The sanctions paradox: economic statecraft and international relations
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
1999
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in international relations
65 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Sample text Publisher description Table of contents Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description. |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 342 S. |
| ISBN: | 0521644151 9780521643320 0521643325 9780521644150 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | THE SANCTIONS PARADOX ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DANIEL W. DREZNER V / CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CONTENTS LIST OF
FIGURES PAGE XII LIST OF TABLES XIII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV 1 INTRODUCTION 1
A TALE OF TWO CASES 1 THE ARGUMENT 4 WHY ECONOMIC COERCION MATTERS 6
77IE LITERATURE 9 FLAWS IN THE LITERATURE 18 THE METHODOLOGY 21 THE REST
OF THE BOOK 22 PART I THEORY AND DATA 25 2 A MODEL OF ECONOMIC COERCION
. 27 THE ASSUMPTIONS 28 THE MODEL 35 A CAOEOF: SWITCHES IN PREFERENCES
47 ANOTHER CAVEAT: NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMANDS 48 CHOOSING BETWEEN CARROTS
AND STICKS 50 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 53 APPENDIX: PROOFS OF LEMMAS
5 5 3 PLAUSIBILITY PROBES 59 FFRSF IMPRESSIONS 60 STATISTICAL STUDIES OF
SANCTIONS INITIATION 62 CONTENTS STATISTICAL STUDIES OF SANCTIONS
OUTCOMES 68 CASE STUDY 1: THE GRAIN EMBARGO 74 CASE STUDY 2: THE
PIPELINE SANCTIONS 80 CASE STUDY 3: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
88 SUMMARY 99 4 STATISTICAL TESTS 102 SELECTING THE APPROPRIATE SAMPLE
102 OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES 106 TESTING THE CAUSES OF SANCTIONS
INITIATION 114 TESTING THE CAUSES OF SANCTIONS OUTCOMES 121 SUMMARY 127
PART II ECONOMIC COERCION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 129 5 RUSSIAN POWER
AND PREFERENCES 131 THE MOTIVATION 131 RUSSIAN POLICY PREFERENCES 134
RUSSIA S ABILITY TO COERCE 140 CONFLICT EXPECTATIONS WITH RUSSIA 147
PREDICTING THE OUTCOMES 150 6 THE EXTENT OF NIS CONCESSIONS 153
INTRODUCTION 15 3 BELARUS 154 KAZAKHSTAN 160 TURKMENISTAN 169 KYRGYZSTAN
173 ARMENIA 176 TAJIKISTAN 179 UZBEKISTAN 183 MOLDOVA 187 GEORGIA 193
UKRAINE 198 AZERBAIJAN 208 LITHUANIA 215 LAFPW 219 ESTONIA 224
CONCLUSION 229 CONTENTS 7 EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE 231 INTRODUCTION 231
CODING THE DATA 232 PREDICTIONS AND OUTCOMES 233 A BOOLEAN ANALYSIS 239
SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS 245 PART III CHOOSING BETWEEN CARROTS AND STICKS
249 8 ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA 251 CARROTS AND STICKS 251 THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM 254 THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
27 5 IMPLICATIONS 303 PART IV CONCLUSION 305 9 CONCLUSIONS,
IMPLICATIONS, SPECULATIONS 307 A REVIEW 307 ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS 309 A
CRITIQUE 311 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 312 QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 317
REFERENCES 322 INDEX 336 XI
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Drezner, Daniel W. |
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| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ. |
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| spelling | Drezner, Daniel W. Verfasser aut The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 1999 XVI, 342 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge studies in international relations 65 Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description. Economische sancties gtt Relations économiques internationales Sanctions économiques Sanctions économiques - Cas, Études de Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions -- Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 s DE-604 Cambridge studies in international relations 65 (DE-604)BV000852162 65 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/98039105.html Sample text http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam029/98039105.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam022/98039105.html Table of contents GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008554658&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Drezner, Daniel W. The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Cambridge studies in international relations Economische sancties gtt Relations économiques internationales Sanctions économiques Sanctions économiques - Cas, Études de Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions -- Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4190074-1 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_auth | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_exact_search | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_full | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner |
| title_fullStr | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner |
| title_full_unstemmed | The sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations Daniel W. Drezner |
| title_short | The sanctions paradox |
| title_sort | the sanctions paradox economic statecraft and international relations |
| title_sub | economic statecraft and international relations |
| topic | Economische sancties gtt Relations économiques internationales Sanctions économiques Sanctions économiques - Cas, Études de Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions -- Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion (DE-588)4190074-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economische sancties Relations économiques internationales Sanctions économiques Sanctions économiques - Cas, Études de Weltwirtschaft Economic sanctions International economic relations Economic sanctions -- Case studies Wirtschaftssanktion Fallstudiensammlung |
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