The future's back: nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War
The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterr...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Montreal [u.a.]
McGill-Queen's Univ. Press
1997
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry. |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 192 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0773516050 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | A 377764 THE FUTURE S BACK NUCLEAR RIVALRY, DETERRENCE THEORY, AND
CRISIS STABILITY AFTER THE COLD WAR FRANK P. HARVEY MCGILL-QUEEN S
UNIVERSITY PRESS MONTREAL & KINGSTON * LONDON * BUFFALO CONTENTS TABLES
AND FIGURES IX ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XI INTRODUCTION XIII 1 CUMULATION IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: METHODOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS AND SOLUTIONS 3 2
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: THE RECORD OF AGGREGATE TESTING 19 3 NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR AGGREGATE TESTING 47 4 GAME THEORY AND SUPERPOWER RIVALRY, 1948*88
56 5 U.S.-SOVIET RIVALRY AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 94 6 NUCLEAR STABILITY
AFTER THE COLD WAR 112 7 CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE THEORY:
PERSPECTIVES ON TESTING AFTER THE COLD WAR 121 NOTES 145 BIBLIOGRAPHY
171 INDEX 191
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Harvey, Frank P. |
| author_facet | Harvey, Frank P. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Harvey, Frank P. |
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| callnumber-subject | U - General Military Science |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)41313133 (DE-599)BVBBV012061379 |
| dewey-full | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-search | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.1 3747 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV012061379 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:20:58Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0773516050 |
| language | English |
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| physical | XVI, 192 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1997 |
| publishDateSearch | 1997 |
| publishDateSort | 1997 |
| publisher | McGill-Queen's Univ. Press |
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| spelling | Harvey, Frank P. Verfasser aut The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey Montreal [u.a.] McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1997 XVI, 192 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry. Dissuasion (Stratégie) Guerre nucléaire - Prévention Stabilité nucléaire Sécurité internationale Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd rswk-swf Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd rswk-swf Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 gnd rswk-swf Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 gnd rswk-swf Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 gnd rswk-swf Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 s Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 s Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 s Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 s DE-604 Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 s Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 s GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008163263&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Harvey, Frank P. The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Dissuasion (Stratégie) Guerre nucléaire - Prévention Stabilité nucléaire Sécurité internationale Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 gnd Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 gnd Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4168427-8 (DE-588)4003434-3 (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)4065004-2 (DE-588)4075770-5 (DE-588)4074812-1 (DE-588)4130238-2 |
| title | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| title_auth | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| title_exact_search | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| title_full | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey |
| title_fullStr | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey |
| title_full_unstemmed | The future's back nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War Frank P. Harvey |
| title_short | The future's back |
| title_sort | the future s back nuclear rivalry deterrence theory and crisis stability after the cold war |
| title_sub | nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War |
| topic | Dissuasion (Stratégie) Guerre nucléaire - Prévention Stabilité nucléaire Sécurité internationale Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd Ost-West-Konflikt (DE-588)4075770-5 gnd Militärisches Gleichgewicht (DE-588)4074812-1 gnd Beendigung (DE-588)4130238-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Dissuasion (Stratégie) Guerre nucléaire - Prévention Stabilité nucléaire Sécurité internationale Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear warfare World politics 1989- Machtpolitik Kernwaffe Abschreckung Militärpolitik Ost-West-Konflikt Militärisches Gleichgewicht Beendigung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=008163263&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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