Beyond Becker: training in imperfect labor markets
In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support th...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1998
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Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6740 |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models. |
Beschreibung: | 30 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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700 | 1 | |a Pischke, Jörn-Steffen |d 1962- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)11252138X |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Pischke, Jörn-Steffen 1962- |
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id | DE-604.BV012269355 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:24:37Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008315444 |
oclc_num | 67964066 |
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physical | 30 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 1998 |
publishDateSearch | 1998 |
publishDateSort | 1998 |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)124929575 aut Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets Daron Acemoglu ; Jörn-Steffen Pischke Cambridge, Mass. 1998 30 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6740 In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models. Pischke, Jörn-Steffen 1962- Verfasser (DE-588)11252138X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6740 (DE-604)BV002801238 6740 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6740.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Pischke, Jörn-Steffen 1962- Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
title | Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets |
title_auth | Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets |
title_exact_search | Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets |
title_full | Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets Daron Acemoglu ; Jörn-Steffen Pischke |
title_fullStr | Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets Daron Acemoglu ; Jörn-Steffen Pischke |
title_full_unstemmed | Beyond Becker training in imperfect labor markets Daron Acemoglu ; Jörn-Steffen Pischke |
title_short | Beyond Becker |
title_sort | beyond becker training in imperfect labor markets |
title_sub | training in imperfect labor markets |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6740.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron beyondbeckertraininginimperfectlabormarkets AT pischkejornsteffen beyondbeckertraininginimperfectlabormarkets |