Truth:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Clarendon Press
1998
|
| Ausgabe: | 2. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVIII, 157 S. |
| ISBN: | 0198752245 0198752237 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV012229986 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20000413 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 981028s1998 |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 0198752245 |9 0-19-875224-5 | ||
| 020 | |a 0198752237 |9 0-19-875223-7 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)39886980 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV012229986 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-824 |a DE-473 |a DE-355 |a DE-19 |a DE-11 |a DE-188 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a BD171 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 121 |2 21 | |
| 084 | |a CC 2500 |0 (DE-625)17609: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a CC 4400 |0 (DE-625)17626: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a CC 4500 |0 (DE-625)17627: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Horwich, Paul |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Truth |c Paul Horwich |
| 250 | |a 2. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Clarendon Press |c 1998 | |
| 300 | |a XVIII, 157 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Vérité | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Waarheid |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Truth | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wahrheit |0 (DE-588)4064314-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Philosophie |0 (DE-588)4045791-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Wahrheit |0 (DE-588)4064314-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Philosophie |0 (DE-588)4045791-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m HBZ Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008287156&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008287156 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804126846917279744 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Titel: Truth
Autor: Horwich, Paul
Jahr: 1998
Contents
1 The Minimal Theory 1
A Sketch of the Minimalist Conception 1
The Space of Alternative Theories 8
Summary of Alleged Difficulties 12
The following is a list of the questions and problems regarding
minimalism to which replies and solutions will be proposed in the course
of this essay
2 The Proper Formulation 15
1. Of what kinds are the entities to which truth may
be attributed? 16
2. What are the fundamental principles of the mini¬
mal theory of truth? . _
3. It seems unlikely that instances of the equivalence
schema could possibly suffice to explain all of the
great variety of facts about truth. 20
4. The minimal theory must be incomplete, for it says
nothing about the relationships between truth and
affiliated phenomena such as verification, practical
success, reference, logical validity, and assertion.
5. Even if the minimal theory is, in some sense,
adequate and pure , it is nevertheless unsatis¬
factory, being so cumbersome that it cannot even be
explicitly formulated.
25
xiv Contents
6. If there were really no more to a complete theory
of truth than a list of biconditionals like The
proposition that snow is white is true if and only if
snow is white , then, since one could always say p
rather than The proposition that p is true , it
would be inexplicable that our language should
contain the word true : there would be no point in
having such a notion. 31
7. The minimal theory fails to specify what are meant
by attributions of truth. It fails to provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for the applicability of the
truth predicate. 33
8. Is the minimalist conception concerned with truth
itself ox with the word true ! 36
9. Even if we grant that, as predicates go, the truth
predicate is highly unusual—even if we grant that
its function is to enable us to say certain important
things while avoiding new forms of quantifi¬
cation—it surely does not follow that being true is
not a genuine property. 37
10. If the equivalence schema is relied on indiscrimi¬
nately, then the notorious liar paradoxes will
result. 40
3 The Explanatory Role of the Concept of Truth 44
11. Truth has certain characteristic effects and causes.
For example, true beliefs tend to facilitate the
achievement of practical goals. General laws such
as this call for explanation in terms of the nature of
truth. Therefore there must be some account of
what truth is, going beyond the minimalist story,
that provides a conceptual or naturalistic reduction
of this property. 44
12. Another lawlike generalization is that beliefs ob¬
tained as a result of certain methods of inquiry tend
to be true. Again this suggests that the minimalist con¬
ception overlooks truth s causal/explanatory nature. 46
Contents xv
13. A further explanatory role for truth lies in the fact
that the truth of scientific theories accounts for
their empirical success. 48
14. Even if all our general beliefs about truth are de-
ducible from the minimal theory (suitably aug¬
mented), this does not imply that no deeper analysis
of truth is desirable; for one might well hope to find
something that will show why it is that the equiva¬
lence schema holds. 50
4 Methodology and Scientific Realism 52
15. Doesn t the deflationary perspective—the renunci¬
ation of a substantive notion of truth—lead in¬
evitably to relativism: to the idea that there is no
such thing as objective correctness? 52
16. Isn t the minimalist perspective in some sense anti-
realist? Does it not deny that scientific theories are
intended to correspond to a mind-independent
world? 53
17. Is it notobvious that the nature of truth bears di¬
rectly on the structure of reality and the conditions
for comprehending it? Surely, truth and reality
are semantically inextricable from one another; so
how could one s position in the realism debate be
divorced from one s conception of truth? 56
18. If, as the minimal theory implies, truth is not defined
as the product of ideal inquiry, why should we believe
that an ideal inquiry would provide the truth? 60
19. How is it possible, given the minimal theory, for
truth to be something of intrinsic value, desirable
independently of its practical utility? 62
20. How can minimalism accommodate the idea of
science progressing towards the truth? 63
21. From the perspective of the minimalist conception
of truth, it is impossible to produce an adequate
justification of scientific methods. 64
xvi Contents
5 Meaning and Logic 68
22. As Davidson has argued, understanding a sen¬
tence, say, Tachyons can travel back in time , is a
matter of appreciating what must be the case for the
sentence to be true—knowing its truth condition.
That is to say, one must be aware that Tachyons
can travel back in time is true if and only if
tachyons can travel back in time. Therefore it is not
possible to agree with the minimalist claim that this
knowledge also helps to constitute our grasp of is
true . For in that case we would be faced with some¬
thing like a single equation and two unknowns.
Rather, if knowledge of the truth conditions of
Tachyons can travel back in time is to constitute
our understanding that sentence, then this know¬
ledge would presuppose some pre-existing concep¬
tion of truth. 68
23. What about falsity and negation? 71
24. As Frege said, logic is the science of truth; so surely
our accounts of truth and logic should be, if not
identical, at least bound up with one another. Yet the
minimal theory does not even enable one to prove that
the principle of non-contradiction is true. 73
25. Minimalism cannot be squared with the role that
the notion of truth must play in the foundations of
logic—in justifying one logic over another. 74
26. How can truth-value gaps be admitted? 76
27. Doesn t philosophy require truth-value gaps in
order to accommodate such phenomena as non-
referring names, vagueness, the emotivist concep¬
tion of ethics, etc.? 78
28. It is obvious that many predicates—for example,
blue , small , bald , heap —do not have
definite extensions; and when such predicates are ap¬
plied to certain objects the result will surely be propo¬
sitions with no truth value. 78
Contents xvii
29. There is a substantive issue in meta-ethics as to
whether evaluative utterances purport to assert
truths or whether they are merely expressions of
feeling; but this question would be trivialized by
minimalism. 84
6 Propositions and Utterances 86
30. Propositions are highly dubious entities. It is un¬
clear what they are supposed to be, and their very
existence is controversial. Would it not be better,
therefore, to develop a theory of truth that does not
presuppose them—by assuming, for example, that
utterances are the primary bearers of truth? 86
31. The case for propositions assumes the adequacy of
a certain logical analysis of belief—one that con¬
strues the state of belief as a relation between a per¬
son and a kind of entity, the content of the belief.
But this assumption is plagued with familiar
difficulties and appears to be mistaken. 90
32. The proposition thatp is true iff/; can be thought
to capture our conception of truth only if truth is
not already presupposed in the very idea of a
proposition. But this requirement may well be vio¬
lated. For a central component of the notion of
proposition is lodged in the statement of identity
conditions for propositions—the conditions for two
utterances to express the same proposition. But this
is an idea one might plausibly explain in terms of
the intertranslatability of the utterances, which, in
turn, must be construed as their having the same
truth conditions. And if the concept of truth is
needed to say what propositions are, then a theory
of truth cannot take propositions for granted. 93
33. The use theory of meaning implies that propo¬
sitions don t exist. For if translation is a matter of
resemblance in use, then it is not a transitive rela¬
tion, and so there can be no such things as what
intertranslatable utterances have in common . 95
xviii Contents
34. Many philosophers would agree that if proposi¬
tions exist then propositional truth would be cov¬
ered by something like the equivalence schema. But
they might still maintain that the truth of an utter¬
ance consists in its correspondence with reality ,
or some other substantive thing. Thus, it is for ut¬
terances that the deflationary account is controver¬
sial, and this position has received no elaboration
or defence. 98
7 The Correspondence Intuition 104
35. Is it not patently obvious that the truth or falsity of
a statement is something that grows out of its rela¬
tions to external aspects of reality? 104
36. Is it not equally clear that, contrary to minimalism,
statements are made true by facts to which they cor¬
respond? 105
37. Certain cases of representation (e.g. by maps)
clearly involve a correspondence—a structural
resemblance—to what is represented. So is it not
reasonable to expect some such relation in linguis¬
tic representation also? 108
38. The minimal theory fails to show how the truth of
a sentence depends on the referential properties of
its parts. 110
39. The great virtue of denning truth in terms of ref¬
erence is that the account may be supplemented
with a naturalistic (causal) theory of the reference
relation to yield, in the end, a naturalistic and scien¬
tifically respectable theory of truth. 113
Conclusion 118
Postscript 120
Bibliography 147
Index 155
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Horwich, Paul |
| author_facet | Horwich, Paul |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Horwich, Paul |
| author_variant | p h ph |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV012229986 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | BD171 |
| callnumber-raw | BD171 |
| callnumber-search | BD171 |
| callnumber-sort | BD 3171 |
| callnumber-subject | BD - Speculative Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | CC 2500 CC 4400 CC 4500 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)39886980 (DE-599)BVBBV012229986 |
| dewey-full | 121 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121 |
| dewey-search | 121 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | 2. ed. |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01604nam a2200457 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV012229986</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20000413 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">981028s1998 |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0198752245</subfield><subfield code="9">0-19-875224-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0198752237</subfield><subfield code="9">0-19-875223-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)39886980</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV012229986</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">BD171</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">121</subfield><subfield code="2">21</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 2500</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17609:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 4400</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17626:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 4500</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17627:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Horwich, Paul</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Truth</subfield><subfield code="c">Paul Horwich</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2. ed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Clarendon Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1998</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XVIII, 157 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Vérité</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Waarheid</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Truth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wahrheit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4064314-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Philosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4045791-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Wahrheit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4064314-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Philosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4045791-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008287156&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008287156</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV012229986 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:23:57Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0198752245 0198752237 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008287156 |
| oclc_num | 39886980 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-824 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-824 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 DE-188 |
| physical | XVIII, 157 S. |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publishDateSearch | 1998 |
| publishDateSort | 1998 |
| publisher | Clarendon Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Horwich, Paul Verfasser aut Truth Paul Horwich 2. ed. Oxford [u.a.] Clarendon Press 1998 XVIII, 157 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Vérité Waarheid gtt Truth Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd rswk-swf Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd rswk-swf Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 s Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 s 1\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008287156&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Horwich, Paul Truth Vérité Waarheid gtt Truth Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4064314-1 (DE-588)4045791-6 |
| title | Truth |
| title_auth | Truth |
| title_exact_search | Truth |
| title_full | Truth Paul Horwich |
| title_fullStr | Truth Paul Horwich |
| title_full_unstemmed | Truth Paul Horwich |
| title_short | Truth |
| title_sort | truth |
| topic | Vérité Waarheid gtt Truth Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Vérité Waarheid Truth Wahrheit Philosophie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008287156&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT horwichpaul truth |