical Integration 91
5.1 Introduction 91
5.2 The basic model 95
5.3 Specialization is not contractible 97
5.4 Specialization is contractible 102
5.5 Conclusion 104
6 Know How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts 107
6.1 Introduction 107
6.2 The model 109
6.3 Optimal ownership structures Ill
6.4 Concluding Remarks 113
7 Liability and Safety Regulation 115
7.1 Introduction 115
7.2 The basic model 117
7.3 Wealth does not vary among injurers 119
7.4 Wealth varies among injurers 123
7.5 Discussion 126
References 129
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
author_GND | (DE-588)121527328 |
author_facet | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
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author_sort | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
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dewey-full | 338.6041 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
dewey-raw | 338.6041 |
dewey-search | 338.6041 |
dewey-sort | 3338.6041 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
edition | Als Ms. gedr. |
format | Book |
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genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
id | DE-604.BV012861884 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:35:01Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 382655874X |
language | German |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008752578 |
oclc_num | 260011752 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-384 DE-20 DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-384 DE-20 DE-12 |
physical | 140 S. Ill. |
publishDate | 1999 |
publishDateSearch | 1999 |
publishDateSort | 1999 |
publisher | Shaker |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft |
spelling | Schmitz, Patrick W. Verfasser (DE-588)121527328 aut Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts Patrick W. Schmitz Als Ms. gedr. Aachen Shaker 1999 140 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft Zugl.: Bonn, Univ., Diss., 1999 Investitionsverhalten (DE-588)4114046-1 gnd rswk-swf Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Investitionsverhalten (DE-588)4114046-1 s Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 s Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008752578&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Schmitz, Patrick W. Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts Investitionsverhalten (DE-588)4114046-1 gnd Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4114046-1 (DE-588)4120934-5 (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
title | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts |
title_auth | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts |
title_exact_search | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts |
title_full | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts Patrick W. Schmitz |
title_fullStr | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts Patrick W. Schmitz |
title_full_unstemmed | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts Patrick W. Schmitz |
title_short | Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts |
title_sort | investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts |
topic | Investitionsverhalten (DE-588)4114046-1 gnd Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
topic_facet | Investitionsverhalten Asymmetrische Information Kontrakttheorie Hochschulschrift |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008752578&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT schmitzpatrickw investmentincentivesunderasymmetricinformationandincompletecontracts |